Wed. Mar 20th, 2019

Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra [Death sentence affirmed]

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APPEALS RELATING TO DEATH SENTENCE

                                   PART-1
                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1728 of 2007


Yakub Abdul Razak Memon                           .... Appellant(s)

      vs.

The State of Maharashtra,
through CBI , Bombay                         …. Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                     Criminal Appeal No. 609-610 of 2008

                                    WITH

                     Criminal Appeal No. 628-629 of 2008

                                    WITH

                     Criminal Appeal No. 637-638 of 2008

                                    WITH

                       Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 2008

                                    WITH

                     Criminal Appeal No. 864-865 of 2008

                                    WITH

                       Criminal Appeal No. 897 of 2008


                                    WITH

                     Criminal Appeal No. 941-942 of 2008



                                     AND

                     Death Reference Case No. 1 of 2011

                            ********
                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      1


                     2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1728 OF 2007




Yakub Abdul Razak Memon                    .... Appellant (s)

            Versus

State of Maharashtra thr., CBI, Bombay    .... Respondent(s)




                                 With Batch


                               J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.
1)    This appeal and the connected matters have been directed  against  the
final orders and judgments of conviction  and  sentence  passed  on  various
dates by the Presiding Officer of the Designated Court under  Terrorist  and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,  1987  (in  short  ‘the  TADA’)  for
Bombay Bomb Blast Case, Greater Bombay in BBC No. 1 of 1993.  These  appeals
have been filed under Section 19 of the TADA by the  accused  against  their
conviction and sentence and  by  the  CBI  for  confirmation  of  the  death
sentence and against the acquittal of some of the accused persons.
2) Brief facts:
The case of the prosecution is as follows:
(a)   Babri Masjid at Ayodhya  was  demolished  on  06.12.1992.   After  its
demolition, violence broke out throughout the country.   In  order  to  take
revenge of the said demolition, Tiger  Memon  (AA)  and  Dawood  Ibrahim,  a
resident of Dubai, formulated a conspiracy to commit a terrorist act in  the
city of Bombay.  In pursuance of the said object, Dawood Ibrahim  agreed  to
send arms and ammunitions from abroad.  Tiger  Memon,  in  association  with
his  men,  particularly,  the  accused  persons,  received  those  arms  and
ammunitions through sea-coasts of  Bombay.   In  continuation  of  the  said
conspiracy, Tiger Memon sent some of the accused persons to Dubai  and  from
there to Pakistan for training and handling in arms and ammunitions.
(b)   On 12.03.1993, the commercial hub of the country, the city of  Bombay,
witnessed an unprecedented terrorist act sending shock waves throughout  the
world.  In a span of about two hours i.e., between 13:33 to 15:40  hours,  a
series of 12  bomb  explosions  took  place  one  after  the  other  at  the
following twelve places in Bombay,  namely,  Bombay  Stock  Exchange,  Katha
Bazaar, Sena Bhavan, Century Bazaar, Mahim  Causeway,  Air  India  Building,
Zaveri Bazaar, Hotel Sea Rock, Plaza Theatre, Juhu Centaur Hotel,  Air  Port
Bay-54 and Air Port Centaur Hotel.  In  the  abovesaid  incident  of  serial
bombings, 257 human lives were lost, 713 persons were seriously injured  and
properties worth about Rs. 27 crores were destroyed.   This  was  the  first
ever  terrorist  attack  in  the  world  where  RDX   (Research   Department
Explosive) was used on a large scale basis after the World War II.
 (c)  The aforesaid calculated act of terror  was  carried  out  with  utter
disregard to human life and dignity.  The object of the crime was to  incite
communal violence and to overawe and weaken the government,  disturb  social
harmony and to break up the social, political  and  economic  order  of  the
country.  This overt act of violence not only  caused  physical  and  mental
damage but also left a psychological impact on society as  a  whole  as  the
lives of several citizens were completely destroyed.
(d)   The conspiratorial acts leading to one of the aforesaid  object  began
on or before 06.01.1993 at  a  meeting  in  Hotel  Persian  Darbar,  Panvel,
wherein the following accused persons, viz., Md. Ahmed Dosa (AA), Md.  Salim
Mira Moiddin Shaikh @ Salim  Kutta  (A-134),  Md.  Kasam  Lajpuria  (A-136),
Ranjitkumar Singh Baleshwar Prasad (A-102) and Md. Sultan Sayyed (A-90)  met
and organized the landing of fire arms and  ammunitions  and  hand  grenades
which was to take place on the coast of Dighi Jetty in  Raigad  District  of
State of Maharashtra on 09.01.1993.   On  the  said  date,  Md.  Dossa  (AA)
smuggled and sent a consignment of arms  and  ammunitions  at  Dighi  Jetty,
Raigad in connivance with Md. Sultan Sayeed  (A-90),  who  received  illegal
gratification for the same.  The following persons  were  also  involved  in
the landing at Dighi Jetty, namely, Uttam Shantaram Poddar  (A-30),  Abdulla
Ibrahim Surti (A-66), Ashok Narayan Muneshwar (A-70), Faki  Ali  Faki  Ahmed
Subedar (A-74), Janardhan Pandurang Gambas (A-81), Jaywant Keshav Gurav  (A-
82), Krishna Sadanand Mokal (A-83), Krishna Tukaram Pingle  (A-84),  Manohar
Mahadeo  More  (A-87),  Md.  Sultan  Sayyed  (A-90),  Pandharinath  Madhukar
Mahadik (A-99), Ramesh Dattatray Mali (A-101), Ranjitkumar  Singh  Baleshwar
Prasad (A-102), Sayed @ Mujju Ismail Ibrahim  Kadri  (A-104),  Sayed  Ismail
Sayed Ali Kadri (A-105),  Srikrishna  Yeshwant  Pashilkar  (A-110),  Somnath
Kakaram  Thapa  (A-112),  Sudhanwa  Sadashiv   Talwadekar   (A-113),   Vijay
Krishnaji Patil (A-116), Jamir Sayyed Ismail Kadri (A-133), Md.  Salim  Mira
Moiddin Shaikh @ Salim Kutta (A-134) and Md. Kasam  Lajpuria  (A-136).   The
said meeting dated 06.01.1993 was not a sudden meeting but was  pre-arranged
and pre-planned.
(e)   On 19.01.1993, another meeting was held  at  Dubai  wherein  Dawood  @
Dawood Taklya Mohammed Phanse  @  Phanasmiyan  (A-14),  Dawood  Ibrahim  and
Tiger Memon (both absconding) were present  and  detailed  discussions  were
held whereafter Tiger Memon agreed  to  arrange  for  landing  of  arms  and
ammunitions and explosives which were to be sent to India by sea  route  for
the purpose of committing the aforesaid  terrorist  act.   Pursuant  to  the
above,  between  02-08.02.1993,  two  more  such  landings   of   arms   and
ammunitions, detonators, hand grenades and explosives like  RDX  took  place
at Shekhadi Coast  under  Taluka  Shrivardhan  in  Raigad  District  through
landing agent A-14, Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17)  (deceased)
and Rahim Abbas Karambelkar @ Rahim Laundrywala.  In the said  landing,  the
following persons also played an active role, namely,  Md.  Shoaib  Mohammed
Kasam Ghansar (A-9), Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Abdul Gani Ismail Turk  (A-
11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh  (A-12),  Dawood  @  Dawood  Taklya  Mohammed
Phanse @ Phanasmiyan (A-14), Imtiyaz Yunusmiya  Ghavte  (A-15),  Md.  Farooq
Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai  (A-17),
Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18), Yeshwant Nago Bhoinkar (A-19),  Munna
@ Mohammed Ali Khan @  Manojkumar  Bhavarlal  Gupta  (A-24),  Muzammil  Umar
Kadri (A-25), Raju Laxmichand Jain @ Raju Kodi (A-26),  Rashid  Umar  Alware
(A-27), Sayyed Abdul Rehman Shaikh (A-28), Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-
29), Abdul Aziz Haji Gharatkar (A-34), Ashfaq Kasim Havaldar (A-38),  Khalil
Ahmed Sayed Ali Nasir (A-42), Mohammed Rafiq @ Rafiq  Madi  Musa  Biyariwala
(A-46),  Sardar  Shahwali  Khan  (A-54),  Sarfaraz  Dawood  Phanse   (A-55),
Shahjahan Ibrahim Shaikhdare (A-56), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar  (A-57),  Shaikh
Mohammed Ethesham  Haji  Gulam  Rasool  Shaikh  (A-58),  Sharif  Khan  Abbas
Adhikar (A-60), Sajjad Alam @  Iqbal  Abdul  Hakim  Nazir  (A-61),  Tulsiram
Dhondu Surve (A-62), Abu Asim Azmi (A-63), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal  @  Nasir
Dakhla (A-64), Gulam Hafiz Shaikh @ Baba (A-73), Jaywant Keshave  Gurav  (A-
82), Liyakat Ali Habib Khan (A-85), Mohmmed  Sultan  Sayyed  (A-90),  Parvez
Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi     (A-100),  Ranjitkumar  Singh  Baleshwar
Prasad (A-102), Somnath Kakaram Thapa (A-112), Sudhanwa Sadashiv  Talwadekar
(A-113), Shahnawaz Khan s/o Faiz Mohammed Khan (A-128), Mujib Sharif  Parkar
(A-131), Mohammed  Shahid  Nizamuddin  Quresh  (A-135)  and  Eijaz  Mohammed
Sharif @ Eijaz Pathan @ Sayyed Zakir (A-137).
(f)   Between February to March 1993, the following  persons  were  sent  to
Pakistan via  Dubai  by  Tiger  Memon  (AA)  and  Dawood  Ibrahim  (AA)  for
receiving training in handling of fire arms, use  of  rocket  launchers  and
explosives, in particular, RDX  for  achieving  the  common  object  of  the
conspiracy, namely, Farooq Mohammed Yusuf  Pawale  (A-16),  Shahnawaz  Abdul
Kadar Qureshi (A-29), Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Abdul  Khan
@ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan       (A-36), Firoz @  Akram  Amani  Malik  (A-39),
Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49), Salim  Rahim  Shaikh  (A-52),  Nasir
Abdul Kader Kewal @ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Salim Bismilla Khan @  Salim  Kurla
(Dead) (A-65), Faroow Iliyas Motorwala   (A-75), Fazal Rehman Abdul Khan (A-
76), Gul Mohammed @  Gullu  Noor  Mohammed  Shaikh  (A-77),  Mohammed  Hanif
Mohammed Usman Shaikh (A-92), Mohammed Rafiq Usman Shaikh  (A-94),  Mohammed
Sayeed Mohammed Issaq (A-95), Niyaz Mohammed @ Islam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh  (A-
98), Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100), Shaikh Ibrahim  Shaikh
Hussain (A-108), Sayed Ismail Sayed Ali Kadri (A-105)  and  Usman  Man  Khan
Shaikh (A-115). All the above said accused persons were  received  at  Dubai
Airport by Ayub Abdul Razak Memon (AA) and Tahir Mohammed Merchant  @  Tahir
Taklya (recently deported to India and arrested  by  the  CBI  in  the  case
being No. RC 1(s)/1993).
(g)   Another batch, comprising of the following  accused  persons,  namely,
Shaikh Mohammed Ethesham Haji Gulam  Rasool  Shaikh  (A-58),  Manzoor  Ahmed
Mohammed Qureshi (A-88), Shaikh  Kasam  @  Babulal  Ismail  Shaikh  (A-109),
Sultan-E-Rome Sardar Ali  Gul  (A-114),  Abdul  Aziz  Abdul  Kader  (A-126),
Mohammed Iqbal Ibrahim s/o Shaikh Ibrahim (A-127), Shahnawaz Khan  s/o  Fair
Mohammed Khan (A-128),  Murad  Ibrahim  Khan  (A-130)  and  Mohammed  Shahid
Nizammudin  Qureshi  (A-135)  went  to  Pakistan  for  a  similar  training,
however, the said training programme was aborted  and  they  had  to  return
from Dubai.
(h)   In March 1993, a weapons training  programme  was  also  conducted  at
Sandheri and Borghat at the behest of Tiger Memon (AA).  In the  said  camp,
training was imparted by Tiger  Memon  (AA),  Anwar  Theba  (AA)  and  Javed
Tailor @ Javed Chikna (AA) to the  following  persons,  namely,  Abdul  Gani
Ismail Turk (A-11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh  (A-12),  Bashir  Ahmed  Usman
Gani Khairulla  (A-13),  Sharif  Abdul  Gafoor  Parkar  @  Dadabhai  (A-17),
Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18), Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf  Shaikh
(A-23), Munna @ Mohammed Ali  Khan  @  Manojkumar  Bhavarlal  Gupta  (A-24),
Mohammed Moin Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54),  Shaikh
Ali  Shaikh  Umar  (A-57),  Issaq  Mohammed  Hajwani  (A-79),  Shahnawaz   @
Shahjahan Dadamiya Hajwani  (A-106)  and  Sikander  Issaq  Hajwani  (A-111).
After completing the said training programme, A-17  and  A-79  attempted  to
destroy the evidence by disposing off the  hand  grenades  in  the  Sandheri
creek on or about 8th March 1993 to aid and abet the above offenders.
(i)   On 04.03.1993, Tiger Memon called for a  preparatory  meeting  at  the
Taj Mahal Hotel which was attended by Javed Chikna  (AA),  Mohammed  Mushtaq
Moosa Tarani (A-44), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-
57), Niyaz Mohammed @ Islam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh  (A-98)  and  Mohammed  Usman
Jan Khan (PW-2) (Approver).  They conducted reconnaissance of  some  of  the
targets on 04.03.1993 as well as on 05.03.1993.
(j)   In order to achieve the  said  object,  vehicles  were  purchased  for
planting explosives by  Tiger  Memon,  Mohammed  Shafi  Zariwala  and  Munaf
Halari (all three absconding).  Three scooters were purchased through  Munaf
Halari (AA) who was a close friend of Tiger  Memon  (AA).   Three  Commander
jeeps were also purchased through Mohammed Shafi Zariwala (AA) and  he  also
bought two Maruti Vans and one  Ambassador  Car.   Mohammed  Shafi  Zariwala
arranged all these vehicles through Suleman Mohammed Lakdawala     (PW-365).
 Two Maruti vans of Blue and Red colour were also purchased through PW-365.
(k)   On 07.03.1993, another meeting was held at the house  of  Shafi  where
Tiger Memon formed separate groups for reconnaissance of the  targets.   PW-
2, A-64 and A-100 were in one group which was assigned the  task  to  survey
Shiv Sena Bhawan and Sahar Airport.
(l)   On 08.03.1993, another meeting was held at  the  residence  of  Babloo
where Tiger Memon  called  Javed  Chikna,  Irfan  Chougule,  Salim  Mujahid,
Bashir Khan, Babloo and PW-2 in the flat and selected the  following  places
as targets, namely, Air India  Building,  Nariman  Point,  Bharat  Petroleum
Refinery, Chembur, Share Market near Fountain, Zaveri Bazaar  near  Mohammed
Ali Road and Pydhonie, Five Star Hotels, Cinema Theatres, Shiv Sena  Bhavan,
Shivaji Park, Dadar, Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  Building,  V.T.,  Sahar
Airport, Passport Office, Worli, Mantralaya and others places.
(m)   Again, on 10.03.1993,  a meeting was held at the  house  of  Mobina  @
Bayamoosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96) where PW-2  met  Tiger  Memon,  Javed  Chikna,
Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Bashir Khan, Zakir Hussain Noor  Mohammed  Shaikh
(A-32), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal  @  Nasir  Dakhla  (A-64),  Parvez  Mohammed
Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100), Mohammed  Moin  Faridulla  Qureshi  (A-43),
Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh (A-23), Sardar  Shahwali  Khan  (A-54),
Bashir Ahmed Usman  Gani  Khairulla  (A-13)  and  Nasim  Ashraf  Shaikh  Ali
Barmare (A-49).  In the second meeting, Tiger Memon distributed Rs.  5,000/-
to each one of them and again formed  the  groups.   PW-2  also  told  Tiger
Memon about the survey of Chembur  Refinery.   The  following  persons  also
participated in the said meeting, namely, Yakub  Abdul  Razak  Memon  (A-1),
Essa @ Anjum Abdul Razak Memon (A-3), Yusuf Abdul Razak Memon  (A-4),  Abdul
Razak Suleman Memon (dead) (A-5), Hanifa  Abdul  Razak  Memon  (A-6),  Rahin
Yakub Memon (A-7), Rubeena Suleman  @  Arif  Memon  (A-8),  Mohammed  Shoaib
Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9), Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Abdul Gani  Ismail
Turk (A-11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed  Shaikh  (A-12),  Bashir  Ahmed  Usman  Gani
Khairulla (A-13), Md. Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale  (A-16),  Mohammed  Iqbal
Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh (A-23), Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar  Qureshi  (A-29),  Zakir
Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32),  Firoz  @  Akram  Amani  Malik  (A-39),
Mohammed Moin Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare  (A-
49), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Shaikh  Ali  Shaikh  Umar  (A-57),   Nasir
Abdul Kader Kewal @ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Mohammed  Rafiq  Usman  Shaikh  (A-
94), Mobina @ Bayamoosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96), Niyaz Mohammed  @  Islam  Iqbal
Ahmed Shaikh (A-98) and Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100).
(n)   Another meeting had taken  place  in  the  intervening  night  between
11/12.03.1993 at Al-Hussaini Building, Dargah  Street,  Mahim,  in  which  a
final touch to the proposed plan of serial bomb blasts was given.   The  co-
conspirators stored explosives like RDX and fire arms in the  garages  owned
by the Memons’ and their relatives  at  Al-Hussaini  Building  and  utilized
these garages and open places outside the same for making bombs  during  the
said night.  The following persons were also present there at that time  and
had actively participated in the work of filling of RDX in the vehicles  and
suitcases for the said purpose, namely, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12,  A-13,  A-16,
A-23, A-32, A-36, A-43, A-49, A-52, A-54, A-57, A-64 and A-100.
(o) On 12.03.1993, bombs and other  explosive  substances  were  planted  at
various places by the following persons in the following sequence:
Firstly, Mohammed Farooq  Mohammed  Yusuf  Pawale  (A-16),  Mohammed  Tainur
Phansopkar (AA) and Irfan Chougule planted  bomb  and  caused  explosion  at
Bombay Stock Exchange at 13:30 hrs. wherein 84 persons were killed  and  218
persons were injured;
Secondly,  Parvez  Nazir  Ahmed  Shaikh  (A-12)  planted  bomb  and   caused
explosion at Katha Bazaar at 14:15 hrs. wherein 4 persons  were  killed  and
21 persons were injured;
Thirdly, Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) and Mohammed Farooq  Mohammed  Yusuf
Pawale (A-16) planted bomb and caused explosion at Lucky  Petrol  Pump  near
Shiv Sena Bhavan wherein 4 persons were killed and 50 persons were  injured;

Fourthly, Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11) planted bomb  and  caused  explosion
at Century Bazaar at 14:45 hrs  wherein  88  persons  were  killed  and  160
persons were injured;
Fifthly, Bashir Ahmed  Usman  Gani  Khairulla  (A-13),  Zakir  Hussain  Noor
Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Abdul Khan @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36), Firoz  @
Akram Amani Malik (A-39), Mohammed  Moin  Faridulla  Qureshi  (A-43),  Salim
Rahim Shaikh (A-52) and Ehsan Mohammed Tufel Mohammed Qureshi (A-122)  threw
hand grenades and caused explosions at Fishermen’s colony at Mahim at  14:45
hrs. wherein 3 persons were killed and 6 persons were injured;
Sixthly, Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Mohammed Tainur  (AA)
and Irfan Chougule planted bomb and caused explosion at Air  India  Building
at 15:00 hrs wherein 20 persons were killed and 84 persons were injured;
Seventhly, Md. Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9) planted bomb  and  caused
explosion at Zaveri Bazaar at 15:05 hrs. wherein 17 persons were killed  and
57 were injured;
Eighthly,  Parvez  Nazir  Ahmed  Shaikh  (A-12)  planted  bomb  and   caused
explosion at Hotel Sea Rock at 15:10 hrs.
Ninthly, Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10) and Shahnawaz Abdul  Kadar  Qureshi  (A-
29) planted explosives and caused explosion at 15:13  hrs  at  Plaza  Cinema
wherein 10 persons were killed and 37 were injured;
Tenthly, Mohammed  Mustaq  Moosa  Tarani  (A-44)  planted  bomb  and  caused
explosion at Hotel Centaur, Juhu at 15:20 hrs. which resulted in  injury  to
three persons.
Eleventhly, Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Sheikh  (A-23)  and  Nasim  Ashraf
Shaikh Ali Barmare  (A-49)  planted  bomb  and  caused  explosion  at  Sahar
Airport at 15:30 hrs and;
Twelfthly, Anwar Theba (AA) caused explosion at 15:40 hrs at Centaur  Hotel,
Airport wherein 2 persons were killed and 8 persons were injured.
      In addition to the above, at various other places, viz., Naigan  Cross
Road, Dhanji Street and Sheikh Memon Street  etc.,  bombs  were  planted  by
accused persons which were defused in  time  on  the  basis  of  information
received by the police.  Thus the object  behind  the  said  conspiracy  was
achieved and commercial hub of the country, Bombay was rocked  by  a  series
of blasts.
(p)   Thereafter, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged  and  pursuant
thereto several arrests were made.  After the arrest  of  Altaf  Ali  Mustaq
Ali Sayed (A-67), he made a disclosure under  Section  27  of  the  Evidence
Act, 1872 and led Mr. Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW-506), Police  Officer  and
pancha Suresh Jagaganath Satam (PW-37) to the residence  of  Mohammed  Hanif
from where the following articles were recovered and taken  into  possession
vide Panchnama Exh. 109.  A suit case (Article 42) was found  containing  65
hand grenades and 100 electronic detonators.   In  addition,  one  VIP  suit
case (Article 43) was found containing 40 hand grenades  and  50  electronic
detonators.  During the examination, only 85 grenades were found in the  two
suit cases which were marked as Article  44  (1-84)  and  one  hand  grenade
which was sent to the FSL was marked as Article 45.
(q)   Further, on 12.03.1993, one maroon coloured Maruti van  was  found  in
abandoned condition near Siemens Factory, Worli bearing No. MFC 1972.   When
the Police party came to know about the  abandoned  vehicle,  a  search  was
conducted and it was seized by the Police Officer, Dinesh P. Kadam  (PW-371)
in the presence of Narayan Dattaram More (PW-46) vide  Panchnama  Exh.  190.
The seizure included 7 AK-56 rifles, a plastic bag and  14  magazines  which
were forwarded to the FSL.  One more plastic  bag  and  four  hand  grenades
were also recovered from the Van and were sent to the FSL.  The  FSL  report
Exh. 2439-A establishes that these hand grenades  were  capable  of  causing
explosion.  During investigation, it was found that in the above  said  van,
the following persons were sitting, viz., A-57, Javed  Chikna  (AA),  Bashir
Khan and Nasir @ Babloo and were proceeding towards  BMC  office  near  V.T.
for the purpose of killing BJP and Shiv Sena Corporators but they  left  the
vehicle because of the damage caused to the  car  during  the  explosion  at
Century Bazaar.
(r)   On 26.03.1993, the following items were recovered  from  Khalil  Ahmed
Sayed Ali Nasir (A-42), namely, a single 7.62  mm  pistol  without  magazine
(Article 87), a single 7.65 mm  pistol  without  magazine  having  body  No.
352468 made in Czechoslovakia marked as Article 88,  four  empty  magazines,
13 cartridges, 7 cartridges of 7.65 mm pistol, 4 KF 7.65  mm  cartridges,  2
SBP 7.65 mm cartridges and 8 cartridges of 7.62 mm pistol.
(s)   On 26.03.1993, Investigating Officer  (PW-506),  in  the  presence  of
Lakshan Loka Karkare (PW-45) searched the house  of  accused  Mujammil  Umar
Kadri (A-25)  at  village  Mhasala,  Tal.  Shrivardhan  and  seized  certain
aricles vide Exh. 158, namely, 13 AK-56 rifles, 26  empty  magazines  and  3
gunny bags (Article 86).
(t)   During the investigation, on 27.03.1993, at the  instance  of  accused
Ashrafur Rehman Azimulla Shaikh @ Lallu,  Shivaji  Shankar  Sawant  (PW-524)
and Abdul Kadar A. Khan (PW-323) prepared  the  disclosure  Panchanama  Exh.
439 in the presence of Sayyed Badshah Gaus Mohiuddin (PW-85).  In  pursuance
of the said disclosure  Panchanama,  the  police  recovered  hand  grenades,
white tubes, detonators tied together and live cartridges.
(u)   On 02.04.1993, at the instance of Mohammed Yunus Gulam  Rasul  @  Bota
Miya (A-47), Eknath Dattatraya Jadhav (PW-606), in the  presence  of  PW-34,
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 93.  In pursuance of  the  same,  the
police seized vide seizure Panchnama Exh.  94  dated  02.04.1993,  a  single
7.62 mm assault short rifle without magazine, 30.32 empty rifle,  magazines,
rounds of 7.62 rifles, Goni, Rexin Bag and 6 swords from Raziya Manzil  near
Ram Shyam Theatre, Jogeshwari, West.
(v)   On 26.04.1993, at the instance of Mohd.  Moin  Faridulla  Qureshi  (A-
43), Eknath Dattatraya Jadhav (PW-606), in the presence of Krishnanad  Jacob
Alwin (PW-41), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 133 and  in  pursuance
of the said disclosure  Panchnama  seized  17  hand  grenades  vide  seizure
Panchnama Exh. 134.  The said hand grenades were defused with  the  help  of
Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS).
(w)   On 14.04.1993, at the instance of Manoj Kumar Bhawarlal Gupta @  Munna
(A-24), Ramrao Mahadev Desai (PW-512), in the presence  of  Pradeep  Atmaram
Ire (PW-42), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 138 and in pursuance  of
the said disclosure Panchnama seized a  single  .45  pistol  with  magazine,
thirteen rounds of .45 pistol, a single 7.62 mm pistol  with  magazine,  six
cartridges,  one  .38  revolver,  nineteen  cartridges,  one  single  barrel
country made revolver and four cartridges of .315 bore.
(x)   On 25.03.1993, at the instance of Parvez Nazir  Ahmed  Shaikh  (A-12),
Anil Prabhakar Mahabole  (PW-506),  in  the  presence  of  Padmakar  Krishna
Bhosle (PW-43), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 146 and in  pursuance
of the said disclosure Panchnama seized a single revolver No. A-85525,  five
cartridges  and  six  more  cartridges  vide  seizure  Panchnama  Exh.  479.
Besides the aforesaid items, one rexin pouch, one  revolver  case  and  Arms
Licence and one permit in the name of Tiger Memon were also recovered.
(y)    On  02.04.1993,  at  the  instance  of  Ayub  Patel  (A-72),   Eknath
Dattatraya  Jadhav  (PW-606),  in  the  presence  of  PW-44   prepared   the
disclosure Panchnama Exh. 154  and  in  pursuance  of  the  said  disclosure
Panchnama seized 13 dismantled hand grenades and 3 more hand  grenades  vide
seizure Panchnama Exh. 155 and marked under various article numbers.
(z)   On 26.03.1993, PW-506, in the presence of Laksham  Loka  Karkare  (PW-
45), searched the house of Sharif  Parkar  at  Sandheri,  Dist.  Raigad  and
seized two AK-56 rifles, two empty magazines of AK-56 and one gunny bag.
(aa)  On 01.04.1993, at the instance of Ibrahim Mussa  Chauhan  @  Baba  (A-
41), Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW-506), in the presence of (PW-45),  prepared
the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 171 and seized a single 7.72 mm Assault  short
rifle without magazine, 10 empty rifle  magazines,  564  cartridges  and  25
hand grenades.  In addition, a blue coloured rexin bag was also recovered.
(ab)  On 18.04.1993, at the instance of Ahmed Birya (A-35),  Uttam  Khandoji
Navghare (PW-545), in the presence of  Manohar  Balchandra  Tandel  (PW-56),
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 226 and  seized  six  rifles  and  12
black coloured magazines.
(ac)  On 13.04.1993, at the instance of Salim Rahim Shaikh  (A-52),  Shivaji
Tukaram Kolekar (PW-526),  in  the  presence  of  Sakharam  Kishan  (PW-35),
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 101 and seized one  pistol  of  black
colour and 48 intact 7.62 mm cartridges.
(ad)  On 04.04.1993, at  the  instance  of  Ehsan  Mohammed  Tufel  Mohammed
Qureshi (A-122), Prakash Dhanaji Khanvelkar (PW-513),  in  the  presence  of
Rohitkumar Ramsaran Chaurasia (PW-39),  prepared  the  disclosure  Panchnama
Exh. 119 and seized one 7.62 mm pistol with magazine and 14 intact  and  two
test fired cartridges.
(ae)  On 10.04.1993, at the instance of Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare  (A-
49), Srirang Vyas Nadgauda  (PW-597),  in  the  presence  of  Ranjeet  Kumar
Surender Nath Das (PW-38), prepared the disclosure Panchnama  Exh.  115  and
seized a five chambered country made revolver.
(af)  On 08.04.1993, at the  instance  of  Asif  Yusuf  Shaikh      (A-107),
Ratan Singh Kalu Rathod (PW-600), in the  presence  of  Chandrakant  Atmaram
Vaidya (PW-40), prepared the disclosure Panchnama  Exh.  126  and  seized  a
single 3.62 mm pistol with magazine as well as 32 cartridges.
(ag)  On 05.04.1993, at the instance of Shaikh Aziz (A-21),  Vijay  D.  Meru
(PW-561), in the presence of Bhaskar Baburao Jadhav  (PW-57),  prepared  the
disclosure Panchnama Exh. 245  and  seized  a  single  .30  US  Carbine,  28
cartridges and 3 magazines.
(ah)  On 17.04.1993, at the instance of Ahmed Shah  Durani  (A-20),  Shivaji
Shankar Sawant (PW-524), in the presence of Mohd. Ayub Mohd.  Umer  (PW-72),
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 378 and  in  pursuance  of  the  said
panchnama seized one AK-56 rifle and two magazines.
(ai)  On 09.04.1993, at the instance of Md. Dawood Mohd. Yusuf Khan  (A-91),
PW-522, in the presence of Ashok Kumar Hari Vilas  Pande  (PW-59),  prepared
the disclosure  Panchnama  Exh.  265  and  seized  9  empty  black  coloured
magazines and 3 AK-56 guns.
(aj)  On 22.03.1993, at  the  instance  of  Mohammed  Shoeb  Mohammed  Kasam
Ghansar (A-9), PW-615, in the presence  of  Dinesh  Dharma  Sarvan  (PW-53),
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 216 and  seized  one  folded  blacken
cardboard, one folded cardbox explosive, Packer Package Ltd. Lahore and  one
Number Plate bearing No. MP-13-D-0380.
(ak)  On 12.03.1993, after the blast, one Maruti Van  bearing  No.  MFC-1972
was  found  abandoned.   During  the  course  of  search,  xerox  copies  of
registration papers of the said vehicle in the  name  of  Rubina  Suleman  @
Arif Memon (A-8) were found which led the police party to the flat Nos.  22,
25 and 26 of Memons’  at  Al  Hussaini  Building.   As  the  involvement  of
Memons’ had come to light in the incidents, the said flats were searched  by
the Police Officer, namely, Dinesh P. Kadam (PW-371),  in  the  presence  of
Uday Narayan Vasaikar (PW-67) and  vide  seizure  Panchnama  Exh.  337,  the
police party seized the passport of Shabana Memon,  five  key  bunches,  two
keys 449, rubber slipper of right  foot,  brown  leather  chappal  of  right
foot, pista coloured chappal, carpet  pieces,  rubber  slipper  and  a  pink
piece of scrap.
(al)  On 01.05.1993, at the instance of Yusuf Nullwala  (A-118),  Suresh  S.
Walishetty (PW-680),  in  the  presence  of  Gangaram  B.  Sawant  (PW-265),
prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 1100 and seized one  plastic  bag  of
Metro Co. and 57 intact bullets.
(am)  During the investigation, the following items were recovered from  the
compound of Al Hussaini Building in the presence of Leoneison  Desouza  (PW-
52), namely, 31 gunny  cloth  pieces,  25  black  cardboard  pieces  and  34
blacken polythene papers.
(an)  Sanjay Dutt (A-117) received three AK-56 rifles and  ammunitions  from
accused Abu Salem, who visited his  residence  along  with  A-53  and  A-41.
After sometime, he returned two AK-56 rifles  to  co-accused  and  kept  one
with him.  He also purchased one  .9mm  pistol  from  one  Qyaoom,  a  close
associate of Dawood.  When the news of his involvement  came  to  light,  he
telephoned A-118 to destroy the AK-56 rifle  and  the  pistol.   During  the
course of investigation, A-117 made a disclosure statement Exh.  1068  which
was recorded as Exh. 1068-A.  He led the police party to A-118.  A-118  made
a disclosure statement which was recorded as Exh. 1068-B and led the  police
party to Kersi Adejania (A-124).  A-124 made a  disclosure  statement  which
is Exh. 1068C and from him one iron rod and one iron spring were  recovered.
 Thereafter, A-124 led the police party to A-125.  A-125 made  a  disclosure
which was recorded in Panchnama Exh. 1068D and led the police  party  to  A-
120 who produced one  pistol  which  is  Article  384-D  which  came  to  be
recovered vide Exh. 1068E drawn by Suresh S.  Wallishetty  (PW-680)  in  the
presence of Shashikaam R.S. (PW-211).
(ao)  On 18.04.1993, at  the  instance  of  Noor  Mohammed  (A-50),  Prakash
Dhanaji  Khanvelkar  (PW-513),  in  the  presence  of  PW-33,  prepared  the
disclosure Panchnama Exh. 88 and seized one olive green bag, one  khaki  bag
and a blackish lamp.  During the course of investigation,  Shankar  Sadashiv
Kamble (PW-503), in the presence of PW-55,  recovered  one  rifle  from  the
residence of Abdul Rashid Khan (AA)  at  Dreamland  Co-op.  Society,  Marol,
Bombay.
(ap)  On 07.04.1993, at the instance of Faki Ali Faki Ahmed Subedar  (A-74),
PW-588, in the presence of PW-88, recovered 12 AK-56  rifles,  36  magazines
and cartridges.
(aq)  At the instance of Janu Kamlya Vetkoli, PW-588, in the presence of PW-
89, recovered six military  coloured  bags  containing  9000  rounds  and  3
wooden boxes containing 44 magazines vide Panchnama  Exhibit  503.   In  the
Court, the said articles were marked as below:-
     i) 750 cartridges marked as Article No.296-B;
    ii) 6000 cartridges marked as Article No. 297-(A-i) to (A-viii);
   iii) 549 cartridges marked as Article No. 297 (A-ix(b));
    iv) 750 cartridges marked as Article No. 297 (A-x(b)); and
     v) 850 cartridges marked as Article No. 294-D (Colly).
(ar)  On 25.05.1993, PW-670 forwarded 12 AK-56 rifles, 80 magazines and  100
cartridges with forwarding letter vide Exh. 2471 to Chemical Analyser.
(as)  At the instance of Sayeed @ Mujju Ismail Ibrahim  Kadri  (A-104),  PW-
573, in the presence  of  PW-91,  recovered  five  plastic  jars  containing
explosives and  detonators  from  the  lavatory  in  the  courtyard  of  the
accused.
(at)  The accused persons had undertaken firing practice  at  Chinchechamal,
Dist. Raigad.  Nandev P.  Mahajan  (PW-587),  in  the  presence  of  PW-103,
seized certain articles, namely, 3 broken branches, pieces of  cardboard,  3
empties, 6 lead pieces and pieces of stones.
(au)  Out of the aforesaid articles, the following  articles  were  sent  to
the FSL vide Exh. 2112 i.e., 3 empties, 6 lead shots, 3  tree  branches  and
pieces of target, stones, cardboard and 12 empties recovered on  01.04.1993,
02.04.1993 and 03.04.1993.
(av)  At the instance of Issaq  Mohammed  Hajwani  (A-79),  PW-587,  in  the
presence of PW-104, recovered 13 hand grenades and 79 empties from  Sandheri
Jetty.  The articles were marked in the  Court  as  per  the  details  given
below:
   (i)            12 empties            Article 307(v) colly
   (ii)           67 empties            Article 308-B colly
   (iii)    One hand grenade      Article 309-A (i)
   (iv)     White, yellow and green explosive powder and  a  cap  which  was
        removed from the hand grenade.
   (v)      PW-598 defused the hand grenades at Goregaon P.S. and issued the
        Defusal Certificate.  The carbon copy of the Defusal Certificate is
        marked as Exh. 2055.
   (vi)     12 defused hand grenades    Article 310-B colly
   (vii)    On 21.06.1993,  Shashinath  Raghunath  Chavan  (PW-676)  sent  a
        letter Exh. 2517 to the FSL along with 67 empties for opinion.
   (viii)   CA Report dated 05.08.1993 vide M.L. case No. BL 643/93, 447/93,
        385/93 and 568/93 through MA No. 382/2000 dated 17.10.2000.
(aw)  During the course of  investigation,  Shashikant  Eknath  Shinde  (PW-
519), in the presence of Dilip  Manekrao  Dawalekar  (PW-65),  recovered  57
gunny  bags  filled  with  RDX  and  gelatine  from  the  Nangla  Creek   on
02.04.1993.      Out of 57 bags, 37 were found to be  loaded  with  RDX  and
the remaining 20 bags to be loaded with gelatine.  A-50,  A-24,  A-59,  A-69
and A-121 having admitted dumping of the said bags in the  Nangla  Creek  in
their confessional statements.
(ax)  Thereafter, 27 criminal cases were registered in relation to the  said
incidents at various police stations in  Bombay  City,  District  Thane  and
District Raigarh.  Upon completion of the  investigation,  a  single  charge
sheet was filed against 189 accused persons including 44 absconding  accused
persons on 04.11.1993.  Subsequently, further investigation of the case  was
transferred to the Respondent-CBI who filed 19 supplementary  charge  sheets
under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short  ‘the
Code’) and the trial of 123 accused persons was concluded on 23.11.2003.
3)    In order to enquire into the  matter  and  render  speedy  justice,  a
Special Judge (TADA) was nominated and  recording  of  evidence  started  in
1995 and the said process  was  concluded  in  the  year  2002.   Total  687
witnesses were examined and the Special Court  pronounced  the  judgment  on
12.09.2006/27.07.2007  awarding  death  sentence  to  11  persons  and  life
sentence and other sentences for the offences under TADA, the  Indian  Penal
Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’) Arms Act, 1959 and  the  Explosives  Act,  1884.
By way of impugned judgment, the trial Court has convicted 100  persons  and
acquitted 23 persons of all the charges. The  judgment  under  consideration
pertains to the trial of 123 accused persons involved in  the  said  blasts.
In cases of death sentence, the Special Judge referred the  matter  to  this
Court for confirmation.  In  total,  51  appeals  have  been  filed  by  the
accused against their conviction ranging from various  sentences  upto  life
imprisonment. Against the  order  of  acquittal,  the  State  of  Mahrashtra
through CBI has filed 48 appeals.
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (A-1)
4)    At the first instance, let us consider the charges,  materials  placed
by the prosecution, defence and details regarding  conviction  and  sentence
insofar as A-1 is concerned.
Charges:
      The following charges were framed against A-1, namely:
      “…..During the period from December, 1992 to April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai (U.A.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosive substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or persons, loss of  or  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs.27 crores destroyed, and  attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and  its  suburbs  i.e.  within  Greater  Bombay.   And
      thereby committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of  TADA  (P)
      Act, 1987 and Section 120-B of  IPC  read  with  Section  3(2)(i)(ii),
      3(3)(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with  Sections  302,
      307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and 212 of  Indian  Penal  Code  and
      offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with Sections 25 (1-A),  (1-B)(a)
      of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections 9B (1)(a)(b)(c) of the Explosives Act,
      1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6 of the  Explosive  Substances  Act,
      1908 and Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act,
      1984 and within my cognizance.”


           In addition to the abovesaid principal charge of conspiracy, the
      appellant was also charged on the following counts:
      At head secondly, for commission of the offence under Section 3(3)  of
      TADA Act, for in pursuance to  the  conspiracy  in  India,  Dubai  and
      Pakistan, during the period between December, 1992  and  April,  1993,
      having conspired advocated, abetted, advised and knowingly facilitated
      the commission of terrorist acts and  acts  preparatory  to  terrorist
      acts i.e. serial bomb blast in Bombay and its  suburbs  on  12.03.1993
      by:


      (i)   arranging finance and managing the  disbursement  by  generating
           the same through Mulchand Shah Choksi (A-97) and from  the  firm
           M/s Tejarat International owned by Ayub Memon (AA) for achieving
           the objective of conspiracy to commit the terrorist act;


      (ii)  arranging air tickets through Altaf Ali Mushtaq Ali  Sayyed  (A-
           67), East West Travels and others to enable the  co-conspirators
           and accused in the case to undergo weapons training in  Pakistan
           and for having made arrangement for their lodging and boarding;


      (iii) purchasing motor vehicles for the purpose of preparing them  for
           being used as bombs and for planting them at important locations
           in furtherance of objective of conspiracy  to  commit  terrorist
           act; and


      (iv)  requesting the discharged Amjad Ali Meharbux and A-67  to  store
           suitcases containing arms and  ammunitions,  handgrenades  which
           were part of consignment smuggled into India by  the  absconding
           accused Tiger Memon and other co-conspirators.


      At head thirdly, for commission of the offence under Section 5 of TADA
      Act, on the count of  unauthorisedly,  within  the  notified  area  of
      Greater Bombay, from 03.02.1993 onwards, by  being  in  possession  of
      hand grenades, detonators which were the part of  the  consignment  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives smuggled into the  country  by  Tiger
      Memon and his associates for committing the terrorist acts.


      At head fourthly, for commission of the offence  under  Section  6  of
      TADA Act, on the count of unauthorisedly, within the area  of  Greater
      Bombay, with an intent to aid  terrorists,  from  03.02.1993  onwards,
      being in possession of handgrenades, detonators which were the part of
      the consignment of arms, ammunitions and explosives smuggled into  the
      country by Tiger Memon and his associates for committing the terrorist
      act and thereby having contravened the provisions  of  the  Arms  Act,
      1959,  the Explosives Act, 1884, the Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908
      and the Explosives Rules, 2008 by keeping the same in  his  possession
      and by transporting and distributing the same to different persons.


      At head fifthly, for commission of the offences under Sections 3  &  4
      read with Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act on the  count  of,
      from  03.02.1993  onwards,  providing   premises,   having   procured,
      concealed, aided and  abetted  Tiger  Memon  and  his  associates  for
      smuggling arms,  ammunitions  and  explosives  into  the  country  for
      commission of terrorist act and also by having in his  possession  and
      control explosive substances like handgrenades and detonators with  an
      intent, and by means thereof, to endanger the lives  and  for  causing
      serious damage to property in India and to enable his  co-conspirators
      to do such acts.”

5)    The appellant (A-1) has been convicted and  sentenced  for  the  above
said charges as follows:-

(i)   The appellant-A1 has been  convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  under
Section 3(3) of TADA and  Section  120-B  of  IPC  read  with  the  offences
mentioned in the said charge.  In addition, the  appellant  was  ordered  to
pay a fine of Rs. 25, 000/-.  (charge firstly)

ii)   The appellant (A-1) was sentenced to RI for life alongwith a  fine  of
Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under  Section
3(3) of TADA. (charge secondly)

iii)  The appellant was sentenced to RI for 10 years  alongwith  a  fine  of
Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under  Section
5 of TADA (charge thirdly)

iv)   The appellant was sentenced to RI for 14 years  alongwith  a  fine  of
Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under  Section
6 of TADA. (charge fourthly)

v)    The appellant was sentenced to RI for 10 years  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
50,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 1 year under Sections 3  and
4 read with Section  6  of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908.  (charge
fifthly).
6)    Heard Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for the  appellant  and
Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel duly  assisted  by  Mr.  Mukul
Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr.  Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent-CBI.
Contentions raised by A-1:
7)    Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel, after taking us through  the
charges framed against A-1, prosecution witnesses, documents and  all  other
materials raised the following contentions:-
(i)   The impugned judgment is not a “judgment” in terms  of  Sections  353,
354, 362 and 363 of the Code since reasons for conviction and sentence  were
not provided to the appellant   (A-1) along with  the  order  of  conviction
and sentence dated 12.09.2006  and  27.07.2007  respectively.   Inasmuch  as
only ‘operative portion’ was read out and  after  hearing  the  accused  the
conviction and sentence was imposed, it  is  not  permissible  in  law.   He
further pointed out that as per the “operative portion”, A-1  was  convicted
and sentenced to death, RI  along  with  fine  for  commission  of  offences
mentioned in charges at head firstly to fifthly.   In  the  absence  of  the
entire judgment in terms of the above mentioned provisions,  the  conviction
and sentence imposed on A-1 cannot be sustained.
(ii)  The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of  Mohammed  Usman  Jan
Khan (PW-2), who turned approver.   According  to  learned  senior  counsel,
there is no provision for pardoning an accused and permitting him to  become
an approver under TADA.  He further pointed out that neither under TADA  nor
under the Code it can be said that PW-2 has been validly pardoned.   In  any
event, according  to  him,  his  statement  needs  to  be  corroborated  and
conviction based on his sole testimony cannot be sustained.
(iii) The Special Judge heavily relied on the confessional statements of  A-
10, A-11, A-46,  A-67  and  A-97.   Among  them,  except  A-97  others  have
retracted their statements.  Since the prosecution case rests entirely  upon
the confessional statements of those  accused  persons,  in  view  of  their
retraction statements, the conviction and sentence cannot be sustained.
(iv)  Several recoveries were made by the prosecution on  the  statement  of
Md. Hanif (PW-282) and in the absence of strict adherence to the  procedure,
those recoveries are inadmissible in evidence.  He further pointed out  that
seizure panchnamas were not in  accordance  with  the  procedure  and,  more
particularly, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(v)   All the confessional statements are exculpatory and  not  inculpatory.
In view of the same, the entire statements made are not acceptable.
(vi)  There is no material to prove that there was a  conspiracy  among  the
accused persons pursuant to the demolition of Babri Masjid.
(vii) In any event, the prosecution failed to pin point  the  specific  role
of A-1.  A-1 had no knowledge of the conspiracy and  of  the  ultimate  bomb
blasts on 12.03.1993.   Even, the confessional  statements  cannot  be  used
against A-1 since the same were recorded before  the  amendment  of  Section
3(5)  of  TADA.    Considering  the  entire  evidence   against   him,   the
prosecution failed to point out any specific role,  accordingly,  the  death
sentence is not warranted and other sentences are  also  liable  to  be  set
aside.
Reply by CBI:
8)    Mr. Gopal  Subramanium,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  CBI  duly
assisted by Mr. Mukul  Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  and  Mr.  Satyakam,
learned counsel met all the points raised by Mr. Jaspal Singh.   He  pointed
out the following evidence against the appellant (A1), namely;
(i) confessional statements made by co-accused;
(ii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses; and
(iii) documentary evidence.
According to him, it is incorrect to state that conviction was based  solely
on the evidence of Approver (PW-2).  He pointed  out  that  the  prosecution
has placed enough materials to substantiate “conspiracy”  and  the  ultimate
role played by each one of the accused persons,  particularly  A-1,  in  the
commission of offence.   He further pointed out  that  all  the  confessions
made  by  the  accused,  namely,  A-10,  A-11,  A-46,  A-67  and  A-97   are
admissible, and on the other  hand,  their  alleged  retractions  cannot  be
accepted.  He further pointed out that apart from the  confession  of  those
accused, the prosecution has  established  several  incriminating  materials
connecting all the accused in the commission of  offence.   He  pointed  out
various  recoveries  made  against  the  accused  which  clearly  show   the
seriousness of the matter. Among all the accused persons,  A-1,  brother  of
Tiger Memon, was in-charge of entire financial management,  sending  persons
to Pakistan via Dubai for training in arms and  ammunitions,  securing  air-
tickets and travel documents such  as  passports,  visas  etc.   He  further
pointed out that there was no flaw in the procedure adopted by  the  Special
Court in delivering the judgment.  There is no merit in the appeal filed  by
A-1 and prayed for confirmation of death sentence.
9)     We  have  carefully  considered  the  entire  materials,   oral   and
documentary evidence and the submissions made by either side.
Validity of impugned judgment by the Special Court
10)   Among various points raised, since the argument relating  to  impugned
judgment is paramount, we intend to take up the said issue at the  foremost.
  Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for  A-1,  took  us  through  the
impugned judgment which contains  two  parts.   According  to  him,  in  the
absence of whole judgment for perusal of the accused, the  sentence  imposed
cannot be sustained.  In support of the above claim, he relied  on  Sections
353, 354, 362 and 363 of  the  Code.   He  further  pointed  out  that  only
‘operative portion’ was read out and after hearing the  accused,  conviction
and sentence was imposed.  As per the operative portion, A-1  was  convicted
under Sections 3(3), 5 and 6  of  TADA  read  with  Section  120-B  IPC  and
Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1984.   He  further
pointed out that after convicting and sentencing A-1, the Presiding  Officer
stated that the reasons will be given within two months  which  shows  that,
admittedly, the judgment was not ready on the date of the pronouncement.
11)   In view of the above, it is  desirable  to  go  through  the  relevant
provisions of TADA.  The  TADA  contains:  (a)  judgment;  and  (b)  orders,
admittedly,  it  is  not  defined   anywhere   that   what   is   meant   by
judgment/order.  It is the claim of  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant that  if  it  is  not  a  complete  judgment,  accused  cannot  be
convicted and sentenced.  In the absence of specific provision in TADA  with
regard to the same, we have to look into  the  relevant  provisions  of  the
Code.  Chapter XXVII of the Code  speaks  about  ‘Judgment’.   The  relevant
provisions are Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 which are as under:
      “353. Judgment.--(1). The judgment in  every  trial  in  any  Criminal
      Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in  open  court  by
      the presiding officer immediately after the termination of  the  trial
      or at some subsequent time of which  notice  shall  be  given  to  the
      parties or their pleaders.
 
      (a) By delivering the whole of the judgment; or
 
      (b) By reading out the whole of the judgment; or
 
      (c) By reading out the operative part of the judgment  and  explaining
      the substance of the judgment in a language, which  is  understood  by
      the accused or his pleader.
 
      (2) Where the judgment is delivered under clause  (a)  of  sub-section
      (1), the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken  down  in  short
      hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as it is made
      ready, and write on it the date of the delivery  of  the  judgment  in
      open Court.
 
      (3) Where the judgment or the operative part thereof is read out under
      clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1), as the case  may  be,  it
      shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open  court  and
      if it is not written with his own hand, every  page  of  the  judgment
      shall be signed by him.
 
      (4) Where the judgment is pronounced in the manner specified in clause
      (c) of sub-section (1), the whole judgment or a copy thereof shall  be
      immediately made available for the perusal of  the  parties  or  their
      pleaders free of cost.
 
      (5) If the accused is in custody, he shall be brought up to  hear  the
      judgment pronounced.
 
      (6) If the accused is not in custody, he  shall  be  required  by  the
      court to attend to hear the  judgment  pronounced,  except  where  his
      personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with  and  the
      sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted:
 
      Provided that, where there are more accused than one, and one or  more
      of them do not attend the court on the date on which the  judgment  is
      to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in order to  avoid  undue
      delay  in  the  disposal  of  the   case,   pronounce   the   judgment
      notwithstanding their absence.
 
      (7) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to  be
      invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his  pleader  on
      the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any
      omission to serve, or defect in  serving,  on  the  parties  or  their
      pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day and place.
 
      (8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way the
      extent of the provisions of section 465.


      354. Language and  contents  of  judgment.--(1)  Except  as  otherwise
      expressly provided by this Code, every judgment referred to in section
      353, -
 
      (a) Shall be written in the language of the court;
 
      (b) Shall contain the point or points for determination, the  decision
      thereon and the reasons for the decision;
 
      (c) Shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and  the  section  of
      the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)  or  other  law  under  which,  the
      accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced;
 
      (d) If it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which
      the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.
 
      (2) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code  (45  of  1860)
      and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of  two
      parts of the same section, of that Code the offence falls,  the  court
      shall  distinctly  express  the  same,  and  pass  judgment   in   the
      alternative.
 
      (3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in
      the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term
      of years, the judgment  shall  state  the  reasons  for  the  sentence
      awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death,  the  special  reasons
      for such sentence.
 
      (4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment
      for a term of one year of more, but the court imposes  a  sentence  of
      imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its
      reasons for awarding such sentence, unless  the  sentence  is  one  of
      imprisonment till the rising of the court or unless the case was tried
      summarily under the provisions of this Code.
 
      (5) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence  shall  direct
      that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
 
      (6) Every order under section 117 or sub-section (2)  of  section  138
      and every final order made under section 125, section 145  or  section
      147 shall contain the point or points for determination, the  decision
      thereon and the reasons for the decision.

      362. Court not to alter judgment.--Save as otherwise provided by  this
      Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no  court,  when
      it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a  case,  shall
      after or review the same except to correct a clerical or  arithmetical
      error.
 

      363. Copy of judgment to be given to the accused and other  persons.--
      (1) When the accused is sentenced  to  imprisonment,  a  copy  of  the
      judgment shall, immediately after the pronouncement of  the  judgment,
      be given to him free of cost.
 
      (2) On the application  of  the  accused,  a  certified  copy  of  the
      judgment, or when he so desires, a translation in his own language  if
      practicable or in the language of the court, shall  be  given  to  him
      without delay, and such copy shall, in every case where  the  judgment
      is appeal able by the accused be given free of cost:
 
      Provided that where a sentence of death is passed or confirmed by  the
      High Court, a certified copy of  the  judgment  shall  be  immediately
      given to the accused free of cost whether or not he  applies  for  the
      same.


      (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply in  relation  to  an
      order under section 117 as they apply in relation to a judgment, which
      is appealable by the accused.
 
      (4) When the accused is sentenced to death by any court and an  appeal
      lies from such judgment as of right, the court shall inform him of the
      period within which, if he wishes to  appeal,  his  appeal  should  be
      preferred.


      (5) Save as otherwise provided in sub-Section (2), any person affected
      by a judgment or order  passed  by  a  Criminal  Court  shall,  on  an
      application made in this behalf  and  on  payment  of  the  prescribed
      charges, be given a copy of such judgment or order of  any  deposition
      or other part of the record:


      Provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason,
      give it to him free of cost.


      (6)  The High Court may, by rules, provide for the grant of copies  of
      any judgment or order of a Criminal Court to any  person  who  is  not
      affected by a judgment or order, on payment, by such person,  of  such
      fees, and subject to such conditions, as the High Court may,  by  such
      rules provide.”

12)   By drawing our attention to Section 353(1)(a)(b)(c), it  is  contended
by learned senior counsel for the appellant that  it  is  incumbent  on  the
part of the trial Judge to provide the whole judgment.  In  the  absence  of
reasoning and the discussion in the form of full judgment, it  is  contended
that  the  conviction  and  sentence  under  various  provisions   are   not
permissible.  He also pointed out that in case of  death  sentence,  special
reasons have to be assigned.  According to Mr. Jaspal  Singh,  in  terms  of
Section 353 of the Code, the judgment means the  whole  judgment  signed  by
the Judge.  He elaborated that when the Code permits the Court to  hear  the
accused on sentence, he must be provided with the whole  judgment  including
the reasons.  According to him, though A-1 was awarded  death  sentence,  no
special reasons were assigned by the Designated Court and he  was  not  even
furnished the whole  judgment.   By  highlighting  various  aspects  on  the
issue, in view of the fact that the  judgment  pronounced  is  not  a  “full
judgment” in terms of the above said provisions,  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh  prayed
for remand to the Special Court to go through all  the  reasoning  and  hear
afresh on the question of sentence.  Though Mr. Gopal  Subramanium  met  all
the submissions relating to the alleged defect  in  the  impugned  judgment,
first let us consider the  decisions  relied  on  by  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh  in
support of the above proposition.
13)   In Shambhu & Ors. vs. The State AIR  1956  All.  633,  learned  single
Judge of the High Court with regard to the words “judgment” and “order”  has
held as under:-

      “4. The argument sounds plausible; nevertheless I have  no  hesitation
      in holding it to be untenable. A study of the provisions of  the  Code
      of Criminal Procedure discloses that the expression of the opinion  of
      the criminal Court on  any  matter  at  issue  arrived  at  after  due
      consideration of the evidence and of the arguments (if any) falls into
      two categories : judgments and orders. None-theless neither  of  these
      terms has been defined either in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the
      Indian Penal Code.


      There is, however, no controversy as to what a "judgment" is. As  held
      by the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC  43  (A)
      and  Kuppuswami  Rao  v.  The  King,  it  is  used  "to  indicate  the
      termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of  the
      accused", and to this, by virtue of Section  367(6),  Criminal  P.  C.
      must be added orders under Sections 118 or 123 (3), orders which  bear
      the  character  of  a  conviction.  Chapter  26  of  the  Code   deals
      exclusively  with  judgments  and  on  the  basis  of  its  exhaustive
      provisions there can  be  no  difficulty  in  recognising  a  criminal
      Court's "judgment".”

14)   In Baldeo. vs. Deo Narain and  Ors.  AIR  1954  All.  104,  there  was
discussion about how the judgment to be in terms of the  provisions  of  the
Code.  The relevant para is as under:

      “14.…..Under Section 367, Criminal P. C. every judgment must contain:

      (1) the points for determination;
      (2) the decision thereon; and
      (3) the reasons for such decision.

      Where the reasons given by the trial  Court  are  such  as  cannot  be
      supported by the evidence on record, they  are  not  reasons  for  the
      decision, out reasons against the  decision.  To  constitute  a  legal
      appreciation of evidence, the Judgment should be such as  to  indicate
      that the Court has applied its  mind  to  it.  Every  portion  of  the
      Judgment of the trial Court seems to indicate non-application of  mind
      by the Court to the evidence on record.  The  third  requirement  laid
      down in Section  367,  Criminal  P.  C.  viz.,  the  reasons  for  the
      decision, is an important ingredient of a  Judgment.  Compliance  with
      law in this regard should not be merely  formal  but  substantial  and
      real, for it is this part of the  judgment  alone  which  enables  the
      higher Court to  appreciate  the  correctness  of  the  decision,  the
      parties to feel that the Court has fully  and  impartially  considered
      their respective cases and the public to realise that  a  genuine  and
      sincere attempt has been made to mete out even-handed Justice.  It  is
      in the way the Court discharges its duty in this  regard  that  it  is
      able to instil confidence in its justice and to inspire  that  respect
      and reverence in public mind  which  is  its  due.  Reasons  form  the
      substratum of the decision and their factual accuracy is  a  guarantee
      that the Court has applied its mind to the evidence in the case. Where
      the statement of reasons turn out to be a mere hollow pretension of  a
      baseless claim of application of mind by the Court,  the  Judgment  is
      robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits its claim
      to be termed a Judgment in the eye of law.”

15)   In Surendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954  SC  194,
this Court has interpreted the word “judgment”.   The  following  conclusion
is relevant which reads as under:-

      “10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of  these  sections
      is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the
      world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open  court.
      It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way.  Small
      irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of  delivery
      do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there : that  can
      neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it  be
      vague. All the rest - the manner in which it is to  be  recorded,  the
      way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and  the  sealing,
      all the rules designed to  secure  certainty  about  its  content  and
      matter - can be cured; but  not  the  hard  core,  namely  the  formal
      intimation of the decision and its contents  formally  declared  in  a
      judicial way in open court. The exact way in which this is  done  does
      not matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered  orally  or  read
      out, in some only the operative portion is  pronounced,  in  some  the
      judgment is merely signed after  giving  notice  to  the  parties  and
      laying the draft  on  the  table  for  a  given  number  of  days  for
      inspection.


      11. An important point  therefore  arises.  It  is  evident  that  the
      decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration  of
      the mind of the court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay on
      stress on the mode of manner of  delivery,  as  that  is  not  of  the
      essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in  open
      court. But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind  of
      the court at the time of delivery. We say this  because  that  is  the
      first judicial act touching the  judgment  which  the  court  performs
      after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out  of  court
      and is not intended to  be  the  operative  act  which  sets  all  the
      consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges  may,  and
      often do, discuss the matter among themselves and  reach  a  tentative
      conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may  write  and  exchange
      drafts. Those are not the judgments either, however heavily and  often
      they may have been signed. The final operative act is  that  which  is
      formally declared in open court with the intention of  making  it  the
      operative  decision  of  the  court.  That  is  what  constitutes  the
      "judgment".


      14. As soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes  the  operative
      pronouncement of the court. The law then provides for  the  manner  in
      which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules  regarding
      this differ but they do not form the essence  of  the  matter  and  if
      there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus,  if  a
      judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently  acted  on  and
      executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid  because  of
      the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would
      stand  good  despite  defects  in   the   mode   of   its   subsequent
      authentication.”

16)   In Ratia Mohan. vs. The State  of  Gujarat  AIR  1969  Guj.  320,  the
following para is pressed into service:-

      “9.  In  this  connection,  I  was  referred  to  a  decision  In  re.
      Athipalayan, AIR 1960 Mad 507, where it was held that the irregularity
      even in pronouncing the judgment in open Court and signing and  dating
      the same would amount to an illegality vitiating  the  conviction  and
      sentence passed in the case. While saying so,  it  has  been  observed
      thus:--

      ".......it  is  one  of  the  glorious  principles  of  our   criminal
      jurisprudence that we do not try or sentence people in absentia and we
      do not also  convict  and  sentence  people  without  judgments  being
      pronounced in open court and signed and dated then and there.  It  may
      be different in the continental system of criminal jurisprudence."

      It was a case in which a sentence was announced before judgment, which
      was the final decision of the court intimated to the parties  and  the
      world at large by formal pronouncement of delivery in  open  court  by
      the trial judge and signing and dating it simultaneously  and  thereby
      terminating the criminal proceedings finally. In Nathusing  Vridhasing
      v. Vasantlal B. Shah. 8 Guj LR 496 : (AIR 1968 Guj 210), the  question
      arose whether the order of dismissal of a complaint under Section  203
      of the Criminal Procedure Code without recording any  reasons  amounts
      to an irregularity or illegality curable  under  Section  537  of  the
      Criminal Procedure Code and it was held that  the  order  was  one  in
      contravention of that provision and such a  breach  of  the  provision
      renders the order void and  ineffective.  It  was  not  curable  under
      Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Some observations made  by
      the Supreme Court in  Willie  (William)  Slaney  v.  State  of  Madhya
      Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, were quoted to say that "the complainant  is
      entitled to know why his complaint has been dismissed with a  view  to
      consider an approach to a revisional Court. Being kept in ignorance of
      the reasons clearly prejudices his right to move the revisional  Court
      and where he takes a matter to the revisional Court renders  his  task
      before that Court difficult, particularly in view of the limited scope
      of  the  provisions  of  Sections  438  and  439,  Code  of   Criminal
      Procedure." Those observations may well  apply  in  the  present  case
      particularly when the accused has a right of appeal against the  order
      of conviction and sentence passed in the case and he  would  obviously
      be at a disadvantage to assail the reasons which were in the  mind  of
      the learned Magistrate and which came out so late as  on  6-2-68.  The
      accused-appellant had a right  to  know  the  reasons  which  led  the
      learned Magistrate to come to that conclusion. It may well happen that
      after coming to know about the accused going in  appeal,  the  learned
      Magistrate may try to record a proper judgment which otherwise he  may
      later on do in some other manner. In any event, the learned Magistrate
      has clearly contravened the imperative provisions contained in Section
      264 of the Criminal Procedure Code by  passing  the  sentence  without
      recording the judgment in the case and has that way  acted  illegally.
      Such an illegality cannot be treated as an  irregularity  contemplated
      under Section 537 or an omission as urged by Mr.  Nanavati  so  as  to
      become curable one. Even if it were to be treated as  such  as  coming
      within the ambit of Section 537, it can easily be  said  that  it  had
      occasioned failure of justice in the circumstances of the case. In any
      view of the matter, the order is, therefore, liable to be set aside.”

17)   The other decision relied on  is  State  of  Orissa  vs.  Ram  Chander
Agarwala & Ors. (1979)  2  SCC  305.   We  have  gone  through  the  factual
position and the ratio laid down therein.  Inasmuch as it is only a  general
observation, the same is not helpful to the case on hand.
18)   Another decision relied on is Jhari Lal  vs.  Emperor  AIR  1930  Pat.
148.  While considering Sections 367 and 369 of the  Code,  the  Court  held
that pronouncing sentence before completing the judgment, that  is  to  say,
before preparing the essential part of it, such as the statement  of  points
for determination and the reasons for decision makes  the  sentence  illegal
and vitiates conviction.
19)   In State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Jagdev Singh  Talwandi  (1984)  1  SCC
596 while considering how the final  order/judgment  is  to  be  pronounced,
this Court pointed out as under:-

      “30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that  serious
      difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted  by
      the High Courts, of pronouncing the final  order  without  a  reasoned
      judgment. It is desirable that the final order which  the  High  Court
      intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned  judgment  is
      ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for  example,  that  a  final  order
      without a reasoned judgment is announced by  the  High  Court  that  a
      house shall be demolished, or that the custody of  a  child  shall  be
      handed over to one parent as against  the  order,  or  that  a  person
      accused of a serious  charge  is  acquitted,  or  that  a  statute  is
      unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released
      from detention. If the object of passing  such  orders  is  to  ensure
      speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the
      aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court  against
      the order passed by the High  Court.  That  places  this  Court  in  a
      predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the  High
      Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare  order  to  be
      implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the  order
      passed by the High Court has to be  stayed  pending  delivery  of  the
      reasoned judgment.”

20)   The next decision relied on is Krishna Swami vs. Union  of  India  and
Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1407, which is a Constitution  Bench  decision.   We  have
gone  through  the  factual  position  and  the  ratio  laid  down  therein.
According to us, the said decision is neither helpful nor applicable to  the
case on hand.
21)   The other decision relied on by Mr. Jaspal Singh is reported  in  K.V.
Rami Reddi. vs. Prema  (2009)  17  SCC  308  which  arose  out  of  a  civil
proceeding.  It is not in dispute that Section 2(9) of the  Civil  Procedure
Code,  1908  defines  “judgment”.   Order  XX  Rule  1(1)(2)  of  the  Civil
Procedure Code (Madras amendment)  refers  “judgment  when  pronounced”  and
“judgment to be signed”.  In para 9, this Court has held as under:
       “9. Order XX Rule 5 on which  great  emphasis  was  laid  by  learned
      counsel for the appellant says that in suits in which issues have been
      framed, the court shall state its finding or decision with the  reason
      therefore, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon  any  one
      or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit.”

In the light of the definition clause, namely, “judgment”  though  the  same
has not been explained in the Code, the procedure to  be  followed  both  in
the civil and criminal cases are all acceptable.
22)   By pointing out that when the judgment does not contain  the  material
case of the prosecution, defence and discussion on conclusion, according  to
learned senior counsel, it not  only  vitiates  the  principles  of  natural
justice but also infringes the right under Article 21 of  the  Constitution.
He heavily relied on a Constitution Bench decision of  this  Court  reported
in Sarojini Ramaswami (Mrs.) vs. Union of India & Ors.  (1992)  4  SCC  506.
In para 141, the Constitution Bench has held as under:-
         “141 …..It is now settled  law  that  the  principles  of  natural
      justice are an integral part of constitutional scheme of just and fair
      procedure envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution.”


23)   In M. Nagaraj & Ors. vs. Union of India and  Ors.  (2006)  8  SCC  212
which  is  also  a  decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench,  the   following
conclusion is pressed into service.
        “20…..Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person  shall
      be deprived of his life  and  personal  liberty  except  according  to
      procedure established by law. The Supreme Court  by  a  majority  held
      that “procedure established by law” means any procedure established by
      law made by Parliament or the legislatures of the State.  The  Supreme
      Court refused to infuse  the  procedure  with  principles  of  natural
      justice. It concentrated solely upon the  existence  of  enacted  law.
      After three decades, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision
      in A.K. Gopalan and held in its landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi  v.
      Union of India that the procedure  contemplated  by  Article  21  must
      answer the test of reasonableness. The Court  further  held  that  the
      procedure should also be in conformity with the principles of  natural
      justice. This example is given to demonstrate an instance of expansive
      interpretation of  a  fundamental  right.  The  expression  “life”  in
      Article 21 does not connote merely physical or animal  existence.  The
      right to life includes right to live with human  dignity.  This  Court
      has in numerous cases  deduced  fundamental  features  which  are  not
      specifically mentioned in Part  III  on  the  principle  that  certain
      unarticulated rights are implicit in the  enumerated  guarantees.  For
      example, freedom of information has been held to be  implicit  in  the
      guarantee  of  freedom  of  speech  and  expression.  In  India,  till
      recently, there was no legislation securing  freedom  of  information.
      However, this Court by a liberal interpretation deduced the  right  to
      know and right to access information on the reasoning that the concept
      of an open Government is the direct result  from  the  right  to  know
      which  is  implicit  in  the  right  of  free  speech  and  expression
      guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).”




24)   In Confederation of ex-Servicemen Associations and  Others  vs.  Union
of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC  399  which  is  also  a  Constitution  Bench
judgment, this Court held as under:-
        “61. It cannot be gainsaid that the right to life guaranteed  under
      Article 21 of the Constitution embraces  within  its  sweep  not  only
      physical existence but the quality of life. If any statutory provision
      runs counter to such a right, it must  be  held  unconstitutional  and
      ultra vires Part III of the Constitution.…”

25)    Now,  let  us  consider  the  decisions  relied  on  by   Mr.   Gopal
Subramanium,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  CBI  with  regard  to  the
contentions raised.  In Iqbal Ismail Sodawala vs. The State  of  Maharashtra
and Others (1975) 3 SCC 140, this Court considered almost similar  question.
 It was argued before the  Bench  that  the  allegation  of  the  petitioner
therein that the judgment in the case under Sections  392  and  397  of  IPC
against the petitioner was not pronounced by learned Sessions Judge  but  by
his Sheristedar.  It was urged that the procedure adopted  in  this  respect
by learned Sessions Judge was not in accordance with law.   This  submission
was not acceptable to the Bench.  The following observation  and  conclusion
are relevant:
       “6…The report of Shri Gupte shows that he dictated  the  judgment  in
   the case against the petitioner in open court. The judgment included,  as
   it must, the concluding part relating  to  the  conviction  and  sentence
   awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner who  apparently  did  not  know
   English was thereafter apprised by the Sheristedar of the  Court  of  the
   concluding part of the judgment relating to his conviction and  sentence.
   Although normally the trial Judges should themselves convey the result of
   the trial to the accused, the fact that the learned Judge in the  present
   case did not do so and left it to the Sheristedar would not introduce  an
   infirmity in the procedure adopted by him. The Sheristedar  in  the  very
   nature of  things  must  have  translated  to  the  petitioner  what  was
   contained in the concluding part of the judgment. It was, in our opinion,
   the dictation of the concluding part of the judgment in open court by the
   learned Sessions Judge which should in the circumstances be taken  to  be
   tantamount to the pronouncement of the judgment.


      8. Question then arises as to whether the appellant can be said to  be
   not properly imprisoned if  the  trial  Judge  had  merely  dictated  the
   judgment but not signed it because of its not having been transcribed  at
   the time he pronounced it. So far as this aspect is  concerned,  we  find
   that Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter  alia,
   that subject to the other provisions of the Code, no finding, sentence or
   order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall  be  reversed  or
   altered on appeal or revision  on  account  of  any  error,  omission  or
   irregularity in the  complaint,  summons,  warrant,  proclamation  order,
   judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or
   other  proceedings  under  this  Code,  unless  such   error,   omission,
   irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. This section is
   designed to ensure that no order of  a  competent  court  should  in  the
   absence of failure of  justice  be  reversed  or  altered  in  appeal  or
   revision on account of a procedural irregularity. The  Code  of  Criminal
   Procedure is essentially a code of procedure and like all procedural law,
   is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate  them  by
   the introduction of endless technicalities. At the same time it has to be
   borne in mind that it is procedure that spells  much  of  the  difference
   between rule of law and rule by whim and caprice. The object of the  Code
   is to ensure for the accused a full and fair trial in accordance with the
   principles of natural justice. If there be  substantial  compliance  with
   the requirements of law, a mere procedural irregularity would not vitiate
   the trial unless the same results  in  miscarriage  of  justice.  In  all
   procedural laws certain things are vital. Disregard of the provisions  in
   respect of them would prove fatal to the trial and would  invalidate  the
   conviction. There are, however,  other  requirements  which  are  not  so
   vital. Non-compliance with them would amount  to  an  irregularity  which
   would be curable unless it has resulted in a failure of justice.”


26)   The next decision relied on by  learned  senior  counsel  for  CBI  is
reported in Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 513  wherein
it was held  that  judgment  becomes  complete  and  appealable  only  after
conviction is recorded and also sentence is awarded.
27)   In view of the above discussion, it is useful to  refer  the  relevant
provision of the Code with regard to right of hearing.
Right of hearing under Section 235(2) of the Code
Right of hearing to the accused on the  question  of  sentence  is  provided
under Section 235(2) of the Code and this provision was introduced  in  view
of the 48th Report of the Law Commission of India.  Section  235(2)  of  the
Code reads as under:
      “If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he  proceeds  in
      accordance with the provisions of Section 360 hear the accused on  the
      question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.”



The purpose of adding the provision is recognition of new trend in  penology
and awarding of sentence taking into consideration various factors  such  as
the prior criminal record of the offender, his age, employment,  educational
background, sociological backdrop, family  background,  financial  position,
antecedents, social adjustment,  emotional  and  mental  condition  and  the
prospects of his returning to normal path in conformity with law. It  is  in
fact humanist principle of individualising punishment  to  suit  the  person
and  his  circumstances  and,  therefore,  a  hearing  is  required   before
imposition of penalty. In order to understand the concept more  clearly,  it
is useful to refer some of the decisions  of  this  Court  directly  on  the
point in issue.

28)   In Santa Singh  vs. The State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190, this  Court
observed:


     “The provisions of Section 235(2) are very salutary and contain one  of
     the cardinal features of natural justice, namely, that the accused must
     be given an opportunity to make a representation against  the  sentence
     proposed to be imposed on him.”


     “7. Non-compliance with the requirement of  Section  235(2)  cannot  be
     described as mere irregularity in the course of the trial curable under
     Section 465. It is much more  serious.  It  amounts  to  by-passing  an
     important stage of the trial and omitting it altogether,  so  that  the
     trial cannot be aid to be that  contemplated  in  the  Code.  It  is  a
     different kind of trial conducted  in  a  manner  different  from  that
     prescribed by the Code. This deviation constitutes disobedience  to  an
     express provision of the Code as to the mode of trial, and  as  pointed
     out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in  Subramania  Iyer
     v. King Emperor (1901) 28 I.A. 257 such a deviation cannot be  regarded
     as a mere irregularity. It goes to the root  of  the  matters  and  the
     resulting illegality is of  such  a  character  that  it  vitiates  the
     sentence. (Vide Pulukurti Kotayya v. King Emperor (1947) 74 I.A. 65 and
     Magga and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan 1953 Cri.L.J. 892). Secondly, when
     no opportunity has been given to the appellant to produce material  and
     make submissions in regard to  the  sentence  to  be  imposed  on  him,
     failure of justice must be regarded as implicit. Section 465 cannot, in
     the circumstances, have any application in a case like the present”.


     “11….This obviously postulates  that  the  accused  must  be  given  an
     opportunity of making his representation only regarding the question of
     sentence and for this purpose he may be allowed to place such materials
     as he may think fit but which may have bearing only on the question  of
     sentence. The statute seeks to achieve a socio-economic purpose and  is
     aimed at attaining the  ideal  principle  of  proper  sentencing  in  a
     rational and progressive society. The modern concept of punishment  and
     penology has undergone a vital transformation and the criminal  is  now
     not looked upon as a grave menace to the society which  should  be  got
     rid of but as  a  diseased  person  suffering  from  mental  malady  or
     psychological  frustration  due  to  subconscious  reactions  and   is,
     therefore, to be cured and  corrected  rather  than  to  be  killed  or
     destroyed. There may be a number of circumstances of  which  the  Court
     may not be aware and which may be taken into consideration by the Court
     while awarding the sentence, particularly a sentence of  death,  as  in
     the instant case. It will be difficult to lay down any  hard  and  fast
     rule, but the statement of objects and reasons of the 1973 Code  itself
     gives a clear illustration. It refers to an instance where the  accused
     is the sole bread-earner of the family. In such a case if the  sentence
     of death is passed and executed it  amounts  not  only  to  a  physical
     effacement  of  the  criminal  but  also  a   complete   socio-economic
     destruction of the family which he leaves behind. Similarly  there  may
     be cases, where, after the offence and during the  trial,  the  accused
     may have developed some virulent  disease  or  some  mental  infirmity,
     which may be an important factor to be taken into  consideration  while
     passing the sentence of death. It was for these  reasons  that  Section
     235(2) of the 1973 Code was enshrined in the Code for  the  purpose  of
     making the Court aware of these  circumstances  so  that  even  if  the
     highest penalty of death is passed on the accused he does  not  have  a
     grievance that he was not heard on his personal,  social  and  domestic
     circumstances before the sentence was given.”





29)  In Ram Deo Chauhan @ Raj Nath Chauhan vs. State of Assam, AIR  2001  SC
2231, this Court examined the issue at length and held:


     “4…..The requirement contained in  Section  235(2)  of  the  Code  (the
     obligation of the  Judge  to  hear  the  accused  on  the  question  of
     sentence) is intended  to  achieve  a  purpose.  The  said  legislative
     provision is meant for affording benefit to the convicted person in the
     matter of sentence. But when the Sessions judge  does  not  propose  to
     award death penalty to a person convicted of the offence under  Section
     302 IPC what is the benefit to be secured by hearing the accused on the
     question of sentence. However much it  is  argued  the  Sessions  Judge
     cannot award a sentence less than imprisonment for life  for  the  said
     offence. If a Sessions Judge who convicts the accused under Section 302
     IPC (with or without the aid of other sections)  does  not  propose  to
     award death penalty, we feel that the Court  need  not  waste  time  on
     hearing the accused on the question of sentence. We therefore choose to
     use this occasion for reiterating  the  legal  position  regarding  the
     necessity to afford opportunity for  hearing  to  the  accused  on  the
     question of sentence is as follows:-


     (1) When the conviction is under Section 302 IPC (with or  without  the
     aid of Section 34 or 149 or 120B of IPC) if the Sessions Judge does not
     propose  to  impose  death  penalty  on  the  convicted  person  it  is
     unnecessary to proceed to hear the accused on the question of sentence.
     Section 235(2) of the Code will not be violated if the sentence of life
     imprisonment (SIC) awarded for that offence without hearing the accused
     on the question of sentence.


     (2) In all other cases the accused must be given sufficient opportunity
     of hearing on the question of sentence.


     (3) The normal rule is that after pronouncing the verdict of guilty the
     hearing should be made on the same day and the sentence shall  also  be
     pronounced on the same day.


     (4) In cases where the Judge feels or if the accused demands more  time
     for hearing on the question of  sentence  (especially  when  the  Judge
     propose to impose death penalty) the proviso to Section 309(2) is not a
     bar for affording such time.


     (5) For any reason the court is inclined  to  adjourn  the  case  after
     pronouncing the verdict of  guilty  in  grave  offences  the  convicted
     person shall be committed to jail till the verdict on the  sentence  is
     pronounced. Further detention will depend upon the process of law.”

30)   In  case,  such  an  opportunity  of  hearing  is  not  provided,  the
Appellate Court must remand the case to the trial court on a  limited  issue
for re-trial on the question of sentence. (Vide:  Narpal Singh  &  Ors.  vs.
State of Haryna, AIR 1977 SC 1066). However, in  exceptional  circumstances,
where remand is likely to cause delay, it is open to  remedy  the  prejudice
by giving a hearing to the accused  on  the  question  of  sentence  by  the
Appellate Court. (Vide: Dagdu & Ors. etc.  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,  AIR
1977 SC 1579; Tarlok Singh vs. State  of  Punjab,  AIR  1977  SC  1747;  and
Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar & Ors. vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,  AIR  2004  SC
503).  In case, at the time  of  trial,  there  was  no  objection  for  not
providing sufficient time to the accused or in respect of small fraction  of
the mandatory provision of Section 235(2) of the Code, he cannot be  allowed
to raise the plea of prejudice of such non-compliance  at  Appellate  stage.
(Vide:  Motilal vs. State of M.P. (Now Chhatisgarh), (2004) 2 SCC 469).
31)   Thus, in view of the above, it  is  evident  that  generally  judgment
must be complete  and  it  must  have  points  for  determination,  decision
thereon and reasons for such a decision.  The  basic  requirement  for  such
ingredients appears to be that  the  superior  court  (appellate/revisional)
may be able to examine as to whether the judgment under challenge  has  been
rendered in accordance with law  and  particularly,  based  on  evidence  on
record.  So, the purpose of recording reasons is to facilitate the  superior
court to examine the correctness of the judgment of  the  courts  below.  So
far as the grievance of the accused/convict that opportunity of hearing  was
not given by the court below and, thus,  he  failed  to  address  the  court
appropriately on the issue of sentence, may not have any substance  for  the
reason that the legislative policy discernible  under  Section  235(2)  read
with Section 354(3) is that quantum of punishment is  to  be  determined  on
considerations and circumstances not  merely  connected  with  a  particular
crime but  a  court  is  bound  to  give  due  consideration  to  the  other
circumstances also of the criminal.  It is for this reason that court  while
hearing a convict on sentence is required to give a party an opportunity  of
producing evidence or materials relating to the various factors having  some
bearing on the question of  sentence.   The  court,  while  determining  the
quantum of sentence, acts in an altogether different domain in  which  facts
and factors which operate are of an  entirely  different  order  than  those
which come into play on the question of  conviction.   Therefore,  there  is
bifurcation of trial as an accused has a  right  of  pre-conviction  hearing
under Section 234 and secondly right of pre-sentence hearing  under  Section
235 of the Code. For  pre-conviction  hearing,  the  accused  must  be  well
informed as to what the exact prosecution case is  and  what  evidence  have
been  adduced  by  the  prosecution  to  prove  its  case.  It  is  for  the
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, as in case the  pivot
of the prosecution is not accepted, a new prosecution case  cannot  be  made
to imperil the defence.  The prosecution as well as the convict has a  right
to adduce evidence to show aggravating grounds to impose  severe  punishment
or mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser sentence.   More  so,  appeal
is a continuity of trial.
32)   In Akhtari Bi (Smt.) vs. State of M.P., AIR 2001 SC 1528,  this  Court
explained the nature of appeal observing as under:-

     “Appeal being a statutory right, the trial  court's  verdict  does  not
     attain finality during pendency of the appeal and for that purpose  his
     trial is deemed to be continuing despite conviction”.
33)   Needless to say that Appellate court has a  right  of  rehearing,  re-
appreciating the evidence and in exceptional circumstances even to permit  a
party to adduce additional evidence.  Therefore, in a case where  there  has
been some irregularity in delivering the judgment, it can be  cured  at  the
appellate stage.
34)   As against the above mentioned decisions, it is also useful  to  refer
the following decisions which are directly on the point in issue.

35)   Judgment indicates  the  termination  of  the  case  by  an  order  of
conviction or acquittal of the accused and judgment is  to  be  rendered  in
strict adherence to the provisions of Chapter  XXVII  of  the  Code.  (Vide:
Hori Ram Singh vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 43; and Kuppuswami Rao vs. The  King,
AIR 1949 PC 1)


36)   In view of the provisions of Section 354 of the Code, it is  necessary
that every judgment must contain:


(1) the points for determination;


(2) the decision thereon; and


(3) the reasons for such decision.


 Where the reasons given by the trial Court are such as cannot be  supported
by the evidence on record, they  are  not  reasons  for  the  decision.   To
constitute a legal appreciation of evidence, the judgment should be such  as
to indicate that the Court has applied its mind to it. Every portion of  the
judgment must indicate application of mind by the Court to the  evidence  on
record. The reason  for  the  decision  is  an  important  ingredient  of  a
judgment. Compliance with the law  in  this  regard  should  not  be  merely
formal but substantial and real, for it is this part of the  judgment  alone
which enables  the  higher  Court  to  appreciate  the  correctness  of  the
decision, the parties to feel that  the  Court  has  fully  and  impartially
considered their respective cases and the public to realise that  a  genuine
and sincere attempt has been made to mete out even-handed justice.   Reasons
form the substratum  of  the  decision  and  their  factual  accuracy  is  a
guarantee that the Court has applied its mind to the evidence in  the  case.
Where the statement of reasons turned out to be a mere hollow pretension  of
a baseless claim of application of  mind  by  the  Court,  the  judgment  is
robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits  its  claim  to
be termed as judgment in the eyes of law.

37)   In Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab,  AIR  1980  SC  898,  this  Court
observed:
     “151…..Accordingly, sub-section (3)  of  Section  354  of  the  Cr.P.C.
     provides:
     “When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the
     alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a  term  of
     years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the  sentence  awarded,
     and, in the case of sentence of death, the  special  reasons  for  such
     sentence.”


     “152. In the context, we may also notice Section 235(2) of the Code  of
     1973, because it  makes  not  only  explicit,  what  according  to  the
     decision in Jagmohan Singh vs. State  of  U.P.  AIR  1973  SC  947  was
     implicit in the scheme of the Code, but also bifurcates  the  trial  by
     providing for two hearings, one at the pre-conviction stage and another
     at the pre-sentence stage….”


     …..By enacting Section 235(2) of the new Code, Parliament has  accepted
     that recommendation of the Law Commission. Although sub-section (2)  of
     Section 235 does not contain a specific provision as  to  evidence  and
     provides only for hearing of the accused as  to  sentence,  yet  it  is
     implicit in this provision that if a request is made in that behalf  by
     either the prosecution or the accused, or by  both,  the  Judge  should
     give the  party  or  parties  concerned  an  opportunity  of  producing
     evidence or material relating to the various  factors  bearing  on  the
     question of sentence.


In this view, we are in accord with the dictum laid down  in  Balwant  Singh
vs. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 230, wherein the interpretation  of  Section
354(3) first came up for consideration.


     “4…..Under this provision the court is required to  state  the  reasons
     for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death,  special
     reasons are required to be  stated.  It  would  thus  be  noticed  that
     awarding of the sentence other  than  the  sentence  of  death  is  the
     general rule now and only special reasons,  that  is  to  say,  special
     facts and circumstances in a given case, will warrant  the  passing  of
     the death sentence. It is unnecessary nor is  it  possible  to  make  a
     catalogue of the special reasons which may justify the passing  of  the
     death sentence in a case…..”


The present legislative policy discernible from  Section  235(2)  read  with
Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree  of  punishment  or  making  the
choice of sentence for various offences, including one under Section 302  of
IPC, the court should not confine its consideration “principally” or  merely
to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give  due
consideration to the circumstances of the criminal.


38)   In Allauddin Mian & Ors. Sharif Mian & Anr. vs. State  of  Bihar,  AIR
1989 SC 1456, this Court observed:
     “10…..The  said  provision  therefore  satisfies  a  dual  purpose;  it
     satisfies the rule of natural justice by according to  the  accused  an
     opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at the  same
     time helps the court to choose the sentence to be  awarded.  Since  the
     provision is intended to give  the  accused  an  opportunity  to  place
     before the court all the relevant material  having  a  bearing  on  the
     question of sentence there can  be  no  doubt  that  the  provision  is
     salutary and must be strictly followed. It  is  clearly  mandatory  and
     should not be treated as a mere formality…..”

39)   In Muniappan vs. State of T.N., AIR 1981  SC  1220,  this  Court  held
that the obligation to hear the accused on the question  of  sentence  which
is imposed by Section 235(2) of the Code is  not  discharged  by  putting  a
formal question to the accused as to what he has to say on the  question  of
sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to elicit  from  the  accused
all information which will eventually have a  bearing  on  the  question  of
sentence. All admissible evidence is before  the  Judge  but  that  evidence
itself often  furnishes  a  clue  to  the  genesis  of  the  crime  and  the
motivation of the criminal. It is the bounden duty of a Judge to cast  aside
the formalities of the court scene and approach  the  question  of  sentence
from a broad,  sociological  point  of  view.  The  occasion  to  apply  the
provisions of Section 235(2) arises only after the conviction  is  recorded.
What then remains is the question  of  sentence  in  which  not  merely  the
accused but the whole society has a stake. The court, while on the  question
of sentence, is in  an  altogether  different  domain  in  which  facts  and
factors which operate are of an entirely different order  than  those  which
come into play on the question of conviction.
40)  In Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod vs. State  of  Gujarat,  (2009)  5  SCC
740, this Court observed that in a case where the court  imposes  the  death
sentence both the aforesaid provisions, namely, Section 235(2)  and  Section
354(3) of the Code assume signal significance. The  constitutional  validity
of Section 354(3) was upheld in Bachan Singh (supra) as learned Judges  have
said that the legislative policy in sentencing  is  discernable  from  those
two sections. In a judgment, both those two sections supplement  each  other
and in a case where death penalty is imposed,  both  the  sections  must  be
harmoniously and conjointly appreciated and read.
41)   Section 235(2), as interpreted by this Court in Bachan Singh  (supra),
provides for a “bifurcated trial”. It gives the accused (i) a right of  pre-
sentence hearing, on which he can (ii) bring on record material or  evidence
which  may  not  be  (iii)  strictly  relevant  to  or  connected  with  the
particular crime but (iv) may have a bearing  on  the  choice  of  sentence.
Therefore, it has to be a regular hearing like a trial and not a mere  empty
formality or an exercise in  an  idle  ritual.  Even  without  referring  to
Bachan Singh (supra) in Muniappan (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this  Court,
emphasised the  importance  of  hearing  the  accused  on  the  question  of
sentence under Section 235(2) of the Code and came to  the  conclusion  that
the question of hearing the accused on sentence was  not  to  be  discharged
without putting formal questions to the accused.   This  Court,  in  Malkiat
Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1991) 4  SCC  341,  while  explaining  the
provisions under Section 235(2) of the Code, held as under.
     “18. … Hearing contemplated is not confined merely to oral hearing  but
     also intended to afford an opportunity to the prosecution  as  well  as
     the accused to place before the court facts and  material  relating  to
     various factors on the question  of  sentence,  and  if  interested  by
     either side, to have evidence adduced to show mitigating  circumstances
     to impose a lesser sentence or  aggravating  grounds  to  impose  death
     penalty. Therefore, sufficient time must be given to the accused or the
     prosecution on the question of sentence, to show the grounds  on  which
     the prosecution may plead or the accused  may  show  that  the  maximum
     sentence of death may  be  the  appropriate  sentence  or  the  minimum
     sentence of life imprisonment may be awarded, as the case may be…..”

      Therefore, fairness, justice and reasonableness which  constitute  the
essence of guarantee of life and liberty epitomised in  Article  21  of  the
Constitution also pervades the sentencing  policy  in  Sections  235(2)  and
354(3) of the Code. Those two provisions virtually  assimilate  the  concept
of “procedure established by law” within the meaning of Article  21  of  the
Constitution. Thus, a strict compliance with those provisions in the way  it
was interpreted in Bachan Singh (supra) having regard to the development  of
constitutional law by this Court is a must before imposing death sentence.
42)   It is clear that “judgment” is a formal  intimation  of  the  decision
and its contents formally declare in a  judicial  way  in  open  court.   In
other words, it is a declaration of the mind of the Court  at  the  time  of
pronouncement.  It is also clear that  passing  sentence  without  recording
the judgment  would  amount  to  illegality.   Pronouncing  sentence  before
completing the judgment, that is, before preparing the essential part  makes
the sentence illegal and vitiates the conviction.
43)   We have already adverted to the fact that the word “judgment” has  not
been defined in IPC, and even in TADA.   However,  the  Code,  particularly,
Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 make it clear that how the judgment is to  be
in a criminal trial, language and contents and the procedure to be  followed
in furnishing copy of the judgment immediately after pronouncement.   It  is
also clear that the  ultimate  decision,  namely,  the  judgment,  shall  be
pronounced in the open court after the termination of  the  trial.   Section
353(1) of the Code makes it clear that it is incumbent on the  part  of  the
Presiding Officer to deliver the whole of the judgment  or  by  reading  out
the operative part of the judgment  and  explaining  the  substance  of  the
judgment in a language which is understood by the accused  or  his  pleader.
We  have  already  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  blasts  occurred   on
12.03.1993.   Initially,  the  charge  sheet  was  filed  by  the  State  of
Maharasthra on 04.11.1993 relating to  189  persons.   Thereafter,  CBI  was
asked to investigate  further  on  19.11.1993  and  filed  19  supplementary
charge sheets.  Finally, on 10.04.1995, order framing  charges  was  passed.
Thereafter, recording of evidence  began  on  30.06.1995  by  examining  the
first  prosecution  witness.   Recording  of  the  evidence  continued  till
18.10.2000.  Thereafter,  the  arguments  commenced  from  09.08.2001  which
continued up to 20.09.2003.  After  having  voluminous  record  of  evidence
both oral and documentary,  the  Designated  Court  reserved  for  order  on
23.11.2003 and the same  position  continued  up  till  12.09.2006.   It  is
relevant to point out that in total 123 persons were tried as  accused,  out
of which, 23 persons were acquitted of  all  the  charges  and  the  balance
accused were convicted and sentenced under  various  charges.   The  records
produced show that on 12.09.2006, the Designated Court started  reading  the
conclusion.  On that day, the Court passed the following  order  in  respect
of A-1.
      “For the reasons separately recorded the conclusion being reached of:
           A-1 Yakub Abdul Razak Memon being found guilty for offences  for
      which charge at head firstly is framed against  him  and  for  offence
      under Section 3(3) of TADA Act for which charge at  head  secondly  is
      framed against him and for offence under Section 5 of TADA  for  which
      charge at head thirdly is framed against him  and  for  offence  under
      Section 6 of TADA for which charge at head fourthly is framed  against
      him and for offence punishable  under  Sections  3  and  4  read  with
      Section 6 of the Explosive Act for which charge  at  head  fifthly  is
      framed against him. ”


Since at this  moment,  we  are  concentrating  only  on  A-1,  we  are  not
extracting the conclusion  reached  in  respect  of  other  accused.   After
recording the above conclusion, the Designated Court has also  recorded  the
following statements:
      “The said accused were apprised regarding offences for which they were
      found to be guilty.
      In view of court having reached to such findings A-3, 4, A-8  who  are
      on bail are taken into custody of this  court  and  their  bail  bonds
      stand cancelled.
      For recording statement of accused who are found  guilty  about  their
      say regarding quantum of sentence to be  imposed,  the  matter  stands
      posted tomorrow.”


44)    On  27.07.2007,  the  Designated  Court  again  read  the   following
conclusion in respect of A-1.
      “82 a) Accused no. 1 Yakub  Abdul  Razak  Memon  out  of  remaining  5
      accused at trial:
       is found guilty for the offence of conspiracy for commission of  such
      acts  as  found  proved  from  charge  firstly  framed  at  trial  and
      punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA Act, 1987 and Section  120-B  of
      IPC read with offences mentioned in said charge and on said count said
      accused is hereby convicted and  sentenced  to  suffer  punishment  of
      death and for the said purpose is ordered to be  hanged  by  the  neck
      till he is dead but subject to confirmation of same  by  Hon’ble  Apex
      Court about said part of sentence and is also ordered to pay a fine of
      Rs. 25, 000/- (Twenty Five Thousand.)
      (b)   is also found guilty for offence punishable under  Section  3(3)
      of TADA Act, 1987 for commission of such acts  as  found  proved  from
      charge at head secondly framed against him  and  on  said  count  said
      accused is hereby convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for life and is
      ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh only) and in default
      of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI  for  a  period  of
      2(two) years.
      (c)   is also found guilty for offence punishable under Section  5  of
      TADA for commission of such acts as found proved from charge  at  head
      thirdly framed against him and on said counts said accused  is  hereby
      convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 10 (ten) years and is ordered
      to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh  only)  and  in  default  of
      payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI  for  a  period  of  2
      (two) years.
      (d)   is also found guilty for offence punishable under Section  6  of
      TADA for commission of such acts as found proved from charge  at  head
      fourthly framed against him and on said count said accused  is  hereby
      convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 14 (fourteen)  years  and  is
      ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh only) and in default
      of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI for a period  of  2
      (two) years.
      (e)   is also found guilty for offence punishable under Sections 3 and
      4 read with Section 6 of the Explosives Act  for  commission  of  such
      acts as found proved from charge at head fifthly  framed  against  him
      and on said count said accused is hereby convicted  and  sentenced  to
      suffer RI for 10 (ten) years and is ordered  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.
      50,000/- (Fifty thousand only) and in default of payment  of  fine  is
      ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 1 (one) year.
      (f)   however, aforesaid accused being found not guilty of  all  other
      offences for which said accused was  charged  at  trial  vide  charges
      framed at Exh. 4 said accused is acquitted for all said offences.
      (g)   accused entitled for set off in accordance with law  for  period
      for which he was in custody.
      (h)   the substantive sentence awarded to A-1 to run concurrently.
      (i)   A-1 is apprised of sentence awarded to him.  The said accused is
      again apprised that sentence of Death awarded to  him  is  subject  to
      confirmation of same by Hon’ble Apex Court and for said purpose  court
      would be making necessary reference to Apex Court within 30 days  from
      the day of completion of passing of final order.
      (j)   The said accused is further apprised that it will take some time
      to complete pronouncement of final order of conviction and sentence of
      remaining accused in this case  and  thus  complete  the  judgment  by
      getting same transcribed, corrected and signed.  The said  accused  is
      apprised that a copy of judgment and order will  be  supplied  to  him
      free of cost after the same is completed and corrected in all  respect
      and for said purpose the said accused will be ordered to  be  produced
      before Registrar of this Court on 26th September  2007  for  supplying
      such copy subject to same being by then ready.
      (k)   the court Sheristedar to handover operative part of order passed
      today to A-1.
      (l)   Registrar to send A-1, A-3,
      A-4 and A-8 to Arthur Road Prison along with appropriate warrant.


      27.07.2007




                                             -Sd/-


                                          (P.D. Kode)
                                       Presiding Officer
                                      of the Designated Court
                                   (Under TADA (P) Act, 1987)
                                             For Bomb Blast Cases,
                                       Greater Bombay”


45)   On perusal of the conclusion with regard  to  A-1,  it  is  very  much
clear that he was apprised regarding the offences for which he was found  to
be guilty.  While A-1 was awarded death  sentence,  it  is  clear  from  the
conclusion that he was apprised that sentence of death  awarded  to  him  is
subject to the confirmation by the Apex Court and he was also informed  that
for the said purpose the Court would be making necessary reference  to  Apex
Court within 30 days from the date of completion of passing of final  order.
   In the same order, the Court has also apprised  A-1  that  it  will  take
some time to complete the pronouncement of the  final  order  of  conviction
and sentence of remaining accused and completed the judgment by getting  the
same transcribed,  corrected  and  signed.   The  court  also  directed  the
Sheristedar to handover the ‘operative part’ of the  order  passed  on  both
these days, i.e., 12.09.2006 and 27.07.2007.  In view of the  above,  it  is
useful to refer the following decisions on the point.
46)   In Rama Narang  vs. Ramesh Narang & Ors., (1995) 2  SCC  513,  it  was
held as under:
      “12. …… the trial, therefore, comes to an end only after the  sentence
      is awarded to the convicted person.”

                                               (emphasis supplied)


      “13. …… Thus a judgment is not complete unless the punishment to which
      the accused person is sentenced is set out therein.”
                                               (emphasis supplied)



      The Court further held in para 15:
      “15….. Under the provisions of the  Code  to  which  we  have  already
      referred there are two stages in a criminal trial  before  a  Sessions
      Court, the stage upto the recording of a convicton and the stage post-
      conviction upto  the  imposition  of  sentence.   A  judgment  becomes
      complete after both these stages are covered….”
                                               (emphasis supplied)

47)   In Lakdey Ashok vs. Government of A.P., (2009) 6  ALT  677  (in  Paras
12, 13 and 15) it was held  by  the  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  that  the
‘judgment’, as contemplated under Section 353 is  complete  only  after  the
order on sentence is pronounced.  The High Court held that:
      “It will thus be seen that under the  Code  after  the  conviction  is
      recorded, Section 235(2) inter alia provides that a judge  shall  hear
      the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on  him
      according to law.  The trial, therefore, comes to an  end  only  after
      the sentence is awarded to the convicted person.  It will thus be seen
      from above provisions that after the court records a  conviction,  the
      accused has to be heard on the question of sentence  and  it  is  only
      after the sentence is awarded that the judgment becomes  complete  and
      can be appealed against under Section 373  of  the  CrPC.   Under  the
      provisions of the Code to which we have already referred there are two
      stages in a criminal trial before the sessions court, the stage up  to
      recording of a conviction and the  stage  post-conviction  up  to  the
      imposition of sentence.  A judgment becomes complete after both  these
      stages are covered.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)

It is clear that a conviction order is  not  a  “judgment”  as  contemplated
under Section 353 and that a judgment is pronounced only after the award  of
sentence.  In  the  case  on  hand,  the  Designated  Judge  pronounced  the
operative part of the judgment on 27.07.2007 and explained the substance  of
the judgment to  the  appellant  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of
Section 353(1)(c) of the Code.  A perusal  of  the  final  judgment  of  the
Designated Court shows that the Designated Judge has dealt  with  the  issue
of pronouncing the judgment under Section 353(1)(c) in detail.   In  para  5
of Part 46 of  the  final  judgment,  the  Designated  Judge  explained  the
reasons for pronouncing the judgment under Section 353(1)(c) of the Code  as
follows:-
      “5)   In the premises aforesaid but in light of 1)  events  which  had
      occurred in past at trial, 2) keeping in mind attitude and conduct  of
      accused as disclosed during course of trial, 3) mammoth subject matter
      involved at trial i.e. charges framed thereon running  into  512  with
      many of them containing in  all  192  sub  charges,  4)  delicacy  and
      sensitivity of subject  matter  involved  at  trial  due  to  numerous
      incidents involved and communal  conflict  said  to  be  involved,  5)
      impact likely  to  be  caused  at/even  after  commencing  process  of
      judgment within and even outside court precincts, 6) impact likely  to
      be caused at/after declaration of final order, 7)  point  of  security
      and safety of concerns attending during course of proceeding within or
      even outside precincts of court and point of law and order within  the
      City/State/Nation, 8) large number of 123 accused about whom  judgment
      was to be declared, 9) necessity of  smoothly  completing  process  of
      judgement by taking due care to prevent/avoid occurring of  any  event
      causing disturbance, interruptions etc. during same vitiating  decorum
      of court, it was proper to deliver judgement only in  accordance  with
      provision of Sec. 353(1) (c) of Cr.P.C. rather than adopting any other
      prescribed mode for delivery  of  judgement.   Needless  to  add  that
      following the other method was bound  to  result  trend  of  judgement
      being known to accused prior to delivery of same and thus  giving  all
      the chance to unscrupulous accused on  bail  to  flee  away  and  such
      accused in custody  to  create  confusion/or  indulge  in  activities,
      disrupting ongoing work and thereby defeating the process of law.  For
      the  same  reason  it  was  also  felt  necessary  to  keep  judgement
      computerized and contents thereof protected by putting password rather
      than taking print out of the same.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

48)    Since  we  have  completely  analyzed  the  method  follwed  by   the
Designated Judge, we are satisfied that the requirements  of  pronouncing  a
judgment under Section 353(1)(c) of the Code have been fully complied  with.
 The above approach makes it clear  that  while  pronouncing  the  operative
part of the judgment, the Designated Court ensured  that  the  substance  of
the judgment has been explained to the  appellant  in  compliance  with  the
requirement of Section 353.  It is also relevant to point out that the  said
order dated 27.07.2007 was pronounced in open court and signed and dated  by
the Designated Judge  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  said
section.
49)   Regarding  the  requirement  of  providing  a  copy  of  the  judgment
immediately as required by the provisions of  Section  363,  the  Designated
Judge in para 61 of Part 46 of the final judgment has dealt  with  the  same
as follows:-
      “Having regard to the same, the word used  “immediately”  in  sub-sec.
      363 (1) of Cr.P.C. will be required to be interpreted  in  context  of
      subject matter involved in each of the  case.   In  short  in  a  case
      involving such huge subject  matter  furnishing  of  such  copy  after
      reasonable time after completion of passing of final order would never
      be said to be an act offending provisions of law or defeating right of
      accused.”

50)   We have already pointed out  that  this  was  a  joint  trial  of  123
accused persons.  It is also brought to our notice  that  the  copy  of  the
final judgment was  provided  free  of  cost  to  the  appellant  after  the
pronouncement of the orders with respect to  each  of  the  accused  by  the
Designated Judge.  Further, as is evident from para (j) of the  order  dated
27.07.2007, the appellant was apprised of the fact that a copy of the  final
judgment would  be  provided  after  completion  of  the  order  as  regards
sentence in respect of the remaining accused.
51)   As pointed out earlier, the trial at  the  Designated  Court  involved
123 accused and findings were recorded for 512 charges and accordingly,  the
process of pronouncing sentence in respect of  each  accused  and  apprising
the accused of the same could not have been completed in a day.   Thus,  the
process of pronouncement of judgment had to be carried out for  all  accused
since it was a joint trial and accordingly a  copy  of  the  final  judgment
could be provided to each  of  the  accused  only  after  the  sentence  was
pronounced in respect of all the accused persons.  The judgment  also  shows
that detailed hearings on sentencing effectively  commenced  after  all  the
conviction orders were pronounced and counsel for  the  appellant/appellants
made detailed submissions on it.  It is evident from  para  351  onwards  of
Part 46 of the final judgment that detailed submissions  were  made  by  the
counsel by pointing out mitigating  factors  that  were  considered  by  the
Designated Judge while sentencing the appellant and  other  accused  at  the
trial.  It is also clear from the judgment that  detailed  submissions  were
made by the appellant  (A-1)  during  the  pre-sentence  hearing  and  these
submissions were considered and, accordingly, reasons have been recorded  by
the Designated Judge in Part 46 of the final  judgment  in  compliance  with
the requirement of Section 235(2) and Section 353 of the Code.  It  is  also
relevant to mention that Section 354 makes it clear  that  ‘judgment’  shall
contain the punishment awarded to the accused.  It  is  therefore,  complete
only after sentence is determined.
52)   Section 354(1)(c) states that every judgment referred  to  in  Section
353 “shall specify the offence of which,  and  the  section  of  the  Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860), or other law under which, the accused is  convicted
and the punishment to which he is  sentenced.  In  view  of  the  same,  the
judgment under  Section  353(1)(c)  is  to  be  pronounced  only  after  the
sentence in a case where conviction is determined. The process  of  delivery
of judgment includes  the  determination  of  guilt,  or  otherwise,  of  an
accused and in the event of such guilt being established, also includes  the
process of sentencing the accused.
53)   In our case, it was pointed out that  the  judgment  was  reserved  on
23.11.2003.  Till 2006, the Court proceeded to  formulate  its  reasons  and
make judicial determination  of  guilt  or  otherwise  in  respect  of  each
accused.  The process of delivery of judgment commenced on  12.09.2006  when
the Court pronounced its verdict on  the  guilt  or  otherwise  of  specific
accused.  Whilst doing so, the Designated Judge explained the  offences  for
which the accused were being convicted and invited the  accused  persons  to
make their statements with reference to the  quantum  of  sentence.   It  is
evident that at this  stage,  the  detailed  reasoning  may  not  have  been
finally communicated to the accused, but the determination of the  Court  as
well as the broad understanding of the operative part of  the  judgment  was
communicated.  In case there is an objection on  the  part  of  the  accused
regarding not knowing the reasons for his conviction, it contextually  means
that he had not been made aware as to the specific  pieces  of  evidence  or
marshalling of facts which led to his conviction.
54)   In view of the same, there is no illegality  or  irregularity  in  the
process followed and specifically under Sections 353, 354  and  235  keeping
in mind the magnitude of the task before the Designated  Judge  inasmuch  as
he was trying 123 accused persons and had to deliver a judgment  which  runs
in about 4,300 pages.  In view of the above, we hold that the  pronouncement
of the judgment was in compliance with the  above  said  provisions  of  the
Code and does not violate any of the provisions of the Code as contended  by
the appellant.
55)   It is also clear from the reasoning of the Designated  Court  that  by
adopting the same procedure, the Designated Judge  conveyed  the  conclusion
with regard to various charges  leveled  against  other  accused  (convicted
total accused 100) and also apprised each one  of  them  including  A-1  the
reasoning and other materials for arriving at such a conclusion as  well  as
their pleaders.  He also apprised that because  the  convicted  accused  are
100 in number and the common judgment is running into  thousands  of  pages,
it may require some time and as soon as  the  full  judgment  will  be  made
ready, the same will be supplied to them free of cost.   It  does  not  mean
that on the date of pronouncing the decision  (decision  was  pronounced  on
various dates), the whole judgment was not ready or incomplete.
56)   As the Code mandates that  the  accused  are  entitled  to  full/whole
judgment, unless the conclusion relating to all  the  convicted  accused  is
read over and explained to them, opportunity  of  hearing  on  sentence  has
been provided to them or their respective counsel and incorporation of  both
the conclusions relating to conviction and sentence has been done, the  same
cannot be supplied to the accused.  Taking note of  the  number  of  persons
involved, witnesses examined, documents marked/exhibited which  are  running
into thousands of pages, unless the full/whole judgment containing  all  the
details, the same cannot be supplied to the accused.  In  other  words,  the
supplied copy of the judgment unless contains the  charges,  materials  both
oral and documentary relied on  by  the  prosecution,  discussion,  ultimate
conclusion and the sentence,  the  same  cannot  be  treated  as  full/whole
judgment in terms of the procedure prescribed under the Code.   Inasmuch  as
all these factual aspects, particularly, the  peculiar  position  about  the
number  of  accused  and  voluminous  oral  and  documentary  evidence,  the
Designated Judge not only apprised the accused regarding  the  offences  for
which they were found to be guilty but also of  the  reasoning  adopted  and
the materials relied on by him.
57)   It is also relevant to point out that on apprisal of various  offences
for which the accused were  found  to  be  guilty  before  hearing  all  the
accused on sentence, their respective counsel took time for  filing  written
arguments, in fact, filed written submissions  on  various  dates  conveying
their views to the Court.  It is also clear that  on  consideration  of  the
objections raised, the accused were  awarded  sentence  and  the  same  were
ultimately conveyed to all the accused.  It is not in dispute  that  neither
the decision relating to ultimate conviction nor the sentence could be  done
in one day in respect of all the convicted  100  accused.   Undoubtedly,  it
spread over to various dates and we are satisfied that the Designated  Court
completed its task by passing  the  impugned  orders  keeping  in  mind  the
procedural aspects to be followed in terms of the Code (vide  Sections  353,
354, 362, 363 etc.) and at the same time,  adhering  to  the  principles  of
natural justice and the valuable right of the accused under  Article  21  of
the Constitution.
Whether the impugned judgment is in violation of Section 362 of the Code.

58)   It is also brought to our notice that several applications  were  made
by various accused  persons  to  amend  the  conviction  orders  which  were
dismissed as meritless by the Designated Court.   In  fact,  the  Designated
Court dismissed the applications for amending the conviction  orders  of  99
accused persons.  Learned senior counsel for A-1  relied  upon  Section  362
and contended that since judgment on sentence had not been  pronounced,  the
Designated Court could amend the conviction order to bring  all  convictions
under the IPC instead of convicting 99 accused persons under TADA.   In  the
light of the submissions made, we verified the records  and  impugned  final
judgment, particularly, Part 46 and found that neither  A-1  nor  any  other
counsel pointed out the amendment, in particular,  that  would  attract  the
provisions of Section 362 of the  Code.   On  the  other  hand,  as  rightly
pointed out by  the  counsel  for  the  CBI,  there  is  no  alteration  and
amendment that has been made in the  judgment  after  its  pronouncement  as
claimed by the counsel for the appellant.
59)   The Code being essentially a code of procedure unlike  all  procedural
laws is designed to further the ends of justice and not  to  frustrate  them
by the introduction of endless technicalities.  The object of  the  Code  is
to ensure for the accused a full and  fair  trial  in  accordance  with  the
principles  of  natural  justice.   From  the  materials  placed  and  after
verification of the decision, apprisal of the accused about the contents  of
the  judgment,  hearing  all  the  accused  and  their  pleaders   regarding
sentence, we are satisfied that the Designated Court has complied  with  the
requirements  of  law  and  we  are  also  satisfied  that  considering  the
voluminous nature of work, even if there  is  mere  procedural  irregularity
that would not vitiate the trial or the ultimate conclusion unless the  same
results in miscarriage of justice.   We  are  satisfied  that  the  impugned
judgment and procedure followed and adopted by the Designated Court  fulfill
the mandate of the Code and there is  neither  violation  of  principles  of
natural justice  nor  breach  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution.   Even
otherwise, taking note of the fact that present appeals are the only  remedy
for the appellants, we heard the counsel at  length,  perused  and  analysed
all the oral and documentary evidence running into several  volumes.   Every
opportunity was  granted  to  all  the  counsel  and  all  the  issues  were
considered without any restriction.   Accordingly, we reject the  contention
raised by learned senior counsel for the appellant.
Conspiracy
60)   Chapter VA of IPC speaks  about  Criminal  Conspiracy.   Section  120A
defines criminal conspiracy which is as under:


      “120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.- When two  or  more  persons
      agree to do, or cause to be done,—
       
           (1) an illegal act, or
           (2) an act which is  not  illegal  by  illegal  means,  such  an
           agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
       
           Provided that no agreement except  an  agreement  to  commit  an
      offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act  besides
      the agreement is done by one or more  parties  to  such  agreement  in
      pursuance thereof.
       
           Explanation.--It is immaterial whether the illegal  act  is  the
      ultimate object of such agreement, or is  merely  incidental  to  that
      object.”
       
Section 120B speaks about punishment of  criminal  conspiracy  which  is  as
under:
      “120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever is a party to  a
      criminal conspiracy  to  commit  an  offence  punishable  with  death,
      imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years
      or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for
      the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as
      if he had abetted such offence.
       
      (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a  criminal
      conspiracy to commit an  offence  punishable  as  aforesaid  shall  be
      punished with imprisonment  of  either  description  for  a  term  not
      exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.”



      3 Objects and Reasons of the 1913 Amendment

61)   The above mentioned sections  were  introduced  by  the  amendment  of
1913.  It is important to  notice  the  Objects  and  Reasons  of  the  said
amendment to understand that the underlying purpose of  introducing  Section
120-A was to make a mere agreement to do an illegal act or an act  which  is
not illegal by illegal means, punishable.
Objects and Reasons are as follows:
      “The sections of the Indian Penal Code which deal  directly  with  the
      subject of conspiracy are those contained in Chapter V and Section 121-
      A of the Code.  Under the  latter  provision,  it  is  an  offence  to
      conspire to commit any of the offences punishable by  Section  121  of
      the  Indian  Penal  Code  or  to  conspire  to  deprive  the  King  of
      sovereignty of British India or any part  thereof  or  to  overawe  by
      means of criminal force or show of criminal force  the  Government  of
      India or any Local Government and to  constitute  a  conspiracy  under
      this Section. It is not necessary that any  act  or  illegal  omission
      should take place in pursuance thereof.  Under Section  107,  abetment
      includes engaging with one or more person or persons in any conspiracy
      for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
      pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing.
       In other words, except in respect of the offences  particularized  in
      Section 121-A conspiracy per se is not an  offence  under  the  Indian
      Penal Code.”


      “On the other hand, by the common law  of  England,  if  two  or  more
      persons agree together to do  anyting  contrary  to  law,  or  to  use
      unlawful means  in  the  carrying  out  of  an  object  not  otherwise
      unlawful, the persons, who so agree, commit the offence of conspiracy.
       In other words, conspiracy in England may be defined as an  agreement
      of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act  by
      unlawful means, and the parties to such a  conspiracy  are  liable  to
      indictment.”


      “Experience has shown that dangerous conspiracies  have  entered  into
      India which have for their object aims other than  the  commission  of
      the offences specified in Section 121-A of the Indian Penal  Code  and
      that the existing law is inadequate to deal  with  modern  conditions.
      The present Bill is designed  to  assimilate  the  provisions  of  the
      Indian Penal Code to those of the  English  law  with  the  additional
      safeguard that in the case of a conspiracy other than a conspiracy  to
      commit an offence some overt act is necessary to bring the  conspiracy
      within the purview of the  criminal  law.   The  Bill  makes  criminal
      conspiracy a substantive offence, and when such  a  conspiracy  is  to
      commit an offence punishable with death,  or  rigourous  imprisonement
      for a term of two years or upwards, and no express provision  is  made
      in the Code, provides a punishment of the same nature  as  that  which
      might be awarded for the abetment of such an offence.   In  all  other
      cases  of  criminal  conspiracy   the   punishment   contemplated   is
      imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months
      or with fine, or with both.”

4


5 Prior to the amendment of the Code and the introduction of Sections 120-A
and B, the doctrine of agency was applicable to ascertain the liability  of
the conspirators, however, conspiracy in itself was not an offence  (except
for certain offences).  The amendment made conspiracy a substantive offence
and rendered the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable.  Prior  to
the amendment, unless an  overt  act  took  place  in  furtherance  of  the
conspiracy it was not indictable (it would become indictable by  virtue  of
being abetment).  The proposition that the mere agreement  constitutes  the
offence has been accepted by this Court in  several  judgments.   Reference
may be made to Major E.G. Barsay vs. State  of  Bombay  (1962)  2  SCR  195
wherein this Court held that the the gist of the offence is an agreement to
break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of  criminal
conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done.  It
is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do
a single illegal act.  It may comprise the commission of a number of  acts.
The Court has held as under:-


      “31….Section  120-A  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  defines   “criminal
      conspiracy” and under that definition, “When two or more persons agree
      to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or an  act  which  is  not
      illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated  a  criminal
      conspiracy.”The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the  law.
      The  parties  to  such  an  agreement  will  be  guilty  of   criminal
      conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to  be  done  has  not  been
      done. So too, it is not an ingredient of  the  offence  that  all  the
      parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may  comprise  the
      commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the  Indian  Penal
      Code, an act would be illegal  if  it  is  an  offence  or  if  it  is
      prohibited by law. Under the first charge the accused are charged with
      having conspired to do three categories of illegal acts, and the  mere
      fact that all of them could not be convicted separately in respect  of
      each of the offences has no  relevancy  in  considering  the  question
      whether the offence of conspiracy has been  committed.  They  are  all
      guilty of the offence of conspiracy to do  illegal  acts,  though  for
      individual offences all of them may not be liable.

Theory of Agency and Conspiracy
62)   An important facet of the Law of Conspiracy is that apart from  it
being a distinct offence, all conspirators are liable for  the  acts  of
each other of the crime or crimes which have been committed as a  result
of the conspiracy. This principle has been  recognized  right  from  the
early judgment in Regina vs. Murphy (1873)  173  ER  502.  In  the  said
judgment Coleridge J. while summing up for the Jury stated as follows:

      “...I am bound to tell you, that although the  common  design  is  the
      root of the charge, it is  not  necessary  to  prove  that  these  two
      parties came together and actually agreed in terms to have this common
      design and to pursue it by comroeff means, and so  to  carry  it  into
      execution. This is not necessary, because in many cases  of  the  most
      clearly established conspiracies there are no  means  of  proving  any
      such thing and neither law nor common sense requires that it should be
      proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their  acts  the
      same object, often by the same means, one performing one  part  of  an
      act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object
      which they  were  pursuing,  you  will  be  at  liberty  to  draw  the
      conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect  that
      object. The question you have to ask yourselves  is,  'Had  they  this
      common design, and did they pursue it by  these  common  means  —  the
      design being unlawful?' it is not necessary that it should  be  proved
      that these defendants met to concoct this scheme, nor is it  necessary
      that they should have  originated  it.  If  a  conspiracy  be  already
      formed, and a person joins it afterwards, he is  equally  guilty.  You
      are to say whether, from the acts  that  have  been  proved,  you  are
      satisfied that these defendants were acting in concertin this  matter.
      If you are satisfied that there was concert between them, I  am  bound
      to say that being convinced of the conspiracy,  it  is  not  necessary
      that you should find both  Mr.  Murphy  and  Mr.  Douglas  doing  each
      particular act, as after the fact of conspiracy is already established
      in your minds, whatever is either  said  or  done  by  either  of  the
      defendants in pursuance of the common design, is, both in law  and  in
      common sense, to be considered as the acts of both.”

63)   Each conspirator can  be  attributed  each  others  actions  in  a
conspiracy. Theory of agency applies and this rule existed even prior to
the amendment of the Penal Code in India. This is reflected in the  rule
of evidence u/s  10  of  the  Evidence  Act.  Conspiracy  is  punishable
independent of its fruition. The  principle  of  agency  as  a  rule  of
liability and not merely a rule of evidence has been  accepted  both  by
the Privy Council as well as by this Court. The following judgments  are
relevant for this proposition:
(a) Babulal vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 130, where the Privy  Council  held
that:

      "if several persons conspire to commit offences, and commit overt acts
      in pursuance of the conspiracy (a circumstance which makes the act  of
      one the act of each   and   all  the  conspirators)  these   acts  are
      committed in the course of the same transaction,  which  embraces  the
      conspiracy and the acts done under it..."


(b) State of A.P. vs. Kandimalla Subbaiah (1962) 1 SCR 194,  where  this
Court opined that where a number of offences are  committed  by  several
persons in pursuance of a conspiracy it is usual  to  charge  them  with
those offences as well as with the offence of conspiracy to commit those
offences, if the alleged  offences  flow  out  of  the  conspiracy,  the
appropriate form of charge would be a specific charge in respect of each
of those offences along with the charge of conspiracy.
(c) State of H.P. vs. Krishan Lal Pardhan, (1987) 2 SCC 17 where it  was
held that the offence of criminal  conspiracy  consists  of  meeting  of
minds of two or more persons for agreeing to do or causing to be done an
illegal act or an act by illegal means, and the performance of an act in
terms thereof. If pursuant to the criminal conspiracy  the  conspirators
commit several offences, then  all  of  them  will  be  liable  for  the
offences even if some of them  had  not  actively  participated  in  the
commission of the offences.
(d) In Nalini (supra), this Court explained that conspiracy results in a
joint responsibility and everything said written or done in  furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been done by each of  them.  The
Court held:

      “583. Some of the broad principles governing the law of conspiracy may
      be summarized though,  as  the  name  implies,  a  summary  cannot  be
      exhaustive of the principles.

      1. Under Section 120-A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed
      when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be  done  an  illegal
      act or legal act by illegal means. When it is a legal act  by  illegal
      means overt act is necessary. Offence of  criminal  conspiracy  is  an
      exception to the general law where intent alone  does  not  constitute
      crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with  persons
      having the same intention. Not only the intention but there has to  be
      agreement to carry out the  object  of  the  intention,  which  is  an
      offence. The question for consideration in  a  case  is  did  all  the
      accused have the intention and  did  they  agree  that  the  crime  be
      committed. It would not be enough for the offence of  conspiracy  when
      some of the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever horrendous it
      may be, that offence be committed.

      2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of the object  of  conspiracy  may
      tend to prove that a particular accused was party to  the  conspiracy.
      Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, any  subsequent  act,
      which may be unlawful, would not  make  the  accused  a  part  of  the
      conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder.

      3. Conspiracy is hatched in  private  or  in  secrecy.  It  is  rarely
      possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence.  Usually,  both
      the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have  to  be  inferred
      from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.

      4. Conspirators may for example, be enrolled in a chain-  A  enrolling
      B, B enrolling C, and so on; and all  will  be  members  of  a  single
      conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each member  knows
      only the person who enrolled him and the person whom he enrols.  There
      may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrolment, where a  single  person  at
      the center does the enrolling and all the other members are unknown to
      each other, though they know that there are to be other members. These
      are theories and in  practice  it  may  be  difficult  to  tell  which
      conspiracy in a particular case falls  into  which  category.  It  may
      however, even overlap.  But  then  there  has  to  be  present  mutual
      interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each
      is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse  roles
      to play. It is not a part of the crime  of  conspiracy  that  all  the
      conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active role.

      5. When two or more persons agree to commit  a  crime  of  conspiracy,
      then regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission,
      and despite the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry
      out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and  every  one
      who joins in the agreement. There has thus to be two conspirators  and
      there may be more than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy  it  is
      not necessary that intended crime was committed or not.  If  committed
      it may further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy.

      6. It is not necessary that  all  conspirators  should  agree  to  the
      common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators
      at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all
      are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not
      be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator  joined  the
      conspiracy and when he left.

      7. A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it  forces
      them into a joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass  of
      evidence against every accused. Prosecution has  to  produce  evidence
      not only to show that each of the accused has knowledge of the  object
      of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the charge  of  conspiracy
      the court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to  the
      accused. Introduction of evidence  against  some  may  result  in  the
      conviction of all, which is to be avoided. By  means  of  evidence  in
      conspiracy, which is otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any  other
      substantive offence prosecution tries to  implicate  the  accused  not
      only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the
      alleged conspirators.  There  is  always  difficulty  in  tracing  the
      precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but  then  there
      has to be cogent and convincing  evidence  against  each  one  of  the
      accused charged with the offence of conspiracy. As observed  by  Judge
      Learned  Hand  “this  distinction  is  important   today   when   many
      prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy  all  those
      who have  been  associated  in  any  degree  whatever  with  the  main
      offenders”.

      8.  As  stated  above  it  is  the  unlawful  agreement  and  not  its
      accomplishment,  which  is  the  gist  or  essence  of  the  crime  of
      conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy  is  complete  even  though
      there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose  is  to  be
      accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement which is  the  gravamen  of
      the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement  which  amounts  to  a
      conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent  in  and
      inferred from the circumstances,  especially  declarations,  acts  and
      conduct of the conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by
      all the parties to it  at  the  same  time,  but  may  be  reached  by
      successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy.

      9. It has been said that a criminal conspiracy  is  a  partnership  in
      crime, and that there is in each conspiracy a joint or  mutual  agency
      for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if  two  or  more  persons
      enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant  to  the
      agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of  each  of  them  and
      they are jointly responsible therefore.  This  means  that  everything
      said, written or done by any  of  the  conspirators  in  execution  or
      furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done or
      written by each of them. And this  joint  responsibility  extends  not
      only to what is done by  any  of  the  conspirators  pursuant  to  the
      original agreement but also  to  collateral  acts  incidental  to  and
      growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible,
      however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after  termination  of  the
      conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy  by  a  new  member  does  not
      create a new conspiracy nor does it change the  status  of  the  other
      conspirators, and the mere fact that conspirators individually  or  in
      groups perform different tasks to a common end does  not  split  up  a
      conspiracy into several different conspiracies.

      10. A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However,  criminal
      responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than  a  merely  passive
      attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt  act
      with knowledge of the  conspiracy  is  guilty.  And  one  who  tacitly
      consents to the object of a  conspiracy  and  goes  along  with  other
      conspirators, actually standing by while the others put the conspiracy
      into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the
      crime.”


                                                 (emphasis supplied)

64)   The offence under Section 120B is a crime between the parties to do  a
particular act.  Association or relation to lead conspiracy  is  not  enough
to establish the intention to kill the  deceased.   To  make  it  clear,  to
bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of Section 120B, it  is
necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the  parties  for
doing an unlawful act.  It is difficult to establish  conspiracy  by  direct
evidence.
65)   Since conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, to bring home  the  charge  of
conspiracy, it is relevant to decide conclusively the object behind it  from
the charges leveled against the accused and the  facts  of  the  case.   The
object behind it is the ultimate  aim  of  the  conspiracy.   Further,  many
means might have been adopted to achieve this ultimate  object.   The  means
may even constitute different offences by themselves, but as  long  as  they
are adopted to achieve the ultimate object of the conspiracy, they are  also
acts of conspiracy.
66)   In Ajay Aggarwal vs. Union of India, AIR  1993  SC  1637,  this  Court
rejected the submission of the accused that as he was staying in  Dubai  and
the conspiracy was initially hatched in Chandigarh and he did  not  play  an
active part in the commission of the  acts  which  ultimately  lead  to  the
incident, thus, could not be liable for any offence, observing:
      “8…..Section 120-A of the IPC defines ‘conspiracy’ to mean  that  when
      two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done an  illegal  act,
      or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement  is
      designated as “criminal conspiracy”. No agreement except an  agreement
      to commit an offence shall amount to  a  criminal  conspiracy,  unless
      some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to  such
      agreement in furtherance thereof. Section 120-B of the IPC  prescribes
      punishment for criminal conspiracy. It  is  not  necessary  that  each
      conspirator must  know  all  the  details  of  the  scheme  nor  be  a
      participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for
      design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as  having
      three elements: (1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by  whom
      the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal  object,  which  may  be
      either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means,
      or one of the means by which that aim is to  be  accomplished.  It  is
      immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects.  The  common
      law definition of ‘criminal  conspiracy’  was  stated  first  by  Lord
      Denman in Jones case (1832) that an  indictment  for  conspiracy  must
      “charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means…..”

The Court, thus, held that an agreement between two or more  persons  to  do
an illegal act or  legal  act  by  illegal  means  is  criminal  conspiracy.
Conspiracy itself is a substantive offence and is distinct from the  offence
to be committed, for which the conspiracy was entered  into.   A  conspiracy
is a continuing offence and continues to subsist and is  committed  wherever
one of the conspirators does an act or  series  of  acts.  So  long  as  its
performance continues, it is a continuing offence till  it  is  executed  or
rescinded or frustrated by choice or necessity. A crime is complete as  soon
as the agreement is made, but it is not a thing of the moment. It  does  not
end with the making of the agreement. It will continue so long as there  are
two or more parties to it intending to carry into effect the design.
(Vide: Sudhir Shantilal Mehta vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009)  8
SCC 1)
67)   In Yash Pal Mittal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1977  SC  2433,  the  rule
was laid down as follows:
      “The very agreement, concert  or  league  is  the  ingredient  of  the
      offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know  each
      and  every  detail  of  the  conspiracy  as  long  as  they  are   co-
      participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There  may  be  so
      many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of  the
      conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the  chain  of
      actions with one object  to  achieve  the  real  end  of  which  every
      collaborator must be aware and in which  each  one  of  them  must  be
      interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may  be
      plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst  the
      conspirators. In achieving the goal, several offences may be committed
      by some of the conspirators even  unknown  to  the  others.  The  only
      relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts  done  must
      be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the  conspiracy
      even though there may be sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some of
      the conspirators.”


68)   For an offence under  Section  120B  IPC,  the  prosecution  need  not
necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or  cause  to
be  done  the  illegal  act,  the  agreement  may  be  proved  by  necessary
implication.  It is not necessary that each member of  the  conspiracy  must
know all the details of the conspiracy.  The offence can be  proved  largely
from the inferences drawn from the acts or  illegal  omission  committed  by
the conspirators in  pursuance  of  a  common  design.  Being  a  continuing
offence, if any acts or omissions which constitute an offence  are  done  in
India or outside its  territory,  the  conspirators  continuing  to  be  the
parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts  were  done  in  India,
they  would  obviate  the  need  to  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Central
Government. All of them need not be present in India nor continue to  remain
in India.  The entire agreement must be viewed as a whole and it has  to  be
ascertained as to what in fact  the  conspirators  intended  to  do  or  the
object they wanted to achieve. (Vide: R.K. Dalmia vs. Delhi  Administration,
AIR 1962 SC 1821; Lennart Schussler & Anr. vs.  Director  of  Enforcement  &
Anr., (1970) 1  SCC  152;  Shivanarayan  Laxminarayan  Joshi  vs.  State  of
Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465 and Mohammad Usman  Mohammad  Hussain  Maniyar
and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1062)
69)   In Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra,  (2008)  10
SCC 394, this Court held:
      “25 Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of  minds  of  two  or  more
      persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal  means  is  sine
      qua non of the criminal conspiracy but it may not be possible to prove
      the agreement between them by direct proof. Nevertheless, existence of
      the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the  surrounding
      circumstances and the conduct of the accused.  But  the  incriminating
      circumstances must form a chain of  events  from  which  a  conclusion
      about the guilt of the accused could be drawn. It is well settled that
      an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence and renders the mere
      agreement to commit an offence punishable, even if an offence does not
      take place pursuant to the illegal agreement.”


70)   In Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs. State of Punjab,  AIR  2009  SC  984,  this
Court following Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR  1979  SC  1791,
held that a conspiracy may be a general one  and  a  separate  one,  meaning
thereby, a larger  conspiracy  and  a  smaller  one  which  may  develop  in
successive stages.
71)   In K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala, (2005)  12  SCC  631,  this
Court held:
      “11. Section 120-A IPC defines  ‘criminal  conspiracy’.  According  to
      this section when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done
      (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is  not  illegal  by  illegal
      means, such an agreement is designated  a  criminal  conspiracy.…..The
      existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced  from  the
      circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused  involved  in
      the conspiracy…”


72)   In State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa, AIR  1996  SC  1744,  this
Court held :
      “…to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge  about  indulgence  in
      either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal  means  is  necessary.
      In some cases, intent of unlawful use  being  made  of  the  goods  or
      services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself.   This
      apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful
      use was intended……The ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions,
      it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish,  to  bring
      home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators  had  the
      knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as  it  is  known
      that the collaborator would put the goods or service  to  an  unlawful
      use.”


73)   In State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini & Ors.,
(1999) 5 SCC 253, this Court held:
      “……Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception to the  general  law
      where intent alone does not  constitute  crime.  It  is  intention  to
      commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention.
      Not only the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out  the
      object of the  intention,  which  is  an  offence.  The  question  for
      consideration in a case is did all the accused have the intention  and
      did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for
      the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely  entertained
      a  wish,  howsoever  horrendous   it   may   be,   that   offence   be
      committed……...It is not necessary that all conspirators  should  agree
      to the common purpose at the same  time.  They  may  join  with  other
      conspirators at any time  before  the  consummation  of  the  intended
      objective, and all are equally responsible……Prosecution has to produce
      evidence not only to show that each of the accused  has  knowledge  of
      the object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the  charge  of
      conspiracy the court  has  to  guard  itself  against  the  danger  of
      unfairness to the accused……There  has  to  be  cogent  and  convincing
      evidence against each one of the accused charged with the  offence  of
      conspiracy…….it is the unlawful agreement and not its  accomplishment,
      which is the gist or essence of the crime of  conspiracy.  Offence  of
      criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no  agreement  as
      to the means by which the purpose is to be  accomplished.  It  is  the
      unlawful agreement which is the gravamen of the crime  of  conspiracy.
      The unlawful agreement which amounts  to  a  conspiracy  need  not  be
      formal or express, but may  be  inherent  in  and  inferred  from  the
      circumstances,  especially  declarations,  acts  and  conduct  of  the
      conspirators. The agreement need  not  be  entered  into  by  all  the
      parties to it at the same time,  but  may  be  reached  by  successive
      actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy.


      The agreement, sine qua non of conspiracy, may  be  proved  either  by
      direct evidence which is rarely available in such cases or it  may  be
      inferred from utterances, writings, acts, omissions and conduct of the
      parties to the conspiracy which is usually done. In view of Section 10
      of the Evidence Act anything said, done or written by those who enlist
      their support to the object of conspiracy and those who join later  or
      make their exit before completion of  the  object  in  furtherance  of
      their common intention will be relevant facts to prove that  each  one
      of them can justifiably be treated as a conspirator.”


(See Also: Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883)
74)   In Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors. vs. State of Kerala,  (2001)  7  SCC
596, this Court held:
      “Like most crimes, conspiracy requires an  act  (actus  reus)  and  an
      accompanying mental state (mens rea). The  agreement  constitutes  the
      act, and the intention to  achieve  the  unlawful  objective  of  that
      agreement constitutes the required  mental  state…..The  law  punishes
      conduct that threatens to produce the harm, as well  as  conduct  that
      has actually produced it. Contrary to the usual rule that  an  attempt
      to commit a crime merges with the completed offence, conspirators  may
      be tried and punished for both the conspiracy and the completed crime.
      The  rationale  of  conspiracy  is   that   the   required   objective
      manifestation of disposition to criminality is provided by the act  of
      agreement. Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally  do
      not form illegal covenants openly. In the  interests  of  security,  a
      person may carry out his part  of  a  conspiracy  without  even  being
      informed of the identity of his co-conspirators.......


      Conspiracy is not only a substantive crime, it also serves as a  basis
      for holding one person liable for the crimes of others in cases  where
      application of the usual doctrines of complicity would not render that
      person liable. Thus, one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship
      is liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime  committed  by  every
      other member of the  conspiracy  in  furtherance  of  its  objectives,
      whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission. The
      rationale is that criminal acts done in furtherance  of  a  conspiracy
      may be sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement  and  support  of
      the group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal agent
      to each act. Under this view, which of the conspirators committed  the
      substantive offence would  be  less  significant  in  determining  the
      defendant's liability than the fact that the crime was performed as  a
      part of a larger division of labour to  which  the  accused  had  also
      contributed his efforts.
      Regarding admissibility of evidence, loosened standards prevail  in  a
      conspiracy  trial.  Contrary  to  the  usual   rule,   in   conspiracy
      prosecutions, any declaration by one conspirator, made in  furtherance
      of a conspiracy and during its pendency, is admissible against each co-
      conspirator. Despite the unreliability  of  hearsay  evidence,  it  is
      admissible in conspiracy prosecutions………Thus conspirators  are  liable
      on an agency theory for statements of co-conspirators,  just  as  they
      are for the overt acts and crimes committed by their confréres.”


(See also: State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan  Guru,  (2005)  11
SCC 600)
75)   In Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau  of  Investigation,  (2003)  3
SCC 641, this Court held:
      “…….The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be:  (a)
      an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means  to
      accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between  two
      or more  of  the  accused  persons  whereby,  they  become  definitely
      committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of  the  object  by  the
      means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in
      the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The  essence
      of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful  combination  and  ordinarily
      the offence is complete when the combination is framed. From this,  it
      necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt  act
      need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object  of
      the combination need not be accomplished, in order  to  constitute  an
      indictable offence. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to  curb
      immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by  a  combination  of
      the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to
      one  another  rendering  enterprises  possible  which,  if   left   to
      individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground  for
      visiting  conspirators  and  abettors  with  condign  punishment.  The
      conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all  its  members
      wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance
      of the common design.”


76)   In Mohd. Khalid vs. State of West  Bengal,  (2002)  7  SCC  334,  this
Court held:
      “Where trustworthy evidence establishing all links  of  circumstantial
      evidence is available the confession of a co-accused as to  conspiracy
      even without corroborative evidence can be taken into consideration.”




77)   In the present case, the conspiracy might have been started  in  Dubai
but ultimately it continued here in India and  a  part  of  the  object  was
executed in India and even in the  conspiratorial  meetings  at  Dubai,  the
matter was discussed with respect to  India  and  amongst  Indian  citizens.
Further, as far as the present accused is concerned, the fact  that  he  was
constantly present at Al-Hussaini building, where  the  major  part  of  the
plans  have  been  made  and  executed,  is  established,  and  his   active
involvement has also emerged from the evidence on record as to  how  he  was
dealing with the so called men of Tiger, managing the ill  gotten  money  of
Tiger, booking tickets and actively working  for  confirming  them  for  the
conspirators.  Further, there is enough evidence of meeting with  co-accused
and his actively working in furtherance  of  the  conspiracy.   The  present
accused need not be present at each and every meeting for being held  to  be
a part of the conspiracy.
78)   Section 10 of the Evidence Act further provides a unique  and  special
rule of evidence to be followed in cases of conspiracy.   Section  10  reads
as under:
      “10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design--
      Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or  more  persons
      have conspired together to commit an offence or an  actionable  wrong,
      anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference
      to their common intention, after the  time  when  such  intention  was
      first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant  fact  as  against
      each of the persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose
      of proving the existence of the  conspiracy  as  for  the  purpose  of
      showing that any such person was a party to it.”


      Illustrations


      (i)   Reasonable ground exists for believing that A has  joined  in  a
      conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India.


      (ii)  The facts that B procured arms in Europe for the purpose of  the
      conspiracy, C collected  money  in  Calcutta  for  a  like  object,  D
      persuaded persons to  join  the  conspiracy  in  Bombay,  E  published
      writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from
      Delhi to G at Kabul the money which C had collected at  Calcutta,  and
      the contents of a letter  written  by  H  giving  an  account  of  the
      conspiracy, are each relevant, both to  prove  the  existence  of  the
      conspiracy, and to prove A' s complicity in it, although he  may  have
      been ignorant of all of them, and although the persons  by  whom  they
      were done were strangers to him, and  although  they  may  have  taken
      place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.


It is to be seen that there are three conditions in  the  Section.  One  is,
before utilizing the section for admitting certain  statements  of  the  co-
accused from a confession, there should be a reasonable  ground  to  believe
that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or  an
actionable wrong.  According to this Section, only when  this  condition  is
satisfied in  a  given  case,  then  only  the  question  of  utilizing  the
statement  of  an  accused  against  the  co-accused  can  be   taken   into
consideration. Thus, as per Section 10, the following principles are  agreed
upon unanimously:-
   1. There shall be prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground  for
      the Court to  believe  that  two  or  more  persons  were  part  of  a
      conspiracy to commit a wrongful act or offence;
   2. Once this condition was fulfilled, anything said, done or  written  by
      any of its members, in reference to their common  intention,  will  be
      considered as evidence against other co-conspirators;
   3. This fact would  be  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  existence  of  a
      conspiracy and that the persons were a part of such conspiracy.
79)   This Court, in Nalini (supra), observed as under:
(a)   Justice Thomas (para 106-113)
Theory of Agency, according to him, is the basic principle which  underlines
Section 10 of the Evidence Act.   He  says  that  the  first  condition  for
application of Section  10  is  “reasonable  ground  to  believe”  that  the
conspirators have conspired together based  on  prima  facie  evidence.   If
this condition is fulfilled,  anything  said  by  any  of  the  conspirators
becomes substantive  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  corroboration  if  the
statement is in reference to their common  intention  (This  is  much  wider
than its English counterpart which uses the  expression  in  furtherance  of
the common object).  The arrest  of  a  conspirator  will  not  cut-off  his
connection with the conspiracy.
(b)   Justice Wadhwa concurring, (para 575-581)
He was of the opinion that before considering the principle  of  Section  10
and applying  it  to  the  facts  and  circumstances,  it  is  necessary  to
ascertain the period of conspiracy because  any  statement  made  before  or
after the conspiracy is thatched will not be admissible under the  aforesaid
section.  It would also be relevant against a person  who  entered  or  left
the time frame during the existence of conspiracy.
(c)   Justice Wadhwa (para 663-665)
Two conditions are to be followed:- firstly, reasonable  ground  to  believe
conspiracy,  and  secondly,  conspiracy  is  to  commit  an  offence  or  an
actionable wrong.  If both the conditions exist, then anything said or  done
can be used as a relevant fact against one another, to prove  the  existence
of conspiracy and that the person was a part to it.
80)   In the case on hand, the first condition for applying  Section  10  of
the Evidence Act is satisfied by the evidence of PWs 1  and  2  (approvers).
There  are  77  confessions  in  this  case  which  are  voluntary  and  are
corroborated with the other circumstances of the  case.   These  confessions
contain statements inculpating the makers as  well  as  the  co-accused.   A
common charge of conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-conspirators
including A-1.  This is evident from  the  charges  framed  by  the  Special
Judge which we have already extracted.  On all the  aforesaid  charges,  the
appellant was found  guilty  by  the  Designated  Court.   The  evidence  in
respect of A-1 is in the nature of the confessions made  by  the  co-accused
persons, the testimony of prosecution witnesses and documentary evidence  on
record.
81)   The law on the issue emerges to  the  effect  that  conspiracy  is  an
agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an  act  which
is not illegal by illegal means.  The object behind  the  conspiracy  is  to
achieve the ultimate aim of conspiracy. In order  to  achieve  the  ultimate
object, parties may adopt many means. Such means  may  constitute  different
offences by themselves, but so long as  they  are  adopted  to  achieve  the
ultimate object of the conspiracy, they are also acts of conspiracy. For  an
offence of conspiracy, it is not necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  prove
that conspirators expressly agreed to do an illegal act, the  agreement  may
be proved by necessary implication. It  is  also  not  necessary  that  each
member of the conspiracy should know all  the  details  of  the  conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a continuing offence. Thus,  if  any  act  or  omission  which
constitutes an offence is done  in  India  or  outside  its  territory,  the
conspirators continue to be the parties to the  conspiracy.  The  conspiracy
may be a general one and a smaller  one  which  may  develop  in  successive
stages.  It is an unlawful agreement and not its  accomplishment,  which  is
the gist/essence of the crime of conspiracy. In order to  determine  whether
the conspiracy was hatched,  the  court  is  required  to  view  the  entire
agreement and to find out as in fact what the conspirators intended to do.
82)   Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for A-1, submitted that  from
the evidence of PW-2 (Approver), it is evident that  various  meetings  were
held on and from 02.02.1993 till 11.03.1993 at various places in and  around
Bombay.  By taking us through the entire  evidence  of  PW-2,  he  submitted
that neither  PW-2  nor  any  other  co-accused  nor  even  any  independent
witness/evidence spoken to about the role of A-1 either being aware  of  the
said meetings or being present in them or having any  knowledge  about  what
conspired  in  the  said  meetings.   Though  learned  senior  counsel   has
vehemently contended that A-1 was neither involved in arranging for  landing
of arms and ammunitions nor in conducting surveys and choosing  targets  nor
in filling vehicles with RDX and  arms  nor  in  the  meeting  held  at  Al-
Hussaini building, the specific instances as stated by  various  prosecution
witnesses amply prove his involvement.
83)   Apart from the evidence of PW-2,  several  accused  persons  in  their
confessional statements and other witnesses examined  on  the  side  of  the
prosecution clearly implicate A-1 and his  involvement  in  all  the  events
which we are going to discuss under various heads.
84)   It also emerged from  the  prosecution  evidence  that  conspiratorial
meetings were also held on 06.01.1993 at Hotel Parsian Darbar, Panvel  which
were attended by A-136, A-90, A-102, A-134 and Md.  Dosa,  (AA),  middle  of
January, 1993 at Dubai attended by A-14 and  Tiger  Memon  (AA)  and  Dawood
Ibrahim (AA) leading to the landing of arms and ammunitions at  Dighi  Jetty
and Shekhadi.  These meetings formed the genesis of the  conspiracy  and  it
was at these meetings that meeting  of  minds  occurred  and  knowledge  was
obtained by  the  co-conspirators  and  their  intention  was  expressed  to
further the cause  of  the  said  conspiracy.   Since  we  have  elaborately
discussed the constituents relating to the conspiracy, there is no  need  to
refer to the same in subsequent appeals before us.  It is also evident  that
a common charge of conspiracy was framed against all  the  accused  persons.
In view of the above, we are  satisfied  that  the  prosecution  has  placed
sufficient acceptable materials to prove the  charge  of  conspiracy  beyond
reasonable doubt which we will analyse in the later part of our judgment.
Confession
85)   In this heading, we have to consider the confession  made  by  accused
and co-accused persons relied on by the prosecution.  Before going into  the
acceptability or otherwise and merits of the claim made by both the  parties
relating to the confession of the accused and co-accused, it  is  useful  to
refer to the relevant provisions of the Code as well as TADA.
86)   Section 164 of the Code  speaks  about  recording  of  confession  and
statement which is as under:-
      “164. Recording of confessions and statements.--(1)  Any  Metropolitan
      Magistrate  or  Judicial  Magistrate  may,  whether  or  not  he   has
      jurisdiction in the case, record any confession or statement  made  to
      him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or under  any
      other law for the time being in force,  or  at  any,  time  afterwards
      before the commencement of the inquiry or trial:

      Provided that any confession or statement made under this  sub-section
      may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in  the  presence
      of the advocate of the person accused of an offence:

      Provided that no confession shall be recorded by a police  officer  on
      whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred under  any  law  for
      the time being in force.
 
      (2) The  Magistrate  shall,  before  recording  any  such  confession,
      explain to the person making it  that  he  is  not  bound  to  make  a
      confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against
      him; and the Magistrate shall not record any such  confession  unless,
      upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to  believe  that
      it is being, made voluntarily.
 
      (3) If at any time before  the  confession  is  recorded,  the  person
      appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not willing to  make
      the confession, the Magistrate shall not authorize  the  detention  of
      such person in police custody.
 
      (4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the  manner  provided  in
      section 281 for recording the examination of  an  accused  person  and
      shall  be  signed  by  the  person  making  the  confession;  and  the
      Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record  to  the
      following effect.
 
           "I have explained to (name) that he  is  not  bound  to  make  a
           confession and that, if he does so, any confession he  may  make
           may be used as evidence against him  and  I  believe  that  this
           confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and
           hearing, and was read over to the person making it and  admitted
           by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of
           the statement made by him.
 
                                                   (Signed) A.B.

                                                   Magistrate".
 
      (5) Any statement (other than a confession) made under sub-section (1)
      shall  be  recorded  in  such  manner  hereinafter  provided  for  the
      recording of evidence as is, in the opinion of  the  Magistrate,  best
      fitted to the circumstances of the case; and the Magistrate shall have
      power to administer oath to the person whose statement is so recorded.
 
      (6) The Magistrate recording a  confession  or  statement  under  this
      section shall forward it to the Magistrate by whom the case is  to  be
      inquired into or tried.”

87)   Insofar as  interpretation  relating  to  Section  164  of  the  Code,
particularly, recording of the same and procedures to be adopted, this  very
Bench in Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh vs. Republic of India (2011) 2  SCC
490 after considering large number of judgments on the issue laid  down  the
following principles:
      “64 (i) The provisions of Section 164 CrPC must be complied  with  not
      only in form, but in essence.
      (ii)  Before  proceeding  to  record  the  confessional  statement,  a
      searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the custody from
      which he was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in  such
      custody in order to ensure that there is no scope  for  doubt  of  any
      sort of extraneous influence proceeding from a  source  interested  in
      the prosecution.
      (iii) A Magistrate should ask the accused as to why he wants to make a
      statement which surely shall go against his interest in the trial.
      (iv) The maker should be granted sufficient time for reflection.
      (v) He should be assured of protection from any  sort  of  apprehended
      torture or pressure from the police in case  he  declines  to  make  a
      confessional statement.
      (vi) A judicial confession not given voluntarily is  unreliable,  more
      so, when such a confession is  retracted,  the  conviction  cannot  be
      based on such retracted judicial confession.
      (vii) Non-compliance with Section 164 CrPC goes to  the  root  of  the
      Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the  confession  and  renders  the
      confession unworthy of credence.
      (viii) During the time of reflection, the accused should be completely
      out of police influence. The judicial officer, who is  entrusted  with
      the duty of recording confession, must  apply  his  judicial  mind  to
      ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the statement of the accused
      is not on account of any extraneous influence on him.
      (ix) At the time of recording the statement of the accused, no  police
      or police official shall be present in the open court.
      (x) Confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence.
      (xi)  Usually  the  court  requires  some   corroboration   from   the
      confessional statement before convicting the accused person on such  a
      statement.”
[See also Kalawati & Anr. vs. State of H.P. AIR 1953 SC 131;  Dagdu  &  Ors.
vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68; Davendra Prasad Tiwari  vs.  State
of U.P. (1978) 4 SCC 474; Shivappa vs. Stae of Karnataka (1995)  2  SCC  76;
Nalini (supra) (1999) 5 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra vs. Damu (2000) 6  SCC
269; Bhagwan Singh & Ors. vs. State of  M.P.  (2003)  3  SCC  21;  Gurjinder
Singh vs. State of Punjab (2011) 3 SCC  530;  Surender  Koli  vs.  State  of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 80; Kulvinder Singh & Anr.  vs.  State  of
Haryana (2011) 5 SCC 258; and Inspector  of  Police,  T.N.  vs.  John  David
(2011) 5 SCC 509.]
Law relating to Confessions under TADA
88)   Similar provision is there in TADA, namely, Section 15 which reads  as
under:

      15. Certain confessions made to  police  officers  to  be  taken  into
      consideration.- (1) Nothwithstanding anything in the Code  or  in  the
      Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this
      section, a confession made by a person before  a  police  officer  not
      lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police  and  recorded  by  such
      police officer in writing or on any mechanical device like  cassettes,
      tapes or sound tracks from out  of  which  sounds  or  images  can  be
      reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such  person  or  [co-
      accused, abettor or conspirator] for an  offence  under  this  Act  or
      rules made thereunder:


      Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and  tried
      in the same case together with the accused.

      (2) The police officer shall, before recording  any  confession  under
      sub-section (1), explain to the person making it that he is not  bound
      to make a confession and that, if he  does  so,  it  may  be  used  as
      evidence against him and such police officer shall not record any such
      confession unless upon questioning the person making it, he has reason
      to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

The bracketed words ‘[or  co-accused,  abettor  or  conspiractor]’  and  the
proviso in Section 15(1)  above  were  added  by  way  of  an  amendment  on
22.05.1993.  The amendments to  TADA  dated  22.05.1993  were  not  only  in
respect of Section 15(1) of TADA but also with  respect  to  Section  21  of
TADA (Presumption as to Offences under Section 3).  The  un-amended  Section
21 is reproduced as under for ready reference:

      “21. Presumption as to offences under Section 3. – (1) In a
      prosecution for an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 3, if it
      is proved –


      (a)   that the arms or explosives or any other substances specified in
      Section 3 were recovered from the possession of the accused and  there
      is reason to believe that such arms or explosives or other  substances
      of similar nature, were used in the commission of such offence; or


      (b)   that by the evidence  of  an  expert  the  fingerprints  of  the
      accused were found at the site of the offence or on anything including
      arms and vehicles used in  connection  with  the  commission  of  such
      offence; or


      “(c)  that a confession has been made by a co-accused that the accused
      had committed the offence; or


      (d)   that the accused had made a confession of  the  offence  to  any
      person other than a police officer


                                  (deleted by Act 43 of 1993)”


      The Designated Court shall presume, unless  the  contrary  is  proved,
      that the accused had committed such offence.

      (2) In a prosecution for an offence under sub-section 3 of Section  3,
      if it is proved that the accused rendered any financial assistance  to
      a person accused of, or reasonably suspected of, an offence under that
      section, the Designated Court shall presume, unless  the  contrary  is
      proved, that such person has committed the  offence  under  that  sub-
      section.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)

89)   Admissibility of confession against co-accused  under  Section  15  of
TADA was considered in Nalini (supra).  This Court,  while  considering  the
provisions of  Section  15  of  TADA  and  Rule  15  of  the  Terrorist  and
Disruptive Activities (P) Rules, 1987 (in short ‘the Rules’) held:
      “…..the confession of one  accused  as  against  a  co-accused  to  be
      substantive evidence against the latter, and in the absence  of  proof
      to the contrary, the Designated Court would have full power to base  a
      conviction of the co-accused  upon  the  confession  made  by  another
      accused”


This Court further held:
      “In view of the above discussions, we  hold  the  confessions  of  the
      accused in the present case to be voluntarily  and  validly  made  and
      under Section 15 of  TADA  confession  of  an  accused  is  admissible
      against a co-accused as a substantive evidence.  Substantive evidence,
      however, does not necessarily mean substantial evidence.   It  is  the
      quality of evidence that matters.  As to what value is to be  attached
      to a confession  will  fall  within  the  domain  of  appreciation  of
      evidence.  As a matter of  prudence,  the  Court  may  look  for  some
      corroboration if confession is to be used against a co-accused through
      that will again be within the sphere of appraisal of evidence.”

90)   In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed &  Anr.  vs.  State  of  Gujarat
(2009) 7 SCC 254, this Court held that it is no  more  res  integra  that  a
confession recorded under Section 15 is  a  substantive  piece  of  evidence
against the accused and co-accused.  However, in case of  co-accused,  as  a
rule of prudence, the court would look upon corroborative evidence as well.
91)   In Jayawant Dattatray Suryarao vs. State of Mharashtra, (2001) 10  SCC
109,  this  Court  considered  in   detail   the   evidentiary   value   and
admissibility of a confessional statement recorded under Section 15 of  TADA
and held that it is a settled legal position that a  confessional  statement
recorded by a police officer is a substantive evidence and it can be  relied
upon in the trial of such person or co-accused, abettor  or  conspirator  so
long as the requirements of Section 15 and TADA  rules  are  complied  with.
It was observed:
      “60.  ….  Confessional  statement  before  the  police  officer  under
      Section 15 of the TADA is substantive evidence and it  can  be  relied
      upon in the trial of such person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator
      for an offence punishable under the  Act  or  the  Rules.  The  police
      officer before recording the confession has to observe the requirement
      of sub-section (2) of Section 15. Irregularities here and there  would
      not make such confessional statement inadmissible in evidence. If  the
      legislature in its wisdom has provided after considering the situation
      prevailing in the society that such confessional statement can be used
      as evidence, it would not be just, reasonable  and  prudent  to  water
      down the scheme of the Act on the assumption that the  said  statement
      was recorded under duress or was not recorded  truly  by  the  officer
      concerned in whom faith is reposed.”


It was further held by this Court that minor irregularities do not make  the
confessional statement inadmissible as substantive evidence and observed  as
under:

      ”50. In this view of settled legal position, confessional statement is
      admissible in evidence and is substantive evidence. It also  could  be
      relied upon for  connecting  the  co-accused  with  the  crime.  Minor
      irregularity would not vitiate its evidentiary value……..”

92)   In Ravinder Singh @ Bittu vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 9  SCC  55,
this Court, while considering  the  reliability  of  a  confession  recorded
under Section 15 of TADA against the maker, as well as the co-accused,  held
that after State vs. Nalini, Kalpnath Rai  vs.  CBI  does  not  reflect  the
correct position of law.  It was observed:

      “13. In Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI) it was observed  that  the
      confession made by one accused is not substantive evidence  against  a
      co-accused. It has only a corroborative value. In the present case, we
      are, however, primarily concerned with  the  confession  made  by  the
      maker i.e. the appellant himself. Besides this  confession,  there  is
      also a confession made by co-accused Nishan Singh which too implicates
      the appellant in commission of the offence of the bomb  blast  in  the
      train. The observations made in Kalpnath Rai case were  considered  in
      State through Supdt. of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini,  a  decision  by  a
      three-Judge Bench. “It was held that  the  confession  recorded  under
      Section 15 of the TADA Act is to be considered as a substantive  piece
      of evidence not only against the maker of it but also against its  co-
      accused. In this view, the observations in Kalpnath Rai  case  do  not
      represent the correct position of law.”


It was further held that:

      17. It  is  thus  well  established  that  a  voluntary  and  truthful
      confessional statement recorded under  Section  15  of  the  TADA  Act
      requires no corroboration. Here, we are concerned primarily  with  the
      confessional statement of the maker. The weight to be attached to  the
      truthful and voluntary confession made by an accused under Section  15
      of the TADA Act came to be considered again in  a  recent  three-Judge
      Bench decision in Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi. It  was
      held in the majority opinion that the confessional  statement  of  the
      accused can be relied upon  for  the  purpose  of  conviction  and  no
      further corroboration is  necessary  if  it  relates  to  the  accused
      himself.


      18. There can be  no  doubt  that  a  free  and  voluntary  confession
      deserves the highest credit. It is presumed to flow from  the  highest
      sense of guilt. Having examined the record, we are satisfied that  the
      confession made by the appellant is voluntary  and  truthful  and  was
      recorded, as already noticed, by due observance of all the  safeguards
      provided under Section 15 and the appellant could be convicted  solely
      on the basis of his confession.”


93)   In Mohmed Amin vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 15 SCC  49,
it was observed:
      “28. In Devender Pal Singh case majority of three-Judge Bench  made  a
      reference to Gurdeep Singh case and Nalini case and held (at  SCC  pp.
      261-62, para 33) that whenever an  accused  challenges  the  voluntary
      character of his confession recorded under Section 15(1) of  the  Act,
      the initial burden is  on  the  prosecution  to  prove  that  all  the
      conditions specified in that section read with Rule 15  of  the  Rules
      have been complied with and once that is done, it is for  the  accused
      to show and satisfy  the  court  that  the  confession  was  not  made
      voluntarily. The Court further held that the confession of an  accused
      can be relied upon for  the  purpose  of  conviction  and  no  further
      corroboration is necessary if  it  relates  to  the  accused  himself.
      However, as  a  matter  of  prudence  the  court  may  look  for  some
      corroboration if confession is to be used against a co-accused  though
      that will be again within the sphere of appraisal of evidence.


      29.  In  Jameel  Ahmed  case  a  two-Judge  Bench  after   discussing,
      considering and analysing several precedents on the subject, including
      Devender Pal  Singh  case,  culled  out  the  following  propositions:
      (Jameel Ahmed case, SCC pp. 689-90, para 35)


           “(i)  If  the  confessional  statement  is  properly   recorded,
           satisfying the mandatory provision of Section 15 of the TADA Act
           and the Rules made thereunder, and if the same is found  by  the
           court as having been made voluntarily and  truthfully  then  the
           said confession is sufficient to base a conviction on the  maker
           of the confession.


           (ii) Whether such confession requires corroboration or not, is a
           matter for the court considering such  confession  on  facts  of
           each case.


           (iii) In regard to the use of such confession as against  a  co-
           accused, it has to be held  that  as  a  matter  of  caution,  a
           general corroboration should be sought for but  in  cases  where
           the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  probative  value  of  such
           confession is such that it does not require  corroboration  then
           it may base a conviction on the basis of such confession of  the
           co-accused without corroboration. But this is  an  exception  to
           the general rule of requiring corroboration when such confession
           is to be used against a co-accused.


           (iv) The nature of corroboration required both in regard to  the
           use of confession against the maker as also in regard to the use
           of the same against a co-accused is of a general nature,  unless
           the court comes to the conclusion that such corroboration should
           be on material facts also because of the facts of  a  particular
           case. The degree of corroboration so required is that  which  is
           necessary for a prudent man to believe in the existence of facts
           mentioned in the confessional statement.


           (v) The requirement of sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 of the TADA Rules
           which contemplates a confessional statement being  sent  to  the
           Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate
           who, in turn, will have to send the same to the Designated Court
           is not mandatory and  is  only  directory.  However,  the  court
           considering the case of direct transmission of the  confessional
           statement to the Designated Court should satisfy itself on facts
           of  each  case  whether  such   direct   transmission   of   the
           confessional statement in the facts  of  the  case  creates  any
           doubt as to the genuineness of the said confessional statement.”


      30. In Abdulvahab Abdul Majid Shaikh  case  this  Court  rejected  the
      argument raised on behalf of the appellant that the confession made by
      him cannot be treated as voluntary because the same had been retracted
      and observed:


           “9. … The police officer was empowered to record the  confession
           and in law such  a  confession  is  made  admissible  under  the
           provisions of the TADA Act. The mere fact that  A-9  Musakhan  @
           Babakhan retracted subsequently is not a valid ground to  reject
           the confession. The crucial question is whether at the time when
           the accused  was  giving  the  statement  he  was  subjected  to
           coercion, threat or any  undue  influence  or  was  offered  any
           inducement to give any  confession.  There  is  nothing  in  the
           evidence to show that there was  any  coercion,  threat  or  any
           undue influence to the accused to make the confession.”


      31. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that if a person  accused
      of an offence under the Act makes a confession before a police officer
      not below the rank  of  Superintendent  of  Police  and  the  same  is
      recorded by the officer concerned in  writing  or  on  any  mechanical
      device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which  sounds
      or images can be reproduced, then such confession is admissible in the
      trial of the maker as also the co-accused, abettor or conspirator  not
      only for an offence under the Act but also for offence(s) under  other
      enactments, provided that the co-accused, abettor  or  conspirator  is
      charged and tried in the same case along  with  the  accused  and  the
      court is satisfied that requirements of the Act  and  the  Rules  have
      been complied with. Whether  such  confession  requires  corroboration
      depends on the facts of the given case. If the court is convinced that
      the probative value of the confession is such that it does not require
      corroboration then the same can  be  used  for  convicting  the  maker
      and/or the co-accused  under  the  Act  and/or  the  other  enactments
      without independent corroboration.”


After considering the confessions of the accused in the aforesaid  case,  it
was held as under:
      “81. Therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Section  15  of  the
      Act as interpreted by this Court in Gurprit Singh case,  Nalini  case,
      S.N. Dube case, Lal Singh case, Devender Pal  Singh  case  and  Jameel
      Ahmed case, we hold that the appellants are guilty  of  offence  under
      Section  302  read  with  Section  120-B  IPC   and   no   independent
      corroboration is required for sustaining their conviction.”


94)   In Jameel Ahmed & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 9 SCC  673  this
Court held that Section 30 of the Evidence  Act  has  no  role  to  play  in
deciding the admissibility of a confession  recorded  under  Section  15  of
TADA.  The Court held that:
      “23. …. it is relevant to note that Section 15 of the TADA Act by  the
      use of non obstante clause has made confession recorded under  Section
      15  admissible  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the   Indian
      Evidence Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure. It  also  specifically
      provides that the confession so recorded shall be  admissible  in  the
      trial of a co-accused for offence committed and tried in the same case
      together with the accused who makes the  confession.  Apart  from  the
      plain language of Section 15 which excludes the application of Section
      30 of the Evidence Act, this Court has in many judgments  in  specific
      terms held that Section 30 of the Evidence Act has  no  role  to  play
      when the court considers the  confession  of  an  accused  made  under
      Section 15 of the TADA Act either in regard to himself or in regard to
      his co-accused.”


95)   In Ahmed Hussein Vali (supra), this Court, while relying  upon  Nalini
(supra), held that if the confession made by an  accused  is  voluntary  and
true, then it is admissible against the co-accused as  a  substantive  piece
of evidence, and that minor and curable irregularities in the  recording  of
the confession like omission  in  obtaining  the  certificate  of  competent
office with respect to confession do not affect  the  admissibility  of  the
said evidence.  It was further observed:
      “74. … As far as the admissibility of the confessional statement of A-
      27 is concerned with regard to his co-accused in this case, it is  not
      vitiated because of the amendment and it is rightly used  as  a  major
      evidence for the trial of his co-accused by the Designated  Court.  As
      this confessional statement was made complying with all the procedural
      essentials as provided for by the TADA Act and the Rules it can  be  a
      valid  ground  for  the  conviction   when   corroborated   with   the
      confessional statement of the other four accused, namely, A-1, A-2, A-
      3 and A-20 respectively which have been made prior to the amendment of
      the Act….”

96)   The  amendment,  by  Act  43  of  1993  which  came  into  force  from
22.05.1993 deleted sub-clauses (c) and (d) to  sub-section  (1)  of  Section
21.  This Court considered the effect of amendment in  Nalini  (supra),  and
observed as follows:


      “698. ….the effect of the said clauses was that in the event of the co-
      accused making confession inculpating the accused or in the  event  of
      the accused himself making an extra-judicial confession to any  person
      other than a police officer the legal presumption that the accused had
      committed such offence would arise.”


In the event of un-amended TADA as it stood  prior  to  22.05.1993  were  to
apply, there would be a presumption of guilt against the appellant  pursuant
to  un-amended  Section  21  since  confession  of  other  co-accused  would
implicate the appellant for the offence of  conspiracy.   The  amendment  of
1993  did  not  bring  about  any  change  as  to  the   admissibility   and
applicability of the confession of the co-accused.


Admissibility of Confessions recorded u/s 15 of TADA prior to the amendment

97)   Learned senior counsel for A-1 submitted  that  as  the  amendment  of
Section 15 of  TADA  under  which  the  said  confessional  statements  were
purported to have been recorded was brought  into  effect  from  22.05.1993,
the said confessional statements could not be used to adjudge the  appellant
guilty inasmuch as all the said confessional statements were recorded  prior
to the date of amendment.  He further  stated  that  the  said  confessional
statements were obtained pursuant to prolonged police custody  of  the  said
accused  persons,  therefore,  the  same  cannot  be  said  to  be  obtained
voluntarily and further cannot be said  to  be  free  from  taint  and  were
wholly unreliable.  Learned senior counsel has  finally  submitted  that  as
the said  confessional  statements  were  recorded  prior  to  the  date  of
amendment of Section 15 of TADA, the same have  to  be  tested  against  the
touchstone of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act under the  general  law.

98)   The prosecution heavily relied on the confessional statements  of  co-
accused persons, namely, Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Abdul Gani Ismail  Turk
(A-11), Mohammed Rafiq @  Rafiq  Madi  Musa  Biyariwala  (A-46),  Altaf  Ali
Mustaq Ali Sayed (A-67) and Mulchand Sampatraj Shah  @  Choksi  (A-97).   It
was submitted by senior counsel for A-1 that all the  said  statements  were
recorded prior to the date of amendment of TADA  Act  on  22.05.1993.   Till
the said amendment, the statement of an accused person was  admissible  only
against him.  However, the amended Section 15 of TADA made the statement  of
an accused person admissible in evidence against a  co-accused,  an  abettor
and a conspirator.  It was submitted by learned senior counsel that  as  the
recording of  statement  of  A-10  was  completed  on  20.04.1993,  A-11  on
18.04.1993, A-46 on 23.04.1993, A-67 on 19.04.1993 and  A-97  on  19.05.1993
i.e., before the date on which the said Section 15 of TADA was  amended  and
in  the  absence  of   express   intention   making   the   said   amendment
retrospective, the same will have to be taken as prospective,  as  a  result
whereof, the said statements  cannot  be  used  against  the  appellant  and
cannot be the basis of adjudging him guilty.  It was  submitted  by  learned
senior counsel  that  law  is  well  settled  that  an  amendment  which  is
procedural in nature may be applied retrospectively but an  amendment  which
not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights  and  liabilities
has to be construed to be prospective in nature  unless  otherwise  provided
either expressly or by necessary implication.  It was further  submitted  by
learned senior counsel that a procedural amendment that imposes  new  duties
or creates new  disabilities  or  obligations  in  respect  of  transactions
already accomplished cannot be said to be retrospective in nature.   It  was
urged by learned senior counsel that as  the  said  confessional  statements
were recorded prior to the amendment of TADA, i.e., on  22.05.1993  and  the
said amendment cannot be said to be retrospective in  nature,  it  does  not
necessarily mean that the same will have  to  be  totally  discarded  rather
they will have to be appreciated in the light of Section 30 of the  Evidence
Act and can be used to lend assurance to independent materials collected  by
the investigating agency but cannot be made the sole basis of adjudging  the
appellant guilty as has purportedly been done in the instant case.
99)   With regard to the same, reliance was placed on the decision  of  this
Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Ajit Singh (2008) 1 SCC 601, which  held  as
under in paras 15 and 16.

      “15. It has accordingly been emphasised that the statement made by the
      accused could be used one against the  other.  Mr  Sodhi  has  however
      pointed out that the decision in Jameel Ahmed case had  been  rendered
      without noticing that the words in Section 15(1)  of  the  Act  (which
      have been  underlined  above)  that  is  “or  co-accused,  abettor  or
      conspirator” had been inserted in the Act in 1993 and  as  such  could
      not be retrospectively applied to an incident  of  12-8-1991.  He  has
      also referred us to State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot  Sandhu  to  submit
      that this issue had been specifically raised and  while  noticing  the
      addition made in  1993  it  had  been  observed  that  a  confessional
      statement recorded under Section 15 would  be  sufficient  to  base  a
      conviction on the maker of the confession but on the other proposition
      whether such a confession could  be  used  against  a  co-accused  was
      another matter.

      16. It is, therefore, clear that the Division Bench in  Navjot  Sandhu
      case clearly repelled the contention raised by the State counsel  that
      a confession made by an  accused  could  be  used  as  against  a  co-
      accused…..”

100)  Reliance was also placed on the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Ganesh
Gogoi vs. State of Assam (2009) 7 SCC 404. Paragraph  Nos.  21  and  24  are
relevant which read as under:

      “21. It appears that in the instant case the charge which  was  framed
      by the court against the appellant was under Section 3(5) of the  said
      Act. But such a charge could not have been framed against him  by  the
      court inasmuch as on the alleged date of occurrence i.e. in  September
      1991, Section 3(5) of TADA was not brought on the statute. The framing
      of the charge was thus inherently defective…..


      24…..It is clear from the perusal of Section 3 and its  interpretation
      in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur that the requisite intention is the sine qua
      non of terrorist activity. That intention is totally missing  in  this
      case. It is not there in the charge and it has also not  come  in  the
      evidence. Therefore, both the framing of charges against the appellant
      under Section 3(5) and his conviction under  Section  3(2)(i)  of  the
      said Act are totally bad in law.”

101)  In State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru (2005)  11  SCC
600, this Court held as under:

      “49…..It is, however, the contention of  the  learned  Senior  Counsel
      Shri Gopal Subramanium that Section 32(1) can be so  construed  as  to
      include the admissibility of confessions of the  co-accused  as  well.
      The  omission  of  the  words  in  POTA  “or  co-accused,  abettor  or
      conspirator” following the expression “in the trial  of  such  person”
      which are the words contained in Section 15(1) of TADA does  not  make
      material difference, according to him. It is his submission  that  the
      words “co-accused”, etc. were included by the 1993 Amendment  of  TADA
      by way of abundant caution and not because the  unamended  section  of
      TADA did not cover the confession of the co-accused. According to  the
      learned Senior Counsel, the phrase “shall be admissible in  the  trial
      of such person” does not restrict the admissibility only  against  the
      maker of the confession. It extends to all those who are  being  tried
      jointly along with the maker of the confession provided they are  also
      affected by the confession. The learned Senior Counsel highlights  the
      crucial words “in the trial  of  such  person”  and  argues  that  the
      confession would not merely be admissible against the maker but  would
      be admissible in the trial of the maker which may be a  trial  jointly
      with the other accused persons. Our attention has been  drawn  to  the
      provisions of CrPC and POTA providing for a joint trial in  which  the
      accused could be tried not only for the offences under POTA  but  also
      for the offences under IPC. We find no  difficulty  in  accepting  the
      proposition that there could be a joint trial and the expression  “the
      trial of such person” may encompass a trial in which the  accused  who
      made the confession is tried jointly  with  the  other  accused.  From
      that, does it follow that  the  confession  made  by  one  accused  is
      equally admissible against others, in the absence of  specific  words?
      The answer, in our view, should be in the negative. On a plain reading
      of Section 32(1), the confession made by an accused  before  a  police
      officer shall be admissible against the maker of the confession in the
      course of his trial. It may be a joint trial  along  with  some  other
      accused; but, we cannot stretch the language of the section so  as  to
      bring  the  confession  of  the  co-accused   within   the   fold   of
      admissibility. Such stretching of the language of law is  not  at  all
      warranted especially in the case of a law which visits a  person  with
      serious penal consequences [vide the observations of Ahmadi, J. (as he
      then was) in Niranjan Singh v. Jitendra, SCC  at  p.  86,  which  were
      cited with approval in Kartar Singh case].  We  would  expect  a  more
      explicit and transparent wording to be employed in the section to rope
      in the confession of the co-accused within the net of admissibility on
      a par with the confession of the maker. An evidentiary  rule  of  such
      importance and grave consequence to the accused could  not  have  been
      conveyed in a deficient language. It seems  to  us  that  a  conscious
      departure was made by the framers of POTA on a  consideration  of  the
      pros and cons, by dropping the words “co-accused”, etc. These specific
      words consciously added to Section 15(1) by the 1993 Amendment of TADA
      so as to cover the  confessions  of  the  co-accused  would  not  have
      escaped the notice of Parliament when POTA  was  enacted.  Apparently,
      Parliament in its wisdom would have thought that the law  relating  to
      confession of the co-accused  under  the  ordinary  law  of  evidence,
      should be allowed to have its sway, taking a cue from the observations
      in Kartar Singh case at para  255.  The  confession  recorded  by  the
      police officer was, therefore, allowed to be used against the maker of
      the  confession  without  going  further  and  transposing  the  legal
      position that was obtained  under  TADA.  We  cannot  countenance  the
      contention that the words “co-accused”, etc.  were  added  in  Section
      15(1) of TADA, ex majore cautela.”


102)  In Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab (2011) 4 SCC 441, at para  14,  it
was held:

      “14…..However, the submission is not acceptable as  it  is  a  settled
      legal proposition that a penal provision providing for  enhancing  the
      sentence does not operate retrospectively. This  amendment,  in  fact,
      provides for a procedure which may enhance  the  sentence.  Thus,  its
      application would be violative of restrictions imposed by  Article  20
      of the Constitution of India….. “


Learned senior counsel also placed  reliance  on  the  following  decisions,
viz.,: Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. vs. Commissioner of  Income  Tax,  Delhi  I
(2007) 9 SCC 665, Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI,  Bombay  (1994)  5  SCC
410, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1994)  4
SCC 602, Fairey vs. Southampton County Council (1956)  2  ALL  ER  843,  The
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. vs. Irving 1905 AC 369,  In  Re:  Athlumney
(1898) QB 547.


103)  The issue of admissibility of confessions recorded  under  Section  15
of TADA prior to the amendment on 22.05.1993 has been dealt with  in  detail
by the Designated Judge in paras 1-8 of Part 3 of the final  judgment.   The
issue of admissibility against the co-accused of  the  confessions  recorded
prior to the amendment in Section 15 of TADA was considered  by  this  Court
in Nalini (supra) wherein this Court  concluded  that  confessions  recorded
under Section 15 of  TADA  are  substantive  evidence  and  are  accordingly
admissible not only against  the  maker  but  also  against  the  co-accused
charged and tried in the same  case  together  with  the  accused.   It  was
further held:


      ’416. The term “admissible”  under  Section  15  has  to  be  given  a
      meaning.  When it says that confession is  admissible  against  a  co-
      accused it can only mean that it is substantive evidence  against  him
      as well as against the maker of the confession.”


It was further observed:


      “429. ….Confession of the accused is admissible with the same force in
      its application to the co-accused who is tried in the same  case.   It
      is primary evidence and not corroborative.”

104)  We are in entire agreement with the same.  Accordingly, we  hold  that
the confession of the co-accused, namely, A-10, A-11, A-46,  A-67  and  A-97
are admissible as primary and substantive evidence against the appellant (A-
1) notwithstanding the amendment by Act 43 of 1993.
105)   To sum up, it can easily be inferred that the position of law on  the
evidentiary value of confession is as under:-
(i)   If the confessional statement  is  properly  recorded  satisfying  the
      mandatory  provision  of  Section  15  of  TADA  and  the  Rules  made
      thereunder, and if the same is found by the court as having been  made
      voluntarily and truthfully then the said confession is  sufficient  to
      base conviction on the maker of the confession.
(ii)  Whether such confession requires corroboration or  not,  is  a  matter
      for the court to consider on the basis of the facts of each case.
(iii) With regard to the use of such confession as against a co-accused,  it
      has to be held that as a matter of caution,  a  general  corroboration
      should be sought for but in cases where the court  is  satisfied  that
      the probative value of such  confession  is  such  that  it  does  not
      require corroboration then it may base conviction on the basis of such
      confession of the co-accused without corroboration.  But  this  is  an
      exception to the general rule of  requiring  corroboration  when  such
      confession is to be used against a co-accused.
(iv)  The nature of corroboration required both in  regard  to  the  use  of
      confession against the maker as also in regard to the use of the  same
      against a co-accused is of a general nature, unless the court comes to
      the conclusion that such corroboration should  be  on  material  facts
      also because of the  facts  of  a  particular  case.   The  degree  of
      corroboration so required is that which is necessary for a prudent man
      to believe in the existence of facts  mentioned  in  the  confessional
      statement.
(v)   The requirement of  sub-rule  (5)  of  Rule  15  of  the  Rules  which
      contemplates  a  confessional  statement  being  sent  to  the   Chief
      Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn,
      will have to send the same to the Designated Court  is  not  mandatory
      and is only directory.  However, the court  considering  the  case  of
      direct transmission of the confessional statement  to  the  Designated
      Court should satisfy itself on the facts of  each  case  whether  such
      direct transmission of the confessional statement creates any doubt as
      to the genuineness of the said confessional statement.
Since we have elaborately discussed the contention raised by learned  senior
counsel relating to the  admissibility  or  otherwise  of  the  confessional
statements, there is no need to refer to  the  same  in  subsequent  appeals
before us.
106)  In light of the above principles, let us discuss the confessions  made
by the co-accused persons.



i)    Confessional statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)
    Confessional statement of A-10 (Exh. Nos. 858 and 858A) was recorded by
Mr. K.L. Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP which referred to A-1 as under:
       1) “A-1 is the younger brother of Tiger Memon.
       2) When A-10 had telephoned at Tiger’s residence, Yakub  Memon  (A-1)
          attended the call and asked him to come and meet him.  On  10/11th
          February, at his residence, A-1 handed over 3  tickets  for  Dubai
          and 3 passports to A-10 asking him to pick up Parvez  Qureshi  (A-
          100), Farooq (A-16) and Salim from  Midland  Hotel,  handover  the
          said tickets and passports to them and drop at the airport by taxi
          which was duly performed by the confessing accused.  The next  day
          Tiger asked him to come and meet him.  When he went to see  Tiger,
          he was ready to go to Airport.  At the  airport,  Tiger  told  him
          that he should stay in touch with A-1 and in case  of  requirement
          of money he should get the money from Choksi and give it to him.
       3) On 13th February, he directed the confessing  accused  to  collect
          Rs. 1 crore from Choksi for him which was done by  the  confessing
          accused with the help of co-accused Gani  (A-11),  Parvez  (A-12),
          Mohd. Hussain, Salim and Anwar (AA).
       4) On 17-18th February, Yakub Memon directed the  accused  to  remain
          with Rafiq Madi (A-46).  Next  day  the  accused  and  Rafiq  Madi
          picked up Irfan Chougule (Absconding) from Mahim and Shahnawaz and
          his companion from Bandra Reclamation  and  dropped  them  at  the
          airport.
       5) On return to Tiger’s  residence,  Yakub  directed  the  confessing
          accused to talk to Tiger on phone  (during  the  telephonic  talks
          Tiger pulled up the deponent accused for having not contacted  him
          on phone).
       6) On 9th March, he directed the confessing accused to  transfer  Rs.
          25 lakhs by transferring the same from Tiger’s account to  Irani’s
          account and transfer Rs. 10 lakhs to the  Ohalia’s  account  which
          was done by the accused by contacting Choksi (A-97) on phone.
       7) In the morning, on 10th  March,  he  again  asked  the  confessing
          accused to transfer Rs. 21 lakhs from Tiger’s account  to  Irani’s
          account which was  duly  got  done  by  the  deponent  accused  by
          instructing Choksi (A-97) on phone accordingly.”

ii) Confessional Statement of Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11)
   Confessional statement of A-11 (Exh. Nos. 818 and 818A) was  recorded  by
Mr. P.K. Jain (PW-189) which stated as under:
     1) “On 27/28th Jan, A-1 was present at Al-Hussaini building  with  co-
        accused Tiger, Anwar, (AA),  Rafiq  Madi  (A-46),  Imtiyaz  (A-15),
        Parvez, Rahim (A-52) when the said co-accused left for Mhasla after
        taking the meals.
     2) On 07.03.1993, he was present in Al-Hussaini building  with  Tiger,
        Shafi, Essa (A-3), Rahim (A-7) wife of A-1, A.R. Memon (A-5)  since
        deceased, father of A-1 and Hanifa Memon (A-6), mother of A-1, when
        co-accused Gani visited Al-Hussaini.”

iii)  Confessional Statement of Md. Rafiq Moosa Biyariwala    (A-46)

      Confessional statement of A-46 (Exh. Nos. 867 and 867A)  was  recorded
by Mr. K.L. Bishnoi (PW-193) which referred the appellant as follows:
     1) “A-1 is the younger brother of Tiger Memon.
     2) He used to drive Tiger’s blue  Maruti-800  for  attending  business
        activities.
     3) On 8/9th February, he handed over Rs. 50,000/- to the Rafiq  (A-46)
        which were made over to Altaf Passportwala by the latter.
     4) On 10/11th February, he got the VIP suitcases taken out of the jeep
        in his garage through Anwar and he  took  the  same  to  his  house
        upstairs.
     5) On 13th  February,  he  got  the  jeep  after  repairs  brought  to
        Meharbux’s residence through the accused and Anwar.
     6) Between 14/15th February, he got the brown coloured  round  objects
        from the  secret  cavities  of  the  jeep  filled  into  three  VIP
        suitcases which he got transported away  from  his  garage  by  red
        Maruti Van by Altaf (A-67).
     7) Next day, he handed over Rs. 62,000/- or 63,000/- to the accused to
        be given to Altaf.
     8) On 17th February, he handed over 5 passports and tickets  to  Anwar
        for Yeda Yakub and others for their departure to Dubai.
     9) Next day, on his directions, the accused  dropped  Irfan  Chougule,
        Asgar and Shahnawaz at Airport for their departure to Dubai.
    10) On 14th, he was given Rs. 4 lakhs by the accused  after  collecting
        the said amount from Choksi (A-97).”


iv)   Confessional Statement of Altaf Ali Mustaq Ali Sayeed  (A-67)

      Confessional statement of A-67 (Exh. Nos. 819 and 819A)  was  recorded
which referred the appellant as under:
     1) “In the presence of Yakub Memon, Amjad (A-68) told Altaf  that  the
        goods belonging to Yakub are to be shifted to some other places  as
        these got burnt in the riots.
     2) Yakub Memon asked accused Altaf Ali about whether the bags had been
        delivered to him by Amjad.
     3) Yakub Memon  arranged  for  tickets  for  some  co-accused  through
        accused Altaf Ali by sending money  and  passport  through  accused
        Rafiq Madi.
     4) Yakub Memon sent 3 bags through Rafiq Madi to accused Altaf Ali for
        safe keeping.  The bags contained arms/ammunition.
     5) Yakub instructed Altaf Ali over phone for sending the bags  to  Al-
        Hussaini Building i.e., residence of Yakub  Memon  and  his  family
        members.
     6) Earlier, Yakub Memon had asked Altaf Ali to keep the bags since  he
        was giving so much business.  When Altaf Ali told Yakub that he may
        be implicated, Yakub replied that he need not worry.”

v)    Confessional Statement of Mulchand Sampatraj Shah @ Choksi (A-97)

      In his  confessional  statement,  he  narrated  the  role  of  A-1  as
follows:
      “It was emerged that Tiger Memon had a hawala account with him and  in
      the said account, which was opened in November, 1992,  a  sum  of  Rs.
      1,89,78,000/- was deposited by A-26 Raju Laxmichand Jain @  Raju  Kodi
      from November, 1992 to December,  1992.   A-26,  in  his  confessional
      statement, admitted having deposited the said amount in the account of
      Tiger Memon with A-97.  A-10 Asgar Yusuf Mukadam has  also  stated  in
      his confession about handling some transaction from the said account.”

107)  In pursuance of the  said  disclosure,  PW-513,  in  the  presence  of
Pandharinath Ganpat Hanse (PW-70) recovered two  chits  i.e.,  Article  Nos.
247 and 247-A from a diary in a pouch (Art. 248)  vide  panchnama  Exh.  No.
373 which was found in the cupboard of Room No.  604,  6th  Floor,  Rajender
Vihar, Guilder Lane, Grant Road, Bombay.   The  writings  mentioned  on  the
said two chits corroborate the figures given by  A-97  in  his  confessional
statement. The amounts deposited/withdrawn on the said two chits if seen  in
light of confessional statements of co-accused, i.e., A-10,  A-26  and  A-46
were the amounts deposited/withdrawn by accused Tiger Memon through his  men
on various dates.
108)   A  perusal  of  the  above  recitals  in  the  form  of  confessional
statements clearly establish the fact that Tiger had an  account  with  A-97
in which various amounts totaling to Rs. 161.48 lakhs were deposited  by  A-
26 at the behest of Tiger Memon (AA) and which was also being controlled  by
A-1.
109)  On 12.02.1993, at the time of departure to Dubai, Tiger Memon told  A-
10 that he should remain in touch with A-1 and in case of need of  money  to
A-1, arrange the same from A-97.  Tiger Memon further  asked  him  to  bring
Rs. 5 lakhs from A-97 and to pay the same to Sharif Abdul  Gafoor  Parkar  @
Dadabhai (A-17) on account of landing charges.  Accordingly, A-10  alongwith
Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) brought the money from A-97 and paid it  to
A-17 at his residence.  From the above, it can safely be inferred  that  the
account maintained with A-97 by Tiger Memon was being used for  meeting  the
expenses incurred for achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy  and  A-1
was handling it through other co-conspirators.  Confessional  statements  of
A-10, A-11 and A-46 clearly reveal that  the  relevant  role  of  collecting
money was played by A-10 at the behest of A-1.  In  the  said  context,  the
material contained in the confession of A-10 that Tiger Memon while  leaving
for Dubai had told him to remain in touch with A-1 and having  further  said
that in the event of A-1 requiring any money  then  he  should  collect  the
same from A-97 clearly reveals that A-1 himself  having  not  collected  the
money from A-97 but he was handling  it  through  other  conspirators.   The
said matter is further clear from the confession of A-10 which reveals  that
when A-1 told him to bring an amount of Rs. 1 crore from  A-97,  the  manner
in which the said amount was brought by A-10 by going to the house  of  A-97
along with A-11, A-12 and two more persons.  The further  materials  in  the
confession of A-10 regarding the transaction of Rs.  25  lakhs  and  Rs.  10
lakhs effected on 09.03.1993 clearly  reveals  that  the  account  of  Tiger
Memon was operated by A-1 through  A-10.   The  same  is  also  clear  after
considering  the  manner  in  which  the  transaction  had  taken  place  on
10.03.1993 by A-1.
110)   It has come in the confessional statement of A-67 that A-1 had  asked
him to book air-tickets for Dubai, and he agreed to do  the  same.   It  has
also come in the confession of A-67 that he had booked around 10-12  tickets
for Dubai at the instance of A-1 and A-46 used to bring the  money  for  the
same.  From the above, it is evident that A-67 agreed to  book  the  tickets
for Dubai at the instance of A-1 and for which A-46 used to bring the  cash.
Further, from a perusal of the confessional statement of A-46, it  is  clear
that on 8/9th February, A-1 gave him Rs. 50,000/- for giving it to A-67  and
he accordingly delivered  the  same  to  him.   It  has  also  come  in  the
confession of A-46 that on 14/15 February, he, alongwith A-10 brought Rs.  4
lakhs from A-97 and gave the same to A-1.  On 14/15 February, he  was  given
Rs. 62-63 thousand by A-1 to be delivered to  A-67  which  he,  accordingly,
delivered.
111)  From the above recital of the confessional statement of  A-46,  it  is
evidently clear that out of Rs. 4 lakhs i.e., the amount which  was  brought
by A-46 and A-10 from A-97 at the instance of A-1, Rs. 62-63  thousand  were
given to A-67 by A-46.  It is also clear from the confession  of  A-67  that
it was A-46 who used to bring the cash for the tickets he was booking for A-
1 for Dubai.  Asif Sultan Devji (PW-341) and Massey Fernandes (PW-311)  have
deposed about the booking of 12 tickets and 1  ticket  respectively  at  the
instance of A-67.  A-67, in his 313 statement  had  admitted  having  booked
the tickets for Dubai through the said witnesses.
112)  Md. Usman Ahmed Jan Khan (PW-2), the  approver,  (about  acceptability
or reliability, we shall consider it in a  separate  heading)  categorically
stated that A-1, at the instance of Tiger Memon, handed over air-tickets  to
Javed which were of Parvez Mohmmed Parvez Zulfikar  Qureshi  (A-100),  Salim
Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Md. Farooq Md. Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Zakir Hussain  Noor
Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Salim Mujahid besides PW-2.  It  has  also  come  in
the confession of A-10 that on 09.03.1993, at the instance of A-1, A-10  got
transferred Rs. 25 lakhs from Tiger’s account with A-97 to  Irani’s  account
and Rs. 10 lakhs to Ohalia’s account.  Even  on  10.03.1993,  Rs.  21  lakhs
were transferred to the  account  of  Irani  from  Tiger’s  account  at  the
instance of A-1 by A-10.
113)  The timing of these transfers, if seen in the  context  of  activities
being  carried  out  contemporaneously,  was  transferred  for  meeting  the
expenses for achieving the objects  of  conspiracy,  to  meet  the  expenses
incurred for ticketing of the co-conspirators and also to meet the  expenses
to be incurred during that period.  As  far  as  Tejarath  International  is
concerned, it has come in the evidence of S.P. Udyawar (PW-441) that at  the
instance of A-1, in January/March, 1993, he booked  tickets  for  Dubai  for
the  following  persons,  viz.,  Dawood  @  Dawood  Taklya  Md.   Phanse   @
Phanasmiyan (A-14) Abdul Razak Memon (A-5), Hanifa Abdul Razak Memon  (A-6),
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (A-1), Rahin Yakub Memon (A-7), Essa @  Anjum  Abdul
Razak Memon (A-3), Yusuf Abdul Razak Memon (A-4) and Tiger Memon  (AA)  vide
Exh. 1421.  PW-441 had categorically stated that the tickets booked  by  him
were collected  by  a  person  from  Tejarath  International  sent  by  A-1.
Besides this, Exh. 1192 shows booking of tickets for A-49, A-98, A-94,  A-39
and A-14. Exh. 1192 is a statement of Tejarath International  maintained  by
the firm of PW-441.  The confessional statement of A-67 to the  effect  that
in the second week of February, A-1 asked him to  book  tickets  for  Dubai,
which he agreed to and he also admitted having booked 15-16 tickets for  A-1
to Dubai in February 1993 and received money from A-46 for the same  in  the
second week of February 1993 itself, the time when the  co-accused  went  to
Dubai and then for training to Pakistan.  The confessional statement  of  A-
46 also shows payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 8/9th February and Rs. 62-
63,000/- on 14/15th February by A-1 to be given to A-67.  The  admission  of
A-67 in 313 statement is also evident from the booking of tickets  to  Dubai
through PW-341, who was running a travel agency  by  the  name  of  M/s  ABC
Travels and  Massey  Fernandes  (PW-311)  was  working  with  M/s  Hans  Air
Services Pvt. Ltd.  PW-341 deposed about booking 12  tickets  for  A-67  and
the bills which were marked as under:
      “Exh. 1246 – For booking Dubai on 11th February, 1993 for A-100, A-32,
      Javed Chikna and Mohd. Tainur Phansopkar.
      Exh. 1247 for 12th February, 1993, for Javed Dawood Tailor
      Exh. 1248 Emirates Flight for 17th February,  for  Yeda  Yakub,  Anwar
      Theba, Bashir Ahmed Khan, Nasir Dhakla (A-64), Gul Mohammed (A-77) and
      Abdul Ahmed.
      Exh. 1243 on 11.02.1993 Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29) and Irfan
      Chougule.”
114)  A-10, in his confession has stated that on 10/11  February,  A-1  gave
three tickets and 3 passports and asked him to drop A-100 and  A-16  to  the
Airport.  It is pertinent to note here that Exh. 1246 shows the  booking  of
A-100 for Dubai on 11.02.1993.  The said booking was done at the  behest  of
A-67 who did it at the instance of A-1.   A-46,  in  his  confession  stated
that Javed Chickna (AA) accompanied Tiger  to  Dubai  on  12.02.1993.   Exh.
1247 shows the booking of Javed Dawood Tailor to  Dubai  for  12.02.1993  by
Emirates.  Immigration Officer (PW-205)  stated  that  Javed  Dawood  Tailor
left  India  by  Emirates  on  12.02.1993.   Further,  in  the  confessional
statement of A-46 it has come that on 17.02.1993,  A-1  called  Anwar  Theba
(AA) and handed over 5 passports and 5 tickets.  Anwar asked  A-46  to  drop
him and others at the Airport for going to Dubai.  Accordingly,  he  dropped
Bashir, Gul Mohammed (A-77), Anwar Theba and Yeda Yakub.  He also  saw  A-64
at the Airport and all five of them left for Dubai.   Exh.  1248  shows  the
booking of these persons for Dubai on 17.02.1993 by  Emirates.   Thus,  this
booking was done by A-67 at the instance of A-1.  Immigration  Officer  (PW-
221) stated that the above mentioned persons left by Emirates Airlines.   It
has come in the confession of A-46 that A-1 had given him 3 passports and  3
tickets for dropping 3 persons at the Airport.  Accordingly, A-46  and  A-10
dropped  A-29,  Irfan  Chougule  and  one  more  person  at   the   Airport.
Confessional statements of A-36 and A-29 show that he  was  the  person  who
traveled with them.  A-10 in his confession corroborates  with  A-46.   Exh.
1243 shows the booking of A-29 and Irfan Chougule by Air India for going  to
Dubai.  PW-197 stated that Irfan Chougule left by Air India  on  18.02.1993.
Passport of A-29 (Exh. 1731) shows his departure  on  18.02.1993.  From  the
above, it is clear that the tickets booked by A-67  at  the  behest  of  A-1
were for the co-accused persons mentioned above, who  first  went  to  Dubai
and, subsequently, to Pakistan for weapons training  as  revealed  in  their
confessional statements  and  evidence  of  PW-2.   The  above  confessional
statements by the co-accused/conspirators would show that A-1 was playing  a
key role in furtherance of the above said conspiracy.
115)   The funds of Tejarath International were also used for achieving  the
object of criminal conspiracy.  It has come in the evidence of  PW-441  that
at the instance of A-1, he booked tickets for Dubai in  January/March,  1993
as under:
      “Exh. – 1421 A-14  18th January, 1993 (Dawood Phanse)
      Exh. – 1422 A-5, A-6, A-4
      Exh. – 1423 A-7, A-3, A-1  March 1993
      Exh. – 1424 Tiger Memon”


PW-441 had  categorically  stated  that  the  tickets  booked  by  him  were
collected by a person from Tejarath  International  sent  by  A-1.   Besides
this, Exh. 1192 shows booking of tickets for A-49, A-98, A-94, A-39  and  A-
14 which is a statement of Tejarath International maintained by the firm  of
PW-441.  From the evidence of PW-441, it is clear that A-1 was managing  the
affairs of Tejarath International and had  booked  tickets  on  its  account
with the firm of PW-441.  In light of  the  evidence  of  PW-441  about  the
reservation card of the firm and booking of tickets by A-1  in  the  account
of Tejarath International coupled with the  confession  of  the  co-accused,
viz., A-14, A-94, A-49 and A-39 regarding their visits to Dubai  during  the
relevant time, it is clear that A-1 had  booked  air  tickets  for  the  co-
conspirators.
116)       Vijayanti B. Dembla (PW-313) from East West Travels  had  deposed
that he had been introduced by Samir Hingora (A-53) to Tiger Memon  and  was
organizing tickets for Tiger since March 1992.  He named Nitin K. More  (PW-
310),  who  used  to  collect  tickets  on  behalf  of  Tiger  Memon.    The
prosecution has examined PW-310 and shows that it was A-1  who  was  booking
tickets and would send his employee to  collect  the  same  from  East  West
Travels.  He is a convincing witness for the fact  that  A-1’s  firm  office
was burnt in the riots and that he had started working  from  his  residence
at Al Hussaini Building.  It is relevant to mention that  practically  there
was no cross examination of the witness.
117)  It has come in evidence (confessional statements  of  A-67  and  A-46)
that 4 suitcases were kept in the jeep which was parked in  the  residential
premises of Amhjad Ali Meharbax (A-68-since discharged) by  A-11  and  Anwar
Theba (AA) at the  instance  of  A-1.   Subsequently,  A-67  took  away  the
suitcases and kept them in his office at the instance of  A-1.  Later,  A-46
brought three more suitcases and kept them at the office of  A-67.   Out  of
the total seven suitcases,  A-67  delievered  5  suitcases  to  A-1  at  Al-
Hussaini Building.  Thus, two suitcases remained in his possession.  It  has
further been disclosed by A-67 that due to the involvement  of  A-1  in  the
matter, he kept the said  suitcases  at  the  residence  of  Mohammed  Hanif
(PW-282).
118)    After the arrest of A-67, he made a disclosure under Section  27  of
the Evidence Act and led the Police and Pancha (PW-37) to the  residence  of
Mohammed Hanif from where the following articles were  recovered  and  taken
into possession vide Panchnama Exh. 109:
a)    One suitcase (Article 42) was found  containing  65  handgrenades  and
100 electronic detonators.
b)    One VIP suitcase (Article 43) was found containing  40  hand  grenades
and 50 electronic detonators.  During the  examination  of  Akbar  Khan  Abu
Sama Khan (dead) (PW-37) in the Court only 85  handgrenades  were  found  in
the two suitcases which were marked  as  Article  44  to  84  and  one  hand
grenade which was sent to the FSL was marked as Article 45.
c)    The incharge of the store room of CID,  Crime  Branch,  P.I.  Pargunde
has submitted the details of disposal in respect  of  remaining  20  defused
hand grenades to the Court.  The recovered articles were  forwarded  to  the
FSL and its report (Exh. 2439) proves the nature of article recovered.
d)    Out of 150 electronic detonators, one is marked Article  46  (one)  to
(three) and the remaining 149 were  forwarded  to  the  Bomb  Detection  and
Disposal Squad (BDDS) for defusal.
119)    It is clear from the confession of A-67 that 4 bags  were  given  to
him at the  first  occasion  which  were  containing  ammunitions  etc.,  by
discharged accused Amjad Ali Meharbax  at  the  instance  of  A-1.   On  the
second occasion, A-46 had delivered 3 more suitcases to A-67  and  on  being
asked, A-46 stated that the  suitcases  were  containing  round  bombs  etc.
Thus,  A-67,  in  all  had  received  7  bags  from  A-1   which   contained
arms/ammunitions etc.   A-67,  thereafter,  returned  5  bags  to  A-1  that
included 4 bags which were received on the first occasion  and  one  of  the
three bags received on the second occasion.  Thus  in  all,  there  remained
two bags with A-67 which were recovered by PW-506.  These facts were  stated
by A-67 in his confessional statement which has  since  been  exhibited  and
read in  evidence  as  substantive  evidence.   Moreover,  the  confessional
statement of A-67 corroborated the evidence of PW-37, PW-506 and PW-282.  A-
46, in his confessional statement, also  stated  about  the  delivery  of  3
suitcases to A-67 by A-1, but there is a small discrepancy about the  manner
of receipt of 3 suitcases by A-67 wherein he stated that A-46 had  delivered
3 suitcases to A-67.  The manner of delivery of 3 suitcases is not  of  much
importance, as it has clearly come in the confession of A-67 in  respect  of
delivery of bags at the instance of A-1 and the subsequent recovery  of  two
suitcases at the instance of A-67 which contained 105 hand grenades and  150
electronic detonators.
120)     In the confessional statement of A-46, it  was  mentioned  that  on
13.02.1993 he alongwith Anwar Theba (AA) went to the residence of Amjad  Ali
Meharbax (since discharged).  Accordingly, both of  them  brought  the  said
jeep to the Al-Hussaini Building and Anwar Theba went  up  and  handed  over
the key of the jeep to A-1.  On 14/15.02.1993, when A-46 was present at  Al-
Hussaini Building alongwith Anwar Theba (AA), A-1 called Anwar upstairs  and
after sometime Anwar came down alongwith three suitcases.  He  also  brought
the key of a jeep kept inside the garage  and  Anwar  Theba  asked  A-46  to
unscrew the bolts of the floor of the  jeep.    A-46  accordingly  unscrewed
the bolts of the floor and when he was about  to  lift  the  floor,  he  was
asked by A-1 to go to the office  of  A-67.   He  immediately  went  to  the
office of A-67 and when he found that A-67 was not there,  he  informed  A-1
accordingly.  At that time, A-46 saw that Anwar Theba was filling  something
in the said suitcases which was of light green colour and  round  in  shape.
At that time, A-1 asked A-46 to stand  outside  the  garage  and  watch  the
movements of the people.  He was apparently sent outside by A-1 so  that  he
could not see the contents which were being filled  in  the  suitcases.   He
was again sent by A-1 to see whether A-67 was  available.   Accordingly,  he
went to the office of A-67 and as A-67 was not present, he came back to  Al-
Hussaini.  At that time, he saw A-67  keeping  the  said  suitcases  in  his
Maruti Van.  In the light of the evidence on record, it is  clear  that  A-1
was in possession of  handgrenades  and  electronic  detonators  which  were
concealed in the jeep and which were delivered to A-67  in  three  suitcases
by A-1 through A-46.
121)   PW-87, who was the driver working for Abdul Razak Suleman  Memon  (A-
5), has deposed that A-5 was having four vechicles, namely, red Maruti  Van,
blue Maruti Car, white coloured Maruti  Car  and  one  red  coloured  Maruti
1000.  He also stated that A-5 was staying at  5/6th  floor  of  Al-Hussaini
Building alongwith his wife,  daughter-in-laws  and  sons,  namely,  Essa  @
Anjum Abdul Razak Memon (Anjumbhai)  (A-3),  Yusufbhai  (A-4)  and  Ayubbhai
(AA).  He also stated about  taking  his  blue  coloured  Maruti  car  to  a
service station opposite to Paradise Talkies  on  2-3  occasions.   He  also
identified his signatures (Exh. Nos. 444 and 445) on the  bills  (Exh.  Nos.
444A and 445A) respectively.  These signatures were affected by him  at  the
time of taking the car for  servicing.   The  said  witness  did  not  fully
support the prosecution and was declared hostile.
122)  PW-630, who was the Manager of Hind Automobile and Co.,  deposed  that
he had issued Exh. Nos. 444A and 445A to the Driver who brought  the  Maruti
Car bearing No. MP-09-H-0672 for  servicing  on  03.01.1993  and  23.02.1993
respectively.  He also stated that he had written the name of the  owner  of
the car and  the  car  number  on  the  said  bills  on  the  basis  of  the
information given by the Driver who brought the car  for  servicing  on  the
said two occasions.  It is pertinent  to  note  here  that  the  driver  who
brought the vehicle for servicing was PW-87 as evident from  his  signatures
on Exh. Nos. 444 and 445.  Exh. Nos.  444A  and  445A  shows  that  A-1  was
mentioned as the owner of Vehicle No. MP-09-H-0672.
123)  It has been proved that  the  said  Maruti  Car  of  blue  colour  was
planted at Bombay Stock Exchange which exploded  at  03:30  hrs  killing  84
persons, injuring 217 persons and causing loss to property  worth  rupees  5
crores.  The number plate (Article 227) bearing No. MP-09-H-0672 was  seized
from the  place  of  occurrence  by  Vipul  Manubhai  Vyas,  Deputy  Project
Manager, Bombay  Stock  Exchange  (PW-86).   Engine  No.  F/8/BIN703676  and
Chassis No. 481528 was seized by PW-86 and PW-370 respectively.  It is  also
evident that the Maruti 800 Car bearing No. MP-09-H-0672  was  purchased  by
Shafi Zariwala (AA) in  the  beginning  of  1992  through  Suleman  Mohammed
Lakdawala (PW-365), Shakeel S. Hasan (PW-366), Roopak  Madanlal  Malik  (PW-
628), Atmaram Ramchandra (PW-642), Rajkumar Kamal Chand  Jain  (PW-649)  and
this Maruti Car was used  to  blast  the  Bombay  Stock  Exchange  Building.
Ultimately, this car was used by Tiger Memon and A-1  for  explosion.   This
is evident from the evidence of PWs 87 and 630.  It also  finds  mention  in
the confessional statement of A-46  that  A-1  was  using  a  blue  coloured
Maruti Car.
124)   From  the  above,  the  following  conduct  of  the  appellant  (A-1)
alongwith the co-conspirator family members may be relevant:-
      a) At the time of blast, they all were living together at Dubai.
      b) After the blasts, the Memons’ fled to Pakistan from Dubai.
      c) Their conduct of living together after fleeing from Bombay and  not
      providing information about these blasts to the concerned  authorities
      at Indian Embassy prove that the members of the Memon family were also
      co-conspirators in committing the said  bomb  blasts.   With  all  the
      activities going on at the Al-Hussaini Building, on the eve of blasts,
      the members of Memon family were aware of the activities.
      d) They never disclosed the connection of Tiger Memon with the  blasts
      to anybody.
      e) In Pakistan, they had obtained  Pakistani  Passports  and  National
      Identity Cards in assumed names.
      f) They had acquired properties, started a business in  the  name  and
      style of M/s Home Land  Builders,  acquired  fictitious  qualification
      certificates, driving licenses etc. to lead a comfortable life all  of
      which will show that they have chosen a comfortable life  in  Pakistan
      after causing blasts in Bombay and were determined not  to  return  to
      India in their original identity.
      g) They failed to appear  before  the  Court  inspite  of  issuing  of
      proclamation and the same being widely published.
      h) Instead of surrendering, they traveled  to  Bangkok  and  Singapore
      from Karachi for holidays in  assumed  names  on  Pakistani  Passports
      during April, 1993.
      i) They had not  taken  any  steps  to  surrender  before  the  Indian
      authorities or Thailand Authorities on their arrival  to  Bangkok  and
      Singapore.
      j) Nor they had made any attempt to return to India.
      k) Large amount of jewellery and cash was abandoned by the Memons’  at
      the Al-Hussaini Building when they hurriedly left Bombay  just  before
      the blasts.
Further, recovery from the walls/portions of the  lift  at  the  Al-Hussaini
building of  RDX  remanants  on  22.03.1993  establishes  the  case  of  the
prosecution of the activities being carried out by the appellant and the co-
conspirators at the said place.
125)  Apart from  the  above  confessional  statements  and  evidence,  nine
Indian passports and seven Pakistani passports belonging to the  members  of
Memon’s family including the appellant which were found with A-1  were  also
seized by H.C. Singh (PW-474), SP-STF, Delhi, CBI from  his  person  at  the
time of arrest.  A series of other  documents  were  also  seized  from  the
appellant like a Pakistani Driving Licence, Pakistani Identity  Card,  Chits
having numbers  of  Karachi  residents,  Address  Book,  Pakistani  Computer
Education Certificate and  Pakistani  National  Tax  Number  Certificate  in
favour of Home Land Builders.  The evidence of  Kanjira  Parambil  (PW-473),
Consulate General of India at  Karachi  further  established  that  all  the
Pakistani Passports (13 in number) including the one  seized  from  A-1  are
passports issued genuinely by the Pakistan Government.  On  perusal  of  the
entries in the passports seized from  the  appellant  (A-1),  the  following
facts emerge:
   a) Indian Passport No. M-307804 in respect of A-1  establishes  that  A-1
      left Dubai on 17.03.1993 and there is no arrival stamp of any  country
      available on the said passport.
   b) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763242 in respect of  Yusuf  Ahmed  Mohammed
      shows that the said passport holder left  Karachi  on  17.04.1993  and
      reached Bangkok on the same day.  Again, the said passport holder left
      Bangkok on 29.04.1993.  The passport holder left Karachi on 20.06.1994
      and reached Dubai on the same day.  Again, the  passport  holder  left
      Dubai on 28.06.1994 but there is no entry stamp showing his arrival at
      any place.  After seeing the Pakistani as well as Indian Passports, it
      can be seen that Yusuf Ahmed Mohammed and A-1 are the same persons.
   c) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763651 in respect of Aftab Ahmed Mohammed (A-
      2) shows that the passport  holder  left  Karachi  on  16.04.1993  and
      reached Bangkok on 16.04.1993 itself.  The said person left Bangkok on
      27.04.1993.  There is no arrival stamp of  any  country  on  the  said
      passport.  The said  person  again  left  Karachi  on  17.06.1994  and
      entered Dubai on  the  same  day.   The  said  person  left  Dubai  on
      03.07.1994.  Again, the said person left  Karachi  on  09.07.1994  and
      entered Dubai on 09.07.1994 itself.  Again, the said  passport  holder
      left Dubai on 25.08.1994 and entered India on 25.08.1994 itself.
   d) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763650 in respect of Akhtar  Ahmed  Mohammed
      shows that the said passport holder left  Karachi  on  16.04.1993  and
      reached Bangkok on 16.04.1993 itself.  The said passport  holder  left
      Bangkok on 27.04.1993.  There is no arrival stamp of  any  country  on
      the said passport.  The said passport holder  again  left  Karachi  on
      17.06.1994 and reached Dubai on 17.06.1994 itself.   Again,  the  said
      passport  holder  left  Dubai  on  25.08.1994  and  reached  India  on
      25.08.1994 itself.
   e) Indian Passport No. C-340734 in respect of Yusuf Abdul Razak Memon (A-
      4) shows that the said person left Bombay on  11.03.1993  and  reached
      Dubai on 11.03.1993.  Further, he left Dubai on 17.03.1993.   However,
      there is no arrival stamp of any country on the said passport.
   f) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763654 in respect of  Imran  Ahmed  Mohammed
      reveals that the said passport holder left Karachi on  17.04.1993  and
      reached Bangkok on the  same  day.   The  said  passport  holder  left
      Bangkok on 29.04.1993.  There is no arrival stamp of  any  country  on
      the said passport.  Again, the said passport holder  left  Karachi  on
      20.06.1994 and entered Dubai on 20.06.1994 itself.  The said  passport
      holder left Dubai on 28.06.1994.  There is no  arrival  stamp  of  any
      country on the passport.  Again, the said passport holder left Karachi
      on 25.07.1994 and reached  Dubai.   The  said  person  left  Dubai  on
      10.08.1994 and re-entered Dubai on 11.08.1994.   Again,  the  passport
      holder  left  Dubai  on  25.08.1994  and  arrived  at  New  Delhi   on
      25.08.1994.  From the Indian Passport of Yusuf Abdul Razak  Memon  and
      Pakistani passport in respect of Imran Ahmed  Mohammed,  it  is  clear
      that Imran Ahmed Mohammed and Yusuf Abdul Razak  Memon  are  the  same
      persons.
   g) Indian Passport No. C-013120 in respect of  Abdul  Razak  Memon  (A-5)
      (dead) shows that the said person left Dubai on 17.03.1994  and  there
      is no arrival stamp of  any  country  after  that.   From  the  Indian
      Passport and Pakistani Passport, it is clear that  Abdul  Razak  Memon
      and Ahmed Mohammed are the same persons.
   h) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763649 in respect of  Ahmed  Mohammed  shows
      that the said passport holder left Karachi on 25.07.1994  and  entered
      Dubai on the same day itself.  The said passport holder left Dubai  on
      10.08.1994 and  re-entered  Dubai  on  11.08.1994.   Again,  the  said
      passport  holder  left  Dubai  on  25.08.1994  and  reached  India  on
      25.08.1994 itself.
   i) Indian Passport No. C-013796 in respect of Hanifa Abdul Razak Memon (A-
      6) shows that she left Dubai on 17.03.1993 and  there  is  no  arrival
      stamp of any country on the said passport.
   j) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763645 in respect of Zainab  Ahmed  Mohammed
      shows that she left Karachi on 25.07.1994 and  reached  Dubai  on  the
      same day itself.  She again left Dubai on  10.08.1994  and  re-entered
      Dubai on 11.08.1994.  She again left Dubai on 25.08.1994  and  entered
      India on 25.08.1994 itself.  From the Indian  passport  and  Pakistani
      passport, it is clear that Zainab  Ahmed  Mohammed  and  Hanifa  Abdul
      Razak Memon are the same persons.
   k) Indian Passport No. N-307801 in respect of  Rahin  Yakub  Memon  (A-7)
      shows that  she  left  Bombay  on  11.03.1993  and  reached  Dubai  on
      11.03.1993 itself.  She left Dubai  on  17.03.1993  and  there  is  no
      arrival stamp of any country on the said passport.
   l) Passport No. T-0-780 in respect of Rahin Yakub Memon shows that  Rahin
      Yakub Memon reached Delhi on 05.09.1994 on the said passport.
   m) Indian Passport No. C-672378 in respect of Rubina Suleman Memon  (A-8)
      shows that she left Dubai on 20.03.1993.  There is no arrival stamp of
      any country available on the said passport.
   n) Pakistani Passport No. AA-763653 in respect of Mrs. Mehtab Aftab Ahmed
      shows that she left Karachi  on  16.04.1993  and  reached  Bangkok  on
      16.04.1993.  Again, she left  Bangkok  on  27.04.1993.   There  is  no
      arrival stamp of any country on the said passport.
   o) Pakistani Passport No. AC-001087 in respect of Mrs. Mehtab Aftab Ahmed
      shows that she left Karachi on 25.07.1994 and  entered  Dubai  on  the
      same  day.   She  left  Dubai  on  10.08.1994  and  entered  Dubai  on
      11.08.1994.  Again, she left Dubai on 25.08.1994 and entered India  on
      25.08.1994.  The passport shows that Rubina Suleman Memon  and  Mehtab
      Aftab Ahmed are the same persons.
The above evidence alongwith the confessions  of  various  co-accused  amply
prove  that  the  weapons  training  was  organized  with  the  aid  of  the
Government of Pakistan and also clearly shows a very deep involvement of  A-
1 in the organization and conduct of serial bomb blasts in question.
Retractions:
126)      It has been contended by  learned  senior  counsel  that  all  the
confessions relied upon have been retracted  and  therefore,  they  are  not
trustworthy and it would not be safe to place reliance on them.  It is  also
contended that those statements had been obtained under threat and  coercion
and were not voluntary, as such, those confessional statements could not  be
taken to be worthy of reliance.  It was submitted by the prosecution that  a
voluntary and free confession, even if later retracted, can be relied  upon.
 It was pointed out  that  the  retractions  were  not  made  at  the  first
available opportunity by the accused persons.  It was also highlighted  that
after their arrest, the accused were brought before the  Magistrate’s  court
several times in 1993 and 1994, however,  the  retractions  were  made  many
months after recording of the confessions.
127)   This Court, in Mohd. Amin  v.  CBI,  (2008)  15  SCC  49,  considered
several TADA cases where confession was recorded under Section  15  of  TADA
and later retracted. This Court was pleased to observe:
      “If a person accused of committing an offence under the Act challenges
      his confession on the ground that it was not  made  voluntarily,  then
      the  initial  burden  is  on  the  prosecution  to  prove   that   all
      requirements under Section 15 of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules have
      been complied with. Once this  is  done,  the  burden  shifts  on  the
      accused person and it is for him to prove that the confession was  not
      made voluntarily and that the same is not truthful and if  he  adduces
      evidence during the trial to  substantiate  his  allegation  that  the
      confession  was  not  voluntary  then  the  court  has  to   carefully
      scrutinize the  entire  evidence  and  surrounding  circumstances  and
      determine whether or not the confession was voluntary. The  confession
      made under Section 15 of the Act  cannot  be  discarded  only  on  the
      ground of violation of the guidelines laid down in Kartar  Singh  case
      because the same have not been incorporated in the  Act  and/  or  the
      Rules.”

The court rejecting the contention that  confession  should  not  be  relied
upon further held in Paragraph 69 that:
      “If the confessions of the appellants are scrutinized in the light  of
      the above enumerated factors, it becomes clear  that  the  allegations
      regarding coercion, threat, torture, etc. after more than one year  of
      recording of confessions are an afterthought and products of ingenuity
      of their advocates. The statements made by them under Section  313  of
      CrPC were also the result  of  an  afterthought  because  no  tangible
      reason has been put forward by the defence as to why Appellants A-4 to
      A-8 did not retract their confessions when they were  produced  before
      the Magistrate at Ahmedabad and thereafter despite the fact that  they
      had access to legal assistance in more than  one  way.  Therefore,  we
      hold that the trial court did not commit any error by relying upon the
      confessions of the Appellants A-4 to A-8 and A-10 and we do  not  find
      any valid ground to discard the confessions of  Appellants  A-4  toA-8
      and A-10.”

128)  This Court, in Jameel Ahmed vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 9  SCC  673
held that “it happens very often, it is the  common  defence  of   a  person
making confessional statement to deny the same  or  retract  from  the  same
subsequently and to allege compulsion in making such statement.”
129)  In State of Maharashtra vs. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani, (2001) 9 SCC  1,
this Court, while setting aside the judgment of acquittal  recorded  by  the
Designated TADA Court, observed as under:
      “58. …. There is no denial of the fact that the  judicial  confessions
      made are usually retracted. Retracted confessions are good confessions
      if held to have been made  voluntarily  and  in  accordance  with  the
      provisions of law…. Corroboration of the confessional statement is not
      a rule of law but  a  rule  of  prudence.  Whether  in  a  given  case
      corroboration  is  sufficient  would  depend  upon   the   facts   and
      circumstances of that case.”

130)  In Manjit Singh  vs.  CBI,  (2011)  11  SCC  578,  this  Court,  while
considering the question whether retracted confessions of  co-accused  could
be relied upon to convict the accused, held that  the  retracted  statements
can be used against the accused as well  as  the  co-accused  provided  such
statements were truthful and voluntary when made.  In  the  said  case,  the
two accused that made confessional statements, subsequently  retracted  from
their statements.  This Court observed:
      “87. A confessional statement given under Section 15 of TADA shall not
      be discarded merely for the reason that the same has been retracted….”

Where the original confession  was  truthful  and  voluntary  and  has  been
recorded after strictly following the law and the prescribed procedure,  the
subsequent retraction and denial  of  such  confessional  statement  in  the
statement of the  accused  under  Section  313  was  only  as  a  result  of
afterthought.
131)  In Kalawati vs. State of Himachal AIR 1953 SC 131, it  was  said  that
“the amount of credibility to be attached to a  retracted  confession  would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”
132)  In State of Tamil Nadu vs. Kutty AIR 2001 SC 2778, it was held:
      “…..the twin test of a confession  is  to  ascertain  whether  it  was
      voluntary and true.  Once those tests are found  to  be  positive  the
      next endeavour is to see whether  there  is  any  other  reason  which
      stands in the way of acting on it.   Therefore,  retracted  confession
      may form legal basis for conviction if  the  court  is  satisfied  the
      confession was true and was voluntarily made.”


(See also: Navjot Sandhu (supra).
133)  In Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957  SC  216,  it  was  held
that the rule of practice and prudence requires a  retracted  confession  to
be corroborated by independent evidence.  (See  also:  Parmananda  Pegu  vs.
State of Assam, AIR 2004 SC 4197, Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of  Rajasthan
AIR 1963 SC 1094, Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. State AIR 1988  SC  1883,  Babubhai
Udesinh Parmar vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 12 SCC 268).
134)  It is therefore clear that where the original confession was  truthful
and voluntary, the Court can  rely  upon  such  confession  to  convict  the
accused in spite of a subsequent retraction  and  its  denial  in  statement
under Section 313.  Since we have elaborately discussed the contention  with
regard to retraction of statements, there is no need to refer  to  the  same
in respect of other appeals before us.


Corroboration of Confession:
135)  Further, a contention was raised by learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant that there was no sufficient  corroboration  of  the  confessional
statements made by the accused.  In reply  to  the  above,  the  prosecution
relied upon the following decisions:-
136)  In Wariyam Singh vs. State of U.P.,  (1995)  6  SCC  458,  this  Court
relied upon the confession made by the  accused  for  convicting  him.   The
confession was  alleged  to  have  been  fabricated.   In  para  16  of  the
judgment, it was held that a part of the confession  stood  corroborated  by
the testimony of a witness and, hence, there was no reason to  believe  that
the confession was fabricated.  This Court held that the allegation  of  the
confession being fabricated was without any basis and the  confession  could
be taken into account while recording conviction.
137)  In S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir, (2000) 2 SCC 254, this Court in  para  34
observed that the confessions of two accused being substantive evidence  are
sufficient for considering them and it also received corroboration from  the
confessions of other accused and also general corroboration as  regards  the
other illegal activities committed  by  them  from  the  evidence  of  other
witnesses.  On the  basis  of  those  confessional  statements,  this  Court
reversed the orders of acquittal passed by the High Court.
138)  In Lal Singh vs. State of  Gujarat,  (2001)  3  SCC  221,  this  Court
upheld the conviction of the accused on the basis of  the  confessions.   It
was held that the Nation has been ‘facing great stress  and  strain  because
of  misguided  militants  and  cooperation  of  the  militancy’  which   was
affecting the social security, peace and stability.  Since the knowledge  of
the details of such conspiracies remains with the people  directly  involved
in it and it is not easy to prove the involvement of all  the  conspirators,
hence the confessional statements are  reliable  pieces  of  evidence.   The
Court in para 84 observed:
      “84.  …..  Hence,  in  case  of  conspiracy  and   particularly   such
      activities, better evidence than acts and statements including that of
      co-conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy is hardly available. In
      such cases, when there is confessional statement it is  not  necessary
      for the prosecution to establish each and every link  as  confessional
      statement gets corroboration from the link  which  is  proved  by  the
      prosecution. In any case, the law requires  establishment  of  such  a
      degree of probability that a prudent man may on its basis, believe  in
      the existence of the facts in issue. For assessing  evidence  in  such
      cases, this Court in Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormall dealing with
      smuggling activities and the penalty proceedings under Section 167  of
      the Sea Customs Act, 1878 observed that many facts relating to illicit
      business remain in the special or peculiar  knowledge  of  the  person
      concerned in it and held thus: (SCC pp. 553-55, paras 30-32 and 37)


        “30. ... that the prosecution or the Department is not required  to
        prove its  case  with  mathematical  precision  to  a  demonstrable
        degree; for, in all human affairs absolute  certainty  is  a  myth,
        and—as Prof. Brett felicitously puts  it  —  ‘all  exactness  is  a
        fake’. El Dorado of absolute  proof  being  unattainable,  the  law
        accepts for it probability as a working substitute in this  work-a-
        day world. The law does not require the prosecution  to  prove  the
        impossible. All that it requires is the  establishment  of  such  a
        degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe
        in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus,  legal  proof  is  not
        necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a  prudent
        man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case.


        31. The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the
        incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of  the
        evidence is to be considered — to use the words of Lord Mansfied in
        Blatch v. Archar (1774) 1 Cowp 63:  98  ER  969  (Cowp  at  p.  65)
        ‘according to the proof which it was in the power of  one  side  to
        prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’.”

139)  In State of Maharashtra vs. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani, (2001) 9 SCC  1,
this Court relied mainly on  the  confessional  statements  of  the  accused
which were also retracted.  It was held that there  was  sufficient  general
corroboration of the confessional statements  made  by  the  accused.   This
Court found sufficient corroboration in the testimony of the  witnesses  and
the recoveries pursuant to the statements given  by  the  accused.   It  was
also held that once the confessional statements  were  found  to  have  been
made voluntarily, the test identification parade was  not  significant.   It
was further held that corroboration is not a rule  of  law  but  a  rule  of
prudence.
140)  In Devender Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi,  (2002)  5  SCC  234,
this Court was considering, among other things, whether the  accused  making
the confessional statement can be convicted on the basis of  the  confession
alone without any corroboration.  It was held that once  it  is  found  that
the confessional statement is voluntary, it is not proper to hold  that  the
police had incorporated certain aspects in the confessional statement  which
were gathered during the investigation conducted earlier.  It was held  that
the so-called retraction by the appellant was made long after he  was  taken
into judicial custody.  It was also observed that:
      “51.  Where   trustworthy   evidence   establishing   all   links   of
      circumstantial evidence is available, the confession of  a  co-accused
      as to conspiracy even without corroborative evidence can be taken into
      consideration. (See Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra.) It
      can in some cases be  inferred  from  the  acts  and  conduct  of  the
      parties. (See Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra)


      54. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial;
      if a case has some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to
      err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the
      meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare  innocent  from  being
      punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof  beyond
      reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish.  [See  Inder  Singh  v.
      State (Delhi Admn.)] Vague hunches cannot take the place  of  judicial
      evaluation.


      “A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that  no
      innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that  a  guilty
      man does not escape. … Both are public duties….” (Per  Viscount  Simon
      in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution quoted in State of  U.P.
      v. Anil Singh, SCC p. 692, para 17.)


      55. When  considered  in  the  aforesaid  background,  the  plea  that
      acquittal of the  co-accused  has  rendered  the  prosecution  version
      brittle, has no substance. Acquittal of  the  co-accused  was  on  the
      ground of non-corroboration. That principle as indicated above has  no
      application to the accused himself.”


141)  In Ravinder Singh vs. State of  Maharashtra,  (2002)  9  SCC  55  this
Court held that a confession  does  not  require  any  corroboration  if  it
relates to the accused himself.  It was further held that there  was  enough
evidence to provide general corroboration  to  the  confessional  statement.
It was further held that minor  contradictions  in  the  statements  of  the
accused were of  no  consequence  once  the  confessions  were  held  to  be
reliable.
142)  In Jameel Ahmed  vs.  State  of  Rajasthan,  (2003)  9  SCC  673,  the
position of law was summed up by this Court as follows:
      “35. To sum up our findings in regard to the legal arguments addressed
      in these appeals, we find:


      (i) If the confessional statement is properly recorded, satisfying the
      mandatory provision of Section 15 of the TADA Act and the  Rules  made
      thereunder, and if the same is found by the court as having been  made
      voluntarily and truthfully then the said confession is  sufficient  to
      base a conviction on the maker of the confession.


      (ii) Whether such confession  requires  corroboration  or  not,  is  a
      matter for the court considering such  confession  on  facts  of  each
      case.


      (iii) In regard to the use of such confession as against a co-accused,
      it has to be held that as a matter of caution, a general corroboration
      should be sought for but in cases where the court  is  satisfied  that
      the probative value of such  confession  is  such  that  it  does  not
      require corroboration then it may base a conviction on  the  basis  of
      such confession of the co-accused without corroboration. But  this  is
      an exception to the general rule of requiring corroboration when  such
      confession is to be used against a co-accused.


      (iv) The nature of corroboration required both in regard to the use of
      confession against the maker as also in regard to the use of the  same
      against a co-accused is of a general nature, unless the court comes to
      the conclusion that such corroboration should  be  on  material  facts
      also because of  the  facts  of  a  particular  case.  The  degree  of
      corroboration so required is that which is necessary for a prudent man
      to believe in the existence of facts  mentioned  in  the  confessional
      statement.


      (v) The requirement of sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 of the TADA Rules which
      contemplates  a  confessional  statement  being  sent  to  the   Chief
      Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn,
      will have to send the same to the Designated Court  is  not  mandatory
      and is only directory. However, the  court  considering  the  case  of
      direct transmission of the confessional statement  to  the  Designated
      Court should satisfy itself on facts of each case whether such  direct
      transmission of the confessional statement in the facts  of  the  case
      creates any doubt as to  the  genuineness  of  the  said  confessional
      statement.”


143)  In Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461,  this  court  held
that the confessional statements made by co-accused can be used  to  convict
a person, and that it is only as a rule of prudence that  the  Court  should
look for corroboration elsewhere.  It was held that:
      “27. Applying  the  principles  which  can  be  culled  out  from  the
      principles set out above  to  the  factual  scenario,  the  inevitable
      conclusion is that the trial court was justified in its conclusions by
      holding  the  accused-appellants  guilty.  When  an   accused   is   a
      participant in a big game planned, he cannot  take  the  advantage  of
      being ignorant about the finer details applied to give effect  to  the
      conspiracy hatched, for example, A-7 is stated to be ignorant  of  the
      conspiracy and the kidnapping. But the factual scenario  described  by
      the co-accused in the statements recorded under Section 15 of the TADA
      Act shows his deep involvement in the meticulous planning done by Umar
      Sheikh. He organized all the activities for  making  arrangements  for
      the accused and other terrorists.


144)  In Sukhwant Singh vs. State, (2003) 8 SCC 90, this  Court  upheld  the
conviction solely on the basis of the confession of the co-accused,  without
any corroboration, that too in a situation where  the  accused  himself  had
not confessed.  The judgment in the case of Jameel Ahmed (supra) was  relied
upon.  It was held:
      “3. In the present case we are aware of the fact  that  the  appellant
      has not made any confessional statement nor is there any corroboration
      of the confessional  statement  of  the  co-accused  implicating  this
      appellant from any other independent source but then we have  held  in
      the above-reported case that if the confessional statement  of  a  co-
      accused is acceptable to the court even without corroboration  then  a
      confession of a co-accused can be the basis of conviction  of  another
      accused so implicated in that confession. Therefore the fact that  the
      appellant herein has not confessed or the confessional statements made
      implicating him by A-1 and A-2  are  not  independently  corroborated,
      will  not  be  a  ground  to  reject  the  evidence  produced  by  the
      prosecution in  the  form  of  confessional  statement  of  co-accused
      provided the confession relied against the appellant is acceptable  to
      the court.”



145)  In Mohmed Amin vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 15 SCC  49,
this Court convicted the accused on  the  basis  of  their  confessions  and
confessional statements of  co-accused.   It  was  held  that  there  is  no
requirement of corroboration if  the  confessions  are  proved  to  be  made
voluntarily,  and  the  Rules  applicable  have  been  complied  with.   The
following observations are pertinent:
      “31. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that if a person accused
      of an offence under the Act makes a confession before a police officer
      not below the rank  of  Superintendent  of  Police  and  the  same  is
      recorded by the officer concerned in  writing  or  on  any  mechanical
      device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which  sounds
      or images can be reproduced, then such confession is admissible in the
      trial of the maker as also the co-accused, abettor or conspirator  not
      only for an offence under the Act but also for offence(s) under  other
      enactments, provided that the co-accused, abettor  or  conspirator  is
      charged and tried in the same case along  with  the  accused  and  the
      court is satisfied that requirements of the Act  and  the  Rules  have
      been complied with. Whether  such  confession  requires  corroboration
      depends on the facts of the given case. If the court is convinced that
      the probative value of the confession is such that it does not require
      corroboration then the same can  be  used  for  convicting  the  maker
      and/or the co-accused  under  the  Act  and/or  the  other  enactments
      without independent corroboration.”

146)   In Mohd. Ayub Dar vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2010) 9  SCC  312,
it was held that even though the guidelines in Kartar Singh, have  not  been
strictly followed, the confession of  the  accused  recorded  is  admissible
against him and can be relied upon solely to  convict  him.   The  following
observations of this Court are pertinent:
      “59. It would, therefore, be clear, as rightly contended by Shri Rawal
      that merely because the guidelines in Kartar Singh v. State of  Punjab
      were not fully  followed,  that  by  itself  does  not  wipe  out  the
      confession recorded. We have already given  our  reasons  for  holding
      that the confession was recorded by A.K. Suri (PW 2) taking full  care
      and cautions which were required to be observed  while  recording  the
      confession.


      60. In Ravinder Singh v. State of Maharashtra it has been observed  in
      para 19 that if the confession made by the accused  is  voluntary  and
      truthful  and  relates  to  the  accused  himself,  then  no   further
      corroboration is necessary and a conviction  of  the  accused  can  be
      solely based on it. It has also been observed that  such  confessional
      statement is admissible as a substantive piece  of  evidence.  It  was
      further observed that the said confession need not be tested  for  the
      contradictions to be found in the confession of the co-accused. It  is
      for that reason that even if the other oral evidence goes  counter  to
      the statements made in the confession, one's confession can  be  found
      to be voluntary and reliable and  it  can  become  the  basis  of  the
      conviction.


      61. In this case, there is ample corroboration to  the  confession  in
      the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence in  shape  of  a
      chit, which is referred to in the said confession. There  is  a  clear
      reference that the Personal Assistant, who was a non-Kashmiri and kept
      a beard, had sent a slip inside. Ultimately, that slip  was  found  by
      the police, which corroborates the contents in the confession. In  our
      opinion, that is a sufficient corroboration to the confession.

      64. All these cases suggest that the only test which the court has  to
      apply is whether the confession was voluntary and  free  of  coercion,
      threat or inducement and whether sufficient caution is  taken  by  the
      police officer who recorded the confession. Once the confession passes
      that test,  it  can  become  the  basis  of  the  conviction.  We  are
      completely convinced that the confession in this case  was  free  from
      all the aforementioned defects and was voluntary.”

147)   In view of the above, it can easily be inferred that with  regard  to
the use of such confession as against a co-accused, as a matter of  caution,
a general corroboration should be sought for but in cases  where  the  court
is satisfied that the probative value of such confession  is  such  that  it
does not require corroboration then it may base conviction on the  basis  of
such confession of the co-accused without  corroboration.  But  this  is  an
exception  to  the  general  rule  of  requiring  corroboration  when   such
confession is to be used against a co-accused.
Deposition of Md. Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) Approver

148)   In the light of the above principles, it is  useful  to  analyse  the
entire evidence of PW-2 not only implicating A-1 but also other  accused  in
respect of the incident that took place on  12.03.1993.   PW-2,  who  turned
approver, is a native of District Rampur, U.P.  However, according  to  him,
he is residing at Bombay for the last  28  years.   He  was  working  as  an
Estate Agent and Property Dealer.  He was  arrested  on  10.05.1993  by  the
Bombay Police in connection with the Bomb Blasts Case.  He was  arrested  on
the allegations that he was involved in the conspiracy,  landing,  planning,
training and planting of bombs.  In his evidence, he admitted that  he  took
training in handling of weapons in Pakistan for a period of  10  days  along
with others.   During  the  training,  according  to  him,  they  were  also
imparted  training  for  handling  RDX.   For  the  present,  since  we  are
concerned about the role of A-1 relating to conspiracy, we  are  constrained
to refer his evidence relating to the said  aspect.   He  admitted  that  he
knew Javed Dawood Tailor (AA) known  as  Javed  Chikna,  Mushtaq  @  Ibrahim
Abudal Razak Memon known as Tiger Memon  and  Yakub  Adbul  Razak  Memon  as
Yakub (A1).  While identifying the accused  concerned  in  the  Court,  PW-2
identified him in the fourth batch consisting of eight persons.  He  further
stated that all the accused persons whom  he  identified  before  the  Court
have worked with him and admitted  that  they  were  together  in  the  bomb
blasts.  It was further stated that  all  the  persons  including  A-1  were
involved in planning, conspiracy, training, landing and planting  of  bombs.
According to him, when he met Tiger Memon and others at Hotel Big Splash  on
02.02.1993, he (Tiger Memon) told them that in communal riots in Bombay  and
Surat, Muslims have suffered a lot and Babri Masjid has been demolished  and
that restrictions have been put even on “Azaan” and  “Namaz”.   He  informed
all of them that during the  riots  their  mothers  and  sisters  have  been
dishonoured and the Government is not extending any help to  them.   So,  he
wanted to take revenge and he requested all of them  to  help  him  in  this
regard. When this meeting was going on, two persons, namely, Yeda Yakub  and
Shahid also joined them in the meeting.  Tiger Memon also told them that  he
has arranged for arms and explosives from Pakistan which are coming on  that
day and he also warned them that if any person betrays him, he  will  finish
him and his family.
149)  He further deposed that on the same day, at about 4 p.m., all of  them
left for Shekhadi Coast  in  two  Commander  Jeeps.   In  one  Jeep  he  was
traveling along with Tiger Memon, Javed, Munna, Anwar, Akbar and  Karimullah
and others were in the second jeep driven by Shafi.  According  to  him,  at
Shekhadi Coast, three  agents  of  Tiger  Memon,  namely,  Dadabhai,  Dawood
Taklya and Rahim Laundriwala along with 30/40 persons from the  neighbouring
village were present.  At about 11 p.m., one speed boat came near the  coast
and passed over 7  military  coloured  bags  containing  guns,  pistols  and
grenades of green colour having oval shape.  The  guns  were  AK-56  rifles.
Tiger  Memon  distributed  AK-56  rifles  to  Javed  and  Anwar  and  others
including PW-2 were given handgrenades and pistols.  PW-2 was also  given  a
pistol.  All the goods were loaded  in  a  truck  which  was  parked  there.
Tiger asked them to  proceed  towards  Waghani  Tower.   When  they  reached
Waghani Tower, PW-2 noticed that 2/3 jeeps and  a  Maruti  Car  were  parked
there.  He along with others unloaded the goods from the truck  and  brought
them to the central room of Waghani Tower.  On Tiger’s instructions, he  and
others unpacked the bags.  The  bags  were  containing  AK-56  rifles,  hand
grenades, pistols, round (cartridges),  wires  (detonators),  magazines  and
RDX etc.  All these items were then  kept  in  the  cavities  of  the  motor
jeeps.  One box of detonators was kept in a blue coloured Commander Jeep  by
Shafi to take to Hotel Persian Darbar on the instructions of Tiger Memon.
150)  He also explained about booking of a room in Hotel Persian  Darbar  at
Panvel on 10.02.1993 in the name of Md. Usman Khan.   On  11.02.1993,  Javed
Chikna came to his residence and asked for his  passport  telling  him  that
‘Tigerbhai’ has called for it.  PW-2  handed  over  his  passport  to  Javed
Chikna.  PW-2 informed the Court  that  he  had  obtained  the  passport  in
January, 1987 and his passport  No.  is  B-751254.   At  about  1  p.m.,  he
received a call from Javed Chikna informing him to come prepared  for  going
to Dubai and to meet him at the Hindustan Soda Factory, Mahim.  At  about  4
p.m., he met Javed Chikna at the said place and from there  Javed  took  him
to the Al Hussaini Building.  In categorical terms, he asserted  that  Tiger
Memon resides in the Al-Hussaini Building at Mahim.  On 11.02.1993, when  he
went there, Tiger Memon and Yakub Memon (A-1) were sitting together  in  the
flat.  Tiger Memon told Yakub Memon to give six air tickets to Javed  Chikna
(AA).  Thereafter, Yakub Memon (A1) gave six air tickets  to  Javed  Chikna.
PW-2 and Javed Chikna wished “Khuda Hafiz”  to  Tiger  Memon  and  left  the
place. Thereafter, he along with others went to the airport to go to  Dubai.
 He reached Dubai at 10.30 p.m.  At Dubai Airport, Ayub Memon (AA) had  come
to receive them.  Ayub Memon is the brother of Tiger  Memon.   This  was  on
11.02.1993.  He also informed the Court that on 13.02.1993, Tiger Memon  and
Ayub Memon met them at the  Dubai  Airport.   Tiger  Memon  gave  seven  air
tickets of Pakistan International Airlines  and  their  passports  to  Javed
Chikna.  Tiger Memon informed all of them that they  need  not  worry  about
their journey to Pakistan.  He also  informed  that  one  Jafar  Saheb  will
receive them at the Islamabad Airport  and  will  take  care  of  them.   On
reaching Islamabad Airport, Jafar Saheb escorted  them  and  they  were  not
required to pass through the immigration  counter  and  various  checks  and
they came out of the airport with their luggage without  any  problem.   The
Airport Officials salute Jafar Saheb when he was escorting them out  of  the
Airport.  He further explained  that  two  Jeeps  were  parked  outside  the
Airport and from there they were  taken  to  a  bunglow.   On  reaching  the
bungalow, Jafar Saheb collected their passports and  air  tickets  and  each
one of them was given a fake name.  He was named ‘Nasir’.   Likewise,  names
of others were also changed.  Jafar Saheb instructed them that during  their
stay in Pakistan they should call each  other  by  these  new  names.   They
stayed in the bungalow for two days i.e.  14th  and  15th.   Then  on  16th,
Jafar Saheb took all of them to a different place  and  introduced  them  to
two persons and informed them that these persons  will  impart  training  in
arms and ammunitions and left the  place.   On  the  next  day,  three  more
persons joined the training camp and all of  them  were  given  training  in
operating fire arms like AK-56 rifles, pistols and they were also shown  how
to dismantle and reassemble the fire arms.  Training in fire arms was  given
from 19.02.1993 to 21.02.1993. During this time, in  the  night,  nine  more
persons came to the training camp, viz., Yeda Yakub  (AA-11),  Nasir  Dhakla
(A-64), Anwar Theba (AA-8), Irfan Chougule (AA-12), Shahnawaz (A-29),  Abdul
Akhtar (A-36), Mohmed Rafiq (A-94), Gullu (A-77) and  Bashir  Khan  (AA-15).
These persons also joined them for training.  According  to  PW-2,  in  all,
there were 19 persons taking training at the relevant  time.   On  the  next
day, Tiger Memon along with one Ahmed Sahab arrived  at  the  training  camp
and stayed there.  In training,  they  were  taught  how  to  operate  AK-56
rifles, pistols, hand grenades and the  use  of  RDX  for  preparing  bombs.
They were given a practical demonstration of an RDX bomb  which  was  fitted
with a half an hour timer pencil detonator.  The bomb explosion resulted  in
a deafening sound followed by huge black smoke  and  it  blew  up  stonesand
earth.  The next  day,  Tiger  left  the  camp.   On  27.02.1993,  they  all
returned from the training camp to the bungalow  where  they  were  kept  on
their arrival at Islamabad.  All of them were escorted by  Ahmed  Sahab  and
Jafarbhai and without any checking they were given boarding cards  and  they
left Islamabad by a PIA flight and reached Dubai at about  1.30  to  2  p.m.
On reaching Dubai, Tiger took all of them to  a  bungalow  situated  at  Al-
Rashidia.  After finishing their meals, they discussed  the  communal  riots
in Bombay and Surat where Muslims had suffered.  Thereafter, Tiger  directed
Irfan Chougule (AA-12) to bring the holy Quran from the other  room.   Tiger
administered oath to all of them by placing their hands on  the  holy  Quran
that they will not  disclose  anything  about  the  training  in  Dubai  and
Pakistan to any person  including  their  family  members  and  about  their
proposed future plans and in the  event  that  they  were  arrested  by  the
Police they would not disclose their plans and names  of  their  associates.
Thereafter, Tiger Memon distributed 200 Dirhams to  each  one  of  them  for
shopping etc.  Thereafter, they left Dubai  in  batches  as  and  when  they
received their passports and tickets.
151)    On  04.03.1993,   they   reached   Sahar   Airport,   Bombay.    The
Disembarkation Card was filled by him in his own handwriting and he  himself
signed it.  At the airport, he noted that one Ambassador Car and one  Maruti
Car had come to receive them.  He further stated that Tiger Memon and  Javed
Chikna sat in the Maruti Car which was  driven  away  by  Tiger  Memon.   He
along with Bashir Khan sat in the Ambassador Car in which Yakub Memon  (A-1)
and one more person was sitting.  After reaching Mahim from there,  he  went
to his house at 5 p.m.
152)  The critical analysis of the evidence of  PW-2  makes  it  clear  that
though he did not  mention  about  the  participation  of  A-1  in  all  the
meetings, however, he identified A-1 in court and asserted that  he  is  the
brother of Tiger Memon and it was he who assisted his  brother  at  the  Al-
Hussaini Building for all preparations, viz.,  purchasing  tickets,  getting
visas, making arrangements for the persons who were  sent  to  Pakistan  via
Dubai for training in handling and throwing bombs, filling RDX  in  vehicles
etc., their stay at Dubai  and  comfortable  return  of  such  persons  from
Pakistan to Bombay, payments  to  various  persons  who  underwent  training
which clearly prove the involvement of A-1 in the conspiracy as well  as  in
subsequent events and actions along with his brother and other accused.
153)   On the very same day, i.e, on 04.03.1993, all of them met at the  Taj
Mahal Hotel.  In the hotel, they went to the Coffee  shop,  Shamiana.   This
was around 10.30 to 10.45 p.m.   Tiger  Memon,  after  discussion  with  one
Farooqbhai took them towards the Share  Market  building  in  his  car  near
Fountain and showed them the new and the old building of the  Share  Market.
On  the  way,  Tiger  Memon  told  them  to  survey  the  Bombay   Municipal
Corporation Building and to check its two  entrances.   After  noticing  the
same from there, they returned to  the  Taj  Mahal  Hotel.   After  dropping
Tiger Memon at his residence i.e. at the Al-Hussaini Building,  Mahim,  they
took his maruti car and went to the residence of Sardar Shawali Khan  (A-54)
at Kurla.  Bashir Khan then administered oath to A-54 stating that  whatever
they will do, they will  do  for  Islam  and  would  take  revenge  for  the
demolition of the Babri Masjid and communal riots.
154)  In respect of a question relating to the purpose  of  the  survey,  he
answered that the purpose was to shoot down  the  Municipal  Councillors  of
BJP and Shiv Sena parties with AK-56 rifles by indiscriminately firing  upon
them.  After conducting the survey,  they  went  to  meet  Tiger  Memon  and
briefed him and after that left for their  house.   He  explained  that  the
third meeting was held on 07.03.1993 and in that meeting Javed  Chikna  (AA-
7), Tiger Memon (AA-2), Nasim @ Yusuf (A-49), Kalu, Bashir  Electrician  (A-
13), Moin (A-43), Parvez Kelewala (A-100), Nasir Dhakla (A-64) and he  along
with Bashir Khan, Salim Rahim Shaikh, Akram @ Firoz  and  some  persons  who
were with them in the training and Sardar Shahwali  Khan  (A-54)  and  Lalli
were also present.  In the said meeting,  Tiger  organized  separate  groups
for surveying targets.  The task assigned to his group  was  to  survey  the
Sena Bhavan and Sahar Airport.  According to  him,  as  directed  by  Tiger,
after   completion   of   the   work,   he   and   others   briefed   Tiger.

155)  On 08.03.1993, a fourth meeting was held  at  Babloo’s  (AA-18)  place
between 10 and 10.30 p.m.  This meeting was held at a flat  on  the  terrace
portion.  After calling them, including PW-2 inside the  flat,  Tiger  Memon
selected the targets.  These targets include  Air  India  Building,  Nariman
Point, Bharat Petroleum  Refinery,  Chembur,  Share  Market  near  Fountain,
Zaveri Bazaar near Mohd. Ali Road and  Pydhoni,  Five  Star  Hotels,  Cinema
Theatres,  Shiv  Sena  Bhavan,  Shivaji  Park,   Dadar,   Bombay   Municipal
Corporation  Building,  V.T.,  Sahar  Airport,   Passport   Office,   Worli,
Mantralaya etc.  These  were  the  places  which  were  to  be  attacked  by
planting bombs, by using AK-56 rifles and by throwing hand grenades.   Tiger
Memon formed separate groups and gave instructions  separately.   About  the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Building, Tiger Memon also  explained  to  them
the entry and exit points of the said Building for the purpose of  attacking
BJP and Shiv Sena Councillors with AK-56  rifles.   After  this,  they  came
back to Mahim and left for their residence.
156)  According to PW-2, another meeting  was  held  on  10.03.1993  at  the
Hindustan Soda Factory, Mahim in the evening.  There he  met  Javed  Chikna.
At that time, Javed Chikna informed him that in the evening  around  8  p.m.
there is a meeting at Shakil’s place at Bandra and directed  him  to  attend
the said meeting.  Pursuant to the same, PW-2 reached Shakil’s residence  at
8.30 p.m.  There he met Tiger Memon, Javed Chikna, Salim  Bazarwala,  Bashir
Khan, Zakir, Nasir Dhakla, Parvez  Kelewala,  Moin,  Iqbal,  Sardar  Shawali
Khan, Bashir Electrician, Mehmood @ Kaloo and Nasim @  Yusuf.   Tiger  Memon
also distributed Rs.5,000/- to each one of them in  the  said  meeting.   He
explained to Tiger about the survey of the Chembur Refinery.
157)  On the next  day  i.e.,  on  11.03.1993,  they  all  gathered  at  the
Hindustan Soda Factory, Mahim at 8 p.m.   At  9.30  p.m.,  they  received  a
phone call from Tiger Memon who directed  all  of  them  to  reach  the  Al-
Hussaini building immediately.  Pursuant to the said direction, all of  them
including PW-2 went to the  fifth  floor  of  the  said  building,  i.e,  to
Tiger’s flat and he noticed several persons interacting with  Tiger.   Tiger
called him to his bedroom.  There, once again, he explained  the  survey  of
the Chembur Refinery and informed him that there  is  very  tight  security,
hence, it will be impossible to carry out the work there.   On  this,  Tiger
Memon cancelled the plan of Chembur Refinery.  Tiger Memon  instructed  them
that as they have learnt the work relating to detonators and timer  pencils,
they should fill RDX in the vehicles and place detonators and timer  pencils
in a proper way.  They all agreed to do the same.  Tiger Memon  handed  over
some detonators and timer pencils to them.  Tiger instructed them to  go  to
the Share Bazaar i.e. Stock Exchange and Air  India  Building.   Tiger  also
gave pencils to various persons and instructed Javed Chikna and Anwar  Theba
to pay Rs. 5,000/- to each one of them and also directed that they  have  to
act and work according to the directions of Javed Chikna and Anwar Theba.
158)  He further informed the Court that Tiger Memon conveyed to  them  that
after the blasts in Bombay, there will be communal riots,  so  all  of  them
should leave Bombay and they can contact him over the  telephone.   He  gave
his telephone No. of Dubai as 27 27 28.  Thereafter, Tiger Memon met all  of
them and left in a Maruti Car with Anwar (AA-8), Asgar (A-10) and Shafi (AA-
9).  He also stated that in the garage Abdul Akhtar  (A-36),  Iqbal  (A-23),
Moin (A-43), Kalu @ Mehmood, Nasim @ Yusuf (A-49) were filling  RDX  in  the
dicky of the motor vehicles.  PWs 2 and  6  met  Farooq  Pawale  (A-16)  and
Javed Chikna instructed Farooq Pawale to take one maruti car  to  Shiv  Sena
Bhavan, Dadar and park it near there.  As directed,  PW-2  accompanied  A-16
in a white maruti car and it was he who drove the maruti car  to  Shiv  Sena
Bhavan.  He further informed  that  one  Hawaldar  (Constable)  was  sitting
there who was not allowing us to park the car but with great  difficulty  he
parked the maruti car near the wall by  the  side  of  the  service  station
within the campus of petrol pump.  The said petrol  pump  was  Lucky  Petrol
Pump and it has a common boundry wall with Shiv Sena Bhavan.
159)  He also explained that after reaching  the  Al-Hussaini  Building,  he
went to the fifth floor in Tiger’s flat.  There  he  saw  Javed  Chikna  was
distributing hand grenades to some persons, namely, Salim Bazarwala  (A-52),
Abdul Akhtar (A-36), Kalu @ Mehmood, Moin (A-43) and Bashir Electrician  (A-
13).  They all were given four hand  grenades  each  by  Javed  Chikna.   He
instructed them that they  would  have  to  throw  these  hand  grenades  in
Fishermen’s Colony at Mahim.  He also gave four hand grenades each to  Iqbal
(A-23) and Nasim @ Yusuf (A-49) and directed  them  to  throw  the  same  to
Sahar Airport.  As planned, several blasts took place at various  places  in
Bombay.  He contacted Tiger Memon and  apprised  him  of  the  same  and  as
directed left Bombay immediately and reached Calcutta.  From there also,  he
contacted Tiger but he could not speak to him.  He reached  Delhi  by  train
and went back to his village at Rampur, U.P.  He was arrested on  10.05.1993
and on the same day, he was brought to Bombay.     About  his  statement  to
DCP Bishnoi, he deposed before the Court on  25.06.1993  that  the  DCP  has
correctly recorded his statement.   It  bears  his  signature  and  is  also
counter signed by DCP Bishnoi.
160)    On 20.09.1993, he wrote  a  letter  to  the  Joint  Commissioner  of
Police, Mr. M.N. Singh through the Jail Authorities.   In  this  letter,  he
expressed that he is repenting  the  crime  committed  by  him  against  his
country and humanity and so he  wanted  to  confess  his  crime  before  the
Court.  At Killa Court, ACP Babar told him that if he  is  really  repenting
what he has done then he can be made a witness and can be  given  pardon  if
he will tell the truth before the Court.  On his statement, he was  produced
before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.   The  CMM  asked  him  about  his
involvement in the Bombay blasts which took place on 12.03.1993.  He  stated
before the CMM about his involvement  in  the  conspiracy  and  planting  of
bombs and expressed that he is repenting for what he  had  done.   When  the
CMM asked him whether he will state the same in the Court, PW-2 answered  in
the affirmative, i.e., Yes.  At this, the CMM  offered  him  pardon  and  he
accepted it.  The entire conversation between the CMM and PW-2 was  recorded
by the typist and read over to  him.  He  also  expressed  that  tender  and
acceptance of pardon was correctly recorded and it bears his signature.   On
28.09.1993, when he was granted pardon in the Killa Court,  he  was  brought
back to the prison and kept in Ward No. 10.
161)  In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had been a  resident  of
Mahim since 1985.  With regard to several questions put by various  counsel,
in his cross-examination, he admitted that he was involved in the case  from
the stage of conspiracy till planting of bombs and is  responsible  for  the
explosions.  He also admitted that he participated  in  all  the  stages  of
conspiracy till the achievement of the object.  He admitted that the  blasts
that took place on 12.03.1993 were very heinous and a serious crime.
162)  When he was produced before the DCP, namely, Shri  K.L.  Bishnoi  (PW-
193) on 25.06.1993, in categorical terms, he  explained  that  the  DCP  had
cautioned him that he was going to record his confession  under  Section  15
of TADA and also warned him that he  was  not  bound  to  make  a  statement
before him and that the said statement would be  used  against  him  in  the
court during the trial.
163)     In respect of a question relating  to  certain  variations  in  his
earlier statement (Exh. 25A), he informed the court that “I cannot  say  why
it is not recorded in my statement Exh. 25A”.  Though counsel appearing  for
the accused pointed out certain variations/omissions,  if  we  consider  the
entire statement both in the examination-in-chief  and  his  explanation  in
the cross examination, we are of  the  view  that  those  omissions  do  not
materially affect his statement.  In fact, he has admitted that he  narrated
the whole story to Mr. Bishnoi and he recorded whatever  was  told  to  him.
However, he admitted that certain statements have been incorrectly  recorded
in Exh. 25A.
164)      In cross-examination, he reiterated what  he  had  stated  in  the
examination-in-chief that he came into  contact  with  Tiger  in  connection
with property dealing through Javed Chikna.  Thereafter,  he  admitted  that
he used to meet Tiger at the Hindustan Soda Factory where Javed Chikna  also
used to visit.  He informed the Court that Javed Chikna  was  a  ‘dada’  and
hatchman of Tiger.  He was assured that there was no risk  in  participating
in the landing of goods which were being smuggled  by  Tiger  as  Tiger  was
known for managing everyone.  According to him, the Hindustan  Soda  Factory
at Mahim was a den for all sorts of anti-social activities which  was  owned
by the brother-in-law of  accused  Hanif  Kandawala.   In  the  meeting,  he
agreed to participate in the conspiracy because Tiger aroused his  religious
feelings mentioning  about  communal  riots  and  demolition  of  the  Babri
Masjid.  He admitted that on 12.03.1993, he left  the  Al-Hussaini  building
in a Maruti Van  bearing  No.  MFC  1972  in  order  to  attack  the  Bombay
Municipal Corporation building which was the target entrusted to him and  to
his team.
165)      When he was in custody,  he  came  to  know  that  most  of  other
accused have also made confessions like him.  He also admitted that  he  was
aware  that  they  will  be  caught  for  the  destruction  caused  in  bomb
explosions and the maximum penalty will be  death.   Assistant  Commissioner
of Police, Mr. Babar had told him in  Killa  Court  that  if  he  agreed  to
become a prosecution witness and make a true and full disclosure of  events,
he will be granted pardon to which he agreed.  According  to  him,  he  read
the Order Exh. 27.  The  order  was  directed  to  be  produced  before  the
Metropolitan Magistrate, 13th Court, Dadar for recording a  statement  under
Section 164.  In para 215 of the cross-examination,  in  categorical  terms,
he admitted “my statement  Exh.  25A  is  correctly  recorded  except  small
mistakes and so what I deposed before the Court in  my  examination-in-chief
and recorded on Page 138  in  para  88  to  the  effect  that  my  statement
recorded on 28.06.1993 and 29.06.1993 is correctly recorded, is correct.”
166)  In para 233 of his cross-examination,  PW-2  has  admitted  that  “the
contents of the retraction (Exh-D-2) are not his statements as  it  contains
language  and  words  of  a   qualified   person   conversant   with   legal
terminology”.  For another question, he specifically denied  that  prior  to
becoming an approver, he was trying to  extract  money  from  other  accused
persons.  He also denied the allegation as incorrect that on  05.10.1993  he
expressed his unwillingness to become an approver and showed his anxiety  to
join the company of other accused.   He  also  denied  the  allegation  that
while he was in police custody, the police obtained his signature  on  blank
sheets.
167) With regard to the Al-Hussaini Building,  he  stated  that  there  were
certain  open  and  closed  garages.   He  described  that  the  Al-Hussaini
building is a multistoried building and Mahim Police Station is situated  at
a walking distance of one minute from the said Building. In para-243 of  his
statement, in categorical terms, he admitted that “I  have  participated  in
all the stages of conspiracy  till  Bombay  blasts  on  12.03.1993  i.e.  in
landing  of  arms  and  ammunitions  and  explosives,  weapons  training  at
Islamabad, survey of targets chosen for causing bomb explosions  in  various
meetings held to plan things and also in planting  of  motor  vehicle  bombs
near Shiv Sena Bhavan  and  in  the  unsuccessful  attempt  to  attack  i.e.
preparation by proceeding towards the goal  in  a  Maruti  Van  MFC-1972  to
attack Councillors of BJP and Shiv Sena in B.M.C. Building at V.T.”
168)  Regarding weapons training, he mentioned in  para  244  that   “It  is
correct to say that for the first time  in  my  life,  I  was  given  weapon
training  in  handling  and  operation  of  AK-56  rifles,  9  mm   pistols,
handgrenades and RDX explosives during the period 17.02.1993 to  27.02.1993.
 Before this, I have never operated any fire arm.  It is  true  that  I  was
given a loaded Pistol at Shekhadi Coast on  the  night  of  02.02.1993  with
clear instructions to attack any outsider who comes to the landing  site,  I
did not tell Tiger Memon  that  I  do  not  know  how  to  operate  Pistol.”
Regarding training and execution of work, he stated that “my object  was  to
take  training  and  participate  in  the  acts  in  accordance   with   the
instructions of Tiger Memon”.
169)  About his reaction after Bombay blasts, he stated  in  his  deposition
that “on 12.03.1993, after  the  successful  explosion  of  bombs,  my  only
desire was to run away and escape as otherwise if  I  was  arrested  by  the
police, my position would  have  been  precarious.”   Regarding  landing  of
ammunitions and explosives,  he  admitted  that  arms  and  ammunitions  and
explosives  were  landed  at  Shekhadi  in  the  intervening  night  between
02.02.1993 and 03.02.1993 and this consignment was carried out  as  per  the
instructions of Tiger Memon.
170)  Regarding filling of RDX and other  ammunition,  he  stated  that  the
work of filling RDX in the motor vehicles started  after  half  an  hour  of
Tiger Memon’s departure.  According to him, there  were  about  10-12  motor
vehicles like Ambassador cars, Maruti cars, Commander  jeeps  and  scooters.
He explained that a motor vehicle  bomb  can  be  prepared  by  loading  RDX
explosive in its dicky or at any place in the vehicle and by fixing it  with
a timer pencil and that it will  explode  at  the  time  set  in  the  Timer
Pencil.  The time of explosion will deviate and depend on  the  temperature.
The timer pencil which he was shown in the training had a  duration  ranging
from half an hour to five hours.  He and others were trained in Pakistan  to
prepare motor vehicle bombs.
171)  In para 322, he asserted that in his statement before  P.I.  Pharande,
DCP Bishnoi and P.I. Chavan, he had stated the truth and made full and  true
disclosure of all the facts within his knowledge.  In his  statement  before
these officers, he reiterated that  he  had  stated  all  the  relevant  and
important events within his  knowledge.   He  also  admitted  that  “he  was
motivated to participate in this heinous crime by Tiger  Memon  by  arousing
his sentiments by administering oath on holy Quran  for  taking  revenge  of
the demolition of Babri Masjid, riots in Bombay and Surat  in  which  Muslim
people had suffered a lot, destruction caused in communal  riots  in  Bombay
and Surat, restrictions imposed on ‘Azaan’ and ‘Namaz’ and  dishonouring  of
their family members in riots and Government remaining silent and hence,  he
got prepared to participate in the crime to take revenge.”
172)  With regard to the relationship of A-1 with his  brother  and  others,
it was stated by him that “In my statement before P.I.Chavan I  have  stated
that Yakub Memon, with one more person had come to receive us at  the  Sahar
Airport on our return from Dubai as stated by me before the Court  which  is
recorded on Page: 108 Para 60.  Similarly, I also stated that I  along  with
Bashir Khan sat in the Ambassador Car in which  Yakub  Memon  and  one  more
person were there, as stated  by  me  before  the  Court,  but,  it  is  not
recorded in my statement before P.I.Chavan, I can not assign any reason  why
it  is  not  recorded  by  P.I.Chavan.”   He  also   reiterated   that   his
confessional statement was recorded as per his narration  and  DCP,  Bishnoi
(PW-193) used to dictate it to the typist as per his say.
173)  He is also very well aware of the fact that giving false  evidence  in
Court is an offence and asserted that he is a law abiding citizen.  In  para
364, he fairly accepted that after recording his  statement  and  after  its
completion, he signed it on all the pages at the bottom and at  the  end  of
the statement before he came out of  the  office  of  the  DCP.   After  his
signature, DCP Bishnoi checked up  his  signature  on  all  the  pages  and,
thereafter, he also signed the same.
174)  About his willingness to confess his guilt before the  Court,  let  us
consider whether all the  required  formalities  and  procedures  have  been
complied  with  by  the  concerned  investigating  officer  and  the   court
concerned.  The Chief Investigating Officer, Bomb Blast Case, in his  letter
dated 28.09.1993, addressed to  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  stated
that after the Bombay blast that  took  place  on  12.03.1993,  one  of  the
accused, namely, Mohammed Usman Ahmed Jan Khan (PW-2) who also  participated
right from the conspiracy ending with blasts on 12.03.1993 and who had  been
arrested has submitted an application from  jail  on  20.09.1993  expressing
voluntary readiness and willingness to confess his guilt before  the  Court.
In the said letter, it was further stated that during the investigation,  it
has transpired that a conspiracy was hatched between the accused persons  in
Dubai and in pursuance of the said conspiracy, some of the  accused  persons
involved in the blasts were sent to Pakistan for training  in  handling  RDX
explosives,  firearms,  grenades  etc.    It   further   transpired   during
investigation that the said  conspiracy  was  hatched  in  order  to  strike
terror in people as well as to affect adversely the harmony  between  Hindus
and Muslims and  also  to  wage  war  against  the  Central  and  the  State
Government.  In the said letter, it  was  further  stated  that  except  the
participants, nobody had any personal knowledge of how, when, where and  why
the criminal conspiracy was hatched and how all  the  details  were  chalked
out to perfect the said conspiracy, how  different  acts  were  carried  out
with determined intention of achieving the object  of  the  said  conspiracy
including training in Pakistan, how RDX explosives and other  firearms  were
smuggled into India, how the RDX laden vehicles were  planted  at  different
places in Bombay and how the  bomb  blasts  took  place.   The  officer  has
further stated that the said accused (PW-2) has  voluntarily  expressed  his
desire to confess before the  Court  out  of  repentance.   Accordingly,  he
suggested that instead of his  mere  confession,  his  evidence  before  the
Court as a prosecution witness would help the prosecution to a great  extent
in collecting evidence against such other offenders.   He  also  noted  that
inasmuch as the accused is repenting very much and is prepared  to  run  the
risk of giving a judicial confession, the said accused would be a very  good
witness as an approver if pardon is granted to him by  this  Court.   Hence,
it was urged that it is necessary to tender pardon to the  said  accused  on
the condition of  his  true  and  full  disclosure  of  all  the  facts  and
circumstances within his knowledge so far as conspiracy  hatched  in  Dubai,
training in Pakistan, smuggling of RDX and landing of the same at Dighi  and
Shekhadi coasts, transportation of RDX to Bombay, filling  of  the  vehicles
with RDX and  planting  of  the  same  at  important  places  in  Bombay  on
12.03.1993 and other acts incidental  thereto  are  concerned.   With  these
particulars and details, the Chief Investigating Officer prayed  before  the
Court or such other Metropolitan Magistrate that he may kindly  be  directed
to record his statement under Section 164 of the Code.
175)  The said application of the Chief Investigating Officer,  Bombay  Bomb
Blast case on 28.09.1993 was submitted to the Court through  Special  Public
Prosecutor Shri Nikam. Shri Nikam has also produced the  warrant  issued  by
the Designated Court in Misc. Application No. 632 of 1993  in  TADA  Special
R.A. No. 34 of 1993.  In the said warrant,  the  Designated  Court  directed
that the accused Mohammed Usman Jan Khan be produced and  forwarded  to  the
Court of Chief Metropoitan Magistrate on 28.09.1993 at  1200  hours  with  a
direction to the said Court to tender pardon to him on the condition of  his
true and full disclosure of facts pertaining to the  Bombay  blast  offences
within  his  personal  knowledge.   Thereafter,  after  fulfilling  all  the
formalities,  the  said  accused  was  first   questioned   by   the   Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay at 4.15 p.m.  The accused stated that he  is
aware that he is before  the  Court  of  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  of
Bombay.  Thereafter, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate  showed  the  accused
his handwritten application dated 20.09.1993 addressed by  him  from  Bombay
Central Prison to Shri M.N.Singh,  Joint  Commissioner  of  Police,  Bombay.
The accused identified  his  hand  writing  and  his  signature.   On  being
confronted with this letter, the accused stated that the letter was  written
by him voluntarily.  The Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  thereafter,  asked
the accused as to whether he was aware as  to  why  he  was  being  produced
before him.  By way of reply, the accused stated that  he  was  involved  in
the Bombay blasts which took place in Bombay on 12.03.1993 along with  other
persons in a conspiracy and as he desires to disclose all  these  things  in
full detail, he is  being  produced  before  him.   The  Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate further noted that he was prepared to make  all  the  disclosures
in detail.  The accused also replied that he is ready and willing  to  stand
as a witness for prosecution and would make all these disclosures if  pardon
is granted to him.  The Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  has  also  recorded
that on going through the replies given by the accused to  several  queries,
he was satisfied that the accused is ready and willing to give  a  full  and
true disclosure of  all  circumstances  within  his  knowledge  relating  to
Bombay Bomb  Blasts  Case.   The  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  has  also
carefully perused the report of the  Chief  Investigating  Officer  and  was
fully satisfied that it is a case of conspiracy  and  in  pursuance  to  the
said conspiracy, the accused  and  other  persons  had  planted  and  caused
explosion of bombs at various places in Bombay  on  12.03.1993.   Therefore,
he was satisfied that the grounds given by the Chief  Investigating  Officer
in his application were true and correct.   After  recording  the  same,  on
28.09.1993 itself, he passed an order in view of  powers  conferred  on  him
under Section 306 of the Code and tendered pardon  to  the  accused-Mohammed
Usman Jan Khan  (PW-2)  on  the  condition  of  his  making  full  and  true
disclosure of all the circumstances within his  knowledge  relating  to  the
blasts which occurred on 12.03.1993 and also in respect of  the  offence  of
conspiracy and such other offences connected  therewith  in  the  commission
thereof.  The said order has been read over and explained to the accused  in
Hindi and he accepted the tender  of  pardon  on  the  aforesaid  condition.
Pursuant to the same, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Bombay was  directed
to keep the accused (PW-2) in a separate cell under proper surveillance  and
to  make  him  available  for  the  purpose  of  producing  him  before  the
Metropolitan Magistrate for recording his statement  under  Section  164  of
the Code as requested by Chief Investigating Officer.  The  above  mentioned
letter  of  the  Chief  Investigating  Officer  dated  28.09.1993  and   the
consequential order  passed  by  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  dated
28.09.1993 giving pardon and recording his statement satisfy  the  procedure
prescribed and there is no flaw with regard to the grant of pardon  and  the
recording of his statement thereafter.
176)  A perusal of the entire evidence of  PW-2  clearly  show  that  at  no
point of time he acted under pressure to become an  approver.   It  is  also
clear that after serious thought and due to repentance, he realized that  in
such a serious matter it is better to reveal all the details to  the  Court.
He withstood the  lengthy  cross-examination.  PW-2’s  testimony  runs  into
hundreds of pages and he covered  all  the  aspects  starting  from  initial
conspiracy and ending with execution of blasts at various places  in  Bombay
on 12.03.1993.  We  are  also  satisfied  that  his  confessional  statement
before the Deputy Commissioner  of  Police  and  his  statement  before  the
Designated Court are not borne out of fear but due  to  his  conscience  and
repentence.  We are also satisfied that  his  statement  is  believable  and
merely because at one or  two  places,  he  made  certain  comments  on  the
omission/addition in the  statement  recorded  by  the  Chief  Investigating
Officer, it does not materially affect the statement.   On  the  whole,  his
testimony is reliable  and  acceptable  and  the  Designated  Court  rightly
relied on his entire statement in support of the prosecution case.
177)  It was further contended by learned senior counsel that  the  evidence
of the approver does not incriminate the appellant  (A-1).   The  deposition
of PW-2 reveals several incriminating circumstances  against  the  appellant
(A-1) which may be summarized as follows:
      (i)   PW-2 identifies the appellant in Court.
      (ii)  PW-2 has deposed that on being told by  Tiger  Memon  (AA),  the
      appellant gave six air tickets to Javed  Chikna  (AA)  at  Al-Hussaini
      Building on 11.02.1993 for going to Dubai.  PW-2 and Asgar Mukadam (A-
      10) were also present at the flat of Tiger Memon where  the  appellant
      handed over air tickets to Duabi.  Further, the fact  that  three  air
      tickets were given by the appellant to Javed Chikna instead of six has
      been expressely denied by PW-2.
      (iii)       These six air tickets were actually used  by  the  accused
      persons to undergo training in Pakistan where  they  went  via  Dubai.
      The appellant was thus instrumental in achieving the  ultimate  object
      of conspiracy by arranging for and handing over  the  air  tickets  to
      accused persons in the presence of Tiger Memon.
      (iv)  On return from arms training in Pakistan, PW-2 states that Tiger
      Memon (AA), Javed Chikna  (AA),  Bashir  Khan  (AA)  and  he  returned
      together from Dubai to Bombay on 04.03.1993 by  Emirates  Flight.   At
      the airport, two cars were waiting to receive them and PW-2 sat in  an
      Ambassador car in which the appellant was also present.

178)  PW-2 stated that the tickets were given by  the  appellant  to  a  co-
conspirator which fact has been corroborated by  A-10  in  his  confessional
statement.  If this evidence is considered along with the  fact  that  these
tickets were arranged by the appellant (A-1)  and  he  was  present  in  the
meeting of the co-conspirators, i.e., in the meeting of Tiger  Memon,  PW-2,
Javed Chikna and A-10, it  very  clearly  establishes  his  unity  with  the
object of the conspiracy.
179)  The  prosecution  has  established  by  evidence  that  arranging  the
tickets to Dubai was one of the responsibilities of A-1.  It is  very  clear
that the deposition  of  PW-2  to  the  extent  that  when  PW-2  and  other
conspirators were called by  Tiger  Memon,  Yakub  Memon  was  also  present
there, who on being asked by Tiger Memon, handed over the tickets to  a  co-
conspirator which clearly establishes the active  participation  of  A-1  in
the conspiracy.  If it was a conspiracy only known to Tiger Memon and  Yakub
Abdul Razak Memon did not share the object of the conspiracy with the  Tiger
Memon and other co-conspirators then Tiger memon would  not  have  met  with
the co-conspirators  in  the  presence  of  A-1.   The  fact  that  the  co-
conspirators were called for the meeting in the presence  of  A-1  and  were
being given  instructions  by  Tiger  Memon  about  the  conspiracy  in  his
presence  clearly  establish  the  active  participation  of  A-1   in   the
conspiracy.
180)  It has further come in evidence that when  PW-2  returned  from  Dubai
along with Tiger Memon and other co-conspirators, A-1 was present  with  the
car at the airport and returned to Mahim along with  other  co-conspirators.
In fact, if A-1 had gone to the airport to  receive  his  brother  only,  he
would then have returned in the car with his  brother  alone.   However,  he
came back in  the  car  with  other  co-conspirators  which  also  show  his
familiarity with other co-conspirators.
181)  It has also been contended by learned senior counsel for A-1 that  the
evidence of an approver is  very  weak  and  reliance  has  been  placed  on
various decisions of this Court  to  that  effect.   In  the  light  of  the
provisions of Section 133 read with Section 114 Illus (b)  of  the  Evidence
Act this Court has held that  the  evidence  of  an  approver  needs  to  be
corroborated in material particulars.  The  evidence  of  the  approver  has
been corroborated in material particulars by way of primary evidence by  the
prosecution.  The following table may summarise the  corroboration  provided
by various materials and evidence on record:
|Sr. |  Deposition of PW-2   |                   Corroborating Evidence      |
|No. |                       |                                               |
|1   |Stay of co-accused and |Entries in the Big Splash Hotel (Register)     |
|    |Meeting at Hotel Big   |                                               |
|    |Splash by Tiger Memon  |Confession of co-accused A-24, A-12, A-15, A-29|
|    |                       |and A-64.                                      |
|    |                       |                                               |
|    |                       |Employees of Hotel Big Splash – PWs 141 and    |
|    |                       |304.                                           |
|2   |a) Participation in Ist|Confession of co-accused A-14, A-17, A-64,     |
|    |Landing-Unloading and  |A-16, A-12, A-29, A-15, PW-108 and PW-137      |
|    |loading at Wagni Tower |(Watchman of Wagini Tower), PW-145 (panch),    |
|    |                       |PW-588 (I.O.)                                  |
|    |                       |                                               |
|    |b) Participation in    |Confession of co-accused A-64, A-16, A-100,    |
|    |IInd landing –Stay at  |A-24, A-58, A-14, A-17 and A-11.               |
|    |Persian Darbar         |                                               |
|    |Hotel-During           |Art.-1. Entries in Hotel Register by name M.V. |
|    |transportation –visit  |Khan. Exh. 20.                                 |
|    |of 2 Customs Officer.  |(A-14), A-82 and A-113.                        |
|3   |Handing over of Tickets|PWs-311, 341, 420                              |
|    |by A-1                 |Confession of A-46, A-67 and A-10.             |
|4   |Departure to Dubai and |Exh. 21-A – Embarkation Card (Emirates)        |
|    |from Dubai to Pakistan |Confession of A-100, A-52, A-16 and A-32.      |
|    |for training           |Immigration Officers-Bill-1244                 |
|5   |Assumed names given to |Exs. 1243, 1244, 1247, 1245                    |
|    |the trainee’s          |A-52, A-100, A-32, A-36, A-49, A-98, A-16,     |
|    |co-accused             |A-64, A-29.                                    |
|6   |No checking at the time|Passport of A-77, Exh. 1730                    |
|    |of arrival in Pakistan |A-29 Exh. 1731.                                |
|    |                       |A-98 Exh. 648                                  |
|7   |No checking at the time|Confession of co-accused A-39, A49, A-98, A-64,|
|    |of Departure from      |A-52 and A-16.                                 |
|    |Pakistan               |                                               |
|8   |Administration of Oath |Exh. 2487 – Tigers presence at Dubai.          |
|    |at Dubai by Tiger Memon|Exh. 2490 – Ayub’s Passport.                   |
|    |                       |Confesion of co-accused A-64, A32, A-36, A-39, |
|    |                       |A-49, A-98, A-52 and A-16.                     |
|9   |Arrival in India       |Disembarkation Card-Exh. 22 – Emirates and     |
|    |                       |other Disembarkation Card and Immigration      |
|    |                       |Officer.                                       |
|10  |Meeting at Taj Hotel   |Confession of co-accused A-44                  |
|11  |Meeting at the         |Confession of co-accused A-32, A-52, A-49,     |
|    |residence of accused   |A-13, A-64 and A-100.                          |
|    |Mobina on 07.03.1993   |                                               |
|12  |Survey of Shiv Sena    |Confession of co-accused A-100 and A-64.       |
|    |Bhavan and Sahar       |                                               |
|    |Airport                |                                               |
|13  |Meeting at the         |Confession of co-accused A-64, 39, 16 and A-98.|
|    |residence of Babloo    |                                               |
|14  |Selection of targets   |Confession of co-accused A-64, 39, 16 and A-98.|
|15  |Meeing at the residence|Confession of co-accused A-52, 64, 100 and     |
|    |of Mobina              |A-13.                                          |
|16  |Survey of Chembur      |Confession of co-accused A-39.                 |
|    |Refinery               |                                               |
|17  |Meeting at the         |Confession of co-accused A-64, 13, 52, 100, 49 |
|    |residence of Tiger     |and A-29.                                      |
|    |Memon Distribution of  |                                               |
|    |Money                  |                                               |
|18  |Departure of Tiger     |Exh. 2487-Tiger’s Passport.                    |
|    |Memon                  |Confession of co-accused A-10 and A-9.         |
|19  |Filing of RDX          | Confession of co-accused A-57, 12, 39, 49, 64,|
|    |                       |23 and A-43.                                   |
|20  |Planting at Shiv Sena  |Confession of A-16, PW-11 and 12 identified    |
|    |Bhawan                 |Pw-2 and A-16.                                 |
|    |                       |PW-469-SEM, TI Parade.                         |
|    |                       |Letter to FSL 2447, 2469.                      |
|    |                       |FSL opinion 2447A, 2448.                       |
|21  |Distribution of        |Confession of co-accused A-32, 36, 39, 52,     |
|    |Handgrenades for       |Pws-5 and 6 and PW-13.                         |
|    |throwing at Mahim      |                                               |
|22  |Member of Maruti Van   |Seizure of Van-Pw-46 and PW-371.               |
|    |MFC-1972 with other    |                                               |
|    |co-accused             |                                               |
|23  |Presence at Tonk       |Confession of co-accused A-20 and A-130.       |
|24  |Stay at Hotel Harry    |Art. 2                                         |
|    |Palace-New Delhi in the|Exh. 3.                                        |
|    |name of Nasir Khan.    |Art. 3, Exh. 24.                               |
|    |Natraj-Howrah          |                                               |

182)  It is further contended by the appellant (A-1) that the  statement  of
approver dated 25.06.1993 given to  DCP  Bishnoi-(PW-193)  was  subsequently
retracted in terms of a letter dated  10.12.1993  and,  accordingly,  should
not be relied upon.  The said statement has not been  pressed  into  service
by the prosecution during the course of trial  against  any  accused  person
including the appellant.  PW-2 has himself explained the episode leading  to
the drafting of the said retraction and stated that the said  statement  was
drafted at the instance of  one  Hanif  Kadawala  and  Samir  Hingora.   The
witness remained unshaken about the said aspect  in  the  deposition.   PW-2
was clear that he was told in jail by Hanif Kadawala and Samir Hingora  that
unless PW-2 retracts his statement they would finish  him  and  his  family.
The following extracts from the deposition are pertinent in this regard:
Para 142 of the cross-examination of PW-2
      “…..(The attention of the witness is drawn to one letter  tendered  by
      Majeed Memon) “This letter has been written by me at the  instance  of
      Hanif and Samir at the time I was made to write my retraction by them.
       The letter is marked as Exh. D-1.  This letter D-1 was  got  prepared
      as a rough note on the basis of which my retraction was  finalized  on
      10.12.1993.  The application dated 10.12.1993 retraction is marked  as
      D-2.  At the time in my examination in chief  on  21.07.1995  whebn  I
      stated before the court that Exh. D-2 was obtained from  me  by  Hanif
      Kadawala and Samir Hingora I did not mention that  there  was  another
      letter or letters obntained by them like the letter Exh. D-1.  Witness
      volunteers that there were two/three such letters prepared and on  the
      basis of all such letters the retraction Exh. D-2  was  finalized  and
      produced before the Court.  I did not read it but has written Exh. D-1
      as dictated to me by Hanif Kadawala  and  Samir  Hingora.   All  these
      letters  which  were  prepared  before  the  retraction  D-1  were  in
      possession of accused Hanif Kadawala and Samir  Hingora.   I  did  not
      want to die.  Today I do not  fear  deasth.   At  this  stage  witness
      complains to the Court that his family members are receiving  repeated
      threats and on Saturday i.e. 29.07.1995 in his jail  mulaquat  he  was
      informed that the family is receiving threats he suspects the  threats
      are coming from Samir Hingora and Hanif Kadawala.  The  witness  wants
      the court to take necessary action.”


      Para 143
      “…It is not correct to say that no threats have been  received  by  my
      family members and tht I am mentioning this in the Court falsely.”  In
      my statement Exh. 25-A recorded by DCP Bishnoi there is no mention  on
      names Hanif Kadawala and Samir Hingora because at that time I was  not
      concerned with them.  Till Friday 28.07.1995  I  did  not  tell  about
      these letters like D-1 and others to any authority or to the court  as
      it was not asked.  I had made a complaint to the court.  I  have  made
      an oral complaint 15/20 days of filing the retraction Exh. D-2.  I did
      not make any complaint t the court as I was with the  accused  persons
      in jail and I was afraid of them.”


      Para 91
      “….I sign in Hindi and English as per my choice.  I can read write and
      understand English.  …..It is true that his application was written by
      me and is signed by me and  it  was  forwarded  to  the  court.   This
      application is written in my hand.  This application was not presented
      by me but it was presented by hanif Kadawala and Samir Hingora.   This
      application was obtained from me against my wish.  I did not  complain
      of this to the court at any time till today.  I did not  complaint  to
      the Superintendent Jail  about  this  application  that  it  has  been
      obtained from me by the other  two  accused  against  my  wish  either
      orally or in writing.
      Para 233
      “The contents of the retraction  D-2  are  not  mine  as  it  contains
      language and  words  of  a  qualified  person  conversant  with  legal
      terminology.  The retraction D-2 was written by me during the day on 9-
      12-1993 and was submitted in  the  court  on  10-12-1993  through  the
      Jailor.  This was written by me when I was with other accused  persons
      in the circle.  In my Retraction Exhibit D-2 there is no reference  of
      Samir Hingora nad Hanif kadawala……”


      Ans: “I did not tell the court because I was  kept  with  the  accused
      persons and was under their influence and pressure”.


      Para 234… “It will be  correct  to  say  that  Hanif  Kadawala,  Samir
      Hingora and Abdul Hamid Birya these three accused persons had filed an
      application before this court on affidavit that I am demanding  monies
      from them.  I do not know what were  the  contents  of  the  affidavit
      filed by these  three  accused  persons  before  this  Court.   I  was
      informed by these accused persons that they are going to file such  an
      affidavit in the court before it was filed in the court on  1-10-1993.
      The accused Abdul Hamid Birya was not in it and he  did  not  tell  me
      that he was going to file such an affidavit.  It is not correct to say
      that I demanded a huge sum of money  from  hanif  kadawala  and  samir
      hingora for not becoming an approver.  It is not correct to say that I
      also told them if they do not give me money I will  falsely  implicate
      them.  It is not  true  that  for  these  reasons  the  accused  Hanif
      kadawala and Samir Hingora filed an application on  oath  before  this
      court on 1.10.1993.  It is not correct to say that  similarly  I  have
      been  demanding  monies  from  other  accused  persons   otherwise   I
      threatened them of falsely implicating them in the case.   It  is  not
      correct to say that at the instance of police I was  pressurizing  the
      accused persons to turn approver like me……..”


      In para 235….”It is not correct to  say  that  prior  to  becoming  an
      approver I was trying to extract money from the other accused persons.
       It is not correct to say that as I did not get Satisfactory  response
      from the  accused  persons  I  turned  to  the  police  expressing  my
      willingness to become an approver and negotiated terms and  conditions
      with them.  It it  not  correct  to,  state  that  I  made  deliberate
      mistakes in my letter addressed to Mr. M.N.Singh i.e. Exh. 26 in order
      to keep my options open.  It is not correct to state that after making
      an half hearted attempt  of  becoming  an  approver  I  again  started
      demanding money from the accused to decide on the names of involvement
      and non-involvement in my evidence.  It is not correct to  state  that
      immediately, prior to my evidence in the court and during my  evidence
      being recorded & I coerced or  induced  the  accused  persons  at  the
      instance of police to turn approver in the case like me and failed. It
      is not correct  to  state  that  my  evidence  before  the  court  and
      attribution of roles of various accused  persons  is  guided  by  this
      consideration.”


      Para 236…”It is not correct to state that retraction D-2 was  prepared
      by me with the assistance of co-accused  persons  on  my  request  and
      willing.  It is not correct to state that I approached the accused S M
      Thapa, R  K  Singh  and  Mr.  Sayyed  of  the  Customs  Department  by
      requesting them to prepare an effective retraction.  It is not correct
      to state that retraction D-2 was read over and understood by me and  I
      willingly signed it in the presence of jailor  for  dispatch  to  this
      court.”


      Para 237…. “It is correct to state that the co-accused facing trial in
      this case were unhappy on my becoming an approver.  It is not  correct
      to say that in order to convince the accused persons that in reality I
      have not become an approver and I have mislead the police  by  writing
      exhibit 26 in which I have deliberately made three important  mistakes
      and that the accused should be rest assured that I am not an approver,
      I wrote the letter D-1 to be retained as a documentary  proof  of  the
      above fact with the accused.”


      Para 238….”It is not correct to  state  that  on  28-9-1993  before  I
      signed Exhibit 27 the order was not read over to me or I read it.   It
      is not correct to state that Hanif kadawala and  Samir  HIngora  never
      threatened me at any time.  It is not correct to state that I did  not
      write anything like D-2 under the threat or  influence  of  Hanif  and
      Samir.  It is not correct to state that letter Exhibit D-1  is  not  a
      preparatory note.”


      Para 243….”It is not true to say that my confession  Exhibit  25-A  is
      involuntary and my retraction Exhibit D-2 is  voluntary.   It  is  not
      true to say that my letter Exhibit D-1 is true  expression  of  events
      written by me in the said letter on my own accord and  independent  of
      any external influence.  It is not true to say that it is not possible
      for any co-accused to repeatedly give threats  to  other  accused  and
      extract any writings spread over several days.  It is not  correct  to
      say that accused Hanif kadawala and Samir Hingora never  gave  me  any
      threats and never asked me to write anything against my wish  anytime.
      It is not true to say that I am making false statement  against  Hanif
      and Samir because they refused to pay monies demanded by me.”

183)  It has been further contended by the appellant (A-1)  that  there  are
variations in the statement given by PW-2 in relation to the air tickets  to
Dubai.  PW-2, in  his  examination-in-chief  has  clearly  stated  that  the
appellant (A-1) gave six air tickets for  Dubai  to  Javed  Chikna  (AA)  on
11.02.1993, on the instructions of Tiger Memon.   This  statement  has  been
clarified by PW-2 in his cross-examination where he confirms  that  “It  did
not happen that Tiger Memon told Yakub Memon to  give  six  air  tickets  to
Asgar and Yakub Memon gave six air tickets to Asgar.  The air  tickets  were
given to Javed Chikna by Yakub  Memon  as  told  by  Tiger  Memon…”   It  is
wrongly recorded in my statement Exhibit 25A.  I cannot  assign  any  reason
why it is so recorded.”  Further,  PW-2  has  clarified  his  statement  and
asserted that it was the appellant (A-1) who gave the air  tickets.   It  is
further submitted that there is no contradiction about the fact that such  a
meeting amongst the co-conspirators took place  where  the  appellant  (A-1)
was present and he was asked to  provide  the  tickets.   The  contradiction
pointed out by the defence does not go to the root of the matter and is  not
a material contradiction.
184)  In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the evidence of PW-
2 very clearly implicates the appellant (A-1) in respect of his  involvement
in the conspiracy.
Grant of Pardon under Section 306 of the Code to Mohammed  Usman  Ahmed  Zan
Khan/(PW-2)/Approver

185)   It was submitted by learned senior counsel for A-1  that  TADA  is  a
complete Code containing provisions for setting  up  of  Designated  Courts,
conduct of trials, awarding of  punishment  etc.   The  said  Act  does  not
contain any provision for the grant of pardon  as  contained  in  the  Code,
namely, Sections 306, 307 and 308.   It  was  submitted  by  learned  senior
counsel that the power to grant pardon is a  substantive  power  and  not  a
procedural power, and as such, the same has  to  be  conferred  specifically
and cannot be assumed to be an inherent power of a Court.   In  the  instant
case, pardon has been granted by the Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Bombay
to PW-2 though there was no specific power of grant of pardon in  TADA  with
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and as such, the  said  pardon  is  ultra
vires the scheme of TADA and the evidence of  the  said  persons  cannot  be
relied upon against the appellant.
186)  In reply to the above contention, learned senior counsel for  the  CBI
placed reliance on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Harshad  S.
Mehta & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (2001) 8 SCC 257 wherein an  identical
objection was raised, namely, in the  absence  of  specific  provisions  for
grant of pardon, the Special Court  has  no  power  to  grant  pardon  under
Special Court (Trial of offences relating to  prosecutions  in  Securities),
Act, 1992.  Taking note of various provisions  of  the  Code,  particularly,
Chapter XXIV, this Court repelled the said contention.  Chapter XXIV of  the
Code deals with general provisons as to inquiries and trials.  Sections  306
and 307 of the Code deal with tender of pardon to  an  accomplice.   Section
306 confers power upon the Magistrate and Section 307 on the Court to  which
commitment is made.  Section  308  provides  for  the  consequences  of  not
complying with the conditions of pardon by a person who has accepted  tender
of pardon made under Section 306 or Section 307. The relevant provisions  of
the Code read as under:
      “306. Tender of pardon to accomplice.--(1) With a  view  to  obtaining
      the  evidence  of  any  person  supposed  to  have  been  directly  or
      indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which  this  section
      applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at
      any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial  of,  the
      offence, and the Magistrate of  the  first  class  inquiring  into  or
      trying the offence, at any, stage of the inquiry or trial, may  tender
      a pardon to such person on condition of his making  a  full  and  true
      disclosure of the whole of  the  circumstances  within  his  knowledge
      relative to the offence and to every other person  concerned,  whether
      as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.
       (2) This section applies to-
            (a) Any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session  or
           by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law
           Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952).
           (b) Any offence punishable with imprisonment, which  may  extend
           to seven years or with a more severe sentence.
       (3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall
      record-
            (a) His reasons for so doing;
           (b) Whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person  to
           whom it was made,
       
      and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy
      of such record free of cost.
      (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made  under  sub-section
      (1)-
           (a) Shall  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  court  of  the
           Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence  and   in   the
           subsequent trial, if any;
           (b) Shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in  custody
           until the termination of the trial.
       
      (5) Where a person has accepted a tender of  pardon  made  under  sub-
      section  (1)  and  has,  been  examined  under  sub-section  (4),  the
      Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making  any
      further inquiry in the case.
            (a) Commit it for trial-
                 (i) To the Court of  Session  if  the  offence  is  triable
                 exclusively by that  court  or  if  the  Magistrate  taking
                 cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate;
                 (ii) To a  court  of  Special  Judge  appointed  under  the
                 Criminal Law Amendment  Act  1952  (46  of  1952),  if  the
                 offence is triable exclusively by that court;
       
           (b) In any other case, make over the case to the Chief  Judicial
           Magistrate who shall try the case himself.


      307. Power to direct tender of pardon.--At any time  after  commitment
      of a case but before Judgment  is  passed,  the  court  to  which  the
      commitment is made may, with a view, to obtaining  at  the  trial  the
      evidence of any person supposed to have been  directly  or  indirectly
      concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender a  pardon  on  the
      same condition to such person.
       


      308. Trial of person  not  complying  with  conditions  of  pardon.(1)
      Where, in regard to a person who has accepted a tender of pardon  made
      under section 306 or section 307, the Public Prosecutor certifies that
      in his opinion such person has, either  the  condition  on  which  the
      tender was made, such person may be tried for the offence  in  respect
      of which the pardon was so tendered or for any other offence of  which
      he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter, and
      also for the offence of giving false evidence:
       
      Provided that such person shall not be tried jointly with any  of  the
      other accused:
       
      Provided further that such person shall not be tried for  the  offence
      of giving false evidence except with the sanction of the  High  Court,
      and nothing contained in section 195 or section  340  shall  apply  to
      that offence.
       
      (2) Any statement made by such person accepting the tender  of  pardon
      and recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 or by a court under sub-
      section (4) of section 306 may be given in  evidence  against  him  at
      such trial.
       
      (3) At such trial, the accused shall be entitled to plead that he  has
      complied with the condition upon which such tender was made, in  which
      case it shall be for the prosecution to prove that the  condition  has
      not been complied with.
       
      (4) At such trial the court shall-
       
           (a) If it is a Court of Session, before the charge is  read  out
           and explained to the accused;
       
           (b) If it is the court of a Magistrate before  the  evidence  of
           the witnesses for the prosecution  is  taken,  ask  the  accused
           whether he pleads that he has complied with  the  conditions  on
           which the tender of pardon was made.
       
      (5) If the accused does so plead, the court shall record the plea  and
      proceed with the trial and it shall, before passing  judgment  in  the
      case, find whether or not the accused has complied with the conditions
      of the pardon, and, if it finds that he  has  so  complied,  it  shall
      notwithstanding anything contained in  this  Code,  pass  judgment  of
      acquittal.

In the case on hand, it was also contended that  grant  of  pardon  being  a
special power has to be conferred  specifically.   After  adverting  to  the
above mentioned provisions of the Code and in the absence  of  any  specific
exclusion or bar for the application for grant of pardon by  Special  Courts
in the Code, in Harshad S. Mehta (supra), this Court has concluded  “but  it
does not necessarily follow therefrom that the power to tender pardon  under
Sections 306 and 307 has not been conferred on the Special Court”.  In  para
22, the Court has held as under:

      “22. The Special Court may not be a criminal court  as  postulated  by
      Section 6 of the Code. All  the  same,  it  is  a  criminal  court  of
      original jurisdiction.  On  this  count  the  doubt,  if  any,  stands
      resolved by the decision of the Constitution Bench of  this  Court  in
      A.R.  Antulay  v.  Ramdas  Sriniwas  Nayak.  In   Antulay   case   the
      Constitution Bench said that shorn of all embellishment,  the  Special
      Court is a court of original criminal  jurisdiction  and  to  make  it
      functionally oriented  some  powers  were  conferred  by  the  statute
      setting it up and except those specifically conferred and specifically
      denied,  it  has  to  function  as  a  court  of   original   criminal
      jurisdiction  not  being  hidebound  by  the   terminological   status
      description of Magistrates or a Court of Session. Under the  Code,  it
      will enjoy all powers which a court of original criminal  jurisdiction
      enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied.”

187)  Posing these questions, the Bench analysed to  see  whether  power  to
grant pardon has been specifically denied to the Special  Court  established
under the Act.  The contention of the learned senior counsel  was  that  the
Act does not postulate commitment of the case to the Special  Court  and  no
provision having been inserted in the Act to empower the  Special  Court  to
tender  pardon,  hence,  the  impugned  order  granting  pardon  is  without
jurisdiction.  In para 35, the Court has observed as under:

      “35. There  cannot  be  any  controversy  that  there  is  no  express
      provision in the Act excluding therefrom the applicability of Sections
      306 and 307 of the Code. Can  it  be  said  to  be  so,  by  necessary
      implication, is what we have to determine.”

The following conclusions are also relevant:


      “51. The Code has been incorporated in the Act by application  of  the
      doctrine of legislation by incorporation. The power  to  grant  pardon
      has not been denied expressly or by necessary implication. As  earlier
      stated after decision in the case of A.R. Antulay it was not necessary
      to make specific provision in the Act conferring power on the  Special
      Court to grant pardon at trial or pre-trial stage. The  Special  Court
      is a court of original criminal jurisdiction and has all the powers of
      such a court under the Code, including those of Sections 306 to 308 of
      the Code, the same not having been excluded specifically or otherwise.


      52. There is no provision in the Act which negates the  power  of  the
      Special Court to grant pardon. The Special Court has  power  to  grant
      pardon at any stage of the proceedings. The power  under  Section  307
      cannot be denied merely because no commitment of the case is  made  to
      the Special Court. Learned Solicitor-General,  in  our  view,  rightly
      contends that the other statutes are  only  an  external  aid  to  the
      interpretation and to rely upon the omission of a provision  which  is
      contained in another different enactment, it has to be shown that  the
      two Acts are similar which is not the position here. The scheme of the
      two Acts is substantially different as has been earlier noticed by us.
      It is also evident from Fernandes case as well”.


188)  After arriving at such a conclusion, the Bench, in  para  55  held  as
under:
      “55.  In  the  present  case,  we  are  unable  to  find  either   any
      inconsistency or any provision which  may  indicate  expressly  or  by
      necessary implication the exclusion  of  the  provision  of  the  Code
      empowering grant of pardon.”

After saying so, the Bench concluded as under:
      “62. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Special Court  established
      under the Act is a court of exclusive jurisdiction. Sections 6  and  7
      confer on the court wide powers. It is a court  of  original  criminal
      jurisdiction and has all the powers of such a  court  under  the  Code
      including those of Sections 306 to 308.”


The above conclusion fully supports the stand taken by CBI and the  ultimate
decision arrived at by the Designated Court.
189)   It was argued by learned senior counsel appearing for  the  CBI  that
the word ‘notwithstanding’ appearing in various  provisions  of  TADA  shows
that the Code would apply to all cases unless specifically provided  for  in
the TADA.  He placed reliance on Section 4(2) of the Code which provides  as
follows:
      “All offences under any other  law  shall  be  investigated,  inquired
      into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions,
      but subject to any enactment for the time being  in  force  regulating
      the manner or  place  of  investigating,  inquiring  into,  trying  or
      otherwise dealing with such offences.”

The other decision relied upon by learned senior  counsel  for  the  CBI  to
support his contention that the power of  pardon  does  exist  by  necessary
implication to cases under TADA is Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs.  State
of Maharashtra & Ors.  (1968)  1  SCR  695  in  which  question  relates  to
tendering pardon to a co-accused under Section  8(2)  of  the  Criminal  Law
Amendment Act of 1952.  A  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court,  even  after
finding that Special Judge created under the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act,
1952 (Act 46 of 1952) is not one established under the Code held,  “For  the
cases triable by  Special  Judges  under  Criminal   Law  Amendment  Act,  a
special provision is to be found in Section 8(2) of that Act, for tender  of
pardon to an accomplice, as part of the  procedure  and  powers  of  Special
Judges”……….On the tender of pardon by the Special Judge  the  provisions  of
Sections 339 and 339-A of the Code will apply”.
190)  It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that even if  Section  306
of the Code is held to  be  applicable,  power  to  grant  pardon  could  be
exercised only by the  Designated  Judge  and  not  by  the  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate and as in the present case the power was exercised by  the  Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate and not by  the  Deisgnated  TADA  Judge,  the  said
exercise of power was illegal and renders the grant of pardon  bad  in  law.
The above contentions of Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior  counsel  for  A-1
are not acceptable since several provisions in TADA clearly show  that  Code
would apply to all cases.  In view of Section 4 of the Code,  trial  of  all
offences under the Indian Penal Code or any other laws including  TADA  have
to be investigated, enquired into, tried and dealt  with  according  to  the
provisons contained in the Code which read as under:
      “4.Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.  -(1)
      All offences under the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860)  shall  be
      investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according
      to the provisions hereinafter contained.


      (2) All offences under any other law shall be  investigated,  inquired
      into,  tried,  and  otherwise  dealt  with  according  to   the   same
      provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being  in  force
      regulating the manner  or  place  of  investigating,  inquiring  into,
      trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”

Section 4(2) of the Code makes it clear that  all  the  offences  under  any
other law shall  be  investigated,  inquired  into,  tried  and  dealt  with
according  to  the  provisons  of  the  Code   but   subject   to   specific
clause/reference of the Special Act.  It is also clear  from  Section  5  of
the Code that in the absence of specific provisons  in  any  enactment,  the
provisions of the Code  shall  govern  for  the  purpose  of  investigation,
enquiry etc.  As per Section 2(1)(b) of the TADA, ‘Code’ means the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).  Section 7(3) of TADA makes  it  clear
that the provisions of the Code shall, sofaras may be and  subject  to  such
modification made in the Act,  apply  to  the  exercise  of  powers  by  the
officer under sub-Section 1.  Section 7(1) of TADA  makes  it  futher  clear
that notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  or  in  any  other
provision  of  this  Act  (TADA),  the  Central   Government,   for   proper
implementation of the provisions of the Act confers upon  any  officer,  the
power to investigate and proceed under the  Act.   As  per  Section  9,  the
Central Government or the State  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the
Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for such area  or
areas or for such class or classes or group of persons by specifying in  the
Notification.   Procedure  and  power  for  Designated  Courts   have   been
mentioned in Section 14 of TADA.  Section 14(2) makes it clear that  if  any
offence is punishable with imprisonment  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three
years or with fine or with both, the Designated Court  may,  notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-Section 1 of Sections 260 or 262 of the Code,  try
the offence in a summary way in accordance with the procedure prescribed  in
the Code and the provisions of Sections 263 to 265 of the Code  shall  apply
to such  trial.   Section  14(3)  of  TADA  specifically  confers  upon  the
Designated Court all the  powers  that  can  be  exercised  by  a  Court  of
Sessions under the Code which includes  the  power  to  grant  pardon  under
Section 306 of the Code.  Section 14 of TADA provides as follows:
      “14. Procedure and powers of Designated Courts. — A  Designated  Court
      may  take  cognizance  of  any  offence,  without  the  accused  being
      committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of  facts  which
      constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts.


      (2) Where an offence triable by a Designated Court is punishable  with
      imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with
      both, the Designated Court may, notwithstanding anything contained  in
      sub-section (1) of Section 260 or Section 262 of  the  Code,  try  the
      offence in a summary way in accordance with the  procedure  prescribed
      in the Code and the provisions of Sections 263 to  265  of  the  Code,
      shall, so far as may be, apply to such trial:


      Provided that when, in the course of a summary trial under  this  sub-
      section, it appears to the Designated Court that  the  nature  of  the
      case is such that it is undesirable to try it in a  summary  way,  the
      Designated Court shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined
      and proceed to  re-hear  the  case  in  the  manner  provided  by  the
      provisions of the Code for the trial of  such  offence  and  the  said
      provisions shall apply to and in relation to  a  Designated  Court  as
      they apply to and in relation to a Magistrate:


      Provided further that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial
      under this section, it shall be lawful for a Designated Court to  pass
      a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.


      (3) Subject to the other provisions of this Act,  a  Designated  Court
      shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of
      a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of
      Session so far as may be in accordance with the  procedure  prescribed
      in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session.


      (4)  Subject  to  the  other  provisions  of  this  Act,  every   case
      transferred to a Designated Court under sub-section (2) of Section  11
      shall be dealt with as if such case had been transferred under Section
      406 of the Code to such Designated Court.


      (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, a Designated Court
      may, if it thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded  by  it,  proceed
      with the trial in the absence of the accused or his pleader and record
      the evidence of any witness, subject to the right of  the  accused  to
      recall the witness for cross-examination.

Section 18 also  makes  it  clear  that  after  taking  congnizance  of  any
offence, if the Designated Court is of the opinion that the offence  is  not
triable by it or it shall notwithstanding that it  had  no  jurisdiction  to
try such offence, transfer the case for the trial of  such  offence  to  any
Court having jurisdiction under the Code and the Court to which the case  is
transferred may proceed with the  trial  of  offence  as  if  it  had  taken
cognizance of the offence.  Section 20  of  the  Act  makes  it  clear  that
certain  provisions  of  the  Code  are  automatically  applicable  and  the
Designated Court is free to apply those provisions from  the  Code  for  due
adjudication of the cases under the Act.  So, from the above,  it  is  clear
that no provision of TADA is inconsistent with the provisions  of  the  Code
of Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  for  grant  of  pardon  as  envisaged  under
Sections 306 to 308.  While  upholding  the  power  of  the  special  courts
established under a Special Courts Act to grant pardon under Section 306  of
the Code, this Court, in Harshad S. Mehta (supra) held thus:
      “61. … It is also not possible to  accept  that  it  was  intended  by
      necessary implication that the Special Court under the Act  shall  not
      have the power to grant pardon.  All powers of Sections 306 to 308  to
      the extent applicable and can be complied are available to the Special
      Court under the Act.  The provisions of the Act and the Code can stand
      together.  There is no inconsistency.  The  two  statutory  provisions
      can harmoniously operate without causing any confusion or resulting in
      absurd consequences and the  scheme  of  the  Code  can,  without  any
      difficulty, fit in the scheme of the Act….”

Further, TADA does not preclude the applicability  of  Section  306  of  the
Code.  As observed earlier,  Section  306(2)(b)  is  clear  in  that  it  is
specifically applicable to instances where the offence for which an  accused
is being tried is punishable with imprisonment extending to seven  years  or
more.  In the instant case, the  approver  was  accused  of  offences  which
carried the maximum punishment as capital punishment.
191)  The object of Section 306 is to tender pardon in cases where  a  grave
offence is alleged to have been committed by several  persons  so  that  the
offence could be brought home  with  the  aid  of  evidence  of  the  person
pardoned.  The legislative  intent  of  this  provision  is,  therefore,  to
secure  the  evidence  of  an  accomplice  in  relation  to  the  whole   of
circumstances, within his knowledge, related to the offence and every  other
person concerned.  In the light of the above  analysis,  we  hold  that  the
power to grant pardon under Section 306 of the  Code  also  applies  to  the
cases tried under the provisions of TADA and there was no infirmity  in  the
order granting pardon to the approver (PW-2) in the facts and  circumstances
of the present case.
192)  It is further contended on behalf of  the  appellant  (A-1)  that  the
deposition of PW-2 cannot be relied upon since the procedure  laid  down  in
Section 306(4)(a) of the Code was not followed.  In the instance  case,  the
CMM granted pardon to PW-2 on 28.09.1993 in compliance with  the  provisions
of Section 306.  Section 306(4)(a) requires that  the  Court  of  Magistrate
taking cognizance of the offence shall examine the witness.  In the  instant
case, where appellant has been charged with the  offences  under  TADA,  the
Designated Court established under TADA alone has the jurisdiction  to  take
cognizance of the offences under TADA.  Section 14 of TADA provides  that  a
Designated Court may take cognizance of any  offence,  without  the  accused
being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of  facts  which
constitute such an offence or upon a police report of such  facts.   Section
306(5) contemplates committal of a case by the Magistrate taking  cognizance
of the offence to the court of appropriate  jurisdiction.   In  the  instant
case, there did not arise an occasion for the Magistrate to commit the  case
to the Designated Court by virtue of above-said  provision  contained  under
Section 14 of TADA whereby the Designated Court  had  jurisdiction  to  take
cognizane and try the offences in TADA.  193)       This  Court,  in  Sardar
Iqbal Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (1977) 4 SCC 536 while  dealing  with  a
case where the offence was triable  by  the  Special  Judge  who  also  took
cognizance  of  the  offence  and  like  the  present  case,  no   committal
proceedings were involved, held as under:
      “5. From these provisions it would appear  that  where  a  person  has
      accepted a tender of pardon under sub-section (1) of  Section  337  at
      the stage of investigation in a case involving  any  of  the  offences
      specified  in  sub-section  (2-B),  the  prosecution  can   file   the
      chargesheet either in the Court of a competent  Magistrate  or  before
      the Special Judge who under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment
      Act, 1952 has power to take cognizance  of  the  offence  without  the
      accused being committed to him for  trial.  It  follows  that  if  the
      Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, the approver will have  to
      be examined as a witness twice, once in the Court  of  the  Magistrate
      and again. in the Court of the Special Judge to  whom  the  Magistrate
      has to send the case for  trial,  but  if  the  chargesheet  is  filed
      directly in the Court of the Special Judge, he can  be  examined  once
      only before the Special Judge. This means that in  a  case  where  the
      chargesheet is filed in the Court of a Magistrate, the accused gets an
      opportunity of having the evidence of the approver at the trial tested
      against what he had said before the Magistrate; the accused is  denied
      this opportunity where the chargesheet is filed in the  Court  of  the
      Special Judge. Whether the accused  will  get  the  advantage  of  the
      procedure which according to the appellant is more beneficial  to  the
      accused, thus  depends  on  the  Court  in  which  the  proceeding  is
      initiated, and, it is contended, if the choice of forum is left to the
      prosecution, it will result in discrimination. Mr Sen submits that the
      only way to avoid this position is to read sub-sections (1),  (2)  and
      (2-B) of Section 337 of the Code and Section 8(1) of the Criminal  Law
      Amendment Act, 1952 together and to construe them in a way to  require
      that in  every  case  where  an  accomplice  is  granted  pardon,  the
      chargesheet must be filed in the Court of a Magistrate.


      6. We are unable to accept the contention. It is clear from the scheme
      of Section 337 that what is required is that a person  who  accepts  a
      tender of pardon must be examined as a witness at the different stages
      of the proceeding. Where, however, a Special Judge takes cognizance of
      the case, the occasion for examining the approver as a witness  arises
      only once. It is true that in such a case there would be  no  previous
      evidence of the approver against which his evidence at the trial could
      be tested, which would have been available  to  the  accused  had  the
      proceeding been initiated in the Court of a Magistrate who under  sub-
      section (2-B) of Section 337 of the Code is required to send the  case
      for trial to the Special Judge after examining the approver. But we do
      not find anything in sub-section (2-B) of Section 337 to suggest  that
      it affects in any way the jurisdiction of the Special  Judge  to  take
      cognizance of an offence without the accused being  committed  to  him
      for trial. Sub-section (2-B) was inserted in Section 337  in  1955  by
      Amendment Act 26 of 1955. If by enacting sub-section (2-B) in 1955 the
      Legislature sought to curb the power given to  the  Special  Judge  by
      Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment  Act,  1952,  there  is  no
      reason why the Legislature should not  have  expressed  its  intention
      clearly. Also, the fact that the approver's evidence cannot be  tested
      against any previous statement  does  not  seem  to  us  to  make  any
      material difference to the  detriment  of  the  accused  transgressing
      Article 14 of the Constitution. The Special Judge  in  any  case  will
      have to apply the well established tests for the appreciation  of  the
      accomplice's evidence. This Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd.  v.
      Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay   held   that   the   mere
      availability of two procedures would not justify  the  quashing  of  a
      provision as being violative of Article 14 and that “what is necessary
      to attract the inhibition  of  the  article  is  that  there  must  be
      substantial and qualitative difference between the two  procedures  so
      that one is really and substantially more drastic and prejudicial than
      the other . . .”.  In  our  opinion,  there  is  no  such  qualitative
      difference in the two procedures; whether a witness is  examined  once
      or twice does not in our opinion make any such substantial  difference
      here that one of them could be described  as  more  drastic  than  the
      other. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.


194)  In view of the  above  discussion  and  the  ratio  decidendi  of  the
decisions of this Court, we are of the view  that  the  provisions  of  sub-
Section 4 of Section 306 have not been violated and there is  no  illegality
in not having examined the approver twice by the Designated Court.
Other witnesses:
Evidence of Shri P K. Jain (PW-189)
195)   He  joined  Maharashtra  Police  in  January  1983  as  an  Assistant
Superintendent of Police.  He was promoted as Superintendent  of  Police  in
April 1985.  The rank of  Superintendent  was  equivalent  to  the  rank  of
Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) in Greater  Bombay.   He  is  conversant
and well versed with English,  Hindi,  Marathi  and  Punjabi  languages  and
according to him, he is  able  to  speak,  read  and  write  the  said  four
languages.  Since January 1993, he was posted as DCP, Zone IX,  Bombay.   In
February 1993, Zone IX of Bombay was re-named as Zone X  and  he  functioned
as DCP for Zone X up  till  August,  1994.   He  recorded  the  confessional
statement of 96 accused persons  in  this  case.   First,  he  recorded  the
confessional statement of A-11.  He explained before the Court the  relevant
provisions of TADA for recording a  confession,  procedure  to  be  followed
etc.  He also deposed before the Court that before recording  a  confession,
he used to receive a letter of requisition for the same.  He also  explained
that on each and every occasion, he explained his position  to  the  accused
who intended to make a confession and apprised him of the  fact  that  there
was no compulsion on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  make  a  confessional
statement and also informed the Court that he  had  also  explained  to  the
accused  that  the  confession  would  be  used  against  him.   He  further
explained that upon the production of each accused,  he  verified  that  the
accused was not under compulsion and was free from any  pressure  either  by
the investigating agency or by anyone else.   He  also  informed  the  Court
that after highlighting  all  the  procedures  and  satisfying  himself,  he
allowed every accused to have 48 hours breathing time and asked the  accused
concerned that still if he was desirable to make such  a  statement  he  was
free to appear before him in his  office.   His  evidence  also  shows  that
whenever such accused was  produced,  he  used  to  verify  that  no  police
personnel or anybody else was present inside his Chamber  and  recorded  his
confessional  statement  after  closing  the  door  and  only  after  proper
verification.  He also informed the Court that every accused who has made  a
statement before him was apprised of the fact  of  his  position  i.e.  DCP,
Zone X.  After making sure that the  accused  understood  his  position  and
after verifying the language, in which  he  desired  to  make  a  statement,
recorded the same in  his  own  handwriting.   He  also  explained  that  no
accused had raised any complaint/grievance against  any  police  officer  or
police in general.  He also said that he  had  asked  all  the  accused  who
confessed before him “whether he was under any fear  or  pressure  or  given
any  inducement  for  making  the  confession”.   After  completion  of  his
recording in his own handwriting  and  after  explaining  the  same  to  the
accused in the language known to him,  he  obtained  the  signature  of  the
accused on all the pages.  After satisfying the accused  about  confessional
statement made and the procedure followed, he used to handover  the  custody
of the said accused  to  the  police  officer  concerned.   Thereafter,  the
recorded confessions were sealed in  one  envelope  and  after  preparing  a
covering letter, the  same  were  sent  to  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate.
According to him, he also obtained the acknowledgement for  receipt  of  the
same in the said Court through his subordinate officers.  He  also  informed
the Court that by following the said elaborate procedure,  he  recorded  the
confessional statements of various accused, viz.,  A-11,  A-67,  A-17,  A-12
and A-9.  He also informed the  Court  that  he  had  issued  the  necessary
certificate as required under Rule 15  of  the  Rules.   He  also  issued  a
certificate regarding the  voluntariness  of  the  confession  made  by  the
accused and the correctness of the record of the same prepared by  him.   He
also signed below the said certificates.  He also produced  and  marked  the
letters of requisition received by him from various  Investigating  officers
for recording the confession.
196)       In the cross-examination,  he  specifically  informed  the  Court
that he had not investigated any offence  under  TADA.   He  also  clarified
that in his Zone i.e. Zone-X, none of the bomb explosions had  occurred  and
that no case was registered with regard to the same.  He  also  stated  that
he was not asked to carry out any investigation in connection with LAC  Case
No. 389 of 1993 registered with Worli Police Station and according  to  him,
the area under Worli Police Station does not fall  within  the  jurisdiction
of Zone X.
197)       With regard to the allegation that  confession  was  recorded  in
the Police Station, he explained that he had recorded the confession in  the
Chamber of DCP, Zone IV, at Matunga.  According to him, the said  office  is
situated in the building in which Matunga Police  Station  is  also  housed.
However, he explained that the office of DCP,  Zone  IV  is  on  the  fourth
floor of the said building.  For a further query,  he  also  clarified  that
Zone IV office is different office then  the  Matunga  Police  Station.   He
asserted that he had followed the procedures  mentioned  in  the  Rules  and
instructions while making the record of confession of all the accused  whose
confession were recorded by him.
Evidence of Shri K.L. Bishnoi (PW-193)
198)  According to him, he had joined  the  Police  Department  in  January,
1986  as  an  Assistant  Superintendent  of  Police.   He  was  promoted  as
Superintendent of Police in  January,  1990  and  was  posted  at  Latur  as
Superintendent of Police.  He was posted as DCP in Bombay from April,  1992,
up till December, 1995.  He worked in Bombay  City  in  various  categories.
He also informed the Court that the post  of  Superintendent  of  Police  in
District  is  equivalent  to  Deputy  Commissioner  of   Police   (DCP)   in
Commissionarate  area.   He  admitted  that  he  had  supervised  one   case
registered with Worli Police Station then under  his  jurisdiction  and  one
crime registered in  connection  with  the  serial  bomb  blasts  which  had
occurred in the month of  March,  1993.   He  had  recorded  confessions  of
several accused persons arrested in the year 1993  in  connection  with  the
offences for which the crimes were registered in respect of the bomb  blasts
which had occurred in the month of March, 1993 in Bombay.
199)       He explained before the Court the  relevant  provisions  of  TADA
for recording a confession, procedure to be followed etc.  He  also  deposed
before the Court that before recording a confession, he used  to  receive  a
letter of requisition for the same.  He also  explained  that  on  each  and
every occasion he had explained his position to the accused who intended  to
make a confession and had  apprised  him  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no
compulsion on the part of the accused to make a confessional  statement  and
also informed the Court that he had also explained to each accused that  the
confession would be used against him and there was  no  compulsion  to  make
such a statement.   He  further  explained  that  upon  production  of  each
accused, he verified that the accused was not under compulsion and was  free
from any pressure either by the investigating agency or by anyone else.   He
also informed the Court that  after  highlighting  all  the  procedures  and
satisfying himself, he allowed the accused to have 48 hours  breathing  time
and asked the accused concerned that still if he was desirable to make  such
a statement, he was free to appear before him in his office.   His  evidence
also shows that whenever such accused were produced, he  would  verify  that
no police personnel or anybody else was present in his Chamber and  recorded
the  confessional  statements  after  closing  the  door  and  after  proper
verification that nobody was there inside.  He also informed the Court  that
every accused who made a statement was apprised of the fact of his  position
i.e., DCP.    After making sure that the  accused  understood  his  position
and after verifying the language in which he desired to  make  a  statement,
he recorded the same in his own handwriting.  He was also used to  tell  the
respective accused that during the said period of two days i.e.,  48  hours,
he would be kept at other Police Station away from the influence of I.O.
200)       He further explained that he used to  write  the  question  after
asking the same to the accused and record the answer to  the  said  question
after the same was given by the accused.  He further made it clear  that  he
was following the same procedure while making the record on  the  typewriter
instead of writing the questions asked, he was dictating  the  same  to  the
typist.  After recording in the aforesaid manner, he  would  read  over  the
whole confessional statement to the accused in the language  known  to  him.
He would also obtain signatures on all the pages of the  concerned  accused.
After satisfying the accused about the confessional statement made  and  the
procedure followed, he would handover the custody of  the  said  accused  to
the police officer concerned.  Thereafter,  the  recorded  confessions  were
sealed in one envelope and after preparing a covering letter, the same  were
sent to the Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate.   According  to  him,  he  also
obtained the acknowledgement for receipt of  the  same  in  the  said  Court
through his subordinate officers.   He  also  informed  the  Court  that  by
following  the  said  elaborate  procedure,  he  recorded  the  confessional
statements of the following accused,  namely,  Gul  Mohammed  (A-77),  Asgar
Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Dawood Phanse (A-14), Shaikh Ali  (A-57),  Mobina  (A-
96), Imtiyaz Ghavate  (A-15),  Sanjay  Dutt  (A-117),  Nulwala,  Kersi  Bapu
Adejania, Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) and Raju Kodi (A-26).
201)     In respect  of  a  question  asked  regarding  whether  during  the
relevant period he was not only supervising the investigation  of  the  said
case (LAC No. 381 of 1993)  but  also  coordinating  the  investigation,  he
admitted to the same.  In para 584 of his evidence, in  reply,  he  admitted
that he had the recorded confessions of accused A-14, A-10  and  Sujat  Alam
in a period when he was supervising the investigation of  the  case  against
them.  However, he clarified that the public  prosecutor  has  produced  and
marked an order dated 22.04.1993 passed by the Joint Commissioner of  Police
regarding the overall supervision of investigation of the Bombay Bomb  Blast
case being given to the DCB (CID).
Recording of Confessions by Police Officers:
202)  Further, it is contended that confessions recorded before  the  Police
Officers should be discarded since the same were recorded  by  the  officers
who were also supervising  the  investigation.   To  this,  the  prosecution
pointed out that in the instant case, the confessions of  the  accused  have
been recorded  after  following  all  the  safeguards  as  enumerated  under
Section 15 of TADA and the rules framed thereunder.  It is  further  pointed
out that the appellants have volunteered to confess their role in the  crime
and they were aware of the fact that they were under no compulsion  to  make
a confession and that the same could be used against  them.   Further,  this
Court, in S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir, (2000)  2  SCC  254  negated  a  similar
contention and held that no illegality or impropriety persists in  recording
of a confession by an officer supervising the investigation:
      “28. The  confessions  have  been  held  inadmissible  mainly  on  two
      grounds. The first ground given by the learned trial Judge is that the
      power under Section 15 of the TADA Act was exercised either mala  fide
      or without proper application of mind. The second ground on which they
      are held inadmissible is that they were recorded in  breach  of  Rules
      15(2) and  15(3)  of  the  TADA  Rules  and  also  in  breach  of  the
      requirements of Section 164 and the High Court  Criminal  Manual.  The
      learned trial Judge held that the TADA Act was applied  in  this  case
      without any justification. The permission was granted in  that  behalf
      without any application of mind. According to the  trial  court  there
      was no material on the basis of which the TADA  Act  could  have  been
      invoked at that stage and that most probably the said Act was  invoked
      in order to defeat the bail application filed by two  accused  in  the
      High Court. In our opinion the trial court was wrong  in  taking  this
      view. We have already pointed out earlier that Deshmukh had  collected
      enough material on the basis of which  reasonable  satisfaction  could
      have been arrived at that the acts committed by  the  two  gangs  were
      terrorist acts. It is no doubt true that it was  wrongly  reported  by
      Deshmukh that Section 5 was also applicable  in  this  case  and  that
      without proper verification sanction was granted to proceed under that
      section also.  The  applicability  of  Section  5  depended  upon  the
      existence of a requisite notification by the State Government. It  was
      wrongly reported by PI Deshmukh in his report that such a notification
      was issued and relying upon his statement the higher officer had given
      the sanction. Merely on this ground it cannot be said that Shinde  has
      exercised the power under Section 15 of the TADA Act  mala  fide.  The
      learned trial Judge has also held that it was not fair on the part  of
      Shinde to record the  confessions  as  he  was  also  supervising  the
      investigation. Shinde has clearly stated in his evidence that  he  had
      made attempts to find out if any other Superintendent  of  Police  was
      available for recording the confessions and as others had declined  to
      oblige him he had no other option  but  to  record  them.  We  see  no
      illegality or impropriety in Shinde  recording  the  confessions  even
      though he was supervising the investigation. One  more  flimsy  reason
      given by the trial court for holding that the power under  Section  15
      was exercised mala fide is that the  accused  making  the  confessions
      were not told that they had been recorded under the TADA Act. No  such
      grievance was made by the accused in  their  statement  under  Section
      313. On the other hand, it appears  from  the  confessions  themselves
      that the accused were made aware of the fact  that  those  confessions
      were recorded under the TADA Act.

203)  Further in Mohd. Amin vs. CBI, (2008) 15 SCC 49, this  Court  held  as
under:
      “61. The question whether confessions of Appellants A-4 to A-8 and  A-
      10 should be treated as non-voluntary and  held  inadmissible  on  the
      ground  that  the  same  were  made  before  the  officers  who   were
      supervising  the  investigation  deserves  to  be  considered  in  the
      backdrop of the following facts:
      (i) Each of the confessing appellants had volunteered to  confess  his
      role in the crime.
      (ii) Their confessions were recorded strictly in accordance  with  the
      manner and procedure prescribed in Section 15 of the Act and  Rule  15
      of the Rules.
      (iii) In reply to the questions put by Shri  A.K.  Majumdar  and  Shri
      Harbhajan Ram, each of the confessing appellants replied that  he  was
      aware of the fact that he was under no compulsion to  make  confession
      and that the same can be used  against  him  and  that  there  was  no
      threat, coercion or allurement for making confession.
      (iv) When Appellant A-10 was produced before  the  Chief  Metropolitan
      Magistrate, Delhi on 25-7-1996, he did state that he has not made  any
      confessional statement but did not utter  a  word  about  any  threat,
      coercion, inducement or allurement by Shri Harbhajan Ram (PW 103)  for
      making confession.
      (v) At the end of the period specified in transit  warrants,  all  the
      confessing appellants were produced before the Magistrate concerned at
      Ahmedabad with an application for their remand  to  judicial  custody.
      None of them made any grievance of ill-treatment, torture (physical or
      mental), inducement or allurement by  the  investigating  officers  or
      supervising officers or claimed that he had made confession under  any
      other type of compulsion. Even when they  were  in  judicial  custody,
      none of  the  appellants  made  a  grievance  that  he  was  tortured,
      threatened or coerced by the  investigating  officers  or  supervising
      officers or  that  any  allurement  was  given  to  him  to  make  the
      confession.
      (vi) All the confessing appellants were facing trial in  a  number  of
      other cases [this  is  evident  from  the  statement  of  PW  100,  Mr
      Satyakant, the then Deputy Inspector General  of  Police,  CID,  Crime
      (Ext. 430)] in which they were duly represented by advocates but  till
      the recording of the statements under Section 313 CrPC,  neither  they
      nor their  advocates  made  a  grievance  regarding  denial  of  legal
      assistance or alleged that any threat was given to either of  them  or
      they were subjected to  physical  or  mental  torture  or  that  undue
      influence  was  exercised  by  the  investigating  officers   or   the
      supervising officers or any allurement was given for  the  purpose  of
      making confession.


      62. Both the investigating officers, namely, Shri R.K. Saini (PW  122)
      and Shri O.P. Chatwal  (PW  123)  were  subjected  to  lengthy  cross-
      examination. Shri R.K. Saini denied the suggestion that Appellant A-10
      Salimkhan was never willing to give any confessional statement and his
      statement was  not  recorded.  He  also  denied  the  suggestion  that
      Appellant A-10 had complained to  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate
      that he was ill-treated by the officers while in custody. In his cross-
      examination, Shri O.P.  Chatwal  (PW  123)  categorically  denied  the
      suggestion that Shri A.K. Majumdar had instructed him to ill-treat the
      accused. He further stated that none of the  accused  was  ill-treated
      mentally or physically by CBI. Shri Chatwal also denied the suggestion
      that the confessional statements of the accused were prepared  by  him
      and their signatures were obtained on the same. In  reply  to  another
      question, he denied that the accused had sought for  the  presence  of
      advocate but the same was declined.


      63. In their statements, PW 103 Shri Harbhajan Ram  and  PW  104  Shri
      A.K. Majumdar explained the details of the mode and  manner  in  which
      confessions of the accused were recorded. Both of  them  categorically
      stated that before recording confession each of the accused  was  told
      that he is not bound to make confession and that the same can be  used
      against him and whether there was any threat, coercion  or  allurement
      for making confession. According to the two  witnesses,  each  of  the
      accused expressed unequivocal willingness to confess his role  in  the
      crime by stating that he knew that the confession can be used  against
      him, that there was no threat, coercion or allurement and that he  was
      making confession voluntarily.


      64. According to PWs 103 and 104, the statements of the  accused  were
      recorded by the stenographers verbatim and each one of  them  appended
      signatures after satisfying that the same was correctly  recorded.  In
      reply to the suggestion made to  him  in  cross-examination  that  the
      accused had been subjected to torture,  PW  104  categorically  stated
      that none  of  the  accused  was  ill-treated  by  him  or  any  other
      officer/official. The defence had made suggestion about the nature and
      extent of supervision exercised by PW 104 but it was not put  to  them
      that either instructed  the  investigating  officers  to  torture  the
      accused and forced them to confess their guilt. In this  view  of  the
      matter, the confessions of Appellants A-4 to A-8 and  A-10  cannot  be
      held inadmissible on the premise that before recording of  confessions
      they were in police custody and the statements were  recorded  by  the
      officers supervising the investigation.”


204)  Similarly, in Lal Singh vs. State of Gujarat, (2001) 3 SCC  221,  this
Court was pleased to observe:
      “91. The next contention that Rule 15 of the TADA Rules has  not  been
      followed also does not carry any weight. For this  purpose,  we  would
      refer to  the  evidence  of  PW  128,  PW  132  and  PW  133.  PW  128
      Satishchandra Rajnarayanlal, who was SP, CBI II, Punjab  Cell  at  New
      Delhi in 1992 stated that he registered the offence RC  No.  6-SII/92.
      He recorded the confessional statements of A-1 Lal Singh, Ext. 620 and
      A-3 Tahir Jamal, Ext. 618 along with other accused.  Before  recording
      confessional statements, he ascertained  from  every  accused  whether
      they were voluntarily ready to give confessional statements. Necessary
      questions were put to them and time was given to them  to  think  over
      the matter. After being satisfied  that  they  were  willing  to  give
      voluntary confessional  statements,  he  recorded  their  confessional
      statements. PW 132 Padamchandra Laxmichandra Sharma, who was SP,  CBI,
      SIC II at the relevant time stated that when he took over  the  charge
      of this case RC No. 6-(S)/92 from Mr Satishchandra, this case  was  in
      the last phase. Deputy SP, CBI, D.P. Singh (PW 136) had  produced  A-2
      Mohd. Sharief and A-20 Shoaib Mukhtiar before him on 8-7-1993 and 6-2-
      1994 for recording their voluntary confessional statements, which  are
      Ext. 650 and Ext. 654 respectively. Before recording their statements,
      he warned them of the consequences of making  confessional  statements
      and further gave  them  time  to  think  over  the  matter.  On  being
      satisfied  that  they  wanted  to  give  confessional  statements,  he
      recorded  their  statements.  PW  133  Sharadkumar  Laxminarayan,  DIG
      Police, CBI, SIC II Branch, New Delhi stated that in the year 1992  he
      was SP in the same branch at New Delhi. On 5-11-1992 he  was  directed
      by DIG M.L.  Sharma  to  proceed  to  Ahmedabad  in  order  to  record
      statement of A-4 Saquib Nachan under Section 15 of the TADA Act. On 6-
      11-1992 after reaching at Ahmedabad, Saquib Nachan was produced before
      him. He put necessary questions to A-4 Saquib Nachan. Before recording
      confessional  statement,  he  ascertained  from  him  whether  he  was
      voluntarily ready to give confessional statement and warned  him  that
      if he made confessional statement, the same can be used  against  him.
      He also apprised the accused  that  he  is  not  bound  to  make  such
      statement. When the accused replied  that  he  wanted  to  make  clean
      admission of guilt, he recorded  the  confessional  statement  of  A-4
      Saquib Nachan. From the above evidence, it is clear that Rule  15  was
      fully  followed  by  the  witnesses,  who  recorded  the  confessional
      statements of accused.


Observations made in para 23 are also noteworthy:

      “23. In view of the settled legal position,  it  is  not  possible  to
      accept the contention of learned Senior Counsel Mr Sushil  Kumar  that
      as the accused were in police custody, the confessional statements are
      either  inadmissible  in  evidence  or  are  not  reliable.  Custodial
      interrogation in such cases is permissible under the law to meet grave
      situation arising out of terrorism unleashed by  terrorist  activities
      by persons residing within or outside the country. The learned counsel
      further submitted that in the present case the guidelines suggested by
      this Court in Kartar Singh  were  not  followed.  In  our  view,  this
      submission  is  without  any  basis  because  in  the   present   case
      confessional statements were recorded prior to the date of decision in
      the said case i.e. before 11-3-1994. Further, despite  the  suggestion
      made by this Court in Kartar  Singh  case,  the  said  guidelines  are
      neither incorporated in the  Act  nor  in  the  Rules  by  Parliament.
      Therefore, it would be difficult to accept the  contention  raised  by
      learned counsel for the accused that as the said  guidelines  are  not
      followed, confessional statements  even  if  admissible  in  evidence,
      should not be relied upon for convicting the  accused.  Further,  this
      Court has not held in Kartar Singh case that if  suggested  guidelines
      are not followed then confessional statement would be inadmissible  in
      evidence. Similar contention was negatived by this Court in S.N.  Dube
      v.  N.B.  Bhoir  by  holding  that  a  police  officer  recording  the
      confession under Section 15 is really not bound to  follow  any  other
      procedure and the rules or the guidelines framed by  the  Bombay  High
      Court for recording the confession by a Magistrate under  Section  164
      CrPC; the said guidelines do not by themselves apply to recording of a
      confession under Section 15 of the TADA Act and it is for the court to
      appreciate the confessional statement  as  the  substantive  piece  of
      evidence and find out whether it is voluntary and  truthful.  Further,
      by a majority decision in State v.  Nalini  the  Court  negatived  the
      contentions that confessional statement is not a substantive piece  of
      evidence and cannot be  used  against  the  co-accused  unless  it  is
      corroborated  in  material  particulars  by  other  evidence  and  the
      confession  of  one  accused  cannot  corroborate  the  confession  of
      another, by holding that to that extent the provisions of the Evidence
      Act including Section 30 would not  be  applicable.  The  decision  in
      Nalini case was considered in S.N. Dube case. The Court observed  that
      Section 15 is an important departure from the ordinary  law  and  must
      receive that interpretation which would achieve  the  object  of  that
      provision and not frustrate or truncate it and that the correct  legal
      position is that a confession recorded under Section 15  of  the  TADA
      Act is a substantive piece of evidence and can be used against  a  co-
      accused also.”


205)  A perusal of the evidence  of  both  the  officers  who  recorded  the
confession of  the  accused  clearly  show  that  they  were  aware  of  the
procedure to be followed before recording the confession of the accused  and
how the same is to be recorded.  We are satisfied that before recording  the
confessional statements both the officers apprised the accused  persons  who
wished to make the same that there is no compulsion on their part to make  a
confessional statement and thus also  apprised  them  that  the  confessions
would be used against them.  It is also clear from their evidence that  both
of them had specifically verified whether such persons were under  coercion,
threat or promise at the time of making confession  and  all  of  them  were
given adequate time to think it over and make a confessional statement.   It
is also clear that after recording their confession, the same was  explained
to them in the language known to them and in token of  the  same,  they  put
their signatures and the officers’ counter signed the same.  Though  in  the
cross-examination,  both  of   them   have   admitted   certain   procedural
violations, in the case of one or two persons, however, the verification  of
their entire  evidence  and  the  confessional  statements  of  the  accused
concerned  clearly  show  that  there  is  no  flagrant  violation  of   any
procedure.  We are satisfied that the Designated Court was  fully  justified
in relying upon the evidence of PW-189 and PW-193.
Special Executive Magistrates (SEM):
206)  A  contention  was  also  raised  that  the  SEMs  were  not  Judicial
Magistrates and their appointment was not made in accordance with  law.   It
was contended that the SEMs who conducted the parades were not  eligible  to
do so and so the entire evidence is vitiated.   It  is  submitted  that  the
Criminal Manual of the Bombay High Court in Chapter 1 expressly states  that
non-Judicial  Magistrates  or  Honourary  Magistrates   should   carry   out
identification parades.  A Special Executive Magistrate  is  a  non-Judicial
Magistrate and is an honorary appointment by the  government.   Extracts  of
the relevant provisions from the Criminal Manual are provided below:-
      “Identification Parades
      It is not desirable that Judicial Officers should associate themselves
      with  identification  parades.   All   Civil   Judges   and   Judicial
      Magistrates are, therefore, directed that they should not  participate
      in identification parades  which  are  conducted  by  the  police  for
      investigation purposes.


      In this connection, order in the Government Circular, Home Department,
      No. MIS. 1054/84588 dated 22nd April, 1955, is  reproduced  below  for
      the information of the Civil Judges and Judicial Magistrates:


      In the Judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Ramkishan vs. Bombay
      State AIR 1955 SC 104, it has  been  held  that  the  statements  made
      before police officers by witnesses  at  the  time  of  identification
      parades are statements to the Police, and as such are hit  by  Section
      162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.  In view of that  ruling,
      it is necessary that such parades are not conducted in the presence of
      Police  Officers.   The  alternative  is  to  take  the  help  of  the
      Magistrates or leave the matter  in  the  hands  of  panch  witnesses.
      There would be serious  difficulties  in  panch  witnesses  conducting
      parades successfully.


      In regard to Magistrates, it is not  feasible  to  associate  Judicial
      Magistrates  with  such  parades.   The   only   practicable   course,
      therefore, is to conduct the parades under Executive  Magistrates  and
      Honorary  Magistrates  (not  doing  judicial  work).   Government   is
      accordingly pleased to  direct  that  the  Police  Officers  concerned
      should  obtain  the  help  of  Executive  Magistrates   and   Honorary
      Magistrates      in       holding       identification       parades.”
      (emphasis added)


      The Criminal Manual requires  that  a  non-judicial  Magistrate  (i.e.
including an  SEM)  should  preferably  conduct  identification  parades  of
accused persons.  The Criminal Manual has adopted the principles  enumerated
by Archibold in his treatise “Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice”  and
states that such principles would apply mutatis mutandis  to  identification
parades with suitable variations.  These guidelines include:
       a) Identification parade should appear fair and  precaution  must  be
          taken to exclude any suspicion of unfairness or risk of  incorrect
          identification.
       b) Officer concerned with the suspect  must  not  take  part  in  the
          parade.
       c) Witnesses should be prevented from seeing the suspect before he is
          paraded.
       d) The suspect should be placed among persons of similar height, age,
          weight etc. as far as possible.
       e) Witnesses should be introduced one by one and should be  asked  to
          identify the suspect. Witness should be free to touch any person.
       f) If parade takes place in a prison then the prison  officer  should
          be present throughout the parade.
       g) SEM should prepare a parade memorandum containing details  of  the
          time, place and date of the parade; details  of  panch  witnesses;
          names of the persons standing in the parade;  statements  made  by
          identifying witnesses etc.
The  particulars/materials  placed  by  the  prosecution   show   that   the
identification parades were carried out in compliance with the  requirements
of the Criminal Manual.
207)  It was further contended by learned senior  counsel  for  the  accused
that the identification parade should not have been conducted  by  the  SEM.
However,  in  the  light  of  the  provisions  of   the   Criminal   Manual,
identification  parades  should  preferably  be  conducted  by  non-Judicial
Magistrates (i.e. Special Executive Magistrates) and  that  in  the  instant
case identification parades were conducted by Special Executive  Magistrates
in compliance with the provisions of the Criminal Manual.
208)  The Criminal Manual and the Government Circular, Home Department,  No.
MIS.1054/84588 dated 22nd April, 1955 in  clear  terms  requires  that  non-
judicial Magistrates or Honorary Magistrates such  as  a  Special  Executive
Magistrate  should  preferably  conduct  an   identification   parade   and,
accordingly, identification parades in the instant case  were  conducted  by
Special Executive Magistrates.
Appointment of Special Executive Magistrates
209)  It was further contended that Special Executive  Magistrates  are  not
trained Magistrates and they ought not to have  conducted  the  proceedings.
In this regard the law relating to  the  appointment  of  Special  Executive
Magistrates may be pertinent.   Special  Executive  Magistrates  (SEMs)  are
appointed by the State Government under Section 21 of the Code which  states
as follows:
      “21 Special Executive Magistrates: The State Government  may  appoint,
      for such term as it may think fit, Executive Magistrates, to be  known
      as Special Executive Magistrates  for  particular  areas  or  for  the
      performance  of  particular  functions  and  confer  on  such  Special
      Executive Magistrates such of the powers as are conferrable under this
      Code on Executive Magistrate, as it may deem fit.”

Section 21 is thus clear that the State  Government  can  appoint  SEMs  for
particular functions on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit.
210)  Section 21 of the Code was  enacted  pursuant  to  the  Thirty-Seventh
Report of the Law Commission  of  India  which  recommended  creation  of  a
special class of magistrates for  carrying  out  specific  functions.   This
report also brought forth a draft of the  new  section  for  appointment  of
Special Magistrates for particular areas or  for  particular  functions  and
confer upon them such powers as are conferrable on an  Executive  Magistrate
under the Code.  It may be noted that the  Forty-First  report  of  the  Law
Commission  did  not  approve  of  the  creation  of  Special   Magistrates.
However, the Joint Select  Committee  of  the  Parliament  agreed  with  the
Thirty Seventh Report of the Law Commission  and  recommended  amending  the
Code to provide for creation of a special class of Magistrates to carry  out
specific functions, upon whom powers exercised by  an  Executive  Magistrate
can be conferred.  Accordingly, Section 21 was enacted.
211)  Special Executive Magistrates are appointed by  the  State  Government
for a particular purpose and can exercise powers so conferred upon  them  by
the State as are exercisable by an Executive Magistrate.  It  is  useful  to
note that the legality  of  Section  21  of  the  Code  which  provides  for
appointment of Special Executive Magistrates was  also  considered  by  this
Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Mohd. Salim Khan (1991)  1  SCC  550.   In
this case, the State of Maharashtra appointed all Assistant Commissioner  of
Police (ACPs) in the Greater Bombay area as Special  Executive  Magistrates.
This Court, while upholding the appointment of  ACPs  as  Special  Executive
Magistrates held as under:
      ‘The purpose of empowering the State  Government  to  appoint  Special
      Executive Magistrates was evidently to meet the  special  needs  of  a
      particular area or to perform particular functions in  a  given  area.
      Such appointments without adequate powers  would  be  futile  and  the
      legislation without providing such powers would be pointless.  It  can
      be  assumed  that  the  Parliament  does  not  indulge  in   pointless
      legislation.  Indeed, it has not done so in  Section  21.   A  careful
      analysis of the  section  indicates  very  clearly  that  the  Special
      Executive Magistrates are also Executive Magistrates.”


Provisions of TADA in this regard:
212)   Section  20  of  TADA  provides  for  certain  modifications  to  the
provisions of the Code.  One such modification was made  to  Section  21  of
the Code which provides that a Special  Executive  Magistrate  can  also  be
appointed by the Central Government in addition to the State  Government  as
provided for in the Code.  Similarly, another modification provides  that  a
Special Executive Magistrate may also record statements made  under  Section
164 of the Code.  Section 20 of TADA provides as follows:


      “20. Modified application  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Code.-(1)
      Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code  or  any  other  laws,
      every offence punishable under this Act or any  rule  made  thereunder
      shall be deemed to be a  cognizable  offence  within  the  meaning  of
      clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as  defined
      in that clause shall be construed accordingly.


      (2) Section 21 of the code shall apply in relation to a case involving
      an offence punishable under this  Act  or  any  rule  made  thereunder
      subject  to  the  modification  that  the  reference  to  “the   State
      Government” therein shall be construed as a reference to “the  Central
      Government or the State Government.”


      (3) Section 164 of  the  Code  shall  apply  in  relation  to  a  case
      involving an offence punishable  under  this  Act  or  any  rule  made
      thereunder, subject to the modification  that  the  reference  in  sub
      section  (1)  thereof  to   “Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   Judicial
      Magsitrate”  shall  be  construed  as  a  reference  to  “Metropolitan
      Magistrate,  Judicial  Magistrate,  Executive  Magistrate  or  Special
      Executive Magistrate…..”

Section 20 of TADA expressly permits that Section 21 of the Code applies  in
relation to an  offence  punishable  under  TADA.   Accordingly,  a  Special
Executive Magistrate may be appointed in a TADA case  either  by  the  State
Government or the Central  government  to  perform  such  functions  as  the
government may deem fit.  Special Executive  Magistrates  may  perform  such
functions as are required in a TADA case.   In  the  instant  case,  Special
Executive Magistrates conducted identification parades of  arrested  accused
persons in compliance with the provisions of  the  Criminal  Manual  of  the
Bombay High Court.
213)  Section 20 of TADA read with Section 21 of the Code permits a  Special
Executive Magistrate to carry out such functions as are required in  a  TADA
case and accordingly in the  instant  case  Special  Executive  Magistrates,
inter alia, conducted identification parades of the accused persons.
214)  The constitutional validity of Section 20 of TADA has been  upheld  by
this Court in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab  (1994)  3  SCC  569  wherein
this  Court  upheld  that  Special  Executive  Magistrates  appointed  under
Section 21 of the Code  can  record  confessional  statements  for  offences
committed under TADA and perform such other  functions  as  directed.   This
Court held as follows:
      “309. Therefore, merely because the Executive Magistrates and  Special
   Executive  Magistrates  are  included  along  with  the  other   Judicial
   Magistrates in  Section  164(1)  of  the  Code  and  empowered  with  the
   authority of recording confessions in relation to the case under the TADA
   Act, it cannot be said that it is contrary to the accepted principles  of
   criminal jurisprudence and that the  Executive  Magistrates  and  Special
   Executive Magistrates are personam outside the  ambit  of  machinery  for
   adjudication of criminal cases.


      316……Therefore,  the  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  that  the
   conferment of judicial functions on the Executive Magistrates and Special
   Executive  Magistrates  is  opposed  to  the  fundamental  principle   of
   governance  contained  in  Article  50  of  the  Constitution  cannot  be
   countenanced. Resultantly, we hold that sub-section (3) of Section 20  of
   the TADA Act does not offend either Article 14 or Article  21  and  hence
   this sub-section does not suffer from any constitutional invalidity.”


In the instant case, which involves offences punishable under TADA,  Special
Executive  Magistrate  can  be  appointed  and  carry  out  such  functions,
including conducting identification parades,  as  the  government  may  deem
fit.  In view of the same, contentions raised regarding SEMs are  liable  to
be rejected.
Recoveries:
215)  Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for A-1 submitted that  based
on the statement of Mohd. Hanif (PW-282) and  other  witnesses  as  well  as
confessional statements of accused, several  recoveries  were  made  by  the
prosecution and in the absence of strict adherence to the  procedure,  those
recoveries are inadmissible in evidence.  He also pointed out  that  seizure
panchnama was not in accordance with the procedure and,  more  particularly,
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.  Now, let us  consider  how  far  the
prosecution has  established  that  the  recovered  articles/materials  were
either used or intended to  be  used  for  the  Bomb  blasts  on  12.03.1993
pursuant to the conspiracy hatched. Apart from the argument  of  Mr.  Jaspal
Singh relating to a deficiency in the panchnama, Mrs. Farhana Shah,  learned
counsel appearing  for  some  of  the  accused  has  also  raised  the  same
contention.
216)  Before going into the merits of the oral and documentary evidence  led
in by the prosecution, let us consider the salient features of  a  Panchnama
and whether the prosecution witnesses  strictly  adhered  to  the  procedure
contemplated for a valid Panchnama.
Panchnama:
217)  The primary  intention  behind  the  Panchnama  is  to  guard  against
possible tricks and unfair dealings on the part of  the  officers  entrusted
with the execution of the search with or without warrant and also to  ensure
that anything incriminating which may be said to  have  been  found  in  the
premises searched was really found there and was not introduced  or  planted
by the officers of the  search  party.     The  legislative  intent  was  to
control and to check these malpractices  of  the  officers,  by  making  the
presence of independent and respectable persons compulsory for search  of  a
place and seizure of article.
Evidentiary value of Panchnama
218)  Panchnama is a document having legal bearings which  records  evidence
and findings that an  officer  makes  at  the  scene  of  an  offence/crime.
However, it is not only the recordings of the scene of  crime  but  also  of
anywhere else which may be related  to  the  crime/offence  and  from  where
incriminating evidence is likely to be collected.  The document so  prepared
needs to be signed by the investigating officer who prepares  the  same  and
at least by two independent and impartial  witnesses  called  ‘Panchas’,  as
also by the concerned party.  The witnesses are  required  to  be  not  only
impartial but also ‘respectable’.  ‘Respectable’ here would  mean  a  person
who is not dis-reputed.  One should also  check  if  the  witnesses  are  in
their senses at the time of the panchnama proceedings.  Only majors  are  to
be taken as witnesses  as  minors’  witness  may  not  withstand  the  legal
scrutiny.
219)  Panchnama can be used as corroborative  evidence  in  the  court  when
that respectable person gives evidence in the court  of  law  under  Section
157 of the Indian Evidence Act. It can also  be  used  as  evidence  of  the
recorded transaction by seeing it so as to refresh their memory u/s  159  of
Indian Evidence Act.
Provisions relating to Panchnama in the Code
220)   The word ‘Panchnama’ is nowhere stated in the Code,  but  it  can  be
construed from the language of certain provisions under the code.   Sections
100 and 174 of the code mandate  the  presence  of  respectable  persons  as
witnesses at the time of search and investigation respectively.
      Section 100: Persons  in  charge  of  closed  place  to  allow  search
      (1)Whenever any place  liable  to  search  or  inspection  under  this
      Chapter is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, such
      place, shall, on demand of the officer or other person  executing  the
      warrant, and on production of the  warrant,  allow  him  free  ingress
      thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein.
      (2) If ingress into such place cannot be so obtained, the  officer  or
      other person executing the warrant may proceed in the manner  provided
      by sub-section (2) of section 47.
      (3) Where any person in or about such place is reasonably suspected of
      concealing about his person any article for  which  search  should  be
      made, such person may be searched and if such person is a  woman,  the
      search shall be made by another woman with strict regard to decency.
      (4) Before making a search under this Chapter, the  officer  or  other
      person about to make it shall call upon two or  more  independent  and
      respectable inhabitants of the locality  in  which  the  place  to  be
      searched is situated or of any other locality if no such inhabitant of
      the said locality is available or is willing to be a  witness  to  the
      search, to attend and witness the search and may  issue  an  order  in
      writing to them or any of them so to do.
      (5) The search shall be made in their presence,  and  a  list  of  all
      things seized in the course of such search and of the places in  which
      they are respectively found shall be prepared by such officer or other
      person and signed by such witnesses; but no person witnessing a search
      under this section shall be required to attend the Court as a  witness
      of the search unless specially summoned by it.
      (6) The occupant of the place searched, or some person in his  behalf,
      shall, in every instance, be permitted to attend during the search and
      a copy of the list prepared under this section,  signed  by  the  said
      witnesses, shall be delivered to such occupant or person.
      (7) When any person is searched under sub-section (3), a list  of  all
      things taken possession of shall be prepared, and a copy thereof shall
      be delivered to such person.
      (8) Any person who, without reasonable cause, refuses or  neglects  to
      attend and witness a search under this section, when called upon to do
      so by an order in writing delivered  or  tendered  to  him,  shall  be
      deemed to have committed an offence under section 187  of  the  Indian
      Penal Code (45 of 1860).


      174. Police to inquire and  report  on  suicide,  etc.  (1)  When  the
      officer in charge of a police station or  some  other  police  officer
      specially empowered by the State Government in  that  behalf  receives
      information that a person has committed suicide, or has been killed by
      another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident, or has died
      under circumstances raising a reasonable  suspicion  that  some  other
      person has committed an offence, he shall immediately give  intimation
      thereof  to  the  nearest  Executive  Magistrate  empowered  to   hold
      inquests, and, unless otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the
      State Government, or by any general or special order of  the  District
      or Sub-divisional Magistrate, shall proceed to  the  place  where  the
      body of such deceased person is, and there, in the presence of two  or
      more  respectable  inhabitants  of  the  neighborhood  shall  make  an
      investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent  cause  of  death,
      describing such wounds, fractures, bruises, and other marks of inquiry
      as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner,  or  by  what
      weapon or  instrument  (if  any),  such  marks  appear  to  have  been
      inflicted.
      (2)  xxx 
      (3)  xxx
      (4)  xxx”

221)  Section 100 of the Code was incorporated in order to build  confidence
and a feeling of safety and security among the public. Section  100  clauses
(4) to (8) stipulate the procedure with regard to search in the presence  of
two or more respectable and independent persons  preferably  from  the  same
locality. The following mandatory conditions can be culled out from  section
100 of the code for a valid Panchnama:
   a) All the necessary steps for personal  search  of  officer  (Inspecting
      officer) and panch witnesses should be taken to create  confidence  in
      the mind of court as nothing is implanted and  true  search  has  been
      made and things seized were found real.
   b) Search proceedings should be recorded by the I.O. or some other person
      under the supervision of the panch witnesses.
   c) All the proceedings of the search  should  be  recorded  very  clearly
      stating the identity of the place to be searched, all the spaces which
      are searched and descriptions of all the articles seized, and also, if
      any sample has been drawn for analysis purpose  that  should  also  be
      stated clearly in the Panchanama.
   d) The I.O. can take the assistance of his  subordinates  for  search  of
      places. If any superior officers are present, they  should  also  sign
      the Panchanama after the signature of the main I.O.
   e)   Place,  Name  of  the  police  station,  Officer  rank  (I.O),  full
      particulars of panch witnesses and the time of commencing  and  ending
      must be mentioned in the Panchnama.
   f) The panchnama should be attested by the panch witnesses as well as  by
      the concerned IO.
   g)  Any overwriting, corrections, and errors in the Panchnama  should  be
      attested by the witnesses.
   h) If a search is conducted without warrant of court u/s 165 of the Code,
      the I.O. must record reasons and a search memo should be issued.
222)  Section 174 of the Code enumerates the list  of  instances  where  the
police officers are empowered to hold inquests, the proviso to this  section
mandates the inquest to  be  conducted  in  the  presence  of  two  or  more
respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood.
Circumstances when the Panchnama is inadmissible:
223)  The Panchnama will  be  inadmissible  in  the  court  of  law  in  the
following circumstances:
   i) The Panchnama recorded by the I.O. under his supervision should not be
      hit by Sec.162 of the Code. The procedure requires the I.O. to  record
      the search proceedings as if they were written by the panch  witnesses
      himself and the same should not be recorded in the form  of  examining
      witnesses as laid down u/s 161 of the Code.
  ii) The Panchnama must be attested by the panch witnesses  for  it  to  be
      valid in the eyes of law. In case of a literate panch witness, he must
      declare that he has gone through the contents of Panchnama and  it  is
      in tune with what he has seen in  the  places  searched,  whereas  for
      illiterate panch witness, the contents should be read over to him  for
      his understanding and then the signature should be appended.   If  the
      above said declaration is not recorded, then  the  panchnama  document
      will be hit by Sec.162 of the Code.
224)  On any deviation from the procedure, the entire panchanama  cannot  be
discarded and the proceedings are not vitiated. If any  deviation  from  the
procedure occurs due to  a  practical  impossibility  then  that  should  be
recorded by the I.O. in his file so as to enable him to  answer  during  the
time of his examination as a witness in the court of law. Where there is  no
availability of panch witnesses, the I.O will conduct  a  search  and  seize
the  articles  without  panchas  and  draw  a  report  of  the  entire  such
proceedings which is called as a ‘Special Report’.
225)  In Pradeep Narayan  Madgaonkar  and  Ors.  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra
(1995) 4 SCC 255, this court  upheld  that  the  evidence  of  the  official
(police) witnesses cannot be  discarded  merely  on  the  ground  that  they
belong to the police force and are either interested  in  the  investigating
or the prosecuting agency. But prudence dictates that their  evidence  needs
to be subjected to strict scrutiny and as far as  possible  a  corroboration
of their evidence in material particulars should be sought. Their desire  to
see the success of the  case  based  on  their  investigation  and  requires
greater care to appreciate their testimony.
 226) In Mohd. Hussain Babamiyan Ramzan vs.  State  Of  Maharashtra,  (1994)
Cri.L.J. 1020, and Pannalal Damodar vs. State of Maharashtra  (1979)  4  SCC
526, it was held that  normally,  it  is  expected  that  the  investigating
officer will take independent panch witnesses and if knowingly he has  taken
pliable witnesses as panch witnesses  then  the  entire  raid  would  become
suspect and in such a case it  would  not  be  possible  to  hold  that  the
evidence of police witnesses by  themselves  would  be  sufficient  to  base
conviction.
227)  In M. Prabhulal vs. The Assistant  Director,  Directorate  of  Revenue
Intelligence (2003) 8 SCC 449  and  Ravindra  Shantram  Sawan  vs. State  of
Maharashtra (2002) 5 SCC 604, this Court came to the  conclusion  that  mere
non-examination of the panch  witnesses,  who  are  normally  considered  as
independent witnesses, would not be sufficient to discard  the  evidence  of
the  police  witnesses,  if  their  evidence  is  otherwise  found   to   be
trustworthy.
228)   In Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat (2011)  11
SCC 111, this Court  held  that “Merely  because  the  panch-witnesses  have
turned hostile is no ground to reject their evidence in toto  but  the  same
can be accepted to the extent that their version was found to be  dependable
on a careful scrutiny.
229)  Keeping the above principles in mind, let us consider  the  recoveries
made through prosecution witnesses.  Altaf Ali Mustaq Ali Sayed, (A-67),  in
his  confessional  statement  narrated  about  various  articles  and   also
identified the articles used for the  preparation  of  bomb.   He  made  his
confessional statement before Mr. P.K. Jain (PW-189), the then DCP,  Zone-X,
Bombay.  Since we are concerned about the recoveries, we are  not  adverting
to his  entire  statement  for  the  present.    A-67  in  his  confessional
statement implicated A-1 at many places.  He informed the officer  that  A-1
asked him to get the tickets confirmed for Dubai on short  notice  since  he
was working as a recruiting agent. For this, he assured A-1  that  it  would
be possible for him to arrange tickets even on  short  notice.   Thereafter,
when he returned to his office, in the evening,  he  received  a  call  from
Amjad telling him that as discussed in the morning with A-1, bags have  been
sent for keeping the same with him.  After saying so, he brought 4  bags  in
which one was a big  brown  coloured  VIP  bag,  one  small  and  one  black
coloured VIP like bag and two handbags tied together, from a jeep parked  in
the compound and handed over the same to him.  The next  day,  according  to
him, A-1 telephoned him and verified whether Amjad had handed over the  bags
to him.  He answered in the affirmative then he asked to  book  4-5  tickets
for Dubai.  A-1 also sent the names with money through one  Rafiq  Madi  (A-
46), who was also a resident of Mahim and known to him for  the  last  10-12
years.  He booked 15/16 tickets for them.   Rafiq Madi, who  used  to  bring
the money every time, took  the  tickets.  In  his  further  confession,  he
stated that after 10-12 days Amjad handed over three bags through Rafiq  for
keeping the same with him (A-67), out of them, one  was  big  and  two  were
small and A-46 kept them in his office and told him  that  Yakub  Menon  had
sent these bags and these were to be  sent  along  with  the  persons  going
abroad.   He gave them 5 tickets in the first week  of  March  and  all  the
persons went away but the bags remained lying there, then he spoke to  Yakub
Memon over phone and asked as to when he  will  take  away  the  bags.   For
this, A-1 replied that he will take away the same in a couple of  days.   On
the same day, in the afternoon, at 2 p.m., A-1 called him and  directed  him
to send those bags to him since he had nobody with  him.   Then,  at  6  ‘o’
clock, in the evening he put all those bags in his Maruti  car  and  reached
his building.  He further explained that  among  those  bags,  4  bags  were
given to him by Amjad and one small bag was given by Rafiq Madi.   He  could
not give the other 2 bags due to their  being  heavy.   When  he  asked  the
watchman to call Yakub bhai, at that time, a servant girl, aged about  10/12
years, came down with the keys of garage  and  put  those  bags  inside  the
garage of Yakub bhai.  When he returned to his house,  he  telephoned  Yakub
Memon (A-1) that he had given 5 bags to his watchman and he had put them  in
his garage.
230)  Thereafter, he  went  to  Borivali  where  he  heard  that  bombs  had
exploded at several places in Bombay on Friday i.e. 12.03.1993.   After  2-3
days, when he read the newspaper and  came to know that Yakub Memon and  his
men were behind the blasts then he got very scared.    The  other  two  bags
were lying in his office.  He further stated  before  the  DCP  that  during
this period, Amjad had gone to Karachi and  London  on  21/22nd  March.   He
gave both the bags to  Yakub  Memon  (A-1)  through  a  Taxi  Driver,  viz.,
Mohammed Hanif, who used to handle all his parties  etc.  and  told  him  to
keep those bags with him and return as and when  required  or  when  he  was
asked for the same.  He also stated that the police came to  his  office  on
26.03.1993, at about 5 ‘o’ clock and inquired about  the  bags  which  Amjad
had given to him and he explained to them in  detail.   Later,  he  realized
and believed that the bags kept in his office by Yakub Memon  through  Amjad
contained gun powder, arms and ammunitions and he and his men used all  that
for the bomb blasts in Bombay.
231)  In his confessional statement before the recording officer, he  stated
that, at first, A-1 told him that it contained office  documents  but  later
he informed him that it contained weapons etc. to take revenge  against  the
loss of Muslims in Bombay riots.  Later, he informed A-1  not  to  implicate
him and not to create any problem for him.  On this, A-1 told  him  to  keep
those two bags for few more days.  After this, when Rafiq  came  to  keep  3
bags with him, he asked him what was contained in these bags  as  they  were
very heavy, at that time, he told him that the bags  contained  bullets  and
grenades etc. for some work in Bombay.  He informed the officer that he  had
no other role except for keeping those bags in his office.
232)  The next witness heavily relied upon by the prosecution  is  ‘Mohammed
Hanif Usman Shaikh (PW-282)’.  According to him, he  had  been  residing  at
Bombay for the last 30 years and had been plying a  taxi  for  the  last  10
years.   He  admitted  in  his  evidence  that  he  knows  Altafbhai  (Altaf
Passportwala) and he identified Altafbhai in the  Court  and  also  informed
his full name as Altaf Ali Mustaq  Ali  Sayeed.   He  further  informed  the
Court that Altafbhai gave him 2 suit cases in his office when  he  had  been
to the said office at 09:00 p.m., on 22.03.1993.  Both  the  said  suitcases
were given to him in a closed condition.  Altafbhai told  him  to  keep  the
said suit cases and informed him that it contained fax machines.   Both  the
said suitcases were of light brown colour.   While  describing  further,  it
was stated that 1 suitcase was of bigger in size while another  one  was  of
smaller in size.  He further explained that since Altafbhai was  not  having
place to keep the said suitcases, he had given the same to him  for  keeping
the same for a few days.  Accordingly, he brought the said suitcases to  his
house.
233)   In continuation of his evidence, he stated  that  on  26.03.1993,  at
about 10:30 p.m., 4/5 policemen along with Altafbhai came to his house.   On
seeing him, Altafbhai told him to return the bags given by him.   Though  an
objection was raised about the  said  question,  the  Designated  Court  has
rightly clarified that the answer was allowed with  the  limited  object  to
show only a fact that Altafbhai had made a  statement.   Thereafter,  PW-282
deposed that he took out the bags which were under the  Sofa  and  gave  the
same to police persons who had accompanied Altafbhai (A-67).  Since  he  was
not having the keys, he was unable to produce the same when he was asked  by
Police Officer Mahabale.  Thereafter, the said  officer  called  a  mechanic
and the mechanic opened both the bags by preparing the keys  for  the  same.
After opening the bags, the mechanic went away.  Both  the  said  bags  were
found to contain hand grenades.  Both  bags  also  contained  wire  bundles.
The bigger suit case contained 65 hand grenades.  The  same  also  contained
10 bundles of wire.  The smaller suit case contained 40 hand grenades and  5
bundles of wire.  He further explained that the chits were affixed  on  each
of the hand grenades in both the said bags.  The bundles of wire  from  both
the bags were kept together and wrapped in a paper.   The  said  packet  was
tied by means of a string.  A seal was also affixed upon  the  said  packet.
The hand grenades from both the bags were of similar size.   The  same  were
of green colour.  Each bundle of wire contained  wires  of  green,  red  and
yellow colour.  The witness deposed that he had seen the  suit-cases  before
this day.  Accordingly, the suit cases were marked as Article  Nos.  42  and
43 after showing the same to him.  He mentioned that he had  seen  both  the
said suitcases in the year 1993 and had seen both the  said  suit  cases  on
22.03.1993.  He reiterated that he had seen the said suit cases on the  said
day in the office of Altafbhai.  Thereafter, the said suitcases  were  given
to him by Altafbhai.  When a specific  question  was  put,  namely,  whether
Article Nos. 42 and 43 shown to him had any connection  with  the  suitcases
given to him by Altafbhai, he answered that  the  same  were  the  suitcases
like these suitcases.  He again reiterated that suitcases  Article  Nos.  42
and 43 were the suitcases given to him by Altafbhai.
234)   In the cross-examination, he mentioned that the  hand  grenades  from
the bigger suitcase were counted in his presence  and  asserted  that  after
counting the same they were found to be 65 in number.   He  also  reiterated
that thereafter 65 labels were prepared and signatures  of  panch  witnesses
were obtained upon each of the said labels.  After affixing of the  said  65
labels one by one on each of  the  said  hand  grenades,  the  labeled  hand
grenades were kept in a bigger suit case.  He also asserted  that  the  said
labeled hand grenades or any hand grenade out of them was not  removed  from
the said bigger suitcase after the same were kept in the same  up  till  the
said bag was removed from his house by  the  police.   Before  removing  the
bigger suit case from his house, he stated  that  the  same  was  locked  by
means of a key which was prepared by  the  mechanic  for  opening  the  said
suitcase.  He also stated  that  the  bigger  suitcase  was  sealed  in  his
presence in such a manner that contents thereof  could  not  be  removed  by
anybody without tampering or breaking the seal  affixed  on  the  said  suit
case.
235)  Regarding the smaller box, he stated that in the same manner  40  hand
grenades were found from the smaller  bag  and  after  that  the  same  were
labeled.  The said bag was also locked by means of a  key  prepared  by  the
mechanic for opening the said bag.  He also stated that  the  said  bag  was
also sealed in such a manner that the contents thereof could  not  be  taken
out without damaging the intact seal affixed to  the  said  bag  or  without
breaking the said bag.  He  also  stated  that  none  of  the  labeled  hand
grenades kept in the said bag was removed after the same were  kept  in  the
said bag, after labeling and uptill the said small bag (suitcase) was  taken
out of his house by the police.
236)   He further stated that in the said night, he had seen only  105  hand
grenades and out of them 65 hand grenades were kept in bigger  suitcase  and
40 hand grenades were kept in the smaller suit case.  Since he disputed  the
number of hand grenades, labeling and locking  in  cross  examination,  with
the permission of the Court, the Special  Public  Prosecutor  put  questions
regarding happenings at Mahim Police Station in  the  month  of  Feb./March,
1993 and the circumstances  in  which  the  statement  of  the  witness  was
recorded by the police and the reason for which he had  deposed  before  the
Court.  In respect of a suggestion that he had made such a  wrong  statement
at the instance of accused Altafbhai (A-67) and his agents,  he  denied  the
same.  Regarding the acceptability or its evidentiary  value  regarding  the
number of hand grenades is to be discussed in the coming paragraphs.
237)  Regarding recoveries, the prosecution also relied on the  evidence  of
‘Ramesh Manohar Parkunde (PW-541)’.  According  to  him,  in  the  month  of
March 1993, he was attached to the DCB CID, Unit VIII as  P.I.   He  deposed
before the Court that on 24.03.1993, senior P.I. V. S. Kumbhar of  DCB,  CID
entrusted him with further investigation of  C.R.  138  of  1993  registered
with L.T. Marg Police Station on 23.03.1993.  After  taking  charge  of  the
said investigation, he registered C.R. No. 77 of  1993  as  a  corresponding
C.R. No. for the said  crime.   On  going  through  the  earlier  papers  of
investigation, he noticed a panchnama  dated  23.03.1993  affected  at  L.T.
Marg Police Station.  He took charge of the articles recorded  in  the  said
panchnama and kept the same in the  Strong  Room  of  DCB,  CID.   The  said
articles were suit cases, AK-56 rifles, ammunitions and hand  grenades  etc.
He further informed that on 24.03.1993, he visited the place from where  the
said articles were seized and made a thorough inquiry regarding  the  manner
in which the said articles came to the said spots.  He further  stated  that
on 27.03.1993, he handed over all live hand grenades seized under  Panchnama
Exh. 728 to P.I. Chaugule of B.D.D.S for defusing the  same.   On  the  same
day, he had also  given  him  all  the  detonators  seized  under  the  same
panchnama for diffusing.  He had requested the said squad for returning  the
said hand grenades and detonators after diffusing the same.
238)        PW-541 forwarded the seized articles to FSL for  examination  by
preparing necessary  forwarding  letter  and  described  the  articles  sent
therein.  On going through the office copy of the said letter, he  explained
that on the said day, he had sent in all 11 sealed packets to  the  FSL  and
out of them 4 articles were sealed  gunny  bag  packets  and  other  7  were
sealed bags with each packet containing the articles  as  described  in  the
said forwarding letter.  The said articles were received on the same day  by
the FSL and the FSL has given the acknowledgement of receipt of  the  letter
and articles.  The letter shown to him containing the  said  acknowledgement
of FSL is marked as Exh. 1846.  According to him, since  the  said  articles
were in large quantity, he had personally taken those articles to  the  FSL.
On 02.04.1993, he had taken out the said articles from the Strong Room.   He
asserted that the said articles were found in perfectly sealed  labeled  and
packed condition in which the same were deposited in the strong room,  i.e.,
they were in the same condition in which he  had  received  them.   He  sent
those articles in  the  same  condition  to  the  FSL.   On  27.04.1993,  he
received a report from Chemical Analysor regarding the articles sent by  him
for examination.  In the absence of any objection by  the  defence  counsel,
the Chemical Analyser report has been admitted in evidence and the  same  is
marked as Exh. 1847.
239)        Apart from the above mentioned evidence of  PW-541,  who  is  an
officer incharge of the muddemal  property,  since  20  hand  grenades  were
found less while  recording  his  evidence,  he  filed  an  affidavit  dated
11.10.1999 before the Designated Court which reads as under:
           “In the Court of Designated TADA(P) Ac, BBC, Gr. Mumbai
                                     In
                                BBC No. 1/93


      The State of Maharashtra/CBI, STF            …Appellant
                       vs.
      Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar & Others.              …..Accused


                                  AFFIDAVIT


           I, Ramesh Manohar Pargunde, 52  yrs  Sr.  Inspector  of  Police,
      Kherwadi Police Station, Mumbai, do hereby solemnly affirm and say  as
      under:-
      2.    That I am filing this affidavit with a view  to  explaining  the
      shortage of 20 hand grenades in muddemal property of this case.
      3.    I say that I was incharge of the store of muddemal  property  of
      Crime Bracnh, CID, Mumbai in the year 1993.  On 22.05.1993, the Police
      Inspector of Worli Police Station had deposited 105 hand grenades  and
      150 detonators, which were seized in connection with LAC No. 389/93 of
      Worli Police Station, Mumbai in DCB, CID CR No. 112/93.
      4.    I say that I was informed that 20 hand grenades were found  less
      in the muddemal property while recording the evidence of this case.  I
      was, therefore, asked to check up the record of  the  above  store  of
      Crime Branch.  I have personally checked and verified the said record.
       I say that 5 handgrenades were lying in  the  strong  room  of  Crime
      Branch, CID.  I say that inadvertently the said 5 hand  grenades  were
      not deposited in  the  Court  when  the  said  muddemal  property  was
      produced before  the  Court.   I  say  that  the  prosecution  may  be
      permitted to produce the said 5 hand grenades  for  which  a  separate
      application is being moved before this Hon’ble Court.
      5.    I say that I have verified the other record of the Crime  Branch
      and found that the remaining hand grenades were given to  the  various
      authorities as per the orders of the superiors.
                 a)    Six hand grenades given to Intelligence Bureau by PI,
                       BDDS on 10.06.1993.
                 b)    One hand grenade was given to DCP CB, Hyderabad.
                 c)    Eight hand grenades have been given to the  Ballistic
                       Expert of Austria and Britain, as  the  said  experts
                       were called upon to opine on the origin of  the  said
                       hand grenade
            I say that whatever stated in Para No. 3 and 4  is  as  per  the
      record available in the office and whatever stated in Para No. 5 (a, b
      & c) is true as per my personal knowledge and  as  per  the  available
      records and I believe the same to be true.






           Solemnly affirm.
      This 11th day of October, 1999.


                                              Deponent
                                                 (R.M. Pargunde)


      Identified by me
      Spl. Public Prosecutor
      CBI, STF Mumbai”

240)   The  statements  of  various  accused,  particularly,  A-10  and  the
evidence of PW-282 as well as PW-541 coupled with the affidavit sworn by PW-
541 and in the light of the principles to be followed for a valid  panchnama
which we  have  discussed  earlier,  we  are  satisfied  that  though  minor
discrepancies are there, according to us, on this ground we  cannot  destroy
the entire prosecution case.  In view of the fact that the  prosecution  has
led ample corroborative evidence, which we have  discussed  in  the  earlier
paragraphs, we  are  of  the  view  that  the  Designated  Court  was  fully
justified in relying on those recoveries  while  accepting  the  prosecution
case.
Final Analysis relating to A-1
241)  From the total  appreciation  of  the  evidence  as  produced  by  the
prosecution in support of the case against A-1, an offence of conspiracy  is
clearly made out.  The evidence in respect  of  A-1  is  in  the  nature  of
confessions  made  by  the  co-accused  persons,  the  testimonies  of   the
prosecution witnesses and documentary evidence on record and recoveries.
a)    A10 in his confessions  has  categorically  stated  that  A-1  is  the
younger brother of Tiger Memon.  It was  A-1  who  attended  many  telephone
calls at the Tiger’s residence.  On 10/11.02.1993,  A-1  handed  over  three
tickets to Dubai and three passports to A10 asking him to pick up A-100,  A-
16 and Salim from Midland Hotel and handover the tickets  and  passports  to
them and also directed to drop them at the airport by taxi,  all  of  which,
was duly done by A-10.  He further stated that at the  airport,  Tiger  told
them that he should keep in touch with A-1 and in case  of  any  requirement
of money he should get the money from Choksi (A-97).  On 13th February,  A-1
directed A-10 to collect Rs. 1 crore  from  Choksi  (A-97)  for  him.   A-10
collected the said money along with co-accued Abdul Gani (A-11), Parvez  (A-
12), Md. Hussain, Salim and Anwar Theba  (AA).   On  17/18th  February,  A-1
directed A-10 to remain with Rafiq Madi (A-46).  On the next day,  A-10  and
A-46 picked up Irfan Chougule (AA) from Mahim and Shahnawaz (A-29)  and  his
companion from Bandra Reclamation and dropped them at the Airport.   It  was
A-1 who directed A-10 to transfer rupees 25 lakhs from  Tiger’s  account  to
Irani’s account and also to transfer Rs. 10 lakhs to Ohalia’s account  which
was duly done by A-10.  The  timing  of  these  transfers  if  seen  in  the
context of activities being carried out contemporaneously  was  for  meeting
the expenses for achieving the objects of conspiracy, to meet  the  expenses
incurred for admitting of co-conspirators and also to meet the  expenses  to
be incurred during the abscontion period.
b)    In the same way, A-11, in his confession specifically stated  that  on
27th/28th January    A-1 was present at Al-Hussaini Building with other  co-
accused, i.e., A-46, A-15, A-12, A-52.  On 07.03.1993, A-11 was  present  at
Al Hussaini Building along with Tiger, Shafi, Essa (A-3), A-7, A-5 and A-6.
c)    (A-46), in his confession referred to  the  role  of  A-1  apart  from
mentioning that he is the  younger  brother  of  Tiger  Memon.   He  further
confessed that he used to drive Tiger’s blue  Maruti-800  for  attending  to
all business activities.  On  8th  or  9th  February,  he  handed  over  Rs.
50,000/- to him which was in turn  given  to  Altaf  Passportwala.   Between
14/15th February, Anwar filled up brown  coloured  substance  in  three  VIP
suitcases from the secret cavity of the jeep at the instructions of  A-1  in
his presence.  Next day, A-1 gave Rs. 62,000/- to Rs. 63,000/- to him to  be
given to A-67.  On  17th  February,  A-1  handed  over  five  passports  and
tickets to Anwar for Yeda Yakub and others for  their  departure  to  Dubai.
The next day, on the directions of A-1, A-46 dropped  Irfan  Chougule  (AA),
Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10) and Shahnawaz at the Airport for their  departure
to Dubai.  On 14th, he was given Rs. 4 lakhs by  A-1  after  collecting  the
said amount from Choksi A-97.
d)    A-67 in his confession referred to the role of A-1.   A-1  asked  A-67
about the bags that have been delivered to him by Ajmal.   It  was  A-1  who
arranged for tickets for some ten accused through him by sending money  etc.
 A-1 sent three bags through A-46 to accused A-67 for safe  keeping  of  the
same which contained arms and ammunitions.  A-1 instructed A-67  over  phone
for sending the bags  to  Al-Hussaini  i.e.  residence  of  Memon’s  family.
Earlier, A-1 had asked A-67 to keep the bags.  When A-67 told  A-1  that  he
may be implicated, A-1 replied that he need not worry.
e)    The confessional statement of A-97 clearly establishes that Tiger  had
an account with him in which various amounts totaling about Rs.161.48  lakhs
were deposited by A-26 at the behest of Tiger  Memon  (AA)  which  was  also
controlled by A-1.  It is relevant to mention that  on  12.02.1993,  at  the
time of departure to Dubai,  Tiger  told  A-10  that  he  should  remain  in
contact with A-1 and should bring money  for  him  from  A-97  in  case  A-1
needed money.  From the above, it could safely be inferred that the  account
maintained with A-97 by Tiger Memon was being used for meeting the  expenses
incurred for achieving the  objects  of  criminal  conspiracy  and  A-1  was
handling it through the other co-conspirators.
242)  Confessional statements of A-10, A11 and A-46 clearly reveal that  the
relevant role of collecting money was played by A-10 at the behest  of  A-1.
In the said context, the material contained in the confession of  A-10  that
while leaving for Dubai, Tiger Memon told him to remain in  touch  with  A-1
and having further told that in the event of A-1 requiring  any  money  A-10
should collect the same from A-97 clearly reveals that  A-1  himself  having
not collected the money from A-97  but  he  was  using  A-10  for  the  said
purpose and was actively involved in day-to-day  activities.   The  same  is
further clear in the confession of A-10 which reveals that after A-1  having
told him to bring about an amount of Rs. 1 lakh from  A-97,  the  manner  in
which the said amount was brought by A-10 by going  to  the  house  of  A-97
along with A-11, A-12 and two more persons.
243)  Apart from the above evidence, Asif Sultan Devji (PW-341)  and  Massey
Fernandes (PW-311) have deposed about booking of 12  tickets  and  1  ticket
respectively at the instance of A-67.  It is relevant to note that  A-67  in
his statement under Section 313 of the Code has admitted having  booked  the
tickets for Dubai through the said witnesses.
244)  PW-2, Approver had categorically stated that A-1, at the  instance  of
Tiger, gave air tickets to Javed which  were  of  A-100,  A-52,  A-60,  A-32
besides for himself.
245)  It has also come in the evidence of S. P. Udayavar  (PW-441)  that  at
the instance of A-1, in January and  March,  1993,  he  booked  tickets  for
Dubai vide Exh. 1421.  PW-441 had  categorically  stated  that  the  tickets
booked by him were collected by a person from  Tejarath  International  sent
by A-1.  All the above details clearly show that the tickets booked by  A-67
and others at the behest of A-1 were for the co-accused, who went  to  Dubai
and, subsequently, to Pakistan for weapons training  as  revealed  in  their
confessional  statements  and  evidence  of  PW-2.   All  this   information
emanated not only from the accused  in  their  confessional  statements  but
also from the persons who were in charge  of  issuance  of  tickets  at  the
travel agencies and Airport.  In the  light  of  evidence  of  PW-441  about
booking of tickets by A-1 in the account of Tejarath  International  coupled
with the confession of co-accused A-14, A-94, A-49 and A-39 regarding  their
visits to Dubai during the relevant time, establish that A-1 had booked  air
tickets  for  the  co-conspirators  mentioned  above.   The  examination  of
Vijayanti B. Dembla (PW-313) and Nitin K More (PW-310) establishes  that  it
was A-1 who was booking tickets and used to send  his  employee  to  collect
them from East West Travels.   The  examination  further  reveals  that  the
office of his firm was burnt in the riots and he started  working  from  his
residence at the Al-Hussaini Building.
246)  It is also seen from the confession of A-67 that  A-1  had  given  him
four bags on the first occasion which were containing ammunitions.   On  the
second occasion, A-46 had delivered three more suit cases to A-67  and  upon
being asked by him, A-46 stated that the suit cases  were  containing  round
bombs etc.  Thus, A-67, in all had received 7 bags  from  A-1  through  A-46
which containing arms/ammunition etc.  A-67, thereafter, returned five  bags
to A-1 that included four bags which were received  on  the  first  occasion
and  one  of  the  three  received  on  the  second  occasion.   The   above
confessional statement of A-67  corroborated  the  evidence  of  Akbar  Khan
Abusama Khan (A-37). A-46 in his confessional statement  also  stated  about
the delivery of three suit cases to A-67 by A-1.  Though some  discrepancies
are there, in the light of the abundant materials, if  we  read  the  entire
confessional statement of A-67, those were not of much importance.
247)  It is further seen that in all important meetings  with  Tiger  Memon,
particularly, at the residence Al-Hussaini, A-1 used to interact  with  him.
It is further clear that the confessional  statement  of  A-67  corroborated
the evidence of PW-37, PW-506 and PW-282.  It  has  also  come  in  evidence
that A-1 was in possession of handgrenades and electronic  detonators  which
were concealed in the jeep and which were delivered to A-67  in  three  suit
cases by A-1 through A-46.  It is also seen  from  the  evidence  of  PW-87,
driver working for A-5 and PW-630 Manager of  Hind  Automobile  and  Company
that the Maruti Car  bearing  No.  MP-09-H-0672  belonged  to  A-1  and  the
evidence also establishes that he is the owner of  the  said  vehicle  which
was involved in the said bomb blast.  It  has  been  proved  that  the  said
maruti car of blue  colour  was  planted  at  Bombay  Stock  Exchange  which
exploded at 0330 hours killing 84 persons, injuring 270 persons and  causing
loss of property worth Rs. 5 crores.  The number plate  (Art.  227)  bearing
MP-09-H-0672 was seized from the place  of  occurrence  by  Deputy  Manager,
Bombay Stock Exchange (PW-82). Engine No. and Chassis No. were seized by PW-
86  and  PW-370  respectively.   The  said  maruti  car  was  purchased   by
Shafizarimal in the beginning of the year  1992  through  Sulaiman  Mohammed
Lakdawala (PW-365) and thereafter, it was changed fom hand to hand and  this
car was used to blast Bombay Stock Exchange building.  This car was used  by
Tiger Memon and A-1 for explosion.  This is evident  from  the  evidence  of
PWs 87 and 630.
248)  We have already noted that the confessions of A-10, A-11, A-46 and  A-
97 are voluntary confessions and the same have  been  properly  recorded  by
recording officers and the same being not liable to  be  discarded.   Merely
because confession of A-1 is not on record, i.e., the  said  accused  having
not made a confession, the  same  cannot  be  considered  as  a  factor  for
terming other evidence led by the prosecution as a weak type of evidence.
249)  The material portion  in  the  confessions  of  A-10,  A-11  and  A-46
clearly reveal the relevant role  of  collecting  money  paid  by  the  said
accused at the behest of A-1.  The oral and documentary evidence led  in  by
the prosecution clearly prove that A-1 was  not  only  associated  with  his
brothers and other accused but had  also  participated  in  the  conspiracy.
Several co-accused,  particularly,  A-10,  A-11,  A-46  and  A-97  in  their
confessional statements unequivocally referred to the role of  A-1  and  his
participation in all aspects.  The prosecution has  also  proved  recoveries
of incriminating  articles  like  hand  grenades  etc.,  and  also  for  the
purchase of air tickets, getting passports and visas  for  the  persons  who
went  to  Pakistan  via  Dubai  for  training  in  handling  of   arms   and
ammunitions.  Apart  from  the  categorical  statement  of  co-accused,  the
prosecution has also examined the  independent  witnesses  from  the  travel
agencies and other authorities.  Apart from this, there are  ample  evidence
to show that he was incharge of all money transactions  and  monitoring  the
activities of all the persons concerned in the  movement.   The  prosecution
has also established that A-1 owns a blue Maruti  Car  which  was  used  for
carrying explosives and detonators one day before the blast  took  place  on
12.03.1993.  A-1 left for Dubai on 11.03.1993 with the Indian  Passport  and
thereafter he entered Pakistan with Pakistani Passport.  Though he  was  not
one among the persons who carried arms and ammunitions used  for  the  blast
but it was he who stood behind  them  from  starting  till  the  end,  viz.,
conspiracy, planning and making all the  arrangements  for  sending  certain
persons to Pakistan for training in handling of arms  and  ammunitions.   We
are satisfied that the prosecution has established all the  charges  leveled
against A-1 and the Desginated Court,  after  analysing  all  the  materials
including oral and  documentary  evidence  and  the  independent  witnesses,
rightly convicted him.
250)  A perusal of the above confessions by the co-conspirators  would  show
that the appellant (A-1) was playing a key role in furtherance of the  above
said conspiracy.  The above evidence along with further material  relied  on
by the prosecution show that A-1 also played an active  role  in  generation
and management of funds for achieving the object behind the  conspiracy  and
in all subsequent events.

                    Criminal Appeal Nos. 609-610 of 2008


Zakir Hussain Noor Mohd. Shaikh (A-32)
Abdul Khan @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36) &
Firoz @ Akram Amani Malik (A-39)         …..  Appellant(s)

                 vs.

State of Maharashtra,
Through STF, CBI, Bombay                 ….. Respondent(s)



                                     *********



251)  Mr. Priyadarshi Manish, learned counsel appeared  for  the  appellants
(A-32, A-36 and A-39) and Mr. Gopal  Subramanium,  learned  senior  counsel,
duly assisted by Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel and  Mr.  Satyakam,
learned counsel for the respondent.
252)  The present appeals are directed against the final judgment and  order
of conviction and sentence  dated  04.12.2006  and  24.07.2007  respectively
whereby the appellants  (A-32,  A-36  and  A-39)  have  been  convicted  and
sentenced to death by the Designated Court under TADA for  the  Bombay  Bomb
Blast Case, Greater Bombay in B.B.C. No.1/1993.
Charges:
253)  The following common charge of conspiracy was framed against  all  the
co-conspirators including the appellants herein.  The  relevant  portion  of
the said charge is reproduced hereunder:
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”


      In addition to the  abovesaid  principal  charge  of  conspiracy,  the
appellants were also charged on the following counts:
      At head Secondly; Each of the appellants (A-32, A-36 & A-39) committed
      an offence  punishable  under  Section  3(3)  of  TADA  by  doing  the
      following acts:
      (i)   They received training  in  handling  of  arms,  ammunition  and
           explosives in Pakistan along with co-conspirators.
      (ii)  They attended meetings at the residences of Nazir Ahmed Shaikh @
           Babloo (AA) and Mobina @ Baya  Musa  Bhiwandiwala  (A-96)  where
           plans for committing terrorist acts were discussed  and  chalked
           out.
      (iii) They participated in preparation of vehicle bombs on  the  night
           of 11.03.1993 at Al-Hussaini building.


      At head Thirdly; Each of the appellants along  with  other  co-accused
      went to Mahim Slope on 12.03.1993 in a Maruti Van bearing registration
      no. MP-13-D-385, and  threw  hand  grenades  on  the  hutments,  which
      exploded causing death of three persons and injuries  to  six  persons
      and damage to property worth  Rs.50,000/-  and  thereby  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA read with Section
      149 IPC.


      At head Fourthly; Each of the appellants along with  other  co-accused
      persons formed unlawful assembly as mentioned  above,  while  throwing
      the hand grenades at  the  said  hutments  at  Mahim  Causeway,  which
      resulted into death, injuries and damage  to  properties  and  thereby
      committed an offence punishable under Section 148 IPC.


      At head Fifthly; Each of the appellants, by causing the death of three
      persons as mentioned above by throwing  hand  grenades,  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.


      At head Sixthly; Each of the  appellants,  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion by throwing hand grenades which resulted  into  injuries  to
      various persons, committed an offence  punishable  under  Section  307
      read with Section 149 IPC.


      At head Seventhly; Each of the appellants, by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion by throwing hand grenades,  which  resulted  into  injuries,
      committed an offence punishable under Section 324  read  with  Section
      149 IPC.


      At head Eighthly; Each of the appellants,  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion by throwing hand grenades, which resulted into damage to the
      properties worth Rs.50,000/- committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 436 read with Section 149 IPC.


      At head Ninthly; A-39, by causing the aforesaid explosion by  throwing
      hand grenades, along with other co-accused persons at Mahim  Causeway,
      which resulted into death, injuries  and  destruction  of  properties,
      also committed an offence punishable under Sections  3,  4  read  with
      Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 read with Section  149
      IPC.

254)  The charges mentioned above were proved against all the appellants (A-
32, A-36 and A-39).  The appellants have been convicted  and  sentenced  for
the above said charges as under:

Conviction and Sentence

(i)   The appellants have been sentenced to  death  under  Section  3(3)  of
TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with the offences mentioned in  the  said
charge. In addition, the appellants were also ordered to pay a fine  of  Rs.
25,000/- each.  (charge firstly)
 (ii) A-36 and A-39 have also been sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  10  years
while A-32 has been sentenced to RI for 14 years for the offence  punishable
under Section 3(3) of TADA.  The appellants were also ordered to pay a  fine
of Rs.25,000/- each. (charge secondly)
(iii)   The  appellants  have  been  sentenced  to  death  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA read with Section  149  of  IPC
and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- each. (charge thirdly)
(iv)  The appellants were  also  sentenced  to  RI  for  three  years  under
Section 148 of IPC. (charge fourthly).
(v)   The appellants have been  further  sentenced  to  RI  for  life  under
Section 302 read with Section 149 of IPC accompanied  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
25,000/- each, in default, to further  undergo  RI  for  6  months.  (charge
fifthly).
(vi)  The appellants were sentenced to RI for 14  years  under  Section  307
read with Section 149 of IPC accompanied with a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-  each,
in default, to further undergo RI for 3 months. (charge sixthly).
(vii) The appellants were sentenced to RI for  2  years  under  Section  324
read with Section 149 of IPC.  (charge seventhly).
(viii)      The appellants were sentenced to RI  for  10  years  accompanied
with a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default, to  further  undergo  RI  for  1
month under Section 436 read with Section 149 of IPC. (charge eighthly).
(ix)  A-39 has been sentenced to RI for 10 years accompanied with a fine  of
Rs.5,000/- each, in default, to  further  undergo  RI  for  1  month,  under
Sections 3, 4 read with Section 6 of Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908  read
with Section 149 IPC. (charge ninthly).
Evidence:
255)  The evidence against the appellants is in  the  nature  of  their  own
confessions, confessions  made  by  other  co-accused,  the  testimonies  of
prosecution witnesses, including eye witnesses and documentary  evidence  on
record.  A brief account of the evidence brought on  record  in  respect  of
each of the appellant is as under.
256)  Mr. Manish, learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  after  taking  us
through the relevant materials submitted  that  the  appellants  joined  the
company  of  Tiger  Memon  and  had  gone  to  Dubai  and  Pakistan  due  to
circumstance and by force.  He also submitted that they had no intention  to
go to Dubai and to attend weapons training at  Islamabad.   Their  main  aim
was to secure some job at Dubai.  He  also  pointed  out  that  though  they
participated in the smuggling activities of the Tiger Memon group, they  had
no intention to involve in the terrorist act as claimed by the  prosecution.
 According to the counsel, though the prosecution has relied  on  their  own
confessional statements inasmuch as all of them have  retracted  from  their
statements, there is no need to give importance to  those  confessions.   He
also prayed that considering their poverty and also  that  at  the  relevant
time they were in search  of  some  job  for  their  livelihood,  the  death
sentence imposed by the Special Court is not warranted.  On the other  hand,
learned  senior  counsel  for  the  CBI,  after  taking  us  through   their
confessional statements, confessional statements of  other  co-accused,  the
evidence of PW-2 (Approver), eye-witnesses and recoveries  as  well  as  the
loss of lives and damage to properties submitted that the Special Court  was
justified in awarding capital punishment.
Conspiracy:
257)   The  appellants  have  attended   several   conspiratorial   meetings
including the meeting at the residence of Babloo  (AA)  where  targets  were
selected and at the Al-Hussaini  building  where  RDX  and  other  explosive
materials were filled up in vehicles and suitcases in pursuance of the  said
terrorist act.  The participation of the appellants (A-32,  A-36  and  A-39)
in these meetings  is  a  physical  manifestation  of  the  agreement.   The
agreement to commit an illegal act  can  also  be  inferred  from  the  acts
committed  by  the  appellants,  viz.,  receiving  training   in   Pakistan,
participating in filling RDX in vehicles in the  intervening  night  between
11/12.03.1993 and throwing of hand grenades at  the  Fishermen’s  Colony  at
Mahim on 12.03.1993 causing death  of  3  persons  and  injuring  6  others.
The object behind the conspiracy is the ultimate aim of the  conspiracy  and
many means may be adopted to achieve this ultimate object.   The  means  may
even constitute different offences by themselves, but as long  as  they  are
adopted to achieve the ultimate object of  the  conspiracy,  they  are  also
acts of conspiracy.  Since we have elaborately discussed the issue  relating
to conspiracy in the earlier part of our  judgment,  there  is  no  need  to
refer to the same once again.





Confessional Statements:

Confessional Statement of Zakir Hussain Noor Mohd. Shaikh (A-32)

258)  Confessional statement of A-32 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (11:25 hrs.) and  19.05.1993  (17:30  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  his
confession, he made the following assertions:
(i)   He knew Javed Chikna (AA) ‘very well’.
(ii)  He travelled to Dubai on 11.02.1993 along with  other  co-accused  and
      they were received by Ayub Memon (AA),  brother  of  Tiger  Memon,  at
      Dubai Airport.
(iii) He met Tiger Memon at a flat in Dubai and did not protest when he  was
      told by Javed Chikna that he had come for training  in  handling  arms
      and making bombs.
(iv)  He left for Islamabad from Dubai by a Pakistan International  Airlines
      flight.
(v)   They were taken out of the Islamabad Airport without any checking.
(vi)  He was renamed as ‘Shakir’ and other co-accused were also  given  fake
      names when they were in Pakistan.
(vii) Tiger Memon also joined them in training at Pakistan and  stayed  with
      them for two days.
(viii)      He was trained in  firing  AK-56  rifle,  preparation  of  bombs
      using RDX (black soap), using detonator and to throw hand grenades.
(ix)  After return from  Pakistan,  he  along  with  A-36,  A-39  and  other
      conspirators met in a flat where Tiger Memon brought a  copy  of  holy
      Quran and everyone including him, took oath to keep  the  training  in
      Pakistan a secret and that  after  reaching  Bombay  they  would  take
      revenge.  Tiger Memon also delivered a lecture on  communal  riots  in
      Bombay.
(x)   On 07.03.1993, he attended the meeting in the house of Babloo (AA)  in
      Bombay where Tiger Memon ordered them to cause riots.
(xi)  On 10.03.1993, after the meeting in the house of  Mobina  @  Bayamoosa
      Bhiwandiwala (A-96), he along with A-39 and other co-accused  went  to
      survey Bharat Petroleum Refinery as a prospective target for blasts.
(xii) On the same day, Tiger Memon told  them  to  throw  hand  grenades  at
      Fishermen’s colony at Mahim.
(xiii)      Each of the  appellants  (A-32,  A-36  &  A-39)  filled  RDX  in
      vehicles at the Al-Hussaini building on the night of 11.03.1993.
(xiv) On 12.03.1993, at 2:30 p.m., A-32, A-36 and A-39 along with Bashir (A-
      13),  Mahmood,  Salim  Dandekar  and  Moin  (A-43)  left   Al-Hussaini
      building; thereafter, they all  threw  hand  grenades  at  Fishermen’s
      Colony at Mahim.  He threw two  hand  grenades  and  saw  many  people
      getting injured.
Reference to A-36 and A-39
(i)   A-36 and A-39 joined the training camp in Pakistan.
(ii)  A-36 and A-39 also took oath on holy Quran  to  keep  the  fact  about
      receiving training in Pakistan a secret  and  to  take  revenge  after
      their return to Bombay.
(iii) A-36 and A-39 participated in filling RDX at Al-Hussaini Building  and
      in throwing hand grenades at Fishermen’s Colony at Mahim.
Confessional Statement of Abdul Khan Akhtar @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36)

      Confessional statement of A-36 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.05.1993 (17:40 hrs.) and  21.05.1993  (18:20  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishno (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  his
confession, he made the following assertions:-
(i)   He knew Shahnawaz Qureshi (A-29) very well and also knew that  he  was
      a well-known criminal.
(ii)  He went to Dubai in February, 1993  along  with  Shehnawaz  and  Irfan
      Chougule (AA) and met Gullu @ Gul Mohd. (A-77) at Dubai Airport.  They
      were received by Ayub Memon (AA),  brother  of  Tiger  Memon,  at  the
      Airport.
(iii) He met Tiger Memon at Dubai, and  thereafter,  left  for  Pakistan  to
      receive training in use of arms and explosives.
(iv)  He along with A-32 were  given  training  in  handling  AK-56  rifles,
      pistols, detonators, safety fuse, hand grenades, rocket launchers, use
      of RDX in making bombs and petrol bombs.
(v)   After return from Pakistan, he along with other co-accused  took  oath
      on holy Quran to keep the training in Pakistan a secret  and  to  wage
      ‘Jehad’.
(vi)  In the intervening night  between  11/12.03.1993,  he  and  other  co-
      accused, filled RDX in vehicles at the Al-Hussaini building.
(vii) On 12.03.1993, he along with A-32, A-39, Bashir (A-13),  Moin  (A-43),
      Mehmud and Salim drove to Fishermen’s colony at Mahim and  threw  hand
      grenades.
Reference to A-32 and A-39
(i)   A-32 and A-39 took training in Pakistan
(ii)  A-32 and A-39 took oath on holy Quran to wage Jehad in Bombay.
(iii) A-32 and A-39 threw hand grenades at Fishermen’s colony at Mahim.
Confessional Statement of Feroz @ Akram Amani Malik  (A-39)

      Confessional statement of A-39 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (22:30 hrs.) and 23.04.1993 (20:50 hrs.) by Mr.  P.D.
Pawar  (PW-185),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  V,  Bombay.   In  his  confessional
statement, he made the following assertions:-
 (i)  He deposed that he was the brother-in-law of  co-accused  Fazal  Abdul
      Rehman (A-76).  He left for Dubai on 08.02.1993 along with Niyaz Mohd.
      @ Aslam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98).
(ii)  He and other co-accused were received by Ayub Memon (AA),  brother  of
      Tiger Memon, at Dubai Airport.  He also met Nasim  Ashraf  Shaikh  Ali
      Barmare (A-49) at Dubai.
(iii) He left for Pakistan from Dubai in a PIA flight along with  other  co-
      accused where a person took them out of the Islamabad Airport  without
      any immigration check.
(iv)  He was  renamed  as  ‘Akram’  in  Pakistan  and  he  received  weapons
      training along with others where they were trained  to  assemble  guns
      and throw bombs.
(v)   Tiger Memon attended training in  Pakistan  and  told  the  co-accused
      that they have to blast bombs at Bombay.
(vi)  When they returned to Dubai, he and  other  co-accused  took  oath  on
      holy Quran to keep the training in Pakistan a secret.
(vii) On 10.03.1993, he along with PW-2 went in a car to  Shiv  Sena  Bhawan
      and a petrol pump nearby to survey the prospective targets.   He  also
      went to Chembur Refinery along with PW-2 to survey the target.
(viii)      On 12.03.1993, he along with A-32, A-36, Bashir (A-13) Moin, (A-
      43), Salim and Mahmud threw hand grenades at the Fishermen’s Colony at
      Mahim.
Reference to A-32 and A-36
(i)   A-32 and A-36 joined A-39 for training in Pakistan.
(ii)  A-39 went along with A-32 to survey the Chembur Refinery.
(iii) A-32 and A-36 also threw hand grenades at the  Fishermen’s  Colony  at
Mahim.
259)  On perusal of the confessional statements made by the  appellants,  it
is established that the appellants:
   (a)            attended training camp in Pakistan;
   (b)            took oath on holy Quran to do Jehad;
   (c)      attended meetings at the residence of Babloo  (AA)  and  Mobina;
           and
   (d)      threw hand grenades at Fishermen’s Colony at Mahim.
260)  It is also clear that the  confessions  made  by  the  appellants  are
truthful and voluntary and were made without any coercion.   All  safeguards
enumerated under Section 15 of TADA and the  rules  framed  thereunder  have
been duly complied with while recording the confessions of the appellants.
Retraction Statements
261)  It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that  the  above
mentioned  confessions  should  not  be  relied   upon   since   they   were
subsequently retracted by A-32 and A-39 and the denial of the  voluntariness
of the confessional  statement  made  by  A-36  has  been  recorded  by  the
Designated Court in the statement under Section 313 of  the  Code.   In  the
instant case, it was brought to our notice that retractions  were  not  made
at the first available opportunity by the accused  persons.   After  arrest,
the accused persons were produced before the Court number of times  in  1993
and 1994.  While the confessions  were  recorded  in  April  and  May  1993,
retractions have been made only in May, 1994, i.e. after a gap  of  1  year.
Since we  have  elaborately  discussed  the  contention  raised  by  learned
counsel with regard to the same in the main appeal,  there  is  no  need  to
refer the same once again.
Confessional Statements of co-accused:
Confessional Statement of Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13)

262)  Confessional statement of A-13 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (10:30 hrs.) and  18.05.1993  (17:15  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The
prosecution submits that the confession of A-13 is pertinent  since  he  was
one of the co-accused who accompanied  the  appellants  to  the  Fishermen’s
colony at Mahim on 12.03.1993.  His confession corroborates the  confessions
of the appellants in material aspects.
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 attended a conspiratorial meeting on 10.03.1993 at the  residence
      of Mobina.
(ii)  On 11.03.1993, at 11.00 p.m., A-32 took him  to  the  house  of  Tiger
      Memon at the Al-Hussaini building.
(iii) He along with A-32, A-39, A-36,  Saleem,  Mehmood  and  Moin  went  to
      throw hand grenades at Mahim Slope Cause-way on 12.03.1993.
Reference to A-36
(i)   A-36 actively participated in preparation of vehicle  bombs  by  using
      RDX at Al-Hussaini Building compound in the intervening night  between
      11/12.03.1993.
(ii)  In  the  morning  of  12.03.1993,  A-36  was  present  at  Al-Hussaini
      building to execute his job of throwing hand grenades as  assigned  by
      Tiger Memon.
(iii) He along with A-36, A-32, A-39, Saleem Dandekar and  Mehmood  went  to
      Mahim Slope Cause-way and threw hand grenades at hutments.


Reference to A-39
      He along with A-39, A-32, A-36, Saleem, Mehmood and  Moin  threw  hand
grenades at Mahim Slope way.

Confessional Statement of Mohd. Farooq Mohd. Yusuf Pawale  (A-16)

      Confessional statement of A-16 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (16:30 hrs.) and 22.05.1993 (16:45  hrs.)  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the then  DCP,  Zone-VIII,  Bombay.   In  his  confessional
statement, he made the following assertions with regard to the  appellants:-

Reference to A-32
      A-32 attended training in handling arms and explosives in Pakistan.
Reference to A-39
      He attended the meeting held by Tiger Memon  on  07.03.1993  in  which
Tiger informed that he was going to cause riots in Bombay.




Confessional Statement of Mohd. Iqbal Mohd. Yusuf Shaikh (A-23)

      Confessional statement of A-23 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (10:00 hrs.) and  22.05.1993  (10:00  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  He  made  the
following assertions:-
(i)   In the  intervening  night  between  11/12.03.1993,  A-32  filled  the
      vehicles with RDX along with other co-accused at Al-Hussaini building.


(ii)  On 12.03.1993, A-36 filled the vehicles with RDX along with other  co-
      accused at Al-Hussaini building.

Confessional Statement of Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29)

      Confessional statement of A-29 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.05.1993 (18:30 hrs.) and  21.05.1993  (14:45  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  his
confessional statement, he made the following assertions with regard to  the
appellants:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 was present in the training camp in Pakistan when he  and  others
      reached there.
(ii)  A-32 was present at Al-Hussaini Building in the flat  of  Tiger  Memon
      along with Tiger, Shafi, Anwar,  Bashir  Muchhad,  Nasim,  Parvez  and
      Sardar Khan.
(iii) A-32 received Rs.5,000/- from Tiger Memon
Reference to A-36
(i)   A-36 was present in the training camp in Pakistan when he  and  others
      reached there.
(ii)   A-36  received  training  in  handling  of  arms  and  explosives  in
      Pakistan.
(iii) A-36 returned from Dubai  along  with  him,  Feroz,  Zakir  and  Mohd.
      Rafiq.
(iv)  A-36 was present at Al-Hussaini Building  compound  on  the  night  of
      11.03.1993 along with Tiger,  Shafi,  Anwar,  Bashir  Muchhad,  Nasim,
      Parvez, Zakir and Sardar Khan where vehicle bombs were prepared.
(v)   On 12.03.1993, at about 12:30 noon, A-36 was present in  the  flat  of
      Tiger Memon at Al-Hussaini Building along with  Javed  Chikna,  Bashir
      Muchhad, Bashir Mahimwala, Shafi, Usman,  Salim  Dandekar,  Anwar  and
      Zakir.
(vi)  A-36 received Rs.5,000/- from Tiger Memon.
Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 was present in the training camp in Pakistan when he  and  others
      reached there.
(ii)  A-39 returned from Dubai along with him and A-29 Zakir, Abdul,  Akhtar
      and Mohd. Rafiq.

Confessional Statement of Nasim Ashraf Sherali Barmare (A-49)

      Confessional statement of A-49 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (09:30 hrs.)  and  18.05.1993  by  Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.   He  made  the  following
assertions:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 participated in the weapons training in Pakistan.
(ii)   A-32 was present at  the  Al-Hussaini  building  in  the  morning  of
      12.03.1993.


Reference to A-36
(i)   A-36 participated in the  training  in  Pakistan  and  after  training
      returned to India via Dubai.
(ii)  A-36 was involved in filling of RDX in the vehicles on  the  night  of
      11.03.1993.
Reference to A-39
      A-39 also received weapons training in Pakistan.

Confessional Statement of Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52)
      Confessional statement of A-52 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 and 18.04.1993 by Mr. P.D. Pawar (PW-185),  the  then
DCP, Zone V, Bombay.  He made the following assertions:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   On 11.02.1993, A-32 along with other co-accused  persons  left  Bombay
      and reached Dubai.
(ii)  On 12.02.1993, A-32 along with others stayed in  a  building  opposite
      to the Hotel Al-Khaleez in Dubai where Tiger Memon met them.
(iii) On 13.02.1993, A-32 along with other co-accused attended  the  meeting
      in the same building in which Javed  Chikna  and  Tiger  Memon  talked
      about the communal riots in Bombay and Gujarat.
(iv)  On 14.02.1993,  A-32  along  with  other  co-accused  left  Dubai  and
      reached Islamabad where they were  taken  to  the  training  camp  for
      training in  firing  arms,  handling  LMG  rifles,  throwing  of  hand
      grenades, use of RDX, detonators and timer pencils.
(v)   On  11.03.1993,  A-32  was  seen  at  the  residence  of  Tiger  Memon
      assisting in loading of vehicles with RDX for causing bomb blasts.
(vi)  On 12.03.1993, he along with other  persons  boarded  the  Maruti  Car
      driven by him (A-32) in which 30 hand grenades were kept and they took
      it to the Mahim Slopeway, Koliwada where he along  with  others  threw
      hand grenades at Fishermen’s Colony causing blasts.



Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 was present in the training camp  in  Pakistan  where  they  were
      imparted training in use of arms and explosives.
(ii)  On  11.03.1993,  A-39  (referred  to  as  ‘Akram’)  was  seen  at  the
      residence of Tiger Memon at the Al-Hussaini building along with  other
      accused persons where vehicles were being loaded with RDX.
(iii) A-39 along with other conspirators boarded the  Maruti  Car  to  Mahim
      Slopeway, Koliwada and threw hand grenades.  After that, he took  over
      the bag of remaining hand grenades and the pistol given to him earlier
      and left the vehicle near Bandra Reclamation.
Confessional Statement of Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57)
      Confessional statement of A-57 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (12:00 hrs.) by Shri Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  He made the following assertions:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 took out rifles from the sack and cleaned them.
(ii)  A-32  carried  food  for  other  co-conspirators  at  the  Al-Hussaini
      building.
Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 was a member of the meeting addressed by Tiger  Memon,  where  he
      was asked to take revenge against the killings of  Muslims  in  Bombay
      and Surat.
(ii)  He along with others were paid Rs.5,000/- by Tiger Memon in  the  said
      meeting.

Confessional Statement of Nasir Abdul Kadar Kewal @ Nasir Dhakla (A-64)

      Confessional statement of A-64 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 22.01.1995  and  24.01.1995  by  HC  Singh  (PW-474),  the  then
Superintendent of Police, CBI/SPE/STF, New Delhi.  A-64 made  the  following
assertions:
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 was present at Dubai when A-64 and others reached there.
(ii)  A-32 attended conspiratorial meetings at Dubai.
(iii) A-32 received training in use of arms and explosives in Pakistan.
Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 went to Pakistan by a PIA Flight and received training.
(ii)  A-39 attended a conspiratorial meeting on 10.03.1993 at the  residence
      of Mobina.
(iii) A-39, along with other co-accused,  on  being  asked  by  Tiger  Memon
      whether they were prepared, replied in the affirmative.
(iv)  A-39 actively participated in preparation of vehicle bombs at the  Al-
      Hussaini Building on the night of 11.03.1993 by using  RDX  which  had
      landed at Shekhadi.

Confessional Statement of Mohd. Rafiq Usman Shaikh    (A-94)

      Confessional statement of A-94 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 14.05.1993 (18:30) and 16.05.1993 by Shri  Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi
(PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   He  made   the   following
assertions:-

Reference to A-32
      On 10.03.1993, A-32 accompanied with Niaz @ Aslam,  Usman  (PW-2)  and
Feroz (A-39) went to meet Tiger Memon in a white Maruti Car  to  a  building
behind Bhabha Hospital.  In the said  meeting,  Tiger  enquired  as  to  who
knows driving etc. In the said meeting, he also  distributed  Rs.5,000/-  to
each one of them.
Reference to A-36
      A-36 received training in arms in Pakistan.  Training was  also  given
in  handling  of  pistols,  rifles,  hand  grenades,  rocket  launchers  and
preparation of RDX bombs.
Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 received training in arms in Pakistan.  Training was  also  given
      in handling of pistols, rifles, hand grenades,  rocket  launchers  and
      making of RDX bombs.
(ii)  On 10.03.1993, A-39 along with Nasim @ Aslam, Usman, Rafiq  and  Zakir
      went to meet Tiger Memon in a white Maruti Car to  a  building  behind
      Bhabha Hospital where Tiger enquired as to who knows driving etc.   In
      the said meeting, Tiger also distributed Rs. 5,000/- to  each  one  of
      them.
Confessional Statement of Niyaz Mohd. @ Aslam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98)

      Confessional statement of A-98 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 17.05.1993 (14:30 hrs.) and  20.05.1993  (11:30  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  He  made  the
following assertions:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 received training in handling of  different  types  of  arms  and
      ammunitions, hand grenades and making of bombs by using RDX.
(ii)  On 01.03.1993, after all others  also  reached  Dubai,  A-32,  at  the
      instance of Tiger Memon, took oath after placing  his  hands  on  holy
      Quran.  He also heard about the speech given by  Tiger  regarding  the
      riots in Bombay.



Reference to A-36
(i)   A-36 received training in handling of  different  types  of  arms  and
      ammunitions, hand grenades and making of bombs by using RDX.
(ii)  On 01.03.1993, A-36 along with other conspirators, at the instance  of
      Tiger Memon, took oath in Dubai after placing his hands on holy Quran.
       A-36 also heard about the speech given by Tiger regarding  the  riots
      in Bombay.
Reference to A-39
(i)   On 08.02.1993, A-39 along with  Niyaz  proceeded  to  Dubai.   At  the
      airport, he was received by Ayub Memon and stayed with Tahir.
(ii)  A-39 received training in handling of  different  types  of  arms  and
      ammunitions, hand grenades and making of bombs by using  RDX.   During
      training, his assumed name was ‘Akram’.
(iii) On 01.03.1993, after all others  also  reached  Dubai,  A-39,  at  the
      instance of Tiger, took oath after placing his  hands  on  Quran.   He
      also heard about the speech given by  Tiger  regarding  the  riots  in
      Bombay.
Confessional Statement of Mohd. Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100)

      Confessional statement of A-100 under Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 (23:30 hrs.) and 17.04.1993 (17:00  hrs.)  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW 492), the then DCP, Zone-VIII, Bombay.   He  made  the  following
assertions:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   A-32 participated in the training of  fire  arms  and  ammunitions  in
      Pakistan along with his associates during February, 1993.
(ii)  On 02.03.1993, A-32 came back to Dubai, where  Tiger  Memon  gave  200
      Dirhams to each one of them and administered oath  on  Quran  to  take
      revenge against Hindus  for  demolition  of  Babri  Masjid  and  their
      tyranny perpetrated on them.
(iii) A-32 was present at  the  residence  of  Tiger  Memon  at  Al-Hussaini
      building on the night of 11.03.1993 along with other co-accused.


Reference to A-39
      A-39 participated in the training of  fire  arms  and  ammunitions  at
Islamabad, Pakistan along with his associates during Feb. 1993.
263)  A perusal of the confessional statements  of  all  the  above  accused
viz., A-13, A-23, A-29,  A-49,  A-52,  A-57,  A-64,  A-94,  A-98  and  A-100
clearly establish the fact that the appellants i.e.,  A-32,  A-36  and  A-39
were present at Al-Hussaini Building in the night intervening  11/12.03.1993
and actively participated in filling of RDX  in  the  cavities  of  vehicles
which were later planted at various targets in  Bombay  causing  irreparable
damage to life and property.  It is also sufficiently established that  they
went to Pakistan via Dubai and received training in  handling  of  arms  and
ammunitions at the hands of Tiger Memon and all of them also  took  oath  on
holy Quran to take revenge for the riots in Bombay and to keep the  training
in Pakistan a secret.  It is also sufficiently proved that in  pursuance  of
the said conspiracy, all  the  appellants  herein  threw  hand  grenades  in
Fishermen’s Colony at Mahim on 12.03.1993 causing death  of  3  persons  and
injuring 6 others.
Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Deposition of Mohammed Usman Ahmed Zan Khan (PW-2) (Approver)
264)  PW-2 deposed as under:-
Reference to A-32
(i)   He knew A-32 as ‘Zakir’ and identified him in the court.
(ii)   He  accompanied  A-32  and  other  co-accused  persons  to  Dubai  in
      February, 1993.
(iii) Ayub Memon (AA), brother  of  Tiger  Memon,  received  them  at  Dubai
      Airport and Tiger Memon also visited them at Dubai.
(iv)  In Dubai, A-32 informed PW-2 and other co-accused persons  that  Tiger
      Memon had asked them to  come  to  Dubai  Airport.   All  the  accused
      persons, including A-32, then boarded a flight to Islamabad, Pakistan.


(v)   On reaching Islamabad, all the accused persons  including  A-32,  were
      taken out of the Airport without any immigration check.
(vi)  In Pakistan, all of them received  training  in  use  of  RDX,  pencil
      detonators, guns and hand grenades.
(vii) On return to Dubai, all the accused persons met at a flat where  Tiger
      Memon  was  also  present.   In  this  conspiratorial  meeting,   they
      discussed about the riots in Bombay and took oath  on  holy  Quran  to
      take revenge and not  to  disclose  the  secret  of  the  training  in
      Pakistan to anyone.
(viii)      On 08.03.1993, several accused persons  including  A-32  met  at
      the residence of Babloo (AA) where  targets  were  selected  by  Tiger
      Memon.
(ix)  A-32 attended another meeting on 10.03.1993 at  Bandra  where  he  met
      Tiger Memon and other co-accused and they discussed about the  targets
      and A-32 gave his report on Chembur Refinery.
(x)   PW-2  along  with  A-32  conducted  the  survey  of  Bharat  Petroleum
      Refinery as a possible target of blasts.
Reference to A-36
(i)   A-36 also joined training in Pakistan.
(ii)  A-36 attended the meeting at the Al-Hussaini  building  on  11.03.1993
      where targets were discussed.
(iii) A-36 received four hand grenades from Javed Chikna (AA) on  12.03.1993
      and was instructed to throw the same at Fishermen’s colony at Mahim.
Reference to A-39
(i)   A-39 joined training in Pakistan
(ii)  In Dubai, A-39 also took oath on  holy  Quran  along  with  other  co-
      accused at the instance  of  Tiger  Memon  to  keep  the  training  in
      Pakistan a secret.
(iii) A-39 was present in the  meeting  at  Shakeel’s  place  on  07.03.1993
      where Tiger Memon discussed about targets.
(iv)  On 11.03.1993, A-39  along  with  other  co-accused  persons  went  to
      survey Bharat Refinery as a prospective target.
265)  A perusal of the deposition of  PW-2  clearly  establishes  and  fully
corroborates the confessions of the appellants in all  material  particulars
that the appellants played an active  and  crucial  role  in  achieving  the
object of the conspiracy.   It  further  corroborates  the  fact  that  they
traveled  to  Pakistan  and  received  training  in  handling  of  arms  and
ammunitions, explosive substances  and  throwing  of  hand  grenades.   They
attended meetings at Dubai and in India and also took oath on holy Quran  to
take revenge.  They participated in filling RDX in vehicles which were  used
to cause explosions at targets and hurled hand grenades at  innocent  people
in Fishermen’s colony at Mahim, on 12.03.1993.
Deposition of Laxman Patil (PW-5)
      PW-5 is a resident of the Fishermen’s Colony and is an eye-witness  to
the incident.  He witnessed the incident while he was waiting on the road.
(i)   He identified A-52, A-32, A-36, A-13 and A-43 in court.
(ii)   He  participated  in  the  identification  parade  dated   15.05.1993
      conducted at Mahim Police Station by Special Executive Magistrate (PW-
      469).
(iii) He also identified the  car  bearing  No.  MP-13-D-385  in  which  the
      appellants came to Mahim slopeway in order to throw hand grenades.
Deposition of Santosh Patil (PW-6)
      PW-6 deposed as follows:
(i)   He is a resident of Fishermen’s Colony at  Mahim.   He  witnessed  the
      said incident while he was waiting  near  Municipal  School  at  Mahim
      Slope.
(ii)  He deposed that the appellants came  in  a  Maruti  Van  to  the  said
      Colony and the number of the said vehicle was MP 385.
(iii)  He  identified  A-52,  A-32,  A-36,  A-13,  A-43  and  A-39  in   the
      Identification Parade conducted in the Court on 20.09.1995.
(iv)  He also identified A-32, A-36 and A-39 in  the  identification  parade
      dated  15.05.1993  conducted  at  Mahim  Police  Station  by   Special
      Executive Magistrate, PW-469.
Deposition of Shashikant Shetty (PW 13)
      PW-13 is an eye-witness and a resident of Mahim Fishermens’ Colony. He
deposed as under:-
(i)   He came out of his house after hearing the sound of explosion.
(ii)  He identified A-52, A-32, A-36, A-39, A-13 and A-43 in Court.
(iii)  He  participated  in  the  identification  parade  dated  15.05.1993,
      conducted at Mahim police station by Special Executive Magistrate  PW-
      469.
(iv)  He identified the Maruti Van in which  the  accused  persons  came  to
      Fishermen’s Colony as MP-D-13-385.
(v)    PW-13  lodged  the  First  Information  Report  in  respect  of   the
      explosions at Fishermen’s Colony.
266)  From the depositions of  PWs-5,  6  and  13,  the  eye-witnesses,  the
identification of the appellants as those persons who  threw  hand  grenades
towards Fishermen’s Colony at Mahim  on  12.03.1993  has  been  established.
They also identified the Maruti Van bearing No. MP-D-13-385 as  the  vehicle
in which the appellants came  to  the  place  of  incident  and  fled  away.
Depositions of the said witnesses fully establish the charge in  respect  of
the incident at Fishermen’s colony against the appellants.
Investigation, Recoveries and FSL Report:
267)  On 12.03.1993, Shantaram  Gangaram  Hire  (PW-562),   Police  Officer,
visited the blast site i.e., Fishermen’s colony at Mahim and  prepared  spot
panchnama (Exh. 1942) in the presence  of  panch  witnesses  Dayaram  Timbak
Akare and Mahendra Sadanand Mehre.      PW 562, in the  presence  of  Tamore
(PW-330) and experts  collected  the  articles  from  the  blast  site  vide
Panchnama Exh. No. 1221 which were sent to the Forensic  Science  Laboratory
(“FSL”) for opinion.  The  FSL  Report  Exh.  1943  proved  remnants  to  be
explosives and part of hand grenades.
Evidence with regard to injured victims and deceased:
268)  It is seen from the records that in July, 1993, Achyut  Shamrao  Pawal
(PW-542),  Police  Inspector,  collected  the  injury  certificates  of  the
following injured  persons,  namely,  Mr.  Gurudutt  Agaskar,  Ms.  Rajashri
Agaskar and Ms. Sheetal Kenihas from Bhaba Hospital which amply  prove  that
they sustained injuries during the blast.  Injured  Shashikant  Shetty  (PW-
13) and Sheetal Keni (PW-412) also proved to have sustained injuries  during
the blast.  Dr. Wadekar (PW-641) and Dr. Krishna  Kumar  (PW-640)  were  the
doctors who have proved the injury certificates issued to PW-13 and  Sheetal
Keni (PW-412) which are Exh. Nos. 2374 and 2372 respectively.
269)  Gajanan Tare  (PW-413)  (husband  of  the  deceased  Gulab  Tare)  and
Karande (PW-414) (nephew of the deceased Hira Dhondu  Sawant)  claimants  of
two bodies, have proved the death of Mrs. Gulab Tare (wife  of  PW-413)  and
Smt. Hira Dhondu Sawant (PW 414’s aunt) in the said  incident.   Dr.  Pujari
(PW-482) and Gangadhar Uppe (PW-480) have established the cause of death  to
be the injuries received on 12.03.1993.  Achyut Shamrao Pawal (PW-542)  also
proved the death of 3 persons at Fishermen’s Colony in the said incident.
Vehicle used for committing the act:
270)  The prosecution has brought to our notice that  the  vehicle  used  by
the appellants for traveling to Fishermen’s Colony was  purchased  by  Shafi
(AA) which has been proved through the following witnesses:
Deposition of Kailash Govind Rao Baheti (PW 342)
      He deposed as follows:-
       “On 18.01.1993 I had received a telephone call given by Shakil Hasham
      from Bombay.  Shakil requested me to book one red coloured Maruti  Van
      in the name of Asif Darvesh resident of M.G. Road, Indore and  another
      new Maruti Van of blue colour in the name of Shri Kasam Ahmed residing
      at Indira Nagar, Ujjain.  He also requested me to  register  both  the
      Maruti Van at Indore and send the same to Bombay.   He  also  told  me
      that the payments of the same would be made at Bombay to  the  driver.
      I  quoted  a  price  of  Rs.1,69,000/-  per   vehicle   inclusive   of
      registration and transport charges.  I was having red coloured  Maruti
      Van brought by me from M/s Bhatia & Company, Gurgaon, Haryana and blue
      coloured Maruti Van brought from Vipul Motors, Faridabad, Haryana,  in
      my stock.  I had brought both the  said  vehicles  by  making  advance
      payment.  After receipt of booking from Shakil Hasham for red and blue
      coloured brand  new  Maruti  Vans,  I  informed  the  details  of  the
      purchasers to M/s Bhatia Company and M/s Vipul Motors.  After  receipt
      of the said letters and bills from both the said companies in the name
      of purchasers who wanted red and blue Maruti Vans  I  sent  papers  of
      both the Vans for registration to RTO.  The blue coloured  Maruti  Van
      was registered in the name of Kasam Ahmed at  Ujjain  RTO.   The  blue
      coloured Maruti Van could not be registered at Indore due to lack of E-
      Form necessary for registration.  Thereafter, I  sent  both  the  said
      Vans to Bombay to Shakil Hasham.  Shakil Hasham received the  delivery
      and paid Rs.3,38,000/- to my drivers.  My drivers gave the said amount
      to me.  I made the necessary entries in my office record  for  sending
      the said Vans to Bombay to Shakil Hasham after purchasing the same for
      the parties told by him.   The  RTO  Authority  at  Ujjain  had  given
      registration Number MP-13-D-0385 to “blue coloured Maruti Van.   Today
      I am not remembering the engine number and chassis number of the  said
      Maruti Van.””

Depostion of Shakeel Suleman Hasham (PW-366)
      He deposed that he had asked PW-342 to arrange  for  two  Maruti  Vans
(red and blue) in February, 1993.  Both the vans were  purchased  in  Madhya
Pradesh  and  the  blue  Maruti  Van  was  registered  in  Ujjain  with  the
registration number MP-13-D-0385.  It is submitted that this number and  the
said blue Maruti Van has been  identified  by  PWs-5,  6  and  13  in  their
depositions as the vehicle which  was  involved  in  the  said  incident  at
Fishermen’s Colony.  PW 366 further deposed:
      “In the same month (February, 1993) I had also arranged for  one  blue
      coloured and another red  coloured  Maruti  Vans  also  registered  at
      Madhya  Pradesh  for  Suleman  Lakdawala.   The  said  vehicles   were
      registered at Madhya Pradesh, Indore, in the name  of  the  purchasers
      given  to  me  by  Suleman  Lakdawala.   I  had  given  the  work   of
      registration to one Kailash Baheti of Indore.  Both the said vans were
      insured by Insurance Agent Rakesh Tiwari before  giving  the  same  to
      Suleman Lakdawala.  Both the said vehicles had arrived from Indore.  I
      had sent the same to the petrol pump of Suleman and asked him to  take
      the delivery from the said drivers who had brought the delivery of the
      said vehicles.  Accordingly, he took the delivery by making payment to
      the drivers.”

The said vehicles were insured through Vijay A. Tamore (PW-338).
Evidence of travel to Dubai for training in Pakistan:
271)  The Immigration Officer, Asmita Ashish  Bhosale  (PW-215)  proved  the
Embarkation card (‘X’-314’) that was  submitted  at  the  Sahar  Airport  on
11.02.1993 by A-32 who  was  flying  to  Dubai.   The  Immigration  Officer,
Vishambhar Yadavrao Mitke (PW-212) proved the Disembarkation card  given  by
A-32 at the time of arrival  in  Bombay  from  Dubai  on  03.03.1993.    The
depositions of PWs-215 and 212 establish that A-32 left India on  11.02.1993
for  Dubai  and  returned  on   03.03.1993.    These   depositions   further
corroborate the confessional  statement  of  A-32  wherein  he  admitted  to
flying to Dubai on 11.02.1993 and returned on 03.03.1993.
272)  The Immigration Officer, Chandrakant Gangaram Sawant  (PW-244)  proved
the Disembarkation card given to him by A-39  while  flying  to  Dubai  from
Bombay on 08.02.1993.   It  is  submitted  that  the  deposition  of  PW-244
corroborates the confessional statement of A-39 wherein he  stated  that  he
left for Dubai on 08.02.1993 from Bombay.
273) The Immigration Officer, Ajay Krishnaji  Lonaare  (PW-209)  proved  the
Disembarkation card (‘X-306’) submitted by A-36 at the time of  his  arrival
from Dubai to Bombay on 03.03.1993.  This  deposition  further  corroborates
the confessional statement of A-36 wherein he stated that he  returned  from
Dubai on 03.03.1993.
274)   The  evidence  on   record,   particularly,   as   discussed   above,
sufficiently establish that each of the appellants, namely, A-32,  A-36  and
A-39 were actively involved in the conspiracy of causing  blasts  in  Bombay
in the following manner:
(i)   The appellants attended conspiratorial meeting at Dubai on  01.03.1993
      where they took oath on holy Quran to keep their training in  Pakistan
      a secret.
(ii)  On 08.03.1993, the appellants (A-32 and A-39) attended  conspiratorial
      meeting at Babloo’s residence.
(iii) On 10.03.1993, the appellant (A-32)  attended  conspiratorial  meeting
      at Mobina’s residence.
(iv)   On  11/12.03.1993,  the   appellants   (A-36   and   A-39)   attended
      conspiratorial meeting at the Al-Hussaini building.
(v)   The appellants received weapons training in Pakistan;
(vi)  On 11/12.03.1993, the appellants participated in  filling  of  RDX  in
      vehicles at the Al-Hussaini building and;
(vii)  On  12.03.1993,  the  appellants  threw  hand  grenades  towards  the
      Fishermen’s colony which resulted in death of 3 persons and injuring 6
      others.
275)  It is contended by Mr. Manish that the appellant  (A-32)  was  working
as a floor mechanic prior to 1992 December riots,  and  since  then  he  was
jobless and was lured to go to Dubai  as  it  attracts  a  large  number  of
Indian mechanics, plumbers, electricians, etc.  and  he  willingly  went  to
Dubai not knowing that he was to attend a training camp in Pakistan.  It  is
further contended that he was forced to go to Pakistan  since  his  passport
was taken from him in Dubai, and  accordingly,  he  had  no  choice  but  to
follow the instructions.  He thus did  not  willingly  participated  in  the
conspiracy but was forced to carry out conspiratorial acts.
276)  As against this argument, learned senior counsel for the  CBI  pointed
out that this line of defence has never been urged by the  appellant  before
the trial Court.  It  is  further  pointed  out  that  had  there  been  any
compulsion, the appellant could have opted out of the  conspiracy  upon  his
return from Dubai, which he did not do.  Further, on a holistic  reading  of
the entire body of evidence, it is clear that from the very  beginning,  the
appellants have willingly participated in the successful  execution  of  the
object of conspiracy.  The argument of coercion is a  belated  argument  and
necessarily a product of afterthought.  It is further  contended  on  behalf
of the appellant  (A-32)  that  the  reasons  for  his  involvement  in  the
conspiracy were (i)  money,  (ii)  provocation,  and  (iii)  riots.   It  is
further contended that there is no record anywhere that  someone  will  take
care of the family of the appellant (A-32) after  the  blasts.   In  such  a
situation, appellant  would  not  have  willingly  participated  in  such  a
conspiracy without having  thought  about  his  family.  In  reply,  learned
senior counsel for the CBI contended that he  was  fully  conscious  of  the
conspiratorial acts and  willingly  participated  in  the  conspiracy.   The
loss, if any, suffered by the appellant during the riots  does  not  justify
his terrorist act of killing innocent people.  The fact that  appellant  (A-
32) was fully conscious of his acts is further established from his  conduct
subsequent to the incident, wherein he  traveled  to  Karnataka  immediately
after the blasts in order to evade arrest.
277)   The  fact  that  appellant  (A-32)  was  actively  involved  in   the
conspiratorial acts is clear from his own confession wherein he  has  stated
that after their return to Dubai from Pakistan,  he  along  with  other  co-
conspirators took oath on holy Quran that they will  take  revenge  for  the
Bombay riots and will not disclose the training in Pakistan to anyone.
278)  All the aforesaid acts clearly establish the fact that the  appellants
knowingly and willingly participated in the  conspiratorial  acts  and  were
fully aware and conscious of the fact that  they  were  participating  in  a
conspiracy with a grave design.
279)  It is further contended by the counsel for the appellants that the Al-
Hussaini building is located in  a  densely  populated  area  within  a  few
hundred meters of Mahim Police Station and it is strange  that  neither  the
statement of the security guard was recorded nor any of the  neighbours  saw
anyone  filling  RDX  in  vehicles  in   the   intervening   night   between
11/12.03.1993.  Therefore, learned counsel  for  the  appellants  vehemently
contended that the prosecution story is fabricated and no  reliance  can  be
placed on it.  But it is amply clear  from  the  materials  on  record,  the
confessional statements of the appellants and other  co-accused,  deposition
of prosecution witnesses and the testimony of the Approver (PW-2)  that  RDX
was filled in vehicles which were  parked  in  the  garages  at  Al-Hussaini
building.  The aforesaid acts were the  result  of  a  conspiracy  and  were
carried out in a covert manner in the night at the Al Hussaini Building.
280)  It is further  contended  by  the  appellant  (A-32)  that  there  are
material inconsistencies between his confession and that of A-39  that  A-32
went to Mahim on 12.03.1993 in a blue Maruti car while A-39 stated  that  he
went in a white Maruti car to Mahim.  In  our  considered  view,  these  are
minor inconsistencies which do not go to the root of the matter  since  both
the abovesaid accused have admitted to have gone to  Mahim  on  the  fateful
day in a Maruti car.
281)  It is further contended by the counsel for the  appellants  that  PW-5
is not an independent  witness  but  is  an  interested  witness  since  his
brother-in-law and sister-in-law sustained injuries in the blast  at  Mahim.
In the light of the materials placed, we hold that the testimony of PW-5  is
convincing and even the credibility of the witness has not  been  shaken  in
the cross-examination.  The testimony of  Laxman  Patil  (PW-5)  is  further
corroborated by the testimony of Santosh Patil (PW-6).   A  perusal  of  all
the above materials clearly shows that the prosecution has  established  all
the charges and the Designated Court rightly convicted them for the same.

                    Criminal Appeal Nos. 628-629 of 2008


Mohammed Mushtaq Moosa Tarani (A-44)    …..  Appellant

                 vs.

State of Maharashtra,
Through STF, CBI Bombay                        ….. Respondent

                                  *********


282)  Mr. Priyadarshi Manish learned counsel appeared for the appellant  (A-
44) and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by  Mr.
Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr. Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for
the respondent
283)  The instant appeals are directed against the final judgment and  order
of conviction and sentence dated  27.09.2006  and  18.07.2007  respectively,
whereby the appellant has been convicted  and  sentenced  to  Death  by  the
Designated Court under TADA for the Bombay Bomb Blast Case,  Greater  Bombay
in BBC No. 1/1993.


Charges:
284)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators including the appellant (A-44).  The relevant  portion  of  the
said charge is reproduced hereunder:-
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”


      In addition to the above-said principal charge of conspiracy framed at
head firstly, the appellant (A-44) was also charged on  other  counts  which
are as under:

      At head secondly; The appellant (A-44) committed an offence punishable
      under Section 3(3) of TADA by committing following overt acts:
      a)    He attended a meeting with co-conspirators at Hotel  Taj  Mahal;
           and
      b)     He  surveyed  Stock  Exchange  Building  and  Bombay  Municipal
           Corporation Building, along with co-accused for the  purpose  of
           committing terrorist acts by planting bombs.

      At head  thirdly;  On  12.03.1993,  the  appellant  (A-44)  planted  a
      suitcase filled with RDX in Room No.3078 of Hotel Centaur,  Juhu  Tara
      Road, Mumbai, which exploded, causing injuries to  three  persons  and
      loss of property to the tune of Rs.2.1 crore,  thereby  committing  an
      offence punishable under Section 3(2)(ii) of TADA


      At head fourthly; The  appellant  (A-44),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion in Hotel Centaur, Juhu Tara  Road,  Mumbai,  which  resulted
      into injuries to three persons, committed an offence punishable  under
      Section 307 of IPC


      At head fifthly;  The  appellant  (A-44),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted into injuries to three persons, committed an
      offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC.


      At head sixthly;  The  appellant  (A-44),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted in damage of property,  by  using  explosive
      material, committed an offence punishable under Section 436 of IPC.


      At head seventhly; On 12.03.1993,  the  appellant  (A-44)  planted  an
      explosive laden scooter bearing No. MH-05-TC-16 at Shaikh Memon Street
      with an intent  to  cause  death  and  destruction  of  properties  by
      explosion and thereby committed an offence  punishable  under  Section
      3(3) of TADA.

      At head eighthly; The appellant  (A-44),  by  planting  the  aforesaid
      explosive laden scooter also committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 307 of IPC


      At head ninthly; The  appellant  (A-44),  by  planting  the  aforesaid
      explosive laden scooter with the knowledge that it was likely to cause
      damage to  the  properties,  committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 435 read with Section 511 of IPC.

      At head tenthly;       The appellant (A-44), by planting the aforesaid
      explosive laden scooter committed an offence punishable under  Section
      436 of IPC.


      At head eleventhly; The appellant (A-44), by  planting  the  aforesaid
      explosive laden suitcase in  Hotel  Centaur,  Juhu  Tara  Road,  which
      caused damage to the properties, committed an offence punishable under
      Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and;


      At head twelfthly; The appellant (A-44),  by  planting  the  aforesaid
      explosive laden suitcase  and  by  possessing  the  RDX  in  the  said
      suitcase unauthorisedly committed an offence punishable under  Section
      4(a)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

285)  The Designated Judge found the appellant guilty on all  the  aforesaid
charges.  The appellant has been convicted and sentenced for the above  said
charges as follows:

Conviction and Sentence:

(i)   The appellant (A-44) has been sentenced to death  under  Section  3(3)
of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and Section  120-B  of  IPC  read  with  the  offences
mentioned in the said charge. In addition, the appellant  was  also  ordered
to pay a fine of Rs. 25, 000/-. (charge firstly)
(ii)  He has been sentenced to RI for 12 years along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
50,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for one year for the  commission
of offence under Section 3(3) of TADA. (charge secondly)
(iii) He has been sentenced to RI for life along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-
, in default, to further undergo RI for  6  months  for  the  commission  of
offence under Section 3(2)(ii) of TADA. (charge thirdly)
(iv)  He has been sentenced to RI for life along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-
, in default, to further undergo RI for  6  months  for  the  commission  of
offence under Section 307 of IPC. (charge fourthly)
(v)   He has been sentenced to RI for 3 years for the commission of  offence
under Section 324 of IPC. (charge fifthly)
(vi)  He has been sentenced to RI for 10 years along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
1,00,000/-,  in  default,  to  further  undergo  RI  for  3  years  for  the
commission of offence under Section 436 of IPC. (charge sixthly)
(vii)       He has been sentenced to RI for life along with a  fine  of  Rs.
50,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 1 year  for  the  commission
of offence under Section 3(3) of TADA. (charge seventhly)
(viii)      He has been sentenced to RI for 10 years along with  a  fine  of
Rs. 50,000/-, in  default,  to  further  undergo  RI  for  1  year  for  the
commission of offence under Section 307 of IPC.         (charge eighthly)
(ix)  He has been sentenced to RI for 31/2 (three and a  half)  years  along
with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6  months
for the commission of offence under Sections  435  read  with  511  of  IPC.
(charge ninthly)
(x)   He has been sentenced to RI for 5 years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
12,500/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 3 months for the  commission
of offence under Section 436 read with Section 511 of IPC. (charge tenthly)
(xi)  He has been sentenced to RI for 7 years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.
25,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for  commission  of
offence under Section 3 of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908.  (charge
eleventhly)
(xii)       He has been sentenced to RI for 7 years along  with  a  fine  of
Rs. 25,000/-, in default, to further  undergo  RI  for  6  months,  for  the
commission of offence under Section 4(b) of the  Explosive  Substances  Act,
1908. (charge twelfthly)
Evidence
286)  The evidence against the appellant (A-44) is in the form of:-
(i)   his own confession;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses including eye witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence.
Conspiracy:
287)  As mentioned above, a common charge  of  conspiracy  has  been  framed
against all the accused persons and in order to bring home the  charge,  the
prosecution need not  necessarily  prove  that  the  perpetrators  expressly
agreed to do or cause to be done the  illegal  act,  the  agreement  may  be
proved by necessary  implication.   The  cumulative  effect  of  the  proved
circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt  of  the
accused  rather  than  adopting  an  isolated  approach  to  each   of   the
circumstances.  Since we have elaborately discussed the  issue  relating  to
conspiracy in the earlier part of our judgment, there is no  need  to  refer
the same once again.
Confessional Statement of the appellant - Mohammed Mushtaq Moosa Tarani  (A-
44)

288)  The prosecution pointed out the involvement of  the  appellant  (A-44)
in the  conspiratorial  acts  which  is  evident  from  his  own  confession
recorded under Section 15 of TADA on 26.05.1993 and 28.05.1993 at 18.30  hrs
by Shri K.L. Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said
confessional statement is summarized hereinbelow:
(i)   Since 1991, the appellant (A-44) had developed  good  friendship  with
      Tiger Memon and he knew that Tiger Memon was a notorious ‘goonda’.
(ii)  On 05.03.1993, the appellant (A-44), along with his friend Md.  Farooq
      Mohammed  Yusuf  Pawale  (A-16),  met  Tiger  Memon  and   other   co-
      conspirators at Taj Mahal Hotel where Tiger Memon told them that  they
      have to take revenge for the damage suffered  by  Muslims  during  the
      riots and called for their help.
(iii) Thereafter, the appellant and others, viz., A-16, PW-2,  Bashir  Ahmed
      Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13), Javed Chikna agreed to help Tiger  Memon.
      The appellant, along with Tiger Memon and others, went to  survey  the
      BMC building and the Stock Exchange building.
(iv)  On 06.03.1993, the appellant along with PW-2 and A-13 went  to  survey
      the BMC building, BJP and Shiv Sena office and also  showed  them  the
      entry and exit gates of the said buildings.
(v)   On the same day, after surveying the targets, the appellant  met  A-16
      and told him about what transpired during the day and about the  plans
      of Tiger Memon, on which, A-16 told the appellant not to worry and  do
      whatever has been directed by Tiger Memon.
(vi)  On 11.03.1993, the appellant reached Al-Hussaini building and  on  the
      instructions  of  Tiger  Memon  understood   his   job   from   Anwar.
      Thereafter, Anwar instructed the appellant to carry a suitcase  filled
      with RDX to Hotel Centaur, Juhu on 12.03.1993 and plant  the  same  in
      the reserved room.
(vii) On 12.03.1993, the appellant went  to  Anwar’s  house  and  thereafter
      both of them boarded a Maroon  coloured  car  driven  by  Asgar  Yusuf
      Mukadam (A-10).  Anwar took out pencil detonators from his pocket  and
      inserted them in the three suitcases filled with RDX.  Thereafter, the
      appellant was dropped by Anwar on the way and he (A-44)  took  a  taxi
      and reached Hotel Centaur.
(viii)      On reaching the hotel, the appellant kept the  bag  filled  with
      explosives in Room No. 3078 and came back to the Al-Hussaini  building
      where he informed Anwar that he had planted the bag containing bomb at
      Hotel Centaur, Juhu in Room No. 3078.
(ix)  On Anwar’s instructions, the appellant drove  a  scooter  filled  with
      RDX and parked the same at Zaveri Bazaar.
(x)   The appellant, thereafter, met A-16 and informed everything to him  on
      which A-16 told him that he should not worry and nothing would  happen
      as the appellant has done the job  for  their  community  and  ‘Allah’
      would help him.
289)  On perusal of the aforesaid confessional statement  of  the  appellant
(A-44), the following facts emerge:
(i)   The appellant was an old associate of Tiger Memon;
(ii)  The appellant was fully aware of Tiger Memon’s character and  that  he
      was a ‘goonda’;
(iii) The appellant had participated  in  the  conspiratorial  meeting  with
      Tiger and his co-conspirators;
(iv)  In the said meeting, the appellant agreed to help the Tiger  Memon  in
      the object of the conspiracy; and
(v)   Pursuant to the said agreement, the appellant performed several  acts,
      namely, reconnaissance of targets, planting of suitcase laden with RDX
      and scooter bomb at the targets.
290)  The confession of the appellant (A-44) establishes the charges  framed
against him in the trial.  The fact  that  the  appellant  (A-44)  knowingly
committed the overt act of planting the bomb  at  Hotel  Centaur,  Juhu,  is
evident from his own confession.  He himself  informed  Anwar  that  he  had
planted the bag containing bomb at Hotel Centaur, Juhu.  The  appellant  (A-
44) was fully conscious of the gravity and diabolic nature of his act  which
is apparent from his confession wherein he stated that after committing  the
overt acts he himself informed  everything  to  A-16  who  consoled  him  by
saying that ‘Allah’ would  help  him  as  he  has  done  all  this  for  his
community.


Retraction Statement:
291)  Mr. Manish, learned counsel for the appellant  (A-44)  contended  that
the  above-mentioned  confession  of  the  appellant  dated  26.05.1993  and
28.05.1993 should not be relied upon since it was sought to be retracted  by
the appellant on 07.06.1994.  In reply, learned senior counsel for  the  CBI
submitted  that  a  voluntary  and  free  confession,  even   if   retracted
subsequently, can be relied upon. It is also relevant to point out that  the
retraction allegedly made by the  appellant  also  fails  to  pin-point  the
reason behind failure  to  make  complaint  to  the  authorities  or  police
officers  or  any  other  authority  including  the  court   regarding   his
signatures being obtained on blank papers and/or the papers containing  some
typed material and the reason to effect the said signatures.  In this  case,
the Designated  Court  rightly  relied  upon  the  original  confession  and
discarded the subsequent retraction.  Since we  have  elaborately  discussed
the admissibility or otherwise of the retraction statements in  the  earlier
part of our judgment, there is no need to refer the same once again.

Confessional Statements of co-accused:
292)  Apart from his own confession, the involvement of  the  appellant  has
also been disclosed in the confessional  statements  of  the  following  co-
accused.  The legality and acceptability  of  the  confessions  of  the  co-
accused has been considered by us in the earlier  part  of  our  discussion.
The said confessions insofar as they  refer  to  the  appellant  (A-44)  are
summarized hereinbelow:

Confessional Statement of Md. Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9)

      Confessional statement of A-9  under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 and 22.04.1993 by Shri P.K. Jain, the then DCP,  Zone
X, Bombay.   A  brief  summary  of  the  statement  with  reference  to  the
appellant is as follows:-
(i)   When A-9 along with Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) and  Asgar  Yusuf
      Mukadam (A-10) reached the house of Anwar, a boy of  fair  color  with
      curly hair, wearing coat and pant, also came along with him.
(ii)  After Anwar inserted the pencil detonators in the bags, the  boy  with
      curly hair was dropped and was asked to go to Hotel Centaur, Juhu  and
      to plant the bag at the designated place and come back.
(iii) At the Al-Hussaini building, first, the boy with curly hair came  back
      and then Anwar came back followed by Parvez (A-12).
(iv)  In the afternoon of 12.03.1993, on the  instructions  of  Anwar,  A-44
      drove the scooter filled with black chemical and parked  the  same  at
      Zaveri Bazaar.

Confessional Statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)

      Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.04.1993 and 23.04.1993 at 18:00 hrs by Shri K.L. Bishnoi (PW-
193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  A brief summary of  the  confessional
statement of A-10 with reference to the appellant (A-44) is as follows:
(i)   When A-10 reached the house of Anwar, he came down along  with  a  boy
      and all of them sat in a car.  In  the  car,  Anwar  took  out  pencil
      detonators from  his  pocket  and  inserted  the  same  in  the  bags.
      Thereafter, Anwar instructed the boy (whom he referred to as  Mushtaq)
      to get down with the bag and plant the same at the designated place.
(ii)  When A-10 reached Al-Hussaini after dropping  Anwar  and  others,  the
      appellant (A-44) also reached there.   Thereafter,  as  instructed  by
      Anwar, A-44 drove a scooter filled with RDX and  parked  the  same  at
      Zaveri Bazaar.
Confessional Statement of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh    (A-12)

      Confessional statement of A-12 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 and 20.04.1994 at 06:50 hrs. by Shri P.K.  Jain  (PW-
189), the then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  A brief summary of the  statement  with
reference to the appellant (A-44) is as follows:
(i)   When A-12 along with A-10 and A-9 reached the  house  of  Anwar,  they
      met a person with curly hair whose name was Mushtaq.  Mustaq and Anwar
      sat in a car, and thereafter,  Anwar  opened  the  bags  and  inserted
      pencil detonators which he was carrying.
(ii)   When  A-12  reached  the  Al-Hussaini  building  after  planting  the
      suitcase at Hotel Sea Rock, the  appellant  (A-44)  had  also  reached
      there.

Confessional Statement of Imtiyaz Yunus Miyan Ghavate (A-15)

      Confessional statement of A-15 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 07.05.1993 and 09.05.1993 by Shri K.L.  Bishnoi,  (PW-193),  the
then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  A brief summary  of  the  said  statement  with
reference to the appellant is as follows:
(i)   When A-15 reached the residence of Anwar, the appellant had also  come
      there.  He had curly hair and fair complexion and was wearing a  black
      coloured coat.
(ii)  A-10 came there in a maroon coloured  Maruti  Van  and  the  appellant
      along with Anwar and others sat in the van and left the place.
(iii) When the appellant came to the Al-Hussaini Building,  he  was  holding
      his coat in his hand.  Thereafter, Anwar instructed him to  plant  the
      scooter filled with RDX.
293)  A perusal of the confessional statements of  all  the  above  accused,
viz.,  A-9,  A-10  A-12  and  A-15  clearly  establish  the  fact  that   it
corroborates the confessional statement of the appellant (A-44). The  above-
said confessions of the co-accused further establish the following facts:-
(i)   The appellant (A-44) was seen in the company of the Anwar (AA);
(ii)  The appellant went along with Anwar (AA) and Asgar Yusuf  Mukadam  (A-
      10) in a Maruti Van.
(iii)       The appellant witnessed the insertion of  pencil  detonators  in
      the suitcases filled with RDX;
(iv)  The appellant planted the suitcase filled with RDX  in  Hotel  Centaur
      Juhu;
(v)   The appellant returned to the Al-Hussaini building  and  reported  the
      successful planting of the suitcase bomb to Anwar; and
(vi)  On the instructions of Anwar (AA), the  appellant  proceeded  to  park
      the scooter filled with RDX at Zaveri Bazaar.

Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Deposition of Ravindra Sitaram Vichare (PW-17)

294)  The deposition of PW-17 was  recorded  on  20.11.1995.   The  relevant
material in his evidence is as follows:-
(i)   He deposed that at the relevant time, he was working as a  bellboy  at
      Hotel Centaur, Juhu.
(ii)  On 12.03.1993, around 11:45 am, one guest  got  down  from  the  motor
      taxi and was carrying a light blue coloured briefcase type bag.
(iii) He took the bag from the hands  of  the  guest  and  kept  it  in  the
      Baggage Section.
(iv)  After sometime, the guest came to the Baggage Section  and  picked  up
      his bag and enquired about the lift for going to the room.
(v)   He showed the way towards the lift to the guest.
(vi)  At around 3:00/3:30 p.m., when he was  in  the  lobby  of  the  Hotel,
      there was a loud sound of explosion.
(vii) He identified the appellant (A-44) before the court  in  the  dock  as
      the person who came to the Hotel on 12.03.1993.
(viii)      He also identified the appellant in  the  identification  parade
      dated 07.06.1993 conducted by Special Executive Magistrate,  Vaman  D.
      Sapre (PW-249) at Santacruz Police Station.
Deposition of Milind Purushottam Kamble (PW-18)

      The deposition of PW-18 was recorded  on  22.11.1995  and  he  deposed
that:
(i)   At the relevant time, he was working as  an  attendant  in  the  House
      Keeping Department of Hotel Centaur, Juhu.
(ii)  On 12.03.1993, the  appellant  (A-44)  enquired  from  him  about  the
      location of Room No. 3078 in the Hotel.
(iii) Floor Supervisor,  who  was  also  present  with  PW-18,  pointed  out
      towards Room No. 3078.
(iv)  He saw the appellant (A-44) entering into Room No. 3078 with  a  light
      blue color suitcase.
(v)   Thereafter, the appellant (A-44) came out of the room and left  saying
      that he is going to the restaurant to meet  someone  and  will  return
      shortly.  At that time, he was not carrying the blue suitcase.
(vi)  He identified the appellant (A-44) before the Court  in  the  dock  as
      the person who kept the suitcase in Room No. 3078.
(vii) He also identified the appellant (A-44) in the  identification  parade
      held on 07.06.1993 conducted  by  the  Special  Executive  Magistrate,
      Vaman D. Sapre (PW-249).
(viii)      He also identified Article No. 9 (coat), Article No.  10  (black
      pant) and Article No. 11 (white  shirt)  being  clothes  worn  by  the
      appellant (A-44) on 12.03.1993 when he visited the Hotel.
295)  From the perusal of the testimony of PWs-17 and 18, it is  clear  that
the witnesses established the  identity  of  the  person,  who  planted  the
suitcase in the hotel, as the appellant.  They  very  well  proved  how  the
appellant went to the room where the blast  took  place.   The  presence  of
witnesses in the hotel at the time when the appellant went to the hotel  for
planting the suitcase  has  been  fully  established.   The  witnesses  have
withstood  the  lengthy  cross-examination  and  established  themselves  as
credible and reliable witnesses.

Deposition of Nitin Sumitran (PW-260)
      The deposition of PW-260 was recorded on 13.01.1998.  He deposed that:
(i)   At the relevant time, he  was  working  as  a  receptionist  at  Hotel
      Centaur, Juhu.
(ii)  On 08.03.1993, a male person, aged about 30 to  35  years,  approached
      the Front Desk and told that he was having a reservation in  the  name
      of one Mr. Sanjeev Rai and that he had come to make an advance payment
      of Rs.5,000/- towards reservation of the room.

Deposition of Sanjay Manohar Dalvi (PW-261)
      The deposition of PW-261 was recorded on 13.01.1998.  He deposed  that
at the relevant time, he was working as the  Front  Office  Cashier  and  he
confirmed that a room was booked at Hotel Centaur, Juhu by one  Mr.  Sanjeev
Rai on 08.03.1993 and he issued a  receipt  of  Rs.5,000/-  (Exh.  1093)  as
advance payment towards the room rent.



Deposition of Cedric Merwyn Creado (PW-262)
      The deposition of PW-262 was recorded on 13.01.1998.  He deposed that:

(i)   At the relevant time, he was working as a  Front  Office  Receptionist
      and on 11.03.1993, a male person came to the desk and enquired  for  a
      room.
(ii)  He asked him as to whether he has any prior reservation, on which,  he
      replied that he was having a reservation in the name of Sanjeev Rai.
(iii) He gave him a registration card which he returned  after  filling  the
      same.
(iv)  On verification of the card, he found that the name was  mentioned  as
      ‘Gyanchandani Lalit’ and the  address  was  501,  Bel  Air  Apartment,
      Linking Road, Bandra, Bombay.  As the booking was made in the name  of
      Sanjeev Rai, he asked him as to why he has written a different name on
      which he replied that since people know him by this name that  is  why
      he had mentioned the said name.
(v)   He deleted the name and re-wrote  the  name  as  Sanjeev  Rai  on  the
      Registration Card.  A corrected reservation slip (Exh. 1096) was  also
      prepared by the Hotel staff.
(vi)  Thereafter, PW-262 allotted Room No. 3078 to  him  and  gave  him  the
      keys of the room.

Deposition of Titus Peter Paul Pinto (PW-102)
      The deposition of PW-102 was recorded  on  27.09.1996.   PW-102  is  a
resident of Bel Air Apartment since 1963 and he  is  the  Secretary  of  the
said Cooperative Housing Society.  He deposed that there is no flat  bearing
No. 501 in the said Apartment.  He further deposed that no occupant  by  the
name of Sanjeev Rai or Gyanchandani Lalit was living at  the  relevant  time
in that building.

Deposition of Ravindra Mahadev Kolte (PW-322)
      The deposition of PW-322 was recorded on 27.04.1998.  He deposed that:
(i)   At the relevant time, he was working as an Assistant Security  Officer
      at Hotel Centaur, Juhu.  He also described  about  the  scene  of  the
      blast.
(ii)  Three persons were injured in the blast on 12.03.1993  at  15:30  hrs.
      in Room No. 3078.
(iii) The ceiling and flooring of the said room  were  completely  destroyed
      and the occupant of the said room was not present in the room  at  the
      time of blast.
(iv)  He also made a complaint which was registered as C.R. No. 155/1993.
Deposition of Jaisingh Shivajirao Patil, Police Officer,  (PW-544)

      The  deposition  of  PW-544  was  recorded  on  10.12.1999.   In   his
deposition, he deposed that:-
(i)   He inspected the scene of the blast in the presence of  panch  witness
      Tiyadath R. Nair (PW-438) and prepared a spot panchnama Exh. No. 1414.


(ii)  He also prepared a panchnama dated 15.03.1993 of  four  sealed  sample
      packets containing debris collected by the experts from FSL marked  as
      Exh. No. 1859 in the presence of Sadashiv M. Pattanshetti (PW-549).
(iii) He also proved that he recorded FIR being C.R. No. 155/1993 marked  as
      Exh. No. 1208.
(iv)  The aforesaid articles which were seized  by  him  were  sent  to  the
      forensic lab for examination.
(v)   FSL Reports (Exh. Nos. 2604 and 2605) show the presence of  traces  of
      High Explosive substance, viz., RDX on these articles.

Deposition of Sridhar M. Pandit (PW-355)
      At the  relevant  time,  he  was  working  as  GM  (Technical),  Hotel
Corporation of India.   He  deposed  that  he  inspected  the  site  of  the
explosion and the estimated damage at Hotel Centaur, Juhu came to  the  tune
of Rs. 2.1 crores.
Deposition of Ketan Kantilal Shah (PW-433)
      He was the guest staying at the Hotel at the  relevant  time  and  has
proved the injuries sustained by him on account  of  the  explosion  in  the
Hotel on 12.03.1993.

Deposition of Vaman Dhondu Sapre, Special Executive Magistrate (PW-249)

      He is the person who conducted TIP on 07.06.1993 at  Santacruz  Police
Station in which the appellant (A-44) was identified by PWs-17  and  18  and
has proved the TIP panchnama Exh. No. 1071 dated 07.06.1993.

Deposition of Ramesh Pandurang Bhasare (PW-74)
      He is a panch witness who was running a cigarette-bidi stall at Zaveri
Bazaar at the relevant time and he deposed as under:
(i)   The appellant (A-44) made a statement in the office  of  Crime  Branch
      on 19.05.1993.
(ii)  Thereafter, the appellant (A-44) led the police party and  panchas  to
      a Footwear Shop at Khambekar Street and took out the keys from  a  pit
      like portion on the roof.
(iii) The police party was further taken  to  Room  No.  12  of  a  building
      opposite to Building No. 160 which was locked.
(iv)  The appellant opened the lock with the keys which  he  had  taken  out
      from the pit.
(v)   Thereafter, from a cupboard, the appellant (A-44)  took  out  a  black
      coat, black pant, white shirt and two keys marked as Article 258-B(i).
(vi)  The police party  recovered  the  aforesaid  articles  vide  discovery
      panchnama marked as Exhibit 389.
      The eye witness at the hotel has also identified the  above  cloth  as
the same which was worn by the appellant (A-44) at the time of  planting  of
suitcase bomb.
Evidence in respect  of  the  unexploded  scooter  parked  in  front  of  DP
Jewellers at Zaveri Bazaar:

Deposition of Shashikant Ramkumar Shukla (PW-26).
296)  PW-26 is an eye witness to the incident who witnessed the  parking  of
the said scooter by the appellant (A-44)  in  front  of  the  shop  of  D.P.
Jewellers, Zaveri Bazaar.  He deposed that:
(i)   At the  relevant  time,  he  was  the  owner  of  a  cutlery  shop  at
      Vithalwadi Naka, Zaveri Bazaar.
(ii)  On 12.03.1993, he saw the  appellant  (A-44)  quarelling  with  a  car
      driver in front of D.P. Jewellers, Zaveri Bazaar  for  parking  space.
      He forcibly parked the grey coloured scooter with Registration No. MH-
      05-TC 16 and left the place on the pretext of offering namaz at  ‘Juma
      Masjid’.
(iii) On 16.03.1993, he learnt that the scooter parked in front of the  shop
      of D.P. Jewellers, Zaveri Bazaar contained explosives.
(iv)  Thereafter, he went to Lokmanya Tilak Marg Police Station to  see  the
      scooter which was taken into custody by the police. There, he  met  PI
      Subhash Jadhav who recorded his statement and showed him two scooters.
       He identified the scooter which was parked in front of  the  shop  of
      D.P. Jewellers at Zaveri Bazaar.
(v)   He also identified the appellant (A-44) before the court in  the  dock
      as the person who had parked the scooter
(vi)  He also identified the appellant (A-44) in the  Identification  Parade
      dated  04.06.1993  conducted  by  Sharad  Vichare,  Special  Executive
      Magistrate, (PW-459).

Deposition of Shantaram Sakharam Sigwan (PW-27) (eye-witness).

      PW-27 is a salesman working at Shop  No.  263,  Shaikh  Memon  Street,
Zaveri Bazaar.  He deposed that:
(i)   He saw the appellant (A-44) arguing with a  car  driver  to  park  his
      scooter in front of D.P. Jewellers.  After forcibly parking  his  grey
      scooter No. MH-05-TC-16, the appellant left on the pretext of offering
      namaz at ‘Juma Masjid’.
(ii)  On 12.03.1993, an explosion  took  place  in  front  of  the  shop  of
      Narayandas Jewellers and there was panic in the locality and  all  the
      shop keepers closed their shops and everyone left for their home.
(iii) On 16.03.1993, he learnt from a feriwala that the police  have  seized
      a scooter which was parked in front of the shop of D.P. Jewellers.
(iv)  He, thereafter, went to the police station and  noticed  that  a  grey
      scooter  bearing  Registration  No.  MH-05-TC-16  was  parked  in  the
      compound of the police station.
(v)   He identified the scooter and PI Jadhav recorded his statement.
(vi)  He also identified the appellant (A-44) before the court in  the  dock
      as the person who had parked the scooter.
(vii) PW-27 also identified the appellant (A-44) in  the  TIP  conducted  on
      04.06.1993 by Sharad S. Vichare, Special  Executive  Magistrate,  (PW-
      459) and Memorandum Panchnama Exh. No. 1461 was prepared for the same.

297)  The eye witnesses discussed above clearly  established  the  following
facts:
(i)   the appellant (A-44) came on a scooter at the relevant time.
(ii)  the appellant (A-44) had a sort of quarrel  with  a  car  driver  with
      regard to parking.
(iii) the appellant (A-44) tried to forcibly park the  said  scooter,  which
      drew the attention of the witnesses.
(iv)  the appellant (A-44) left the place on the pretext of offering  namaz.


(v)   the identity of the appellant (A-44) is fully established and  he  has
      been identified by both the witnesses in TIP.

Deposition of Subhash Dattaram Jadhav (PW-547)
      At the relevant time, PW-547 was working as PI  with  LT  Marg  Police
Station.  He deposed that:
(i)   He received a message that an unclaimed scooter has been found  parked
      in front of DP Jewellers at Zaveri Bazaar.
(ii)  He visited Zaveri Bazaar along with Panch Witness Shambhu  K.  Dwadiga
      (PW-451).
(iii) He inspected the scooter and  noticed  that  there  were  black  spots
      outside the dicky of the scooter which was locked.  He further deposed
      that the handle of the scooter was free.
(iv)  Since blast had already occurred in Bombay,  he  got  suspicious  and,
      accordingly, sent a message to  the  control  room  for  sending  Bomb
      Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS).
(v)   Meanwhile, he cordoned off the area where the scooter was  parked  and
      sand bags were placed around the  scooter  and  two  panch  witnesses,
      namely, Shri Shambhu (PW-451) and Shri Prasanna were also called.
(vi)  Nand Kumar Chaugule (PW-444), an officer of  BDDS,  reached  the  spot
      along with his team and inspected the vehicle.
(vii) PW-444 found that there was a layer of brownish oily substance at  the
      top, and thereafter, a layer of blackish oily substance and below  the
      blackish substance, again one brownish layer was present in the dicky.
       He also noticed  that  the  said  cakes  were  also  containing  some
      pallets.
(viii)      PW-547 further deposed that  PW-444  took  away  three  metallic
      tubes and one pipe  with  holes  from  the  said  three  layers.   The
      materials recovered were sealed in packets, and thereafter, wrapped in
      a brown paper.
(ix)  PW-444 prepared a spot panchnama dated 15.03.1993 and  instructed  the
      police constable to take the scooter to LT Marg Police Station.
(x)   On 10.06.1993, SI Dastagir Ghavandi  (PW-552)  handed  over  two  keys
      seized by him during investigation of C.R. No. 155/1993.
(xi)  On the same day, he called Vijay Ramji Wala (PW-454),  Supervisor  and
      Mr. Ajit Vanjari (PW-651) of Vasan Automobiles and in the presence  of
      the two panchas, he gave the said two keys to PW-454 to check  whether
      the same fits in the lock of the scooter which was parked in front  of
      D.P. Jewellers.  PW-454 was  able  to  apply  the  keys  to  the  said
      scooter.
(xii) He then drew a panchnama which is marked  as  Exh.  No.  1868  stating
      that the keys found matched with all the three locks of  the  scooter,
      i.e., dicky lock, steering lock and the helmet-box lock.
The deposition of PW-547 has proved that:
(i)   A scooter was reported abandoned in front of D.P. Jewellers at  Zaveri
      Bazaar.
(ii)  The condition in which the scooter was found aroused suspicion.
(iii) PW-444 was called from BDDS who successfully diffused the bomb  fitted
      in the front side dicky of the scooter.  (the  substance  subsequently
      was found to be RDX).
(iv)  The witness, in front of the independent witnesses, also checked  that
      the keys recovered at the instance of  the  appellant  fitted  in  the
      scooter.
Deposition of Nandkumar Anant Chaugule (PW-444).
      The deposition of PW-444 was recorded on 05/06.10.1998.  At  the  time
of the incident, he was the  Incharge,  Senior  Inspector  of  Police,  Bomb
Detection and Disposal Squad of CID Intelligence, Bombay.  He deposed that:
(i)   On 15.03.1993, he received information through  his  operator  that  a
      scooter has been found lying in suspicious condition opposite to  D.P.
      Jewellers, Zaveri Bazaar.  He went to Zaveri Bazaar and inspected  the
      scooter.  The dicky of the scooter was opened by SI  Pandre  with  the
      help of hook and rope.
(ii)  The dicky of the said scooter contained a black substance  with  timer
      device inserted in  the  same.   The  remaining  part  of  the  dickey
      contained three or more polythene bags of brownish color material.
(iii) Thereafter, the timer was pulled out by SI Pandre by means of a  small
      fishing hook tied with a rope.  He further deposed that  he  separated
      the detonator from the timer pencil and made the same ineffective  and
      handed over the same to the Police Officers at LT Marg Police Station.


(iv)  The other officers from the BDDS removed the black and brown  material
      from the front dickey of the scooter and gave the same to  the  police
      officers of LT Marg police station.
(v)   From the physical appearance of the said black material,  he  gathered
      that the same was RDX  and  from  the  physical  appearance  of  brown
      material, he gathered that the same was nitroglycerin, both being high
      explosive substances.
Deposition of Dhananjay Raghunath Daund (PW-532)
      The deposition of PW-532 was recorded on 02.12.1999.  At the  relevant
time, he was a PSI attached with  the  Worli  Police  Station.   He  deposed
that:
(i)   He arrested the appellant (A-44) on 18.05.1993 and handed him over  to
      PI Shri Ghavandi (PW-552), I.O. in C.R. No. 155/1993.
(ii)  In the presence of Ramesh Pandurang Bhasare (PW-74),  two  keys  of  a
      Bajaj Scooter entangled in a ring were recovered vide  disclosure  and
      seizure Panchnama (Exh. No. 389) at the instance of the appellant  who
      led the police party to Kwality Footwear shop, Khambekar Street.
(iii) He handed over the said keys to PI Ghavande (PW-552).


The owner of the scooter was traced through  examination  of  the  following
witnesses:

Deposition of Sreeram Jeetram Vasan (PW-81)
298)  PW-81 was the sub-Dealer of scooters carrying on business in the  name
of Mohan Automobiles.  He deposed that:
(i)   He used to purchase scooters from Vasan Automobiles and sell the  same
      to customers.
(ii)  He knows a person by the name Sayed Farid Sayed Abdul  Wahab  @  Farid
      Bhai (PW-298) who is also a sub-dealer for  Bajaj  Auto  Ltd.  and  is
      carrying on business under the name Nisha Sales and Services.
(iii) In the month of February and March, 1993,  he  sold  22  Bajaj  Chetak
      Scooters and 2 Kinetic Honda Scooters to PW-298 out of the lot  of  40
      scooters purchased by him from Vasan Automobiles.
(iv)  On 18.03.1993, when he went to the office  of  the  Crime  Branch,  he
      identified the three scooters, which were sold by him to  Nisha  Sales
      and Services on 14.02.1993, 04.03.1993 and 11.03.1993 and  he  further
      produced the notes Exh. Nos. 424, 424-A and 424-B respectively of  the
      said scooters to Inspector Homi Irani.
Deposition of Sayeed Abdul Sattar (PW-82)
      PW-82 was working with Munaf  Halari  (AA).   He  had  helped  him  in
getting loan through his friend Rahid Shaikh.  He deposed that:
(i)   On 10.03.1993, Munaf (AA) contacted him  for  purchase  of  2/3  Bajaj
      Scooters stating that he required the same for his foreign delegation.
(ii)  On the same day, around 6 p.m., they took delivery of  2  scooters  of
      blue and stone colour bearing registration Nos. MH-04-Z-261 and MH-05-
      TC-29, respectively, from Asgar  Ali  Tahir  Ali  Masalawala,  Scooter
      Dealer, (PW 299).
(iii) Next day, i.e, on 11.03.1993, Munaf (AA) took delivery  of  the  third
      scooter bearing Registration  No.  MH-05-TC  16  and  asked  PW-82  to
      arrange for documents for the registration of the  said  scooters  and
      got two Xerox copies of Ration Card from Abdul  Aziz,  an  RTO  agent.
      Munaf (AA) collected the documents from him on 12.03.1993.
(iv)  When he asked Munaf (AA) to repay the loan, Munaf told him  to  forget
      about it since the scooters have been purchased  by  Tiger  Memon  and
      that Tiger Memon has used the same for the bomb blast.
(v)   Munaf Halari also cautioned him not to disclose this to  anyone,  else
      Tiger Memon will shoot him and his family members.
(vi)  He  identified  the  scooters  in  Court  through  their  registration
      numbers.

Deposition of Govind Bechan Baria (PW-452)
      At the relevant time, PW-452  was  working  with  Excellent  Petroleum
Company situated at J.J. Junction.  He deposed that:
(i)   Munaf Halari (AA) had requirement of 3 scooters and he had  approached
      him on 10.03.1993 for the same.
(ii)  He suggested to him that he should go to  the  Scooter  Dealer,  Asgar
      Ali Tahir Ali Masalawala (PW 299).
(iii) PW-299 referred Munaf (AA) to Sayed Farid Abdul  Wahab  @  Farid  Bhai
      (PW 298), Scooter Dealer who was working under the name of Nisha Sales
      and Services.
Deposition of Ajit Vithalrao Vanjari (PW-651)
      PW-651, at the relevant time, was working as a Sales Manager with  M/s
Vasan Automobiles.  He deposed that he had sold 25 Bajaj Chetak Scooters  to
Mohan Automobiles.
Deposition of Sambhali S. Hargude (PW-325)
      PW-325 was the Sub-inspector on station house duty on 15.03.1993.   He
deposed that:
(i)   He received information about the scooter bearing Registration No. MH-
      05-TC-16 parked at Zaveri Bazaar through Police Havaldar Shri  Kumbhar
      posted at the Shaikh Memon Street chowki.
(ii)  In the dickey of the said scooter, the iron pieces mixed with a  black
      coloured substance were found.
(iii) The dickey was also containing a timer pencil inserted at  the  centre
      of the said black substance.
(iv)  The bomb squad defused the said bomb by dismantling the timer  pencil.


Deposition of Vijay Ramji Wala (PW-454)
      PW-454 was a Service Provider at M/s Vasan  Automobiles,  Kalyan.   He
deposed that on being asked to inspect the scooter  with  the  help  of  the
keys given to him at the LT Marg Police  Station,  he  discovered  that  the
said keys belonged  to  the  said  scooter.   He  was  not  sure  about  the
registration number of the scooter.  He, however, said that  it  was  either
MH-05-TC-15 or MH-05-TD-16.  He then deposed that it was MH-05-TC-16.
It is relevant to point out that  the  keys  which  were  recovered  at  the
instance of the appellant (A-44) belonged to  the  same  scooter  which  was
planted by the  appellant  at  Zaveri  Bazaar  and  was  laden  with  highly
explosive substances.
299)  From the evidence discussed above, it is established that:
(i)   The appellant (A-44) actively participated in the conspiracy;
(ii)  He was an old associate of Tiger Memon;
(iii) He agreed with the object of conspiracy in the meeting held  at  Hotel
      Taj Mahal and performed  several  overt  acts  pursuant  to  the  said
      agreement;
(iv)  He associated himself with Tiger Memon (AA) and  on  his  instructions
      with Anwar (AA).
(v)   He was seen taking instructions and being in  association  with  Anwar
      (AA) by several co-conspirators.
(vi)  In his presence, detonators were fitted in the suitcases  filled  with
      RDX.
(vii) He planted one such suitcase laden with RDX in Room No. 3078 of  Hotel
      Centaur, Juhu which exploded injuring 3 persons and causing damage  to
      the property to the tune of Rs.2.10 crores;
(viii)      He parked a scooter laden with RDX in front of the  shop  of  DP
      Jewellers, Zaveri Bazaar;
(ix)  He threw the keys of the room on the roof of a Footwear shop where  he
      hid the clothes he was wearing at the time of  commission  of  offence
      and also the keys of the scooter which he had parked at Zaveri  Bazaar
      to avoid detection by police; and
(x)   He went to his friend Md. Farooq  Mohammed  Yusuf  Pawale  (A-16)  and
      told him everything who, in turn, supported him by saying that ‘Allah’
      would help him as he has done this for his community.
300)  It is contended on behalf of the appellant  (A-44)  that  no  TIP  was
conducted in reality.  It is pointed out by  the  prosecution  that  in  the
instant case, after the arrest of the appellant, identification  parade  was
conducted on 04.06.1993 by Sharad S. Vichare, Special  Executive  Magistrate
(PW-459) wherein PWs-27 and 26 identified the appellant as  the  person  who
had parked the scooter filled with RDX at  Zaveri  Bazaar.   It  is  further
submitted that on 07.06.1993, TIP was conducted by Vaman D.  Sapre,  Special
Executive  Magistrate  (PW-249)  wherein  PWs-17  and  18   identified   the
appellant as the person who had visited the Hotel Centaur, Juhu and  planted
the suitcase in Room No. 3078 of the Hotel.  It is  further  submitted  that
the said parade was duly conducted in the presence of  panch  witnesses  and
memorandum panchnamas were also prepared for the same.
301)  It is further  contended  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  (A-44)  that
Nandkumar Anant Chaugule (PW-444), an officer of BDDS, forcibly  opened  the
lock of the dickey so the question of  opening  the  dickey  with  the  keys
recovered by PW-454 from the roof of the footwear shop does not arise.
302)  Further, the prosecution submitted that the  appellant  (A-44),  after
his arrest on 18.05.1993, made a disclosure statement on 19.05.1993 and  led
the  police  party  to  Kwality  Footwear  shop  at  Khambekar  street,  and
thereafter, he took the keys from its roof and further led the police  party
to Room No. 12 of the building opposite the  shop.   It  is  further  stated
that the appellant then opened the lock of the room with the same  keys  and
went inside the room and two keys of Bajaj Scooter and other  articles  were
recovered from a cupboard.  Thereafter, the said keys were  handed  over  to
the IO who gave the same to PW-547.  In order to complete the  link,  PW-547
called  Vijay  Ramji  Wala  (PW-454)  who  is  a  Supervisor  at  M/s  Vasan
Automobiles to check whether the keys were of the  same  scooter  which  was
parked by the appellant at Zaveri Bazaar.  Thereafter, PW-454  inserted  the
keys in all the three locks of the scooter and the  same  tallied  with  the
locks.  Thus it was proved that the keys recovered at the  instance  of  the
appellant belonged to the scooter  laden  with  RDX  recovered  from  Zaveri
Bazaar.
303)  It is also contended on  behalf  of  the  appellant  (A-44)  that  the
handwriting in which the booking was made in the  hotel  was  not  confirmed
during investigation.  We are unable to accept the contention  raised  since
on perusal of the entire evidence as produced  by  the  prosecution,  it  is
established that the appellant planted the suitcase laden with RDX  in  Room
No. 3078 of Hotel Centaur, Juhu.  We are satisfied that sufficient  evidence
has been brought on record by the prosecution to show  that  the  said  room
was booked by the conspirators in a fake name for  which  payment  was  also
deposited in advance.
304)  It is further contended by the appellant that PW-2 (Approver) has  not
named the appellant in his deposition.  The  prosecution  pointed  out  that
this does not have any bearing on the prosecution case.
305)   We  are  satisfied  that  the  prosecution  has  produced  sufficient
evidence against the appellant (A-44)  to  bring  home  the  charges  framed
against him.
           Criminal Appeal Nos. 637-638 of 2008

Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10) and
Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29)        ……..Appellant(s)

                       versus

The State of Maharashtra
Thr. CBI-STF, Bombay                       ……..Respondent(s)


306)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel appeared for  the  appellants  (A-10
and A-29) and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel,  duly  assisted
by Mr. Mukul  Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  and  Mr.  Satyakam,  learned
counsel for the respondent.
307)  The above-said appeals are directed against  the  final  judgment  and
order  of  conviction  and  sentence   dated   18.09.2006   and   19.07.2007
respectively, whereby the appellants (A-10 and A-29) have been sentenced  to
death by the Designated Court under TADA for the  Bombay  Bomb  Blast  Case,
Greater Bombay in B.B.C. No. 1/1993.
Charges:
308)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators  including  the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29).   The  relevant
portion of the said charge is reproduced hereunder:
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”





In addition to the aforesaid principal charge of conspiracy framed  at  head
firstly, the appellants (A-10 and A-29) were also charged  on  other  common
counts which are summarized as under:
      At  head  secondly;  the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  abetted  and
      knowingly and intentionally facilitated the  commission  of  terrorist
      acts and acts preparatory to terrorist acts by  participating  in  the
      landing and transportation  of  arms,  ammunition  and  explosives  at
      Shekadi on 3rd  and  7th  February,  1993;  by  participating  in  the
      conspiratorial meetings at the residence of Nazir  Ahmed Anwar  Shaikh
      (AA) and Baya Moosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96) to chalk  out  the  plans  for
      commission of terrorist acts and by participating in  the  preparation
      of vehicle bombs at Al-Hussaini Building and collecting money from the
      co-accused Mulchand Shah for disbursement to various  accused  persons
      who were involved in criminal  conspiracy  and  thereby  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA.

      At head thirdly; the appellants (A-10 and A-29), planted an  explosive
      laden Maruti Van in the compound of Plaza Cinema on 12.03.1993,  which
      exploded causing death of 10 persons, injuring 36 others  and  further
      damage to property worth Rs. 87 lakhs and thereby  committed  offences
      punishable under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA

      At head fourthly; the appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion caused death of 10 persons and  thereby  committed
      an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.


      At head fifthly; the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, caused hurt to 36 persons and  thereby  committed
      an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.


      At head sixthly; the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, caused grievous hurt to 16  persons  and  thereby
      committed an offence  punishable  under  Section  326  IPC  read  with
      Section 34 IPC.


      At head seventhly; the appellants (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, voluntarily caused hurt to 27 persons and thereby
      committed an offence  punishable  under  Section  324  IPC  read  with
      Section 34 IPC.


      At head eighthly; the appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, caused damage to properties  and  thereby  having
      committed an offence  punishable  under  Section  435  IPC  read  with
      Section 34 IPC.


      At head ninthly; the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, caused damage to the property  used  as  dwelling
      house and for custody of property  and  thereby  having  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 436 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.


      At head tenthly; the  appellants  (A-10  and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion committed an offence punishable under Section 3 of
      the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


      At head eleventhly; the appellants (A-10 and  A-29),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion, committed an  offence  punishable  under  Section
      4(b) of  the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
      At head twelfthly; the appellants (A-10 and A-29) by possessing RDX in
      the said  Maruti  Van,  which  was  used  for  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, committed an offence punishable under Section 9B(1)(b)   of
      the Explosives Act, 1884.


      At head thirteenthly; the  appellant  (A-10),  abetted  and  knowingly
      facilitated explosions at Hotel Sea Rock, Hotel  Centaur  and  Airport
      Centaur and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3(3)
      of  TADA.


      At head fourteenthly; the appellant (A-10), travelled in the van  MFC-
      1972 with the explosive laden  suitcases  and  thereby  committed  the
      offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 of  the
      Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


309)  The Designated Judge found the appellants guilty on all the  aforesaid
charges.  The appellants have been convicted and  sentenced  for  the  above
said charges as follows:
Conviction and Sentence:

(i)   The appellants have been sentenced to  death  under  Section  3(3)  of
TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with the offences mentioned in  the  said
charge. In addition, the appellants were also ordered to pay a fine  of  Rs.
25,000/- each. (charge firstly)

(ii)  The appellants (A-10 and A-29) were convicted and sentenced to RI  for
9 years and 10 years respectively along with a fine of Rs.50,000/- each,  in
default, to further undergo RI for 1 year for commission  of  offence  under
Section 3(3) of TADA. (charge secondly)

(iii) The appellants have been sentenced to death, subject  to  confirmation
of the same by this Court, along with a fine of Rs.25,000/-  each,  for  the
offence punishable under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA. (charge thirdly)

(iv)  The appellants have been sentenced to death, subject  to  confirmation
of the same by this Court, along with a fine of Rs 25,000/-  each,  for  the
offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC read with  Section  34  of  IPC.
(charge fourthly)

(v)   The appellants have been sentenced to RI for life along  with  a  fine
of Rs. 50,000/- each, in default, to further undergo RI for 1 year, for  the
offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC read with  Section  34  of  IPC.
(charge fifthly)

(vi)  The appellants have been sentenced to RI for 10  years  along  with  a
fine of Rs. 50,000/- each, in default, to further undergo  RI  for  1  year,
for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC read with Section 34  of
IPC (charge sixthly)

(vii) The appellants have been sentenced to RI for 3 years for  the  offence
punishable under Section 324 of  IPC  read  with  Section  34  IPC.  (charge
seventhly)

(viii)      The appellants have been sentenced to RI for 7 years along  with
a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each, in default, to further undergo RI for  1  year,
for the offence punishable under Sections 435  and  436  of  IPC  read  with
Section 34 IPC. (charges eighthly  & ninthly)

(ix)  The appellants have been sentenced to RI for 10  years  along  with  a
fine of Rs. 25,000/- each, in default, to further undergo RI for  6  months,
for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances  Act,
1908. (charge tenthly)

(x)   The appellants have been sentenced to RI for  7  years  along  with  a
fine of Rs 25,000/- each, in default, to further undergo RI  for  6  months,
for the offence punishable under Section 4(b) of  the  Explosive  Substances
Act, 1908. (charge eleventhly)

(xi)  The appellants have been sentenced to RI for 2 years for  the  offence
punishable under Section 9B(1)(b)  of  the  Explosives  Act,  1884.  (charge
twelfthly)

(xii) The appellant (A-10) has been sentenced to RI for 7 years  along  with
a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6 months,  for
the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA.  (charge thirteenthly)

(xiii)      The appellant (A-10) has been sentenced to RI for 5 years  along
with a fine of Rs 25,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6  months,
for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 read  with  Section  6  of
the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. (charge fourteenthly)


Evidence:
310)  The evidence against the appellants (A-10 and A-29)  is  in  the  form
of:-
(i)   their own confessions;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence.

Conspiracy

311)  The object behind the conspiracy is the ultimate aim of  it  and  many
means may  be  adopted  to  achieve  this  ultimate  object.  The  crime  of
conspiracy is complete the moment there is an agreement in terms of  Section
120-A of IPC.  However, where  the  conspiracy  has  in  fact  achieved  its
object and resulted in overt acts, all the conspirators in terms of the  law
explained hereinabove would be liable for  all  the  offences  committed  in
pursuance of the conspiracy on the basis of the principle  of  agency  which
is inherent in the agreement which  constitutes  the  crime  of  conspiracy.
Since we have elaborately discussed the issue relating to conspiracy in  the
earlier part of our judgment, there is  no  need  to  refer  the  same  once
again.

Confessional Statements:

Confessional Statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)

312)  Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 23.04.1994 (18:00 hrs) by Shri  Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.   A  brief  summary  of  the  confessional
statement of A-10 is reproduced hereunder:

(i)   He was working in the office of Tiger Memon (AA) and his  job  was  to
      maintain an account of the Hawala money and the money received in  the
      smuggling of gold and silver.

(ii)  Due to riots in December, 1992, the office of  Tiger  Memon  (AA)  was
      closed which resumed  on  17th  December  after  the  riots  subsided.
      Again, on 6th January, 1993, his office was closed as  the  riots  had
      resurfaced.

(iii) Anwar (AA) and Shafi (AA) always used to  be  by  the  side  of  Tiger
      Memon (AA).   The  smuggled  silver  used  to  be  purchased  by  Raju
      Laxmichand Jain @ Raju Kodi (A-26).

(iv)  The money received by Tiger Memon (AA) in the above  transactions  was
      kept in a ‘Hathi account’ maintained by Tiger with Mulchand  Sampatraj
      Shah @ Choksi (A-97).  Whenever Tiger needed  money  he  would  either
      withdraw it himself or through A-10

(v)   In January, 1993, A-10 had come to know  from  Anwar  that  Tiger  was
      going to smuggle arms and ammunitions, explosive (Kala Sabun) and hand
      grenades.

(vi)  On 10th/11th February, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (A-1) directed A-10  to
      meet him in the evening.  At about 6:30-7:00 p.m.,  A-10  visited  the
      residence of A-1 at which time 3 tickets and  3  passports  of  Parvez
      Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100), Md.  Farooq  Mohammed  Yusuf
      Pawale (A-16) and Salim Phansopkar were handed over to him and he  was
      asked to pick them up from Midland Hotel and then  drop  them  at  the
      Airport for their journey to Dubai.  Accordingly, A-10 carried out the
      said instructions and dropped  the  aforesaid  three  persons  at  the
      Airport after handing over their  passports  and  tickets.   The  said
      tickets were for Dubai.

(vii) Next day, A-10 went to the  Tiger’s  residence  on  his  instructions.
      There he saw Anwar Theba (AA), Shafi (AA), and A-12  standing  outside
      the building.  Thereafter, he met Tiger Memon and escorted him to  the
      Airport where Rafiq Madi and Javed Chikna (AA)  also  arrived.   Tiger
      left for Dubai along with Javed Chikna instructing A-10 to  remain  in
      contact with A-1 and in case of requirement of money to A-1 to get the
      same from A-97.  A-10 was also told by Tiger that Sharif Abdul  Gafoor
      Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17) was to be paid Rs. 5 lacs against the landing
      and that the same should be paid to him.

(viii)      After Tiger’s  departure,  A-10  along  with  co-accused  (A-12)
      collected Rs. 5 lacs from A-97 and handed over the said amount to A-17
      at his residence in Juhu.

(ix)  Next day, A-10 was instructed over the phone by A-1 to collect  Rs.  1
      crore from A-97 for him. A-10, with the help of the other  co-accused,
      collected the said amount from A-97 and gave it to A-1.

(x)   On A-1’s instructions, on 17th  or  18th  February,  A-10  along  with
      other co-accused, viz., Mohammed Rafiq @ Rafiq Madi Musa Biyariwala (A-
      46) picked up Irfan Chougule (AA) from Paramount Hotel  and  A-29  and
      his companion from Bandra Reclamation and dropped them at the Airport.

(xi)  On 9th March, A-1 directed A-10 to transfer Rs. 25 lacs  from  Tiger’s
      account to Irani’s account and also Rs. 10 lacs  to  Ohalia’s  account
      and the same was done by contacting Choksi (A-97) over the phone.

(xii) In the morning of 10th  March,  A-10  transferred  Rs.  21  lacs  from
      Tiger’s account to Irani’s account by contacting  Choksi  (A-97)  over
      the phone on the instructions of A-1.

(xiii)      On 11th  March,  A-10,  following  the  instructions  of  Tiger,
      picked up 2 VIP bags, 2 rexine shoulder bags and  one  briefcase  from
      the garage at Tiger’s residence and carried them to Room No. 17 of the
      Haj Committee House near Crawford  Market.  Co-accused  Parvez  (A-12)
      also accompanied him. The key of the room was given by Tiger Memon.

(xiv) On the instructions of  Shafi,  A-10  took  a  new  scooter  from  his
      residence and left it at the residence of Tiger.

(xv)  On 11th March 1993, at about 11 p.m., following  the  instructions  of
      Tiger, A-10 took two briefcases and went to the residence of Mobina  @
      Bayamoosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96) in Tiger’s Maruti Van bearing  No.  MFC-
      1972, collected Tiger’s passport and ticket and  reached  the  Airport
      along with his relative Md. Shoaib Md. Kasam Ghansar (A-9). There, A-9
      checked-in his luggage and got the boarding pass issued. The remaining
      briefcase, passport and ticket were given to  Tiger  by  A-10  on  his
      arrival at the Airport at about 3.45 am. At  the  time  of  departure,
      Tiger instructed A-10 to follow the instructions of Anwar.

(xvi) On returning to Tiger’s residence, A-10 met co-accused  Javed  Chikna,
      Shafi, Gani, Parvez, Bashir, Usman and several others. He also saw one
      new Ambassador Car, one blue coloured  Commander  Jeep,  2  Maruti-800
      cars (one blue and one white), 3 new Bajaj Scooters and  2  old  Bajaj
      Scooters, all of which were parked there  laden  with  black  coloured
      chemical.

(xvii)      While returning from the Al-Hussaini  building  along  with  A-9
      and A-12, A-10 handed over the  plastic  bags  which  contained  empty
      boxes of the said chemical to  the  attending  staff  of  the  garbage
      vehicle at Bandra Reclamation. Then, A-10 collected 3  VIP  bags  from
      Tiger’s garage and at that time A-9 and A-12 were also with him.  They
      picked up Anwar from his residence in a vehicle. One more boy, namely,
      Mushtaq (A-44) also came along with Anwar. Anwar placed aluminium like
      pencils in the chemical contained  in  all  the  3  bags.  On  Anwar’s
      direction, A-10 took the vehicle to Linking road and  dropped  Mushtaq
      (A-44), and also dropped Parvez and Anwar on the way with one VIP  bag
      each and reached the Al-Hussaini Building, Mahim around 11:45-12:00 o’
      clock at night.

(xviii) At the Al-Hussaini Building, Anwar Theba (AA), A-44 and A-12  joined
      A-10 within an hour. A-10 saw that Anwar picked up aluminum  rod  like
      pencils which were lying on the back seat of the vehicle and  inserted
      them one by one in all the five scooters which were parked there.

(xix) Further, A-10 saw that on the instructions of Anwar Theba (AA),  A-15,
      A-12, A-44 and a boy known to Javed Chikna took out the  scooters  one
      by one and left the place.

(xx)  A-10 also saw that Anwar had individually briefed all  of  them  about
      parking the said scooters.

(xxi) A-10 was asked by Anwar whether A-9 could drive a scooter and when  he
      answered in the affirmative, Anwar asked A-10 to direct  A-9  to  park
      one scooter near Zaveri Bazaar. Following the said  instructions,  A-9
      left with the fifth scooter.

(xxii)       A-10 further noticed that at about  1:45  p.m.,  Usman  arrived
      with a new red coloured Maruti Van in which two VIP bags were kept  by
      the boys of Javed Chikna. A-10 was given the keys of the said  vehicle
      by Anwar while those of Maruti Van  bearing  MFC-1972  were  given  by
      Anwar to Javed Chikna.

(xxiii) A-10 was directed by Anwar and Javed Chikna to park the said  Maruti
      Van near the Plaza Cinema. On refusal by A-10 as he was scared, he was
      directed to take A-29 along with him.  A-10  and  A-29  took  the  red
      Maruti Van and parked it in the parking lot of  the  Plaza  Cinema  at
      about 2:15 p.m.

(xxiv) After sometime, A-10 heard the sound of a bomb blast  while  boarding
      a taxi hired at Dadar T.T. Both A-10  and  A-29  arrived  at  Crawford
      Market where they both parted ways. After  roaming  around  for  15-20
      minutes in the market, he then took a local train from Churchgate  and
      reached home.

Confessional Statement of Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29)

      Confessional statement of A-29 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.05.1993 and 21.05.1993 by Shri Krishan Lal Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.   A  brief  summary  of  his  confession  is
reproduced hereunder:

(i)    A-29  was  a  resident  of  Nargis  Dutt  Nagar  Zhopadpatti,  Bandra
      Reclamation Road, opposite the Telephone Exchange Bandra (W), Bombay.

(ii)  A-29 was acquainted with Javed Chikna and Usman  of  Mahim  since  the
      last 3-4 years.

(iii) A-29 participated in the landing of smuggled goods at  Shekhadi  along
      with Javed Chikna,  Shafi,  Riyaz,  Munna,  Karimulla,  Akbar,  Anwar,
      Parvez, Imtiyaz, Yeda Yakoob, Dadabhai and others.

(iv)  In the evening of 01.02.1993, Javed Chikna  asked  A-29  to  accompany
      him to bring the smuggled goods of Tiger Bhai.  He along  with  Javed,
      Usman, Nasir Dhakla and Shafi left in a blue coloured Commander  Jeep.
      On the way, they met Riyaz along with 3 boys, namely, Munna, Karimulla
      and Akbar who were in a Maruti Van near  a  Hotel.   Shafi  and  Munna
      discussed something and the Maruti Van followed their jeep.

(v)   A-29 was acquainted with Tiger, who met there along with  Anwar  Theba
      (AA), A-12 and A-15.  Tiger arranged for their stay in the hotel.

(vi)  A-29 attended a meeting in a hotel on the way to  Shekhadi,  in  which
      Tiger informed all the persons that he was bringing  weapons  to  take
      revenge against Hindus.

(vii) A-29 actively participated in the unloading, reloading and opening  of
      packets containing smuggled arms and ammunitions and explosives at the
      Waghani Tower.

(viii)      A-29 travelled in a  jeep  containing  arms  etc.  from  Waghani
      Tower to Bombay along with Bashir Ahmed Usman  Gani  Khairulla  (A-13)
      and Akbar.

(ix)  A-29, at the instance of Javed, gave his own passport as  well  as  of
      his friend Abdul Akhtar to Usman.

(x)   A-29 reached Dubai along with Irfan Chaugule and Abdul  Akhtar.   They
      met Gul Mohammed @ Gullu Noor Mohammed  Shaikh  (A-77)  at  the  Dubai
      Airport and were received by Ayub Memon.  Anwar,  Haji  Yakoob,  Nasir
      Dhakla, Bashir Muchhad and Mohd. Rafiq had already reached  Dubai  and
      met them at the place of their stay. Tiger Memon also met them there.

(xi)  A-29 attended conspiratorial meetings in Dubai with  Tiger  Memon  and
      others.

(xii) A-29  went  to  Pakistan  from  Dubai  alongwith  Yakub  Yeda,  Bashir
      Muchhad, Anwar, Nasir Dhakla, Gul  Mohd.,  Mohammed  Rafiq  and  Irfan
      Chougule  for  receiving  training  in  arms   and   ammunitions.   No
      immigration formalities were observed at the Airport while  travelling
      to Pakistan.

(xiii)      A-29 received training in handling  of  revolver,  AK-47,  AK-56
      rifles, hand grenades and making of bombs with black  chemical  powder
      (RDX) and pencil  bomb  timer  devices.  The  training  was  given  by
      Pakistani Army Officers for about 10 days. Tiger Memon  also  attended
      the said training.

(xiv) After the training, A-29 returned to Dubai along with  others  without
      completing any immigration formalities in the same manner.

(xv)  In Dubai, at the instance of Tiger Memon, he along  with  others  took
      an oath by putting their hands on the holy Quran that they would  take
      revenge for the  atrocities  committed  on  the  community  and  would
      indulge in Jehad for Islam and they would not disclose anything  about
      the training to any one and in the event of their  arrest  they  would
      not disclose anything about others to the police.

(xvi) A-29 returned to Bombay from  Dubai  along  with  Nasim,  Feroz  Abdul
      Akhtar and Mohd. Rafiq.

(xvii)      On the night of 11.03.1993, A-29  went  to  the  flat  of  Tiger
      Memon and received Rs. 5,000/- from him. He also noticed that a number
      of boys were already present there.

(xviii) On 12.03.1993, A-29 was present in the  Al-Hussaini  building  along
      with Javed Chikna, Bashir  Muchhad,  Bashir  Mahimwala,  Usman,  Salim
      Dandekar, Zakir, Abdul Akhtar, Anwar, Shafi and 3-4 unknown  boys.  In
      his presence, Usman came there with  one  bag  full  of  handgrenades.
      Javed Chikna distributed 3  to  4  hand  grenades  each  to  the  boys
      standing there.

(xix) Two VIP suitcases were kept by Anwar in a red  Maruti  Van.  A-29  was
      told by Anwar that the vehicle was filled with bombs and directed  him
      to go  along  with  A-10  and  leave  the  vehicle  at  Plaza  Cinema.
      Thereafter, he along with A-10 took  the  vehicle  and  reached  Plaza
      Cinema at about 1:45 or 2:00 p.m. The security guards at Plaza  Cinema
      asked something to A-10 and he parked the vehicle in  one  corner  and
      came out from there, took a taxi and came to Bhendi Bazar side.

(xx)  After the bomb blast, A-29 fled to Rampur and was  later  arrested  by
      police from Indore.

313)  From the above, it can easily  be  inferred  that  both  the  accused,
viz.,  A-10  and  A-29,  apart  from  implicating  themselves   in   various
activities along with other accused persons, corroborate  with  each  other.
It is also clear that both the appellants were present at Tiger’s  residence
and went in a red coloured  Maruti  Van  which  was  loaded  with  explosive
substances and parked it in the compound of the  Plaza  Cinema  which  later
exploded killing 10 persons and injuring 36 others.

Confessional Statements of co-accused:

Confessional Statement of Zakir Hussain Noor Mohd. Shaikh (A-32)

314)  Confessional statement of A-32 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (11:25  hrs)  and  19.05.1993  (17:30  hrs)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay. In  the  above
said confessional statement, the following references have been made to  the
appellants (A-10 and A-29):

(i)   On 11.02.1993, A-10 went to the  Sahar  Airport  with  Zakir  Hussain,
      Saleem Dandekar, Parvez at the instance of  Javed  Chikna  and  handed
      over to them their passports and tickets for Dubai.

(ii)  A-29 went to Pakistan by a PIA flight for the purpose of training.

(iii) A-29 attended conspiratorial meeting on 10.03.1993  at  the  residence
      of Mobina (A-96).

(iv)  A-29 actively participated in the preparation of vehicle bombs in  the
      Al-Hussaini  building  compound  in  the  intervening  night   between
      11/12.03.1993 by using RDX which had landed at Shekhadi.

Confessional Statement of Mohammed Rafiq @ Rafiq Madi  Musa  Biyariwala  (A-
46)

      Confessional statement of A-46 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 21.04.1993 (19:00  hrs)  and  24.04.1993  (21:25  hrs)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.  In  the
abovesaid confessional statement, the following references  have  been  made
to the appellants:

(i)   A-10 worked in the office of Tiger Memon.

(ii)  On 12th February, 1993, A-10 accompanied Tiger  Memon  and  other  co-
      accused and went to the airport wherefrom Tiger and  other  co-accused
      left for Dubai.

(iii) On 18th February, A-10 along with A-46 picked up  Irfan  Chougule  and
      other co-accused persons and dropped them at the Airport after handing
      over to them their passports and tickets to Dubai.

(iv)  On 17th February, 1993, A-29 was  dropped  by  the  said  accused  and
      Anwar along with other accused persons for their departure to Dubai.

   Confessional Statement of Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar     (A-57)

      Confessional statement of A-57 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
   recorded on 19.04.1993 (12:00 hrs.) by Shri Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193),
   the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  In the abovesaid confessional statement,
   the following references have been made to the appellants:

       i)  A-10 worked in the office of Tiger Memon.

      ii)  A-10 drove the explosives laden red Maruti Van  along  with  A-29
          from the Al-Hussaini Building on 12.03.1993.

     iii)  A-29 was present  when  Anwar  Theba  (AA)  kept  two  RDX  laden
          suitcases in the dickey of a red coloured Maruti Van and he (A-29)
          along with A-57 kept two packets of ‘Kala Sabun’ in the dickey  of
          the said Van.  He further stated that the said van was taken by A-
          10 and A-29 accompanied by A-57 himself.

Confessional Statement of Nasir Abdul Kadar Kewal @ Nasir Dhakla (A-64)

      Confessional statement of A-64 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 22.01.1995 and 24.01.1995 by Shri HC Singh  (PW-474),  the  then
Superintendent  of  Police,  CBI/SPE/STF,  New  Delhi.   In  the   abovesaid
confessional statement, the following  references  have  been  made  to  the
appellants:
        i) A-10 was present at the Al-Hussaini  Building  compound  in  the
           intervening night between 11th/12th March,  1993  when  RDX  was
           being filled in vehicles.
       ii) A-29 participated in the first as  well  as  second  landing  at
           Shekhadi.
      iii) A-29 was present in Dubai when A-64 and others  went  there  and
           attended conspiratorial meetings in Dubai.
       iv) A-29 went to Pakistan by a PIA flight for training.
        v) A-29  attended  conspiratorial  meeting  on  10.03.1993  at  the
           residence of Mobina.
       vi) A-29 actively participated in preparation of  vehicle  bombs  at
           the Al-Hussaini  Building  compound  in  the  intervening  night
           between 11/12.03.1993 by using RDX which had landed at Shekhadi.
Confessional Statement of Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100)

      Confessional statement of A-100 under Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 (22:30 hrs.) and 17.04.1993 (17:00 hrs.),  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the  then  DCP,  Zone-VIII,  Bombay.   In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following  references  have  been  made  to  the
appellants:
        i) A-29 participated in the training of fire arms  and  ammunitions
           at  Islamabad,  Pakistan  along  with  his   associates   during
           February, 1993.
       ii) A-29 was  present  at  the  residence  of  Tiger  Memon  in  the
           intervening night between 11/12.03.1993  along  with  other  co-
           accused.
Confessional Statement of Mohammed Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9)

      Confessional statement of A-9  under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (13:10 hrs.) and  22.04.1993  (00:30  hrs.)  by  Shri
Prem Krishna Jain (PW-189), the then DCP, Zone  X,  Bombay.   In  the  above
said confessional statement, the following references have been made to  the
appellant (A-10):
      (i)   A-9 and A-10 are both from  the  same  village,  i.e.  Karda  in
           District Ratnagiri.
      (ii)  A-9’s elder sister is married to A-10’s elder brother, Anwar.
      (iii) A-10 told him that he works for Tiger and does the  business  of
           Hawala and smuggling of gold and silver.
      (iv)  A-9 obtained the boarding pass used by Tiger  on  11.03.1993  at
           the request of A-10.
      (v)   A-10 was at the Airport to see off Tiger Memon before the blasts
           and he arranged for his boarding pass.
      (vi)  A-10 and  A-9  came  back  to  the  Al-Hussaini  building  after
           dropping Tiger on 11.03.1993.  At that time, co-accused  persons
           were filling chemicals in the vehicles as told to him (A-9) by A-
           10.
      (vii) A-10 was driving the Maruti Van on 12.03.1993 and he dropped the
           co-accused sitting in the Van at a taxi stand to go to Hotel Sea-
           Rock, Bandra and Centaur Hotel near Airport.
      (viii)      A-10 gave a scooter to A-9 for parking the same at  Zaveri
           Bazaar intersection.
       ix) A-9 met A-10 on 13.03.1993 after the blasts.

Confessional Statement of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh    (A-12)

      Confessional statement of A-12 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 (14:00 hrs.) and  21.04.1993  (06:50  hrs.)  by  Prem
Krishna Jain (PW-189), the then DCP, Zone X,  Bombay.   In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following references have been made with  regard
to A-10:
        i) A-10 was working in the office of Tiger Memon.
       ii) A-12 was also working in Tiger’s  office  along  with  A-10  and
           other associates to help him in Hawala transactions as  well  as
           in the landing of smuggled silver.
      iii) On 15th/16th February, 1993, A-10 along with A-12  went  to  the
           residence of Tiger  where  they  along  with  others  were  paid
           Rs.10,000/- by Shafi.
       iv) On 11th March, 1993, at noon, A-10 and A-12 were given two small
           suitcases, two hand bags and one big  suitcase  by  Tiger  Memon
           which were taken by them to room No.17 of Musafirkhana in  which
           one  bag  was  containing  AK-56  rifles  while  the  other  was
           containing hand grenades.
        v) On the night of 11th March, A-10 was assisting Gani  and  others
           in the filling of black soap into the  secret  cavities  of  the
           vehicles.
       vi) At the time of leaving for home, A-10 along with  A-12  and  A-9
           were given 5 plastic bags in which the chemicals were kept which
           were thrown by them into the wastage van of BMC.
      vii) A-10 along with A-12 and A-9 carried three suitcases in a van to
           the residence of Anwar.  From there, Anwar and A-44 joined them.
            Anwar  inserted  three  timer  pencils  in  each  of  the  said
           suitcases.
     viii) After the blast, on  13.03.1993,  A-10  met  A-12  and  A-9  and
           received the keys of the scooter which was planted  by  A-12  at
           Katha Bazaar.

Confessional Statement of Imtiaz Yunusmiyan Ghavate   (A-15)

      Confessional statement of A-15 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 07.05.1993 (12:30 hrs.) and  09.05.1993  (13:30  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  In the  above
said confessional statement, the following references have  been  made  with
regard to A-10:
        i) While working for Tiger, A-15 delivered money to various  people
           on the instructions of A-10.
       ii) A-10 was managing the delivery of Hawala money in India.
      iii) Tiger with A-10 and other co-accused persons was  also  involved
           in selling smuggled silver.
       iv)  A-10 was seated in the Maruti Van No. MFC 1972 in  the  morning
           of 12.03.1993 along with A-15.

Confessional Statement of Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17)

      Confessional statement of A-17 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 (00:15 hrs.) and  20.04.1993  (02:50  hrs.)  by  Prem
Krishna Jain (PW-189), the then DCP, Zone X,  Bombay.   In  the  above  said
confessional statement, a reference has been made to A-10 that he  gave  Rs.
5 lakhs to A-17 for the landing work.

Confessional Statement of Mohd. Mushtaq Musa Tarani  (A-44)

      Confessional statement of A-44 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 26.05.1993 (16:55 hrs.) and  22.05.1993  (10:00  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  the
abovesaid confessional statement, the following references  have  been  made
with regard to A-10:
        i) On 12.03.1993, A-10 was driving a maroon coloured car which  was
           carrying A-44 and other accused involved in planting bombs.
       ii) A-44 again met A-10 around noon on 12.03.1993 at Tiger’s house.

Confessional Statement of Baya Musa Bhiwandiwala @ Mobina (A-96)

      Confessional statement of A-96 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 30.04.1993 (18:00 hrs.) and  02.05.1993  (18:00  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  In the  above
said confessional statement, the following references have been made  to  A-
10:
        i) A-10 worked for Tiger.
       ii) A-10 took the tickets for Tiger to Dubai from Mobina’s residence
           on 11.03.1993.

Confessional Statement of Mulchand Sampatraj Shah @ Choksi (A-97)

   Confessional statement of A-97 has been  recorded  on  14.05.1993  (20:55
hrs.) and 18.05.1993 (16:15 hrs.) by Vinod Balwant  Lokhande  (PW-183),  the
then DCP, Airport  Zone.   In  the  abovesaid  confessional  statement,  the
following references have been made to A-10:
        i) A-10 @ Munna opened Tiger Memon’s Hathi account with A-97.
       ii) A-10 (Munna) had been routinely operating  Tiger  Memon’s  Hathi
           Account with A-97.
      iii) All dealings with A-10 were done on the  instructions  of  Tiger
           Memon.
Confessional Statement of Mohd. Farooq Mohd. Yusuf Pawale (A-16)

      Confessional statement of A-16 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (16:30 hrs.) and 22.05.1993 (16:45  hrs.)  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the  then  DCP,  Zone-VIII,  Bombay.   In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
        i) On 08.02.1993, A-16 along with others (including A-29)  went  to
           the spot of landing and assisted Tiger in  landing  of  smuggled
           items containing 84 bags and in their transport to Bombay.
       ii) A-29 attended the training of dismantling and handling  of  fire
           arms and bombs including chemical bombs as well as hand grenades
           in Pakistan and, thereafter, went to Dubai along with others.

Confessional Statement of Mohd. Iqbal Mohd. Yusuf Shaikh (A-23)

      Confessional statement of A-23 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (10:00 hrs.) and  22.05.1993  (10:00  hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  In the  above
said confessional statement, a reference has been made to A-29 that  he  was
present at Tiger’s house on the day of the blast.

Confessional Statement of Munna @ Mohammed Ali  Khan  @  Manojkumar  Bhanwar
Lal Gupta (A-24)

      Confessional statement of A-24 has been recorded on 30.04.1993  (16:15
hrs.) and 09.05.1993 (19:00 hrs.) by Sanjay Pandey (PW-492), the  then  DCP,
Zone III, Bombay.  In the above said  confessional  statement,  a  reference
has been made to A-29.  It was disclosed that A-29 actively participated  in
the landing and transportation of smuggled  goods  from  Shekhadi  coast  to
Waghani  Tower  where  the  packets  containing  arms  and  ammunitions  and
explosives were opened under the supervision of Tiger Memon.

Confessional Statement of Abdul Khan @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36)

   Confessional statement of A-36 under Section 15 of TADA has been recorded
on 19.05.1993 (17:40 hrs.) and 21.05.1993 (18:20 hrs.) by Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193), the then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
     i)    A-36 knew A-29 for many years.
    ii)     A-29 took A-36 to Dubai for training.
   iii) Tiger told A-29 in Dubai that his ticket to Bombay  was  ready  and
        that he should leave.
    iv) A-29 loaded RDX in the vehicles on 11.03.1993.


Confessional Statement of Feroz @ Akram Amani Malik   (A-39)


   Confessional statement of A-39 under Section 15 of TADA has been recorded
on 19.04.1993 (22:30 hrs.) and 23.04.1993 (20:50 hrs.)  by  Mr.  P.D.  Pawar
(PW-185), the then DCP, Zone V, Bombay.   In  the  above  said  confessional
statement, A-39 refers to A-29 that he received training in Pakistan.
Confessional Statement of Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49)


      Confessional statement of A-49 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
   recorded on 16.05.1993 (9:30 hrs) and  18.05.1993  by  Shri  Krishna  Lal
   Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.  In  the  above  said
   confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
   i) A-29 joined Nasim Barmare in Pakistan and received  training  in  arms
      and ammunitions.
  ii) In Dubai, they all were given inflammatory speech by  Tiger  Memon  to
      take revenge against the atrocities upon the Muslims.
(iii) A-29 left Dubai along with other co-accused.

Confessional Statement of Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52)
     Confessional statement of A-52  under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 and 18.04.1993 by Mr. P.D. Pawar (PW-185),  the  then
DCP,  Zone  V,  Bombay.  In  the  above  said  confessional  statement,  the
following references have been made to A-29:
   i) A-29 was one of the nine persons who underwent training  in  Pakistan.
      They were given training in use of hand-grenades, RDX and detonators.
  ii) On 06.03.1993, after coming to Bombay, all the persons  (including  A-
      29) underwent training in Pakistan and met at the residence  of  Tiger
      Memon in Bandra to discuss about the bomb blasts.
 iii) Tiger gave Rs. 5,000/- to each person in another meeting at  his  flat
      next day where the  persons  who  had  gone  for  training  were  also
      present.
  iv) On the night of 11.03.1993, A-52 saw several persons at  Tiger’s  flat
      at the Al-Hussaini building including A-29.


Confessional Statement of Gul Mohd. @ Gullu Noor Mohd. Shaikh (A-77)

   Confessional statement of A-77 under Section 15 of TADA has been recorded
on 17.04.1993 (14:10 hrs.) and 19.04.1993 (18:00 hrs.) by Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi  (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.  In  the  abovesaid
confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
     i) A-77 met A-29 in a Hotel room in Dubai.
    ii) A-29 came to Pakistan with them for training.
Confessional Statement of Mohd. Rafiq Usman Shaikh    (A-94)

      Confessional statement of A-94 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 14.05.1993 (18:30 hrs.)  and  16.05.1993  by  Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.  In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
   i) A-29 was in Dubai with other co-accused.
  ii) Tiger gave tickets to A-29 to fly to Bombay from Dubai.




Confessional Statement of Niyaz Mohd. @ Aslam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh A-98

      Confessional statement under Section 15 of TADA has been  recorded  on
17.05.1993 (14:30 hrs.) and 20.05.1993 (11:30  hrs.)  by  Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.  In  the  above  said
confessional statement, the following references have been made to A-29:
     i) A-29 joined him for training in Pakistan.
    ii)  On 01.03.1993, after others also reached Dubai, the co-accused (A-
        29), who had taken training in Pakistan at the instance  of  Tiger,
        took oath after placing his hands on  holy  Quran.  He  also  heard
        about the speech given by Tiger regarding the riots in Bombay.
315)  A perusal of all the aforesaid  confessional  statements  substantiate
the fact that the appellants, viz., A-10 and A-29 were fully  aware  of  the
conspiracy and  willfully  participated  in  performing  the  conspiratorial
acts.  Further, the confessions of co-accused, viz., A-32,  A-46,  A-57,  A-
64, A-100, A-9, A-12, A-15, A-17, A-44, A-96, A-97, A-16, A-23, A-24,  A-36,
A-39,  A-49,  A-52,  A-77,  A-94  and  A-98  corroborate  the   confessional
statements of the appellants (A-10 and A-29) in material particulars.
316)  It is also clear that the confessions made by the appellants  as  well
as by co-accused are truthful  and  voluntary  and  were  made  without  any
coercion.  All safeguards enumerated under Section 15 of TADA and the  rules
framed  thereunder  have  been  duly  complied  with  while  recording   the
confessions of the appellants.
Retraction Statements:
317)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel for the  appellants  contended  that
the  confessional  statements  of  the  appellants  and   the   confessional
statements of the co-accused persons relied upon by the prosecution  against
them were retracted subsequently, and therefore, it  is  not  safe  to  base
conviction on the said confessional statements under  Section  15  of  TADA.
In reply to the  above  contention,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  CBI
submitted that where the original confession was truthful and voluntary  and
has been recorded after strictly following  the  prescribed  procedure,  the
subsequent retraction and  denial  of  such  confession  under  Section  313
statement by the accused is nothing but is  a  result  of  an  afterthought.
Since the very same objection had already been  considered  in  the  earlier
part of our judgment, we are not inclined to repeat  the  same  once  again.
The said conclusion is applicable to these appeals also.
Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Evidence of Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) (Approver)

318)  PW-2, in his deposition, implicates the appellants and  withstood  the
lengthy cross examination.  He deposed as follows:
   i) PW-2 identified A-10 and A-29.
  ii) The appellants (A-10 and A-29) worked with him in the conspiracy which
      led to the blasts in  Bombay  and  they  were  involved  in  planning,
      conspiracy, training, landing as well as in blasting of bombs.
 iii) A-29 participated in the landing of arms and ammunitions at Shekhadi.
  iv) On 11.02.1993, when  he  went  to  meet  Tiger  Memon  at  Al-Hussaini
      building, A-10 took him to the Tiger’s flat at 5th floor.
   v) A-29 participated in the training in Pakistan.
  vi) When he (PW-2)  returned  after  surveying  the  Chembur  Refinery  on
      11.03.1993, he noticed several boys with  Tiger  Memon  including  the
      appellants at that time.
The said witness duly corroborates the confessions  of  the  co-accused  and
the confessions of the appellants  themselves.  In  the  present  case,  the
deposition of PW-2 has also been corroborated in material  particulars.   It
has been contended  by  the  counsel  for  the  appellants  that  there  are
contradictions in the statement of PW-2 in respect of the presence  of  A-10
as to whether he was standing downstairs or in the hall of  the  5th  floor.
On a perusal of the entire evidence of PW-2, it can be  inferred  that  when
PW-2 came to the Al-Hussaini building, Tiger Memon was  in  the  flat  which
was on the fifth floor along with various accused including the  appellants.
Thereafter, PW-2  described  about  a  meeting  where  Tiger  explained  the
modalities of the blasts and he came down using the  stairs  when  A-10  was
standing downstairs.
319)  It is further contended by the counsel for the appellants  that  there
are certain contradictions regarding the  air  tickets  given  to  A-10  and
regarding introducing A-32 to A-10 at Hotel Midland with respect to  Exhibit
25. It is relevant to mention that Exhibit 25 was  not  the  document  which
was pressed into service by the prosecution. PW-2 proposed to make full  and
true disclosure of all the facts and on the  said  promise  he  was  granted
pardon. Both the statement and the  deposition  were  made  under  different
statutes under the law and are not comparable with each other. The  approver
has withstood the rigorous cross examination and the  prosecution  has  also
corroborated the deposition of  the  approver  by  adequate  evidence  which
further affords credibility to his deposition
Evidence of Sanjay Salunke (PW-3) and Sanjay Mangesh Salaskar (PW-4)

      PWs-3 and 4, who were the Security Guards on duty at Plaza  Cinema  at
the relevant time have also witnessed  the  incident  and  have  deposed  as
follows:
   i) On 12.03.1993, at about 2.15 p.m., one Red  coloured  Maruti  Van  had
      been inside Plaza Cinema Theatre compound from the main gate  and  was
      parked in scooter parking area.
  ii) There was an altercation between PW-4 and the driver of the  said  van
      regarding parking of the van in the scooter parking area.
 iii) Seeing this, PW-3, alongwith two  other  security  guards,  approached
      towards them and explained the correct  parking  area  for  the  same.
      Thereafter, the persons in the Maruti Van parked it in the car parking
      area.
  iv) After about 45 minutes to 1 hour, there was a big explosion in the car
      parking area.  The whole area was shaken and  PW-3  noticed  that  the
      said red coloured Maruti Van parked there  was  totally  damaged.  The
      other motor vehicles in the said area also  caught  fire  and  several
      persons were injured and  a  situation  of  panic  emerged  among  the
      persons who had come to the theater.
   v) Other Security Guards, viz., Mr. Singh and  Mr.  Manchekar  were  also
      injured and, subsequently, Mr. Singh died due to the injuries suffered
      by him in the incident.
  vi) PW-3 had taken his colleague Security Guard PW-4, who suffered a  back
      injury and two three more injured persons to  Sion  Hospital  and  the
      said persons were admitted in the hospital after examination.
 vii) On the way to Sion Hospital, PW-4 told PW-3 that the persons with whom
      they had altercation and who had come in a  red  coloured  Maruti  Van
      were responsible for the said incident as some thing had gone wrong in
      the said red coloured Maruti Van.
viii) PW-3 and PW-4 identified A-10 in the court as the driver of  the  said
      red coloured Maruti van.
  ix) PW-3 and PW-4 identified A-29 as the person who  was  sitting  by  the
      side of the driver i.e., A-10.
320)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel for the  appellants  contended  that
PW-3 was an employee of one  Hindustan  Security  Force  and  not  of  Plaza
Cinema as stated by him in his deposition.  Further,  it  was  contended  on
behalf of  the  appellants  that  the  said  witness  had  not  specifically
described/stated about the  height  of  A-10  and  thus  it  is  a  material
omission. It was also contended that his ‘general’ description of the kurta-
pyjama worn by the accused  at  the  time  of  the  said  incident  and  not
explaining the details thereof is also a material  omission.  Thus,  it  was
argued that  in  view  thereof,  the  identification  of  A-10  by  PW-3  is
doubtful.
321)  PW-3 was an employee of Hindustan Security  Force  which  was  engaged
for providing security guards to Plaza Cinema and he was ‘deputed’  and  was
on ‘duty’ as a Security Guard at Plaza Cinema. Further, he has never  stated
in his deposition that he was an ‘employee of Plaza Cinema’. A-10  has  been
correctly identified by PW-3 in the court at the time of his deposition  and
also in the test identification parades  dated  21.03.1993  and  25.04.1993,
conducted by SEM, PW-462 and in parade dated 14.05.1993 conducted by SEM PW-
469.  Thus,  the  identification  has  been  duly  established  by  the  eye
witnesses.
322)  Further, the  depositions  of  PWs-3  and  4  sufficiently  prove  the
incident and involvement  of  the  appellants.  The  said  depositions  also
provide corroboration with the above said confessional  statements  of  A-10
and A-29 that they parked the Maruti van  laden  with  explosives  in  Plaza
Cinema compound which  caused  the  said  explosions  causing  death  of  10
persons and injuries to 36 people.
Other Witnesses:
323)  Kashiram Kubal (PW-449), Piyara Singh  (PW-447),  Mohan  Mayekar  (PW-
455), Dattatreya Pawar (PW-448) and Ramesh Lad (PW-450) proved the  injuries
sustained by them during the explosion. Dr.  Rajaram  Bhalerao  (PW-646),  a
doctor at Hinduja Hospital who issued certificates  regarding  treatment  of
PW-449 and PW-407 sufficiently corroborates the fact of injury  suffered  by
the victims.  Vinayak A. Mayekar  (PW-456),  who  was  the  brother  of  the
deceased Vishram Mayekar, who died due to head and chest injuries  sustained
in the explosion at Plaza Theatre proved the death of the  said  victim  and
also deposed about the charge being  taken  by  him  of  the  dead  body  on
13.03.1993  from  KEM  Hospital.  Ramesh  Barasingh  (PW-457),  son  of  the
deceased Kisan Barasingh, who died due to  scalp  injury  sustained  in  the
explosion at Plaza Theatre proved the death of  the  said  victim  and  also
deposed about the charge being taken by him of the dead body  on  13.03.1993
from KEM Hospital. This fact is further corroborated by  the  deposition  of
Dr. Walter Vaz (PW-476), who certified the  deaths  and  its  cause  of  the
above said victims.
324)  Ramesh Naik (PW-305), the  Supervisor  of  Plaza  Cine  House  deposed
regarding hearing a loud explosion on 12.03.1993, at about 03:14  p.m.,  and
saw that the cars parked in the parking area caught fire and  a  red  Maruti
Van was completely destroyed, a big crater was  formed,  compound  wall  was
collapsed, watchman and other staff were injured and further  inspected  and
ascertained the damage of Rs. 50 lakhs and lodged a  complaint  with  PW-551
of Mahim Police Station. Further, he  visited  Sion  and  KEM  Hospital  and
found that watchman  Singh  and  project  operators  Shinde  and  Vasta  had
succumbed to their injuries.
325)  Ramesh Tulsiram Kolhe (PW-551), an Officer from Mahim  Police  Station
who recorded the complaint of the above, i.e., Ramesh Naik  (PW-305)  proved
the said document. He further deposed  that  on  13.03.1993,  he  registered
accidental death of Shinde, Vasta, Nissar, Siddiqui and  sent  a  letter  to
Coroner for effecting post-mortem etc. under panchnama Exh.  1894  and  took
charge of brass articles penetrated in  the  body  of  PW-449  brought  from
Hinduja Hospital by PC Kamble. PW-551  also  deposed  about  the  Accidental
Death Reports prepared by him in respect of the deceased persons.
326)  Nivrutti S. Kokare (PW-557), was the officer who inspected  the  scene
of offence  and  prepared  the  inspection  panchnama  in  the  presence  of
witnesses vide Panchnama Exh. 1918 regarding the crater being formed in  the
area of car parking, collapse of  northern  compound  wall,  burnt  vehicles
etc.  He also took charge of 4 to 5 broken parts of the said red Maruti  Van
and the number plate bearing No. MAM 962 amongst other things.
327)  It is contended on behalf  of  the  appellants  with  respect  to  the
deposition of  PW-305  that  on  12.03.1993,  despite  arrival  of  so  many
policemen at the place of explosion, there was no Panchnama prepared on  the
said date and it came to be  prepared  only  the  next  day.  Further,  with
respect to the deposition of Narsingh Sherkhane (PW-556),  it  is  contended
that the said API of the  Bombay  Police  prepared  the  Panchnama  only  on
14.03.1993 whereas the offence was committed on 12.03.1993,  and  therefore,
there has been delay in recording Panchnama which is a serious lapse in  the
procedure. It is brought to our notice that the Police had cordoned off  and
sealed the said area so as to  ensure  that  the  scene  of  crime  was  not
tampered with. Moreover, after several explosions in the city, there  was  a
state of panic and law and order situation which the  Police  were  required
to handle as a priority.
328)  It is  further  contended  by  Ms.  Farhana  Shah  on  behalf  of  the
appellants that no efforts were made by the prosecution or PW-557  to  trace
the ownership of the said Maruti Van. It is further contended  with  respect
to PW-557 that, on inspection of the scene of offence  and  after  effecting
the seizure of articles therefrom, he did not mention  the  articles  seized
and certain details while drawing up the panchnama and thus  his  deposition
cannot be relied upon.  A perusal of the deposition of PW-557  reveals  that
he has duly inspected  the  scene  of  crime  and  carefully  drawn  up  the
panchnama (Exh. 1918) mentioning all  the  details.  He  has  mentioned  the
details of all the articles seized by him therein,  more  particularly,  the
broken parts of the said Maruti van and the number  plate  bearing  no.  MFC
1972. Further, it is amply clear from the depositions of PWs-3  and  4  that
the said Maruti van came inside the  Plaza  Cinema,  they  having  seen  the
accused in the said van and  it  has  been  significantly  proved  that  the
appellants were inside the van and that it is the said van which caused  the
explosion.  It has already been proved that the  two  Maruti  Vans,  one  of
blue and the other of red colour were  purchased  by  Mohd.  Shafi  Jariwala
(AA) from Suleman Lakdawala (PW-365) and Kailash Baheti  (PW-342).  Further,
the number of blue Maruti Van is MH-13-D-385 but the number of red  coloured
Maruti was not known as it was not registered. The delivery  of  both  these
vans was given  by  PW-366  which  was  supplied  by  PW-365,  who  in  turn
delivered these vans to Shafi Jariwala.
329)  It is contended on behalf of the appellants that no evidence has  been
brought on record  to  corroborate  that  the  appellants  had  any  driving
licence. To this, prosecution pointed  out  that  A-10  has  been  duly  and
properly identified as the driver  of  the  said  Maruti  van  by  the  eye-
witnesses, viz., PWs-3 and 4. It has also been revealed by him  in  his  own
confessional statement as well as in the confessional  statements  of  other
co-accused that he drove  the  car  to  Plaza  Cinema.  Notwithstanding  the
absence of driving licence, it has been established that  A-10  was  driving
the car.
330)  Chordekar (PW-361) has proved the damage caused to  the  MTNL  (public
property).  FSL  Reports  Exhs.  1952  to  1955  show  the  traces  of   RDX
explosives. Rajkumar Nagdawne    (PW-563) vide letter had sent the  articles
collected from the scene of offence and other places to FSL for opinion.
331)  In view of the above said confessional statements  of  the  appellants
(A-10 and  A-29),  the  confessional  statements  of  the  other  co-accused
persons, deposition of prosecution witnesses,  as  also  the  eye-witnesses,
viz.,  PWs-3  and  4  along  with  other  witnesses  duly  examined  by  the
prosecution, the charges  framed  against  the  appellants  have  been  duly
proved.
                       Criminal Appeal No.365 of 2008

Mohammed Shoeb Mohammed
Kasam Ghansar (A-9)                     ….. Appellant(s)

      vs

The State of Maharashtra,
Through STF,CBI Mumbai                    …. Respondent(s)

                                 **********

332) Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel appeared for the appellant (A-9)  and
Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel, duly assisted  by  Mr.  Mukul
Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr.  Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent.
333)  The present appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order
of conviction and sentence dated  14.09.2006  and  19.07.2007  respectively,
whereby the appellant has been convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  by  the
Designated Court under TADA for the Bombay Bomb Blasts Case, Greater  Bombay
in B.B.C. No. 1/1993.


Charges:
334)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators including the appellant (A-9).  The  relevant  portion  of  the
charge is reproduced hereunder:-
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”



In addition to the above said charge of conspiracy, the appellant (A-9)  has
also been charged for commission of the following offences:
      At head secondly; the appellant (A-9) committed an offence  punishable
      under Section 3(3) of TADA by doing the following overt acts:
i)    Participated in landing of arms and  explosives  at  Shekhadi   Coast,
      Raigad District along with co-conspirators  on  the  3rd  and  7th  of
      February, 1993;
ii)   facilitated the escape of Tiger Memon (AA) by fetching his ticket  and
      passport from the house of Mobina (A-96) and by obtaining his boarding
      pass on the morning of 12.03.1993, at Sahar Airport; and
iii)  actively participated in preparation of vehicle  bombs  in  the  night
      intervening 11th/12th March, 1993 at Al-Hussaini Building.

      At head thirdly; on 12.03.1993, the appellant (A-9), parked a  scooter
      laden with explosives and fitted  with  a  time  device  detonator  in
      Zaveri Bazaar, which exploded killing 17 persons, injuring 57  persons
      and causing loss of property to the tune of Rs.1.20 crores and thereby
      committed an offence under Section 3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA.


      At head fourthly; for the aforesaid act mentioned in  charge  thirdly,
      the appellant (A-9) committed an offence punishable under Section  302
      IPC.

      At head fifthly; for the aforesaid act mentioned  in  charge  thirdly,
      the appellant (A-9), committed an offence punishable under Section 307
      IPC by injuring 57 persons.

      At head  sixthly;  the  appellant  (A-9),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in grievous hurt to 9  persons  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 326 IPC.

      At head seventhly; the  appellant  (A-9),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion and voluntarily causing hurt  to  48  persons  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 324 IPC.

      At head eighthly;  the  appellant  (A-9),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted into damage to the properties worth Rs.  1.2
      crores committed an offence punishable under Section 435 IPC.

      At head  ninthly;  the  appellant  (A-9),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted into damage to the properties worth Rs.  1.2
      crores committed an offence punishable under Section 436 IPC.

      At head  tenthly;  the  appellant  (A-9),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion at Zaveri Bazaar which resulted  into  death,  injuries  and
      destruction of properties, also committed an offence punishable  under
      Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head eleventhly;    the appellant (A-9), by causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion at Zaveri Bazaar which resulted  into  death,  injuries  and
      destruction of properties, also committed an offence punishable  under
      Section 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head twelfthly; the appellant (A-9), in pursuance of the conspiracy
      and in contravention of rules made under Section 5 of  the  Explosives
      Act,1884 without licence having possessed and used RDX,  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 9-B (1)(b) of the  said Act.

      At head thirteenthly; the appellant (A-9), in pursuance  of  the  said
      conspiracy, on  12.03.1993,  in  the  afternoon,  having  abetted  and
      knowingly facilitated terrorist act  i.e.  the  explosion  at  Centaur
      Hotel Juhu, Centaur Hotel at Airport and  Hotel  Sea  Rock  at  Bandra
      committed by the co-conspirator i.e. Mohammed Mushtaq Moosa Tarani (A-
      44), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) and Anwar Theba (AA) by planting
      explosive laden suitcases in the rooms of the said hotels respectively
      and yourself by accompanying them and A-10 in a Maruti Van bearing No.
      MFC-1972 on their way for planting the  said  suitcases  in  the  said
      hotels with intent to commit the terrorist act, committed  an  offence
      punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA.

      At head fourteenthly; the  appellant  (A-9),  for  the  aforesaid  act
      mentioned in charge  thirteenthly,  committed  an  offence  punishable
      under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 of the Explosive Substances
      Act, 1908.

335)  The Designated Judge found the  appellant  (A-9)  guilty  on  all  the
aforesaid charges except  the  charge  of  participating  in  landing.   The
appellant (A-9) has been convicted and sentenced for the above said  charges
as follows:
Conviction and Sentence:

(i)   The appellant was found guilty  for  the  offence  of  conspiracy  for
      commission of such acts as found proved from charge firstly framed  at
      trial and punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA and Section  120-B  of
      IPC read with the offences mentioned in the said  charge  and  on  the
      said count the appellant has been sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  life
      along with a fine of Rs.25,000/-.(charge firstly)
(ii)  The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 5 years along with  a  fine
      of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA.
       (charge secondly)
(iii) The appellant has been  sentenced  to  death  along  with  a  fine  of
      Rs.25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(i) of  TADA.
      (charge thirdly)
(iv)  The appellant has been sentenced to death along  with  a  fine  of  Rs
      25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section  302  IPC.   (charge
      fourthly)
(v)   The appellant has been sentenced to RI for life along with a  fine  of
      Rs. 50,000/-  for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  307  IPC.
      (charge fifthly)
(vi)  The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 10 years along with a  fine
      of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence  punishable  under  Section  326  IPC.
      (charge sixthly)
(vii) The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 3  years  for  the  offence
      punishable under Section 324 IPC. (charge seventhly)
(viii)      The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 7 years along with  a
      fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 435 IPC.
       (charge eighthly)
(ix)  The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 7 years along with  a  fine
      of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence  punishable  under  Section  436  IPC.
      (charge ninthly)
(x)   The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 10 years along with a  fine
      of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable  under  Section  3  of  the
      Explosive Substances Act, 1908.  (charge tenthly)
(xi)  The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 7 years along with  a  fine
      of Rs 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section  4(b)  of  the
      Explosive Substances Act, 1908. (charge eleventhly)
(xii) The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 2  years  for  the  offence
      punishable under Section 9B(1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884. (charge
      twelfthly)
(xiii)      The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 7 years along with  a
      fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 3(3)  of
      TADA. (charge thirteenthly)

(xiv) The appellant has been sentenced to RI for 5 years along with  a  fine
      of Rs 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4  read
      with  Section  6  of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908.  (charge
      fourteenthly)
Evidence:
336)  The evidence against the appellant is in the form of:-
(i)   his own confession;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence on record.

Conspiracy
337)  As mentioned above, a common charge  of  conspiracy  has  been  framed
against all the accused persons and in order to bring home the  charge,  the
prosecution need not  necessarily  prove  that  the  perpetrators  expressly
agreed to do or cause to be done the  illegal  act,  the  agreement  may  be
proved by necessary implication.  Since we have  elaborately  discussed  the
issue relating to conspiracy in the earlier part of our judgment,  there  is
no need to refer to the same once again.

Confessional Statement of the appellant  -  Mohammed  Shoeb  Mohammed  Kasam
Ghansar (A-9)

338)  Confessional statement of the appellant  (A-9)  under  Section  15  of
TADA has been recorded on 19.04.1993 and 22.04.1993, by Shri P.K. Jain,  the
then DCP, Zone  X,  Bombay.   The  following  facts  emerge  from  the  said
confessional statement:
(i)   In the night of 11.03.1993, on being asked by Asgar Yusuf Mukadam  (A-
      10), the appellant went to Sahar Airport along  with  him  and  got  a
      boarding card issued for Tiger Memon.
(ii)  The appellant (A-9) asked A-10 that "what  to  do  if  anyone  catches
      me”, at this, A-10 answered to tell that “it (boarding  card)  belongs
      to my brother”.
(iii) Tiger Memon left India in the morning of 12.03.1993, at  4  a.m.,  and
      the appellant (A-9) and A-10 saw him leaving the Airport for Dubai.
(iv)  The appellant (A-9) was present at the  Al-Hussaini  building  on  the
      night of 11.03.1993 after dropping Tiger Memon at the Airport, and was
      also present when RDX was being filled into the vehicles by other  co-
      accused persons including Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11), Parvez  Nazir
      Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Mohd. Shafi (AA) and Anwar Theba (AA).
(v)   The appellant (A-9), along with A-10 and A-12,  disposed  of  six  big
      plastic bags in a wastage van  of  BMC  at  Bandra  Reclamation  Road.
      These bags were handed over to them by Anwar Theba  (AA)  at  the  Al-
      Hussaini Building.
(vi)  On 12.03.1993, the appellant (A-9), accompanied A-10 and went  to  the
      residence of A-12 in order to pick him up and, thereafter,  they  went
      to the Al-Hussaini Building in a Maruti Van.
(vii) 3 VIP Bags were collected by A-12 and A-10 from the garage at the  Al-
      Hussaini building and then they along with the appellant (A-9) went to
      the residence of Anwar Theba (AA) to pick him up.
(viii)      On 12.03.1993, the appellant (A-9) was present  in  the  Van  at
      the time of insertion of timer pencil detonators in the black chemical
      (RDX) kept in the 3 VIP suit cases by Anwar Theba (AA).
(ix)  On 12.03.1993, the appellant (A-9) was also present with A-10  in  the
      van used for dropping the co-accused, namely,  A-12,  A-44  and  Anwar
      Theba (AA) who went for  planting  bombs  in  Hotel  Sea  Rock,  Hotel
      Centaur Juhu and Hotel Centaur Airport respectively.
(x)   The appellant (A-9), thereafter, returned to the Al-Hussaini  building
      with A-10.  A-12, A-44 and Anwar Theba (AA) also returned to the  said
      building after planting the bombs at the targets which exploded later.
       He noticed  that  three  new  scooters  were  parked  at  Al-Hussaini
      compound.  He was present when Mustaq (A-44) left with one of the  new
      scooters.
(xi)  On the very same day, i.e., 12.03.1993, on the  instruction  of  A-10,
      the appellant (A-9) planted a scooter laden with RDX  in  front  of  a
      jewellery shop at Zaveri Bazaar  as  per  the  instructions  of  A-10.
      Anwar Theba (AA) had inserted timer pencil  detonators  in  the  black
      chemical (RDX) filled in dicky of the scooter.   The  appellant  (A-9)
      had the knowledge that the scooter was carrying bomb as told to him by
      A-10.
(xii) After planting the scooter laden with RDX, the  appellant  (A-9)  went
      to a Masjid and begged for forgiveness for his sins.   He  also  threw
      the keys of the scooter in a drain near Bus Stop No. 4  at  Mohd.  Ali
      Road.
339)  From a perusal of the entire confession, it is  established  that  the
appellant was fully aware and conscious of the overt acts committed by  him.
 The above stated facts are established from  the  admission  of  his  guilt
that after planting the bomb at Zaveri Bazaar,  he  begged  for  forgiveness
for his sins from ‘Allah’ (the Almighty God) and that even at  the  time  of
getting the boarding pass of Tiger Memon,  he  was  conscious  and  cautious
that he was facilitating, aiding and abetting a terrorist  in  fleeing  from
the country, and accordingly,  the  appellant  enquired  from  A-10  at  the
Airport as to ‘what will happen if anyone catches him’.  The  guilt  of  the
appellant (A-9) is proved from his confession and it is established that  he
knew that his actions were wrong and  illegal.   The  appellant  consciously
joined the conspiracy  and  committed  overt  acts  in  furtherance  of  the
conspiracy.  He was well aware of the consequences of his  actions  and  the
actions of other co-conspirators.
Confessional Statements of co-accused:
340)  Apart from his own confession, the involvement of the appellant  (A-9)
has also been disclosed in the confessional statements of the following  co-
accused.  The legality and acceptability  of  the  confessions  of  the  co-
accused has been considered by us in the earlier  part  of  our  discussion.
The said confessions insofar as they refer to the appellant  are  summarized
hereinbelow:
Confessional Statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)
      Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.04.1993 and 23.04.1993 (18:00 hrs.), by  Shri  K.L.  Bishnoi,
the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  following  facts  emerge  from  the
abovesaid confession with regard to the appellant (A-9):
(i)   In the night of 11.03.1993, the appellant booked the luggage of  Tiger
      Memon and obtained his boarding card at the Airport for his  departure
      to Dubai.
(ii)  The appellant (A-9), accompanied by A-10 and  A-12,  disposed  of  the
      plastic bags in a wastage van of BMC which contained the  empty  boxes
      of explosives.
(iii) The appellant (A-9), accompanied by A-10 and  A-12,  picked  up  three
      VIP bags loaded with explosives from the  garage  at  the  Al-Hussaini
      building and took them to the residence  of  Anwar  Theba  (AA)  where
      Anwar fitted the detonators in these  suitcases  and  thereafter,  the
      bags were taken away by A-12, A-44 and Anwar Theba (AA) to  Hotel  Sea
      Rock, Hotel Centaur Juhu and Hotel Centaur Airport respectively.
(iv)  The appellant (A-9), on being asked by A-10, drove the  scooter  laden
      with explosives on the instructions of Anwar Theba (AA) and parked  it
      at a crowded place in Zaveri Bazaar which later  exploded  killing  17
      persons and injuring 57 others.

Confessional Statement of Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11)
        Confessional statement of A-11 under Section 15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 and 18.04.1993 by Shri P.K. Jain, the then DCP,  Zone
III, Bombay.  A-11, in his confession, has stated that the  appellant  (A-9)
was present at Al-Hussaini Building in the night of  11.03.1993  along  with
other co-accused, namely, Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla  (A-13),  Parvez
Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Md. Shafi, Anwar Theba (AA),  Javed  Chikna  (AA)
and he filled the chemical (black soap) in the vehicles  which  were  to  be
planted as bombs.  He further stated as follows:
      “…..After sometime Shafi, Anwar, Javed Chikna, Bashir,  Parvez,  Shoeb
      and 10/12 boys assembled there.  All people came in the garage of  Al-
      Hussaini Building and all of them filled chemical @ black  soap  in  a
      number of vehicles….”

Confessional Statement of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh   (A-12)
      Confessional statement of A-12 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 and 21.04.1993 (06.50 hrs), by Shri  P.K.  Jain,  the
then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  The following facts emerge from  the  abovesaid
confession with regard to the appellant (A-9):
(i)   The appellant (A-9) was present at the  Al-Hussaini  building  on  the
      night of 11.03.1993 along with other co-conspirators when the work  of
      filling the black chemical (RDX) into the vehicles to  be  planted  as
      bombs in Bombay was being done.  The said black chemical  was  brought
      from Shekhadi which was landed on 03.02.1993.
(ii)  The chemical was packed in cardboard boxes and  pieces  of  iron  were
      also added to it.
(iii) In the morning of 12.03.1993,  on  the  instructions  of  Anwar  Theba
      (AA), the appellant (A-9), along with A-10 and A-12, threw 5-6 plastic
      bags in a wastage van of BMC  at  Bandra  which  contained  the  empty
      cardboard boxes of the explosives.
(iv)  A-12 further stated as follows:
           “And then at about 10.30 o’ clock, Asgar came back to  my  house
           with Shoaib in the same red coloured van and we three came at Al-
           Hussaini.  From there, we reached to the house of  Anwar  taking
           the three Suit cases (big briefcase)  which  were  kept  in  the
           garage, by Maruti van, where we met Anwar and Mushtaq whose hair
           were curly.  They both came and sat in the car, before  starting
           the car Anwar opened the bag and pierced the article  just  like
           pencil into the chemical and closed the bags.”

(v)   The appellant (A-9), along with A-10, came to the  house  of  A-12  on
      13.03.1993 and  discussed  about  the  blasts  that  had  occurred  on
      12.03.1993.
Confessional Statement of Imtiyaz Yunusmiyan Ghavate (A-15)
      Confessional statement of A-15 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 07.05.1993 and 09.05.1993 (13.30 hrs.),  by  Shri  K.L.  Bishnoi
(PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  The following facts  emerge  from
the confessional statement of A-15:
(i)   The appellant (A-9) was seated  in  the  maroon  coloured  Maruti  Van
      along with A-10 and A-12 on 12.03.1993 and all of them  drove  to  the
      house of Anwar Theba (AA) to collect the three suitcases.
(ii)  On 12.03.1993, A-9, along with A-10, came to the Al-Hussaini  Building
      in a Maruti Van.
(iii) In the presence of the appellant  (A-9),  Anwar  Theba  (AA)  inserted
      timer pencil detonators in the dicky of scooters laden with explosives
      which were later planted as bombs.
(iv)  The appellant drove a scooter laden with explosives  and  fitted  with
      pencil detonators on 12.03.1993.




Confessional Statement of Mohd. Mushtaq Moosa Tarani (A-44)

      Confessional statement of A-44 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 26.05.1993 and 22.05.1993 (10.00 hrs.),  by  Shri  K.L.  Bishnoi
(PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  In  his  confessional  statement,
he stated that on 12.03.1993, A-9 and A-15 came to the  residence  of  Anwar
Theba (AA) in a Maroon coloured car driven by A-10.
341)  The aforesaid confessional statements of co-accused persons, viz.,  A-
10, A-11, A-12, A-15 and A-44 duly corroborate  the  confessional  statement
of A-9 in all material aspects.  From the above, it is established that:
(i)   The appellant (A-9) was actively involved in the conspiracy;
(ii)  The appellant was present at the Al-Hussaini building in the night  of
      11.03.1993 and filled RDX in vehicles;
(iii) The appellant went to various places  with  A-10  and  A-12  and  also
      picked up three suitcases filled with RDX from the garage of  the  Al-
      Hussaini building in which detonators were  inserted  by  Anwar  Theba
      (AA) in order to plant the same at various places in the city.
(iv)  The appellant was traveling in the car in which A-10, A-12,  A-44  and
      Anwar Theba (AA) were also present.
(v)    The  appellant  participated  in  various  conspiratorial  acts  like
      aiding, abetting and in fleeing of Tiger Memon out of the country.
(vi)  The appellant was fully aware that the aforementioned accused  persons
      were carrying suitcase bombs for planting the same at Hotel Sea  Rock,
      Hotel Centaur, Juhu and at Hotel Centaur, Airport.
(vii) The appellant parked the scooter  at  the  junction  of  Sheikh  Memon
      Street and Mirza Street at Zaveri Bazaar which exploded at about 03:05
      p.m. killing 17 persons and injuring 57 others;
(viii)      After parking the scooter, the appellant (A-9)  threw  the  keys
      of the scooter into a gutter to avoid detection and went to  a  mosque
      to beg forgiveness for his sins.
342)  It is also clear that the confessions made by co-accused  persons  are
truthful and voluntary and were made without any coercion.   All  safeguards
enumerated under Section 15 of TADA and the  rules  framed  thereunder  have
been duly complied with while recording the confessions of the appellants.
Retraction Statements:
343)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel for the  appellant  (A-9)  contended
that the confessional statement of the appellant as well  as  of  co-accused
persons relied upon by the prosecution  against  the  appellant  (A-9)  were
retracted  subsequently,  and  therefore,  it  is  not  safe  to  base   the
conviction on the said confessional statements under  Section  15  of  TADA.
Since  the  very  same  objection  raised  in  the  connected  appeals   was
considered and rejected, we are not once  again  repeating  the  same.   The
said conclusion is applicable to this appeal also.
Depositions of Prosecution Witnesses:
344)  The prosecution has relied upon the evidence  of  several  prosecution
witnesses to establish  the  involvement  of  the  appellant  (A-9)  in  the
conspiracy.  The relevant facts emerge  from  the  deposition  of  witnesses
incriminating the appellant have been enumerated below:
Eye-witnesses:
Deposition of Badrinath Bishansingh Sharma (PW-29)
 (i)  PW-29 is a hawker at Zaveri Bazaar.   He  is  an  eye-witness  to  the
      blast.  He testified that on 12.03.1993, he saw  a  person  trying  to
      park a scooter in front of the shop of Narayandas Jewellers at  Zaveri
      Bazaar which fell down.  PW-29 offered to  help  him  in  lifting  the
      scooter but the appellant (A-9) refused to take any help.
(ii)  He remembered the colour of the scooter as grey and noted  its  number
      on a cigarette pack.  The said packet was handed over to the police on
      18.03.1993 which was seized by seizure Panchnama Exh. No. 1878  proved
      by Nisar Ahmed Kankarbhai Shaikh (PW-550).  PW-29 also identified  the
      said cigarette packet.
 (iii)      He also described about the site of the blast  and  stated  that
      several persons were killed and injured in the blast including himself
      who got injured in his right leg.
(v)   PW-29 identified the appellant  (A-9)  in  the  identification  parade
      held at Sacred Hearts School, Worli on 25.03.1993 as  the  person  who
      parked the said scooter on 12.03.1993 at Zaveri Bazaar.
(vi)  PW-29 again identified  the  appellant  (A-9)  on  13.05.1993  in  the
      identification parade held at the office of CID in Crawford Market.
A perusal of the deposition establishes the fact that  the  appellant  (A-9)
parked the scooter laden with explosives at Zaveri  Bazaar.     Ms.  Farhana
Shah, learned counsel for the appellant (A-9) contended  that  PW-29  is  an
unreliable witness and his deposition should be discarded since he  did  not
disclose the number of the scooter or inform anyone until he  had  seen  the
appellant even after five days of the blasts on 12.03.1993.  It is  relevant
to point out that PW-29 was also injured in the said blast  and  thereafter,
he went to his house. The police had cordoned off the  area.  On  the  sixth
day after the blasts, PW-29 came to the market and informed the police  that
he could identify the person who had parked the scooter  at  Zaveri  Bazaar.
PW-29 actually identified the appellant in the  Test  Identification  Parade
conducted on 25.03.1993 and 13.05.1993 as the person who parked the  scooter
at Zaveri Bazaar.
Deposition of Amit Champalal Acharya (PW-36)
      (i)   PW-36, who is an Estate Agent, is an eyewitness to the incident.


      (ii)  When he  was  standing  in  front  of  the  shop  of  Narayandas
           Jewellers on the fateful  day,  a  scooterist  (A-9),  lost  his
           balance while parking his scooter in front of the shop and  fell
           down. One passerby tried to help him but he refused angrily.
      (iii) He further testified that the scooterist  (A-9)  left  hurriedly
           after parking the scooter. This further shows that he was  aware
           that there was a bomb inside the  scooter  which  could  explode
           anytime.
      (iv)  He identified the appellant (A-9) in the  identification  parade
           held on 13.05.1993 at the office of CID in Crawford Market.
Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel contended on behalf of the  appellant  (A-
9) that the deposition of this  witness  should  be  discarded  since  PW-36
failed to identify the appellant in the court when he was given  opportunity
twice. The prosecution submits that non-identification of A-9 in  the  Court
would not make the deposition of PW-36 unreliable as  he  did  identify  the
appellant (A-9) in  the  identification  parade  held  on  13.05.1993.   The
identification  parade  took  place  shortly  after  the  blasts   but   the
identification in court took place  only  on  12.01.1996,  which  is  almost
after three years, thus it is possible that due to  passage  of  time  PW-36
was unable to identify the  appellant  before  the  court.  The  prosecution
further submits that this does not impeach  the  deposition  made  by  PW-36
since his evidence is sufficiently corroborated by the deposition  of  PW-29
in all material aspects.    The prosecution has brought to our  notice  that
the identification parade dated 25.03.1993 was conducted  at  Sacred  Hearts
High School by  Ram  S.  Bhosale  (PW-460),  who  conducted  the  parade  in
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Code.   PW-460  also  recognized
Exh.1471, i.e., memorandum panchnama prepared  during  the  parade.   PW-460
further stated that no police official was present in  the  parade  room  at
the time of the parade and that the appellant (A-9)  was  brought  into  the
parade room wearing a cover (chadar) so as not to reveal his identity.
Deposition of Moreshwar Gopal Thakur (PW-469)
      Special Executive Magistrate  (PW-469)  conducted  the  identification
parade in respect of A-9. Exh. 1510 is  the  memorandum  of  the  TIP  dated
13.05.1993.  The following information is available in the said memorandum:-

      (i)   TIP memorandum records that a TIP  was  conducted  by  SEM  Shri
           Thakur (PW-460) on 13.05.1993.
      (ii)  The first witness – PW-29 identified the appellant as the person
           who parked the scooter at Zaveri Bazaar on 12.03.1993.
      (iii) The second witness – PW-36 also identified the appellant as  the
           person who parked the scooter at Zaveri Bazaar on 12.03.1993.






Evidence with regard to recovery of the keys of the Scooter:

Deposition of Narsingh Tukaram Sherkhan (PW-556)
345)  PW-556, a police officer, recorded the Disclosure  Statement  made  by
the appellant on 21.03.1993 to the following effect:
The appellant (A-9) said to the officer:
      “Come with me, I will show you the place, where I had thrown the  keys
      of the scooter, after I parked  the  said  Bajaj  Scooter  laden  with
      explosives”

The said  statement  was  recorded  vide  Disclosure  memo  Exh.199  in  the
presence of Panch Witnesses. Pursuant to the said disclosure, the  appellant
(A-9) led the police party and the same was recorded in the Panchnama  (Exh.
200) to the following effect:
      “Upon making  the  statement  by  the  accused  in  pursuance  of  the
      aforesaid panchnama, we the panchas,  Police  party  and  the  accused
      Mohammed Shoeb Mohammed Kasam Ghansar, Muslim, aged 30  years  sat  in
      the police jeep Number MH-01-M-364 and as per the instruction  of  the
      accused, the jeep Driver of P. N. 1938 Mahim Police Station drove  the
      jeep by L. J. Road, Tilak Bridge, Dadar T.T., Ambedkar  Road,  Ibrahim
      Rahimatulla Road, Bhendi Bazar and after the  jeep  reached  at  Johar
      chowk via Mohammed Ali Road the accused asked the Jeep Driver to  halt
      the vehicle (jeep) and thereupon the  jeep  driver  halted  the  jeep.
      Thereafter the accused person, we the panchas and the police party got
      down from the jeep. Thereafter, as per the instruction of the accused,
      we the panchas, police party crossed the Mohammed Ali Road·and came to
      the open space in front of the office of 'Time Travel & Tour'  on  the
      Western side foot path and on coming at the said place, pointed  at  a
      gutter on Mohammed Ali Road, situated on  the  opposite  side  of  the
      'Time Travel & Tour' and the accused also pointed  that  the  key  was
      thrown therein. The said gutter is at a distance of 10 feet  from  the
      said office. On the said gutter there are two cement  lids  and  below
      the same there is a cement grille. In the presence of us, the panchas,
      distance was measured from the said gutter  which  distance  from  the
      Electric pole MHL 53 is 12 feet.
      The accused push aside the cement lid on the said  gutter  and  dipped
      his hand in the said gutter and removed a below described key from the
      silt of the gutter when the police in the presence of us, the panchas,
      observed the key removed by the accused, the description of  the  said
      key is as follows.
      There are two keys in one steel ring and on one side of both the  said
      keys, 'Bajaj' has been inscribed in English and below the same '2-112'
      has been inscribed and on the another side the letters K.  V.  P.  has
      been inscribed in English and the same were smeared with the earth.”

It is brought to our notice by the prosecution that these were the  keys  of
the  scooter  used  in  the  blast  at  Zaveri  Bazaar  and  this  recovery,
therefore, also established the fact that the  appellant  (A-9)  had  parked
the scooter at Zaveri Bazaar on 12.03.1993 and threw the keys in the  gutter
after parking  the  same.  The  prosecution  submitted  that  the  appellant
further led the police party to recover his passport and driving licence.


Deposition of Kamalakar Kashinath Deo (PW-51)
       The evidence of PW-556 is further corroborated with the  evidence  of
panch witness Kamalakar Kashinath Deo (PW-51) wherein  he  stated  that  the
appellant  (A-9)  had  made  a  voluntary  statement  in  his  presence   on
21.03.1993 and disclosed the location of the keys of the scooter.
346)  It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that  the  deposition
of PW-51 should not be relied upon since the  gutter  from  where  the  keys
were recovered had a manhole, and therefore, the  investigating  agency  has
planted the keys.  To this, the prosecution pointed  out  that  PW-51  is  a
panch witness and has identified the appellant as the person who offered  to
take the police party to the place where the keys of the  scooter  had  been
thrown by him and were infact recovered from  the  said  gutter  after  duly
opening the manhole.  It is further pointed out  that  PW-51  withstood  the
rigorous cross-examination and is a credible witness.
347)  It has also been  contended  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  the
evidence of PW-556 is unreliable  due  to  various  contradictions.   It  is
pointed out by the  prosecution  that  there  is  no  contradiction  in  the
deposition of PW-556 and on  going  through  the  same,  we  feel  that  the
contradictions pointed out on behalf  of  the  appellant  (A-9)  were  minor
contradictions and they do not go to  the  root  of  the  matter  so  as  to
discredit the testimony of the witness.
Evidence with regard to purchase of scooter:
348)  The prosecution pointed out that the scooter which was planted by  the
appellant (A-9) along with  two  other  scooters,  was  purchased  by  Munaf
Halari (AA), who was a close friend of Tiger Memon.  The said  purchase  was
done in the following manner:
(i)   Munaf Halari approached Abdul  Sattar  (PW-82)  for  the  purchase  of
      these scooters under an assumed name.
(ii)  PW-82 took Munaf Halari to Govind Baria (PW-452)  and  PW-452  in-turn
      directed them to Asgar Ali Masalewala (PW-299).
(iii) Munaf Halari paid an amount of Rs. 70,000/-  in  cash  to  PW-299  and
      took the delivery of two Bajaj scooters on  10.03.1993,  and  the  3rd
      scooter was delivered to Munaf Halari on the following day.
(iv)  PW-299 is  a  sub-agent  of  PW-298  who  in-turn  had  purchased  the
      scooters from M/s. Mohan Automobiles  as  deposed  by  Shriram  Jitram
      Vasan (PW-81).
(v)   PW-81 stated that he purchased the scooter from Ajit Vanjari  (PW-651)
      of M/s. Vasan Automobiles.

Deposition of Sayeed Abdul Sattar (PW-82)
      PW-82, who was an employee of Munaf Halari (AA), stated that  two  new
scooters were purchased on 11.03.1993 from the  garage  of  PW-299  in  Chor
Bazar, Bombay and one of them was of blue color. The delivery of  the  third
scooter was given on the next day.  He  identified  two  out  of  the  three
scooters purchased, in court.

Deposition of Govind Bechan Baria (PW-452)
(i)   PW-452 worked at a petrol pump where Munaf Halari  used  to  park  his
      vehicle and that is how he knew Munaf Halari.
(ii)  PW-452 deposed that  Munaf  Halari,  along  with  two  other  persons,
      approached him to purchase new scooters on  10.03.1993  and  that  the
      witness referred them to Asgar Ali Masalewala (PW-299).

Deposition of Asgar Ali Tahir Ali Masalewala (PW-299)
(i)   PW 299 carried on the business of sale/purchase of scooters.
(ii)  On 10.03.1993, Akhtar came  to  PW-299  with  a  request  to  purchase
      scooters. PW-299 obtained the delivery  of  scooters  from  a  dealer,
      viz., Nisha Sales  and  gave  the  scooters  to  Akhtar  and  his  two
      companions.
(iii) The request for purchase of a third scooter was  made  on  10.03.1993.
      On 11.03.1993, he obtained the third scooter from the abovesaid dealer
      and passed it on to Akhtar and his two companions.

Deposition of Shriram Jitram Vasan (PW-81)
(i)   PW-81 is a scooter sub-dealer  (he  used  to  purchase  scooters  from
      Vasan Auto and sell  the  same  to  customers)  and  prepares  scooter
      purchase challans in the name of Mohan Auto.
(ii)  PW-81 sold 22 scooters to Nisha Sales in early days of 1993  three  of
      which were of stone, blue and cosmic colour respectively.
(iii) PW-81 identified the remaining two  of  the  three  scooters  sold  to
      Nisha Sales in Court.

Deposition of Ajit Vitthalrao Vanjari (PW-651)
(i)   PW-651 was an employee at Vasan Auto.
(ii)  He recognized the challans issued in  respect  of  purchase  of  Bajaj
      Scooters for delivery to M/s Mohan Auto in 1993.

The prosecution pointed out that the above  depositions  and  the  documents
clearly establish the chain of purchase of scooters used in  the  blasts  on
12.03.1993.
Investigation, Recoveries and FSL Reports:
349)  The place of incident, i.e., where the  blast  took  place  at  Zaveri
Bazaar was inspected by Narayan Yedu Rajguru (PW-554)  vide  panchnama  Exh.
1908.  The panchnama described the effect of the  explosion  and  vide  this
panchnama debris and other articles were seized by the I.O. from  the  place
of occurrence.  PW-554 also took samples from the  place  of  occurrence  in
the presence of FSL Experts vide panchnama Exhibit 1909.

Deposition of Narayan Yedu Rajguru (PW-554)
      In his deposition dated 29.12.1999, he deposed that:
      (i)   He reached the site within 15 minutes of the blast.
      (ii)  He prepared a  panchnama  Exh.1908  in  the  presence  of  panch
           witnesses and seized the articles/blast debris etc.
       iii) He also proved this panchnama in court.
      (iv)  He deposed that the  Forensic  expert  had  also  collected  the
           samples from the blast site on 13.03.1993 and a panchnama  (Exh.
           1909) was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses.
      (v)   The panchnama was proved by the witness.
      (vi)  The said panchnama records the burnt scooter at the blast site.
The seized articles were sent to the FSL  for  examination  vide  Exh.  Nos.
1910 and 1911.  The FSL Reports  pertaining  to  the  examination  of  these
samples are Exh. Nos. 1883,  1884  and  1885  which  show  the  presence  of
residual high explosive RDX in the samples forwarded for examination.

Evidence with regard to Injured Victims and the Relatives of the Deceased:

350)  Nisar Ahmed Kankarbhai Shaikh  (PW-550)  has  proved  the  deaths  and
injuries  caused  to  various  persons  due  to  the  said  explosion.   The
following  injured  witnesses  have  also  deposed  regarding  the  injuries
received by them on account of explosion at Zaveri Bazaar:
(i)    Ramchandra  Raghunath  Deshmukh  (PW-394)  was  injured  by  a  glass
      splinter that hit him on his back, tearing his  shirt  and  causing  a
      wound.
(ii)  Shivari B Garg (PW-424) was also injured by 15 to 20  glass  splinters
      which struck him with great force causing multiple  bleeding  injuries
      near his left eye, left side of forehead, left hand and chest.
(iii) Arjun Padurang Devde (PW-578) received injuries on the  left  side  of
      his waist.  He had to remain in the  hospital  for  8-9  days  as  the
      injuries were sustained  due  to  some  foreign  particles  which  had
      pierced into his waist.  It is  pertinent  to  mention  that  metallic
      pieces (Article 485) were extracted from his body which were seized by
      Ashok Ganpat Dabhade (PW-558) vide panchnama Exhibit 1925.

The following doctors have proved the injury certificates  (Exh.  Nos.  2364
and 2355) with regard to PWs-394 and 424:
(i)   Dr. Durgaprasad Mahavir Vyas (PW-634) and;
(ii)  Dr. Vijaykumar Purshotam Ved (PW-637).

The following witnesses have proved the ADR/Inquest  panchnamas  in  respect
of the victims who died in the explosion:
(i)   Sudhir Prabhakar Aspat (PW-569) and;
(ii)  Feroz Rajahamed Patel (PW-576) and PW-558.

The following witnesses have proved the death  of  their  relatives  in  the
explosion:
(i)   Vinayak Dattatray Chavan (PW-395) deposed with regard to the death  of
      his sister, brother-in-law  and  nephew,  who  died  due  to  injuries
      sustained in the blast that took place at Zaveri Bazaar on  12.03.1993
      and;
(ii)  Radheshyam Mangalchand Poddar (PW-396) deposed about the death of  his
      son due to the blast that took place at Zaveri Bazaar.
The  prosecution  has  also  established  the  damage  caused   to   various
properties due to the bomb blast at Zaveri Bazaar from  the  panchnama  Exh.
No. 1908 as also by the deposition of PW-554.  It  also  stands  established
that the damage was due to  the  explosion  caused  with  the  help  of  RDX
explosives.
351)  In view of the above said confessional statement of the appellant  (A-
9), the confessional statements of other co-accused persons as also the eye-
witnesses PWs-29 and 36, along with other witnesses  duly  examined  by  the
prosecution, the contentions raised by learned  counsel  for  the  appellant
regarding his  participation  in  the  conspiracy,  landing,  conspiratorial
meetings as well as the filling of RDX during  the  intervening  night,  are
meritless as the charges framed against the appellant (A-9) have  been  duly
proved.
                    Criminal Appeal Nos. 864-865 of 2008

Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11)                   ... Appellant(s)
      versus
The State of Maharashtra
Through STF, CBI Bombay                               ... Respondent

                                  ********


352)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel appeared for the appellant  and  Mr.
Gopal Subramanium, learned  senior  counsel,  duly  assisted  by  Mr.  Mukul
Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr.  Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent.
353)  These appeals have been filed against the final judgment and order  of
conviction  and  sentence  dated  19.09.2006  and  18.07.2007  respectively,
whereby the appellant has been convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  by  the
Designated Court under TADA Bombay Bomb Blast Case, Greater  Bombay  in  BBC
No. 1/ 1993.


Charges:
354)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators including the appellant (A-11).  The relevant  portion  of  the
charge is reproduced hereunder:-
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”


      In addition to the  abovesaid  principal  charge  of  conspiracy,  the
appellant was also charged on other counts which are summarized as under:


      At head Secondly:- The accused committed an offence  punishable  under
      Section 3 (3) of TADA (P) Act 1987 by committing the  following  overt
      acts:


           (a)   He participated in the landing of arms and  explosives  at
           Shekhadi in February 1993.
           (b)   He attended meetings at the house of Babloo and Mobina  to
           make plans for committing terriorist acts.
           (c)   He received training in handling of  arms,  explosives  at
           village Sandheri and Borghat.
           (d)   He participated in preparation of  vehicle  bombs  in  the
           night of 11th/12th March 1993.


      At head Thirdly:-  He planted the explosive laden  Jeep  No.  MP-09-S-
      0070 in front of Udipi Hotel in Century  Bazar,  Worli  on  12.3.1993,
      which exploded causing death of 88 persons, injuries  to  159  persons
      and loss of properties worth Rs. 2.41 crores and,  thereby,  committed
      an offence punishable under Section 3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA.

      At head Fourthly:- By causing  the  above  mentioned  explosion  which
      resulted into death of 88 persons, he committed an offence  punishable
      under Section 302 IPC.


      At head Fifthly:- By  causing  the  above  mentioned  explosion  which
      resulted into  injuries  to  159  persons,  he  committed  an  offence
      punishable under Section 307 IPC.

      At head Sixthly:-  By causing the aforesaid explosion  which  resulted
      into  grievous  injuries  to  53  persons,  he  committed  an  offence
      punishable under Section 326 IPC.

      At head Seventhly:- By causing the above said explosion which resulted
      into injuries to 106 persons, he committed an offence punishable under
      Section 324 IPC.

      At head Eighthly:-  By causing the aforesaid explosion which  resulted
      into damage to properties  worth  Rs.  2.5  crores,  he  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 435 IPC.

      At  head  Ninthly:-  By  causing  the  aforesaid  explosion,  he  also
      committed an offence punishable under Section 436 IPC.

      At head Tenthly:- By causing the aforesaid  explosion  which  resulted
      into death, injuries and damage to the  properties,  he  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 3 of the  Explosive  Substances  Act,
      1908.


      At head Eleventhly:- By causing the aforesaid explosions by possessing
      explosive substances, he committed an offence punishable under Section
      4(a)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head Twelfthly:- By possessing the explosives without valid licence
      that  caused  the  aforesaid  explosions,  he  committed  an   offence
      punishable under Section 9B (1) (b) of the Explosives Act, 1884.

      At head Thirteenthly:-   By  causing  the  aforesaid  explosion  which
      resulted into damage to the public properties, he committed an offence
      punishable under Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to  Public
      Property Act, 1984.




Conviction and Sentence:

355)  On all the aforesaid charges the appellant  was  found  guilty  except
for charges (b) and (c) at head  secondly  by  the  Designated  Judge.   The
appellant (A-11) has been convicted and sentenced as under:

(i)   to suffer punishment of death along with a fine of  Rs.25,000/-  under
      Section 3(3) of TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with  the  offences
      mentioned in the said charge. (charge firstly).

(ii)  to suffer RI for 10  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.50,000/-,  in
      default, to further undergo RI for 1 year for the  offence  punishable
      under Section  3(3) of TADA (charge secondly).

(iii) to suffer punishment of death along with a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-  for
      the  offence  punishable  under  Section   3(2)(i)  of  TADA   (charge
      thirdly).

(iv)  to suffer punishment of death along with a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-  for
      the offence punishable under Section  302 IPC (charge fourthly).

(v)   to suffer RI for life along with a fine of  Rs.25,000/-,  in  default,
      to further undergo RI for 6 months for the  offence  punishable  under
      Section 307 IPC (charge fifthly).

(vi)  to suffer RI for 14  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
      default, to  further  undergo  RI  for  six  months  for  the  offence
      punishable under Section  326 IPC (charge sixthly).

(vii) to suffer RI for 2 years for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section
      435 IPC (charge eighthly).

(viii)      to suffer RI for 7 years along with a fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
      default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for the offence punishable
      under Section 436 IPC (charge ninthly).

(ix)  to suffer RI for 10  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
      default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for the offence punishable
      under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act,1908 (charge tenthly).



(x)   to suffer RI for  7  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
      default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for the offence punishable
      under Section 4(b) of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908  (charge
      eleventhly).

(xi)  to suffer RI for 2 years for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section
      9B(1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884 (charge twelfthly).

(xii) to suffer RI for  5  years  along  with  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
      default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for the offence punishable
      under Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to  Public  Property  Act,
      1984 (charge thirteenthly).
Evidence:
356)  The evidence against the appellant (A-11) is in the form of:-
(i)   his own confession;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses including eye witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence.

Conspiracy
357)  As mentioned above, a common charge of conspiracy was  framed  against
all the accused  persons  and  in  order  to  bring  home  the  charge,  the
prosecution need not  necessarily  prove  that  the  perpetrators  expressly
agreed to do or cause to be done the  illegal  act,  the  agreement  may  be
proved by necessary implication.  Since we have  elaborately  discussed  the
issue relating to conspiracy in the earlier part of our judgment,  there  is
no need to refer to the same once again.
Confessional Statement of the appellant - Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11)

358)  Confessional statement of the appellant (A-11)  under  Section  15  of
TADA has been recorded on 15.04.1993, by Shri Prem  Krishna  Jain  (PW-189),
the  then  DCP,  Zone  X,  Bombay.  The  following  facts  emerge  from  the
confession of the appellant:

(i)   He knew that Tiger was a smuggler but he still joined him and used  to
           perform the work of delivery/bringing of Hawala money.
(ii)  He knew that Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Imtiyaz Yunus  Miyan  Ghavate
           (A-15), Mohammed Rafiq @  Rafiq  Madi  Musa  Biyariwala  (A-46),
           Anwar (AA), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) and the  fact  that
           they were working with Tiger.
 (iii)      He used to bring money from Mulchand Sampatraj Shah @ Choksi (A-
           97) of Zaveri Bazaar.
 (iv) He took part in landings of silver at Mhasla, Shekhadi where Jeeps  of
           Raju  Laxmichand  Jain  @  Raju  Kodi  (A-26)  were   used   for
           transportation.
 (v)  On 27/28 January, on being called by Shafi, he visited the Al-Hussaini
           Building, where Tiger, Anwar Theba (AA), Mohammed Rafiq @  Rafiq
           Madi Musa Biyariwala (A-46), Imityaz Yunus Miyan Ghavate (A-15),
           Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Yakub Abdul Razak Memon  (A-1)
           and his wife were also present.
 (vi) On 27/28 January, 1993, he left  for  Mhasla  alongwith  Tiger,  Anwar
           Theba (AA), Imtiyaz Yunus Miyan Ghavate (A-15), Shafi,  Mohammed
           Rafiq @ Rafiq Madi Musa Biyariwala (A-46) and Parvez Nazir Ahmed
           Shaikh (A-12) and from there he went to Shekhadi.
 (vii)      As there was no landing for 2-3 days, he stayed at Hotel Vaisava
           alongwith co-accused.
 (viii)     He stayed along with others at Hotel  Big  Splash,  Alibaugh  on
           31.01.1993 where other gang members also joined them.
 (ix) On 02/03.02.1993, late at night, he alongwith co-accused Imtiyaz Yunus
           Miyan Ghavate (A-15) and other 4-5 persons went to Waghani Tower
           by jeep.
 (x)  He had seen 70-80 boxes of black coloured chemical,  250  -  500  hand
           grenades, 15-20 big pistols, 60-70 big rifles, electronic wires,
           magazines and rounds when the boxes were brought to the Tower by
           Tiger Memon and his men.   Those  items  were  also  checked  by
           Tiger.
(xi)  All the smuggled contraband was loaded in the  jeeps,  tempo  and  van
           after their packing in the presence of the appellant (A-11).
 (xii)      The jeep of Raju Kodi (A-26) was also used for transportation of
           arms and ammunitions and RDX explosives.
 (xiii)      He also brought one such  jeep  of  Raju  Kodi  to  Bombay  via
           Khandala and  left  it  at  Anwar’s  residence  as  per  Tiger’s
           instructions and dropped the other co-accused at  Bandra  before
           leaving the vehicle.
 (xiv)      He came to know about  the  object  of  smuggling  of  arms  and
           ammunitions from the conversation of co-accused.  He  knew  that
           this was being done to take revenge for the suffering of Muslims
           in the riots.
 (xv) He visited A-15’s residence and as per the instructions of Anwar Theba
           (AA), he brought the jeep to the residence of Amjad  and  handed
           over 3 bags containing wire bundles and bullets to him.  He  (A-
           11) parked the jeep there.
 (xvi)      He  visited  Tiger  Memon’s  (AA)  house  after  04.02.1993  and
           accompanied him to the house of Anwar Theba (AA) and met Suleman
           Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18) and Sayyed Abdul Rehman Shaikh (A-
           28), who had a tempo with them.
 (xvii)     He received Rs. 1 lakh from Tiger Memon to be paid to  Dawood  @
           Dawood Taklya Mohammed Phanse @  Phanasmiyan  (A-14).   He  also
           received instructions to bring ‘black soap’ and to go along with
           Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18) and  Sayyed  Abdul  Rehman
           Shaikh (A-28) using a tempo available with them.  He  knew  that
           the ‘black soap’ was the same  material  which  was  brought  at
           Tower on 03.02.1993.
 (xviii)    He left for Mhasla along with Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-
           18) and Sayyed Abdul Rehman  Shaikh (A-28) for the said purpose.
 (xix)      He reached Mhasla in the morning and  as  instructed,  contacted
           Dawood Taklya (A-14) and paid Rs. 1 lakh to him.
 (xx) He loaded 59 bags in the tempo and left for Bombay. On the way, he met
           Tiger Memon.
 (xxi)      On 07.03.1993, he accompanied Tiger and Shafi (AA) to Bandra and
           then went to the residence  of  Mobina  (A-96)  as  per  Tiger’s
           instructions.
 (xxii)     At Mobina’s place, he gave his scooter to Shafi.  Other  persons
           also went to the residence of Mobina.
 (xxiii)    On 08.03.1993, he accompanied Tiger Memon to Mobina’s residence.


 (xxiv)     He accompanied Shafi to Jogeshwari in a Commander Jeep.  He  had
           seen Shafi with a bag in which 2 rifles, 4-6  hand-grenades  and
           some rounds were kept.
 (xxv)      He then accompanied Shafi to the residence of Mobina (A-96).
 (xxvi)     He went to Mahad in a Jeep along with 3 other co-accused, out of
           them, one was Bashir  Ahmed  Usman  Gani  Khairulla  (A-13)  and
           waited at Hotel Vasava for Tiger as per his instructions.  Tiger
           Memon, Javed Chikna (AA), Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @  Dadabhai
           (A-17), Sardar Shawali Khan (A-54) and three other persons  came
           there after sometime.
 (xxvii)    In his presence, Tiger threw hand-grenades and imparted training
           in firing to the co-accused at Sandheri.
(xxviii)    He accompanied the co-accused to Sandheri and waited  till  they
           did firing practice.
 (xxix)     He also accompanied the co-accused to Bombay and dropped them at
           Mahim slope. The Jeep was parked at Shahnaz Hotel  and  keys  of
           the jeep were given to Tiger’s parents.
 (xxx)      He knew about the planting of suitcases in the  hotels  and  the
           filling of RDX by the co-accused.
 (xxxi)     He knew that Maruti van was used for carrying  RDX  filled  suit
           cases for planting the same in hotels.  This van was  also  used
           for throwing of empty gunny  bags  and  boxes  etc.  immediately
           after they were emptied.
 (xxxii)    He participated in the filling of RDX in the vehicles along with
           the other co-accused persons.  One Jeep, two  Maruti  cars,  one
           Maruti van, one Ambassador car and 5 scooters were  filled  with
           RDX under the supervision of Tiger Memon (AA) and  Javed  Chikna
           (AA).
(xxxiii)    He accompanied Shafi to his residence and  they  brought  2  new
           scooters to the Al-Hussaini building. He again brought one  more
           scooter with Shafi.
(xxxiv)     Timer pencils were inserted by the co-accused Anwar  Theba  (AA)
           and 2 others in the RDX which was filled in the vehicles in  his
           presence.
 (xxxv)     He planted the RDX-laden  Commander  Jeep  at  Passport  office,
           Worli, Bombay.
(xxxvi)     He had knowledge about the smuggling of  chemicals  and  weapons
           for taking revenge and also about the consequences on account of
           use of RDX.

359)  From the above confession, it is clear that the appellant  (A-11)  was
a close associate of Tiger Memon. He had full knowledge of  all  the  facets
of  the  conspiracy  and  played  an  active  part  in   the   landing   and
transportation of RDX and other  contrabands  and  making  of  suitcase  and
vehicle bombs. He planted a jeep containing a bomb at  Century  Bazaar.   He
was involved in all  the  stages  of  conspiratorial  design.   It  is  thus
established from his own confession that he played an important  and  active
role in the conspiracy.
360)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel for the appellant  (A-11)  contended
that a perusal of  his  confession  shows  that  he  was  only  an  employee
(driver) of Tiger Memon and was used only for transportation  of  goods  and
had no role in the conspiracy. It was submitted by the prosecution  that  he
(A-11) knew that Tiger Memon was  a  criminal  and  he  also  used  to  take
delivery on behalf of Tiger  Memon  in  the  hawala  transactions  and  also
participated in the smuggling of silver ignots. On 27/28  January,  he  went
to take delivery of arms and ammunitions and  explosives  along  with  other
accused.  When the landing was delayed by 2-3 days, he  stayed  in  a  hotel
along with others.  The appellant  (A-11) has  admitted  in  his  confession
that he had seen 70 - 80 boxes of black coloured chemical, 250 -  500  hand-
grenades, 15-20 big pistols, 60-70 big rifles, electronic  wires,  magazines
and rounds at the time of  landing  that  took  place  on  02/03.03.1993  at
Waghani Tower.  From the confessional statement of   the  appellant  (A-11),
it can be concluded that he was an integral part of the conspiracy  and  was
a very close associate of Tiger Memon and not  merely  an  innocent  servant
who knew nothing about the actions of his master.  It is also  evident  from
the fact that in his confessional statement, he has stated that he knew  the
object of the smuggling of arms and ammunitions, which in his words was  “to
take revenge of the suffering of Muslims”.
361)  It has also been contended on behalf of the appellant that Section  15
of TADA has not been complied with and the warning required to be given  was
not given. However, a perusal of the same shows that the officer  had  asked
the appellant (A-11) if he was aware that the confession to be made  by  him
can be used as evidence against him in the Court. The accused  had  answered
the aforesaid question in affirmative. The questions that were  asked  while
recording the first part of the confession were:
      “whether he has any complaint against anybody?
      Ans.  No.


      Q. Whether anyone has put any kind of pressure on  you  to  make  this
      confessional statement?
      Ans. No.


      Q. Whether you have been given any kind of allurement or threat?
      Ans. No.


      Q.  Do  you  want  to  make  your  confessional  statement/  statement
      willingly?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. Whether you  understand  that  you  are  not  bound  to  make  this
      statement/confessional statement?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. Whether you understand that it may be produced in the court  as  an
      evidence against you in case you confess?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. After this you will be kept at place  other  than  the  custody  of
      Tapasi Officer. Whether you know this?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. Do you still desire to make a confession ?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. I do not wish to  record  your  statement  forcibly  or  under  any
      pressure and I, therefore, give you time of 48 hours to think over the
      same. During this you will be kept at place other than the custody  of
      Tapasi Officer. Whether have you understood this?
      Ans. Yes.”


      Before recording the second part of the confession, the officer  asked
the following questions to the appellant.  The  questions  and  answers  are
quoted below:
      “Q. On 15.4.93, you were produced before me and on that day  you  were
      given time of 48 hours to think over before recording  the  statement.
      That time limit has been expired, have you thought it over?
      Ans. Yes.


      Q. Whether you are under any pressure  or  you  have  been  given  any
      threat or allurement to make this confessional statement?
      Ans. No.

      Q. Whether you know that, if you make any confession, then it  may  be
      produced in the court as an evidence against you?
      Ans. Yes.”

The above quoted conversation shows  that  the  appellant  (A-11)  had  been
given due warning by the officer recording the statement that his  statement
can be used against him. He had also been asked if there  was  any  coercion
or threat due to  which  he  was  giving  his  confessional  statement.  The
questions and answers establish that the confession made  by  the  appellant
(A-11) was voluntary.
362)  It has also been contended by the side of the appellant  that  a  part
of the confession was made after two months and, hence, it is a  manipulated
confession. This contention of the appellant (A-11) is devoid of any  merit.
The second confession  has  been  discarded  by  the  trial  court  and  the
prosecution has also not pressed into service that  confession  before  this
Court.
363)  Learned counsel for the appellant (A-11) has  further  contended  that
the confession of the appellant (A-11) was recorded in the odd hours of  the
night. It is pointed  out  by  the  prosecution  that  this  fact  could  be
elicited from the officer recording the confession, who was the best  person
to answer the query.  It was also highlighted that it was not  as  a  matter
of routine that the confessions were recorded late at night and only  a  few
confessions have been recorded in the  late  hours  which  could  have  been
explained by the recording officer,  if  he  was  given  an  opportunity  to
explain in the cross examination.
364)   The said confession was sought to be retracted on 11.01.1994.  It  is
pointed out by the side of the prosecution that the  material  contained  in
the retraction  statement  is  vague.  It  does  not  give  any  details  or
particulars. The said retraction statement fails to  pin  point  the  reason
behind the failure of  concerned  accused  to  make  any  complaint  to  the
authority- higher police officers or any  other  authority  including  Court
regarding his signatures being obtained on blank papers  and/or  the  papers
containing some typed material and the reason behind  himself  being  forced
to effect the said signatures.  It may also be  noted  that  retraction  was
not made at the first available opportunity by  the  accused  person.  After
arrest, the accused persons were brought before the court  number  of  times
in 1993 and 1994 and the retraction was made many  months  after  making  of
the confession.  From the above  discussion,  it  is  established  that  the
confession of the appellant (A-11) was truthful and voluntary. It  has  also
been demonstrated that the requirements of Section  15  of  TADA  have  been
complied with. Hence the confession of the appellant  (A-11)  is  admissible
as substantive evidence.
Confessional Statement of co-accused:
365)  A perusal of the above confession of the appellant (A-11)  shows  that
he was playing a key role in furtherance of the  abovesaid  conspiracy.  The
other accused, in their confessions under Section  15  of  TADA,  have  also
discussed the role played by the appellant (A-11) in the conspiracy.
Confessional statement of Mohammed Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9)

      Confessional statement of A-9  under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 and 22.04.1993 by Prem Krishna  Jain  (PW  189),  the
then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  In  the  abovesaid  confessional  statement,  the
reference to the appellant (A-11) is as follows:
      “We, thereafter, came  at  Al-  Hussaini  Building  of  Tiger  by  red
      coloured Maruti van. He took the car inside after dropping me  at  the
      gate and took me inside after ten minutes and offered me  a  chair  to
      sit. At that time Gani, Parvez, Shafi, Anvar were  present  there  and
      5/6 more persons were working in garage.”

(emphasis supplied)

Confessional statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)

      Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 23.04.1994 (18:00 hrs), by Shri Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  his  confessional  statement,  the
reference to the appellant (A-11) is as follows:
(i)   His confession establishes that  the  appellant  (A-11)  was  a  close
      associate of Tiger Memon and used to assist him in hawala transactions
      by accepting delivery and receipt of funds.  He also  used  to  assist
      Tiger in the landing of smuggled items  and  their  transportation  to
      various places.
(ii)  A-11, alongwith other  co-accused,  assisted  the  accused  (A-10)  in
      collecting Rs. 1 crore from Choksi (A-97) for Yakub Abdul Razak Memon.
      (A-1)
(iii) Following the departure of Tiger, he was seen present alongwith  other
      co-accused, viz., Javed Chikna (A-12), Shafi,  Parvez,  Bashir,  Usman
      etc. at Tiger's residence where various vehicles loaded with RDX  were
      parked which were used for causing bomb blast.
Confessional statement of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh    (A-12)

      Confessional statement of A-12 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 (14:00  hrs)  and  21.04.1993  (06:50  hrs)  by  Prem
Krishna Jain (PW 189), the then DCP, Zone X, Bombay. The references made  by
him with regard to the appellant (A-11) are as follows:
(i)   A-11 introduced A-12 to Tiger Memon.
(ii)  A-11 worked in the Tiger's office at Dongri  and  introduced  A-12  to
      Tiger for employment in his office.
(iii) A-11 used to attend  Hawala  transactions  of  Tiger  alongwith  other
      associates and also used to help him  in  his  landing  operations  at
      Shekhadi Coast.
(iv)  A-11 went to Shekhadi Coast alongwith other associates to  help  Tiger
      in the landing of arms  and  ammunitions  and  explosives,  which  was
      delayed and effected on 03.02.1993, and transported the said  material
      to the Tower and  then  to  Bombay  with  the  help  of  the  vehicles
      containing secret cavities for the said purpose.
(v)   A-11 also assisted Tiger alongwith  other  associates  in  landing  at
      Shekhadi in the second week of Febuary, 1993 and transportation of the
      consignments to the Tower and thereafter to Bombay.
(vi)  A-11 was present in the Al Hussaini building even after the  departure
      of Tiger Memon.
(vii) On the  night  of  11.03.1993,  A-11  filled  the  chemical  into  the
      vehicles parked in the garage at the Al-Hussaini Building.
366)  It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant  that  from
the confession of A-12, it can be inferred that  the  appellant  (A-11)  was
working as a driver of Tiger Memon.  In view  of  the  fact  that  A-12  has
given details about the presence and involvement of the appellant (A-11)  in
the conspiracy and also about  his  participation  in  the  act  of  loading
chemicals into the vehicles,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  he  was  not  an
integral part of the conspiracy. The fact that A-11  was  working  in  close
association with Tiger Memon and was entrusted with the task of driving  the
jeep shows the trust reposed in him by Tiger Memon. It is  just  because  of
the said trust, the position of responsibility commanded  by  the  appellant
in  the  conspiratorial  design  followed.  He  played  an   important   and
significant role. It cannot be said that A-12 has not given details  of  any
overt act done by A-11. A-12 has, in fact, given significant  details  about
the involvement of A-11 in the landings that took place and in the  movement
of vehicles in which  cavities  were  made.  A-11  was  present  in  the  Al
Hussaini building even after the departure  of  Tiger  Memon  in  the  early
hours of 12.03.1993. This fact establishes that there was  no  coercion  and
threat and the appellant (A-11) was working in pursuance of  the  object  of
the conspiracy out of his own free will and volition.
Confessional statement of Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13)

      Confessional statement of A-13 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 and 18.05.1993, by  Shri  Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-
193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay. The reference to the appellant  (A-11)
in the said confession has emerged as under:-
(i)   A-11 participated in the firing practice at Sandheri.
(ii)  He was asked by Tiger to take out one gun along with  its  rounds  and
      hand-grenades for training purpose at Sandheri.
Confessional statement of Imtiaz Yunus Miya Ghavate    (A-15)


      Confessional statement of A-15 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 07.05.1993 (12:30  hrs)  and  09.05.1993  (13:30  hrs)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   In  his
confessional statement, the following facts have emerged:
(i)   A-11 was a close associate of Tiger Memon and worked in his office.
(ii)  A-11 had gone to receive Tiger Memon at the Airport on  the  night  of
      23rd/ 24th January 1993 and then took him to his residence.
(iii) He participated in the landing and  transportation  of  smuggled  arms
      and ammunitions at Shekhadi.
(iv)  He transported the arms and explosives from Waghani  Tower  to  Bombay
      in a Jeep.
Confessional statement of Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17)

      Confessional statement of A-17 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 and 20.04.1993, by Prem Krishna Jain  (PW  189),  the
then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  He referred to the role of A-11 as follows:-
(i)   On 07.02.1993, the appellant (A-11), along with other  co-accused  (A-
      18 and A-28), visited the residence of co-accused A-14, and paid Rs. 1
      lakh to him. He also brought gunny bags in a Tempo.
(ii)  A-17 stated that they were  given  a  total  of  Rs.  15  lakhs  which
      included Rs. 1 lakh which was given through the appellant (A-11). This
      money was distributed amongst  the  various  Custom  officers,  Police
      officers, Trawlervala, labourers and some money was also spent for the
      truck and other miscellaneous expenses.
(iii) The appellant (A-11) brought other co-accused  in  a  Jeep.  From  the
      Jeep, handgrenades and rifles were taken out for firing at Varad  Ghat
      beyond Mahad.
(iv)  The appellant (A-11) was present along  with  A-17  at  the  foot-hill
      when co-accused were doing the firing practice.
Confessional statement of Suleman Mohd. Kasam Ghavate (A-18)
      Confessional statement of A-18 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 (13:00 hrs) and 01.05.1993  (20:30  hrs),  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the then DCP, Zone-VIII, Bombay.  The following facts  have
emerged from the confessional statement of A-18:-
(i)   On 05.02.1993, the appellant (A-11)  accompanied  A-18  and  A-28  and
      went to Mhasla in a Tempo bearing No. MMP- 4799 and on  06.02.1993  he
      met Dawood Taklya (A-14) and Dadabhai (A-17) at Mhasla.  He helped  in
      loading 59 to 63 packets  in  the  tempo.   He  also  associated  with
      transporting of those bags.
(ii)  At the instance of Tiger Memon,  A-11  along  with  A-18  returned  to
      Mhasla from Panvel.  They again went to Bombay along with the  son  of
      Dawood Taklya (A-14).
(iii) On 08.02.1993 or 09.02.1993, he met A-18 at Mahad  when  he  was  with
      Tiger and others.
(iv)  He was also present at Mhasla Tower alongwith others.
Confessional statement of Mohd. Iqbal Mohd. Yusuf Shaikh (A-23)

      Confessional statement of A-23 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (10:00  hrs)  and  22.05.1993  (10:00  hrs)  by  Shri
Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The
following facts have emerged from his confessional statement:
(i)   The appellant (A-11) has been referred to as ‘a man of Tiger’.
(ii)  The appellant (A-11) took A-23 and others to the hills  where  he  (A-
      11) took out the arms and ammunitions (a gun, two hand grenades, and a
      bag of bullets of the gun) and Tiger  imparted  training  in  throwing
      hand grenades and firing with AK-56 rifle.
Confessional statement of Manoj Kumar Bhanwar Lal Gupta (A-24)

      Confessional statement of A-24 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 30.04.1993 (16:15 hrs) and  09.05.1993  (19:00  hrs)  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW- 492), the then DCP,  Zone-VIII,  Bombay.   The  following  facts
have emerged in his confessional statement:-
(i)   A-11 participated in the first landing at Shekhadi.
(ii)  At Shekhadi, the packets were opened and reloaded in the truck.  There
      were AK- 56 rifles, hand-grenades, pistols, cartridges in the packets.


(iii) A-24 also participated in the second landing at  Shekhadi  along  with
      other people (he has not  named  the  people  present  in  the  second
      landing).
Confessional statement of Syed Abdul Rehman Kamruddin Syed (A-28)

      Confessional statement of A-28 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 23.04.1993 (17:00 hrs) and  01.05.1993  (23:30  hrs)  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the then  DCP,  Zone-VIII,  Bombay.   The  following  facts
emerge from his confessional statement:-
(i)   A-28 knew Tiger, Anwar, Rafique Madi, Haji Yakub and Gani (A-11).
(ii)  On 05.02.1993,  the  appellant  (A-11),  along  with  A-18  and  A-28,
      proceeded in a vehicle from Mahim to Mhasala.
(iii) At Mhasala, he met A-14 and A-17, who got 55-60 gunny bags  loaded  in
      their tempo.
(iv)  Tiger sent A-11 and A-28 to Persian Darbar.
Confessional statement of Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29)

      Confessional statement of A-29 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.05.1993 (18:30  hrs)  and  21.05.1993  (14:45  hrs)  by  Shri
Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The
statement of A-29 further corroborates the fact that  A-11  participated  in
the landing that took place at Shekhadi.  From the statement, it is  further
established that Gani (A-11) had driven the  jeep  which  was  carrying  the
smuggled goods.
Confessional statement of Mohd. Rafique Musa Miariwala @ Rafiq Madi (A-46)

      Confessional statement of A-46 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 21.04.1993 (19:00 hrs)  and  23.04.1993  (21:25  hrs),  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay. The  following
references have been made in the said confession regarding the appellant:
(i)   A-11 worked in the office of Tiger Memon.
(ii)  A-11 was one of the staff members of Tiger Memon attending his  Dongri
      office for assistance in his business activities including his landing
      operations of smuggled goods.
(iii) A-11, along with A-46 and other associates, assisted  Tiger  Memon  in
      the landing at Shekhadi which took place on 03.02.1993 after the delay
      of 2-3 days and then arranged for transport along with A-17 and others
      for its services at the Tower.
(iv)  A-11 reached the Tower in a Commander Jeep and exchanged  his  vehicle
      with A-46.

Confessional statement of Sahikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57)
      Confessional statement of A-57 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (12:00 hrs) by Shri  Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay. The reference to the appellant in  the  said
confession is as follows:-
(i)   In the first week of February, when Javed Chikna (AA) took A-57 and A-
      77 to the house of Tiger Memon, A-11  was  present  there  along  with
      other co-accused.
(ii)  A-11 was seen on 10.03.1993 after a meeting took place in  a  flat  at
      Bandra.
(iii) A-11 was present in the  flat  of  Tiger  Memon  at  the  Al  Hussaini
      building on the night of 11.03.1993 and then in the garage  where  the
      filling was being done.
Confessional statement of Nasir Abdul Kadar Kewal @ Nasir Dhakla (A-64)

      Confessional statement of A-64 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 22.01.1995 and 24.01.1995, by Shri HC Singh (PW- 474), the  then
Superintendent of Police, CBI/SPE/STF, New  Delhi.  The  references  to  the
appellant (A-11) in the said confession are as follows:
(i)   In the last week of January, when A-64 went to meet Tiger Memon,  A-11
      was present there along with other co-accused.
(ii)  He observed that A-11, Javed Chikna,  Shafi,  Anwar  Theba  and  Rafiq
      Madi used to visit the residence of Tiger Memon.
(iii) The appellant was seen driving a blue coloured  Maruti  car  in  which
      Tiger Memon had gone  to  Hotel  Persian  Darbar  to  meet  the  other
      conspirators.
(iv)  While going to Shekhadi, on the way, the accused stopped at  a  place,
      where A-11 brought a black coloured bag which contained five AK-47/AK-
      56 rifles, revolver, magazines and cartridges.
(v)   The appellant participated in the first landing at Shekhadi.
(vi)  A-11 also participated in the second landing at Shekhadi.
(vii) He was  present  at  the  Al-Hussaini  Building  compound  during  the
      preparation  of  vehicle  bombs  by  using  RDX  in   the   night   of
      11/12.03.1993 which had landed at Shekhadi.
Confessional statement of Gulam Hafiz s/o Suleman Shaikh @ Baba (A-73)

      Confessional statement of A-73 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.05.1993 (22:05 hrs)  and  17.05.1993  (01:45  hrs)  by  Vinod
Balwant Lokhande, the then DCP, Airport Zone, Bombay. The references to  the
appellant in the said confession are to be found as under:
(i)   The appellant (A-11) was present at Mhasla Tower along with Tiger  and
      others in a Jeep. They had also brought a truck which was loaded  with
      goods which contained bombs, rifles and cartridges.
(ii)  He was present while unloading contraband from a truck  into  a  tempo
      and jeep at Mhasla Tower.
Confessional statement of Mohd. Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100)

      Confessional statement of A-100 under Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 (23:30 hrs)  and  17.04.1993  (17:00  hrs),  by  Shri
Sanjay Pandey (PW 492), the then DCP, Zone-VIII, Bombay. The  references  to
the appellant in the said confession are as follows:
(i)   He was present at the  residence  of  Tiger  Memon  in  the  night  of
      11/12.03.1993 along with other co-accused.
(ii)  The appellant was loading ‘goods’ in the Jeep.
Thus, it is very well established  that  the  appellant  was  aware  of  the
consequences of his action and played an important role in the conspiracy.
367)   From  the  confessional  statements  of  the  above  co-accused,  the
following facts are established:
(i)   The appellant was a very close  associate  and  trusted  confidant  of
      Tiger Memon.
(ii)  The appellant worked in the office of Tiger Memon  and  was  entrusted
      with the tasks which could only be assigned to trusted and responsible
      persons.
(iii) The appellant played an active role  in  the  hawala  transactions  of
      Tiger Memon.
(iv)  The appellant used to collect  money  from  Choksi  (A-97)  of  Zaveri
      Bazaar.
(v)   The appellant collected Rs. 1 lakh from Choksi (A-97) for Yakub  Memon
      (A-1).
(vi)  The appellant was involved in the  episode  of  landing  of  arms  and
      ammunitions and explosives at Shekhadi Coast.
(vii) The appellant was present at Waghani Tower  where  the  said  articles
      were shifted in a tempo and jeep.
(viii)      The appellant participated in the landing which  took  place  at
      Mhsala and was also entrusted with the duty of transportation  of  the
      smuggled goods.
(ix)  The appellant was present in the garage of  the  Al-Hussaini  Building
      in the intervening night between 11/12.03.1993.
(x)   The appellant  was  actively  involved  in  the  work  of  filling  of
      chemical in the vehicles for their use as bombs.
(xi)  On 23/24.01.1993, the appellant had gone to  the  Airport  to  receive
      Tiger Memon.
(xii) The appellant attended conspiratorial meetings.
(xiii)      The appellant  was  a  participant  in  the  training  programme
      conducted at Sandheri by Tiger Memon.
(xiv) The appellant was present in the Al-Hussaini building even  after  the
      departure of Tiger Memon.
(xv)  The appellant was one of the most active member of the conspiracy  and
      was a part of it from the stage of inception to  the  final  stage  of
      execution of the terrorist activities.
(xvi)  The  appellant  participated  in  the  conspiracy  from  planning  to
      execution at various stages.
Retracted Confessions:
368)  We have already held that the confessional statement made by a  person
under Section 15 of TADA shall be admissible in the trial  of  a  co-accused
for offence committed and tried in the same case together with  the  accused
who makes the confession.  A confessional statement given under  Section  15
shall not be discarded  merely  for  the  reason  that  the  same  has  been
retracted.   Further,  a  voluntary  and  truthful  confessional   statement
recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act requires no corroboration.   Since
the very same objection raised  in  the  connected  appeals  was  considered
earlier, we are not once again repeating the same.  The said  conclusion  is
applicable to these appeals also.
Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Deposition of Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) (Approver)

369)  In the deposition of PW-2, the following statements are relevant:
(i)   PW-2 deposed that he knew A-11. He identified  the  appellant  in  the
      Court.
(ii)  He mentioned that Tiger Memon along with other co-accused was  waiting
      for the appellant to come with his Commander Jeep  after  the  landing
      had taken place at Shekhadi.
(iii) On reaching Nagothane Petrol Pump, Shafi took the  co-accused  to  the
      South Indian Hotel at the  Petrol  Pump  where  the  witness  saw  the
      appellant (A-11) sitting with  Tiger  along  with  Anwar  Theba  (AA),
      Munna, Karimullah, Ethesham, Akbar. Then they all  had  lunch  in  the
      hotel.
(iv)  He also deposed about  the  landing  of  AK-56  rifles,  rounds,  hand
      grenades, pistols, magazines and RDX i.e. "Kala Sabun".
(v)   He also gave details of their stay at Hotel Persian Darbar  where  the
      appellant (A-11) was also present.
(vi)  On the same day, i.e., on 10.02.1993, at about 7:30 p.m., Tiger  Memon
      came to Hotel Persian Darbar with A-16. Tiger Memon went to  the  room
      of the witness and told Shafi to shift the box which they had  brought
      from their Jeep to the Jeep of the appellant (A-11).
(vii) PW-2 also told about the meeting which took  place  at  the  house  of
      Shakil, and thereafter, the meeting with the appellant (A-11)  outside
      Lucky Hotel.
370)   Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  A-11  had  no
involvement in the conspiracy and was used as a driver  to  transport  goods
and people from one place to another and also that the presence of  A-11  in
the  important  conspiratorial  meetings  has  not  been  mentioned  by  the
approver. It is pointed out by the prosecution that the charges against  the
appellant have  been  fully  established  by  the  admissible  and  reliable
evidence on record. It is also stated that it  is  not  necessary  that  the
approver ought to speak about each  and  every  aspect  of  the  prosecution
case. It is not the case of the  appellant  that  the  approver  present  an
inherently contradictory facts than the one proved by the  prosecution.   It
is also pointed out that A-11 has admitted that  he  was  present  when  the
chemical (black soap/ RDX) was being  filled  in  the  vehicles,  viz.,  one
jeep, 2 Maruti cars, one Maruti Van, one  Ambassador  and  5  scooters.   He
further stated as under:
      “While filling the chemical, firstly a layer of chemical  was  filled
      and then pieces of iron were spreaded  over  and  again  a  layer  of
      chemical was filled and pressed. I also had done some work. Something
      like pencil was pierced into the chemical when the  work  of  filling
      the chemical was over and before we left taking the  vehicle  in  the
      morning. This work of piercing the pencil into was done by Anvar  and
      some other 1-2 boys.”

Further, when  a  question  was  put  to  him  as  to  why  these  arms  and
ammunitions were brought and what was the motive behind the  conspiracy,  he
answered that this was to avenge the loss suffered  by  Muslims  during  the
riots and he  further  admitted  to  be  knowing  the  consequences  of  the
actions, i.e., the destruction that would take place due to their actions.
Deposition of 5




Shekhar Shukra Devadiga (PW-15)             (eye-witness)

      PW-15 has deposed as under:-
(i)   He had seen A-11 parking the Jeep at Century Bazaar on 12.03.1993.
(ii)   He  identified  A-11  in  the  Test  Identification  Parade  held  on
      14.05.1993 by Moreshwar Gopal Thakur,  Special  Executive  Magistrate,
      (PW-469) for which Memorandum Exhibit 1512 was prepared.
(iii) He again identified A-11 in the Court and said that he had observed A-
      11 very carefully prior to identifying him.
(iv)  He identified the appellant (A-11) as the person who brought the  blue
      jeep and parked it in front of his shop which subsequently exploded.
(iv)  He deposed that other than identifying the appellant (A-11)  in  Court
      and seeing him on the day of the blast, he had never seen him before.
Regarding the evidence given by PW-15, learned counsel for the appellant (A-
11) has contended that the eye witness had left the  city  after  the  blast
and, hence, he was not reliable.  In reply to the  said  contention,  it  is
rightly pointed out that this is normal human conduct. Further, it has  come
on record that many persons left the city immediately after the blasts.  The
people who were injured or who had witnessed the  blasts  were  very  scared
and horrified by the incident.  Similar explosions were  caused  at  various
places in the city. So the people of the city were frightened  and  went  to
their native places.  The said conduct of the witness does  not  render  his
testimony doubtful.

Deposition of Moreshwar Gopal Thakur,  Special  Executive  Magistrate,  (PW-
469)

      PW-469, the Special Magistrate, deposed on 01.02.1999.  He stated that
he conducted the Test Identification parade on 14.05.1993 for PW-15 for  the
identification of A-11. The eyewitness (Shri Shreedharan Govindan  and  Shri
Shekhara Shukara Devadiga (PW-15)) identified the appellant  (A-11)  as  the
person who parked the blue jeep near Century  Bazaar,  Worli.   The  witness
also proved Exhibit 1512 which was the identification parade panchnama.


Deposition of Maharajpuram Subramaniyam Seshadri    (PW–327)

      At the relevant time, PW-327 was the Deputy General  Manager,  Quality
Control, Mahindra & Mahindra Company. He deposed as under:
(i)   The bumper (Article No.406) was of a Commander Jeep. The said  article
      was proved to be a part of front bumper of  Mahindra  Jeep,  Commander
      hard top model shown to him by Inspector  Gaikwad  at  the  office  of
      Police at Crawford Market.
(ii)  He also proved his report being Exhibit No. 655 and gave the  same  to
      Police officer Gaikwad.

Deposition of  Anilkumar Vithal Kamat (PW 669)
      At the relevant time, PW-669 was the Inspector of Police.  He  deposed
as under:
(i)   He seized 11 articles from the place of occurrence in the presence  of
      FSL Experts and prepared a Panchnama  Exhibit  2466.   This  panchnama
      contains the details of collection of samples by Chemical Analyser and
      the chassis and engine number of fully burnt cars.
(ii)  One engine was also seized from  the  place  of  occurrence.  He  also
      stated that the investigation carried  out  so  far  by  him  provided
      reasonable ground to believe the involvement of A-11.
(iii) He arrested the appellant.
(iv)  He obtained the custody of the appellant  (A-11)  on  12.05.1993  from
      the Designated Court.
(v)   He interrogated the appellant (A-11) and put  him  for  identification
      parade.

Deposition of Fatehsingh Sohanrao Gaekwad (PW-543)
      At the relevant time, PW-543  was  working  with  the  DCB,  CID.  His
deposition was recorded on 09.12.1999.  He also proved the death of  various
persons in the said blasts. He deposed that:
(i)   He recorded the statement of  the  appellant  (A-11)  in  August  1993
      under Section 108 of Customs Act, 1962 in respect of  damage  done  to
      the property due to bomb blast.
(ii)  He sought the order of sanction for prosecution of the  appellant  (A-
      11), who had already been arrested by him along with other accused.
It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that  PW-543  had
made a mistake and had admitted the same in  paragraph  21,  so  it  can  be
inferred that they were acting negligently and they have not adhered to  the
provisions of the Code.  PW-543 admitted as under:
      “Though I had formally arrested the said 11 accused persons, the  said
      persons being in judicial custody, I had not taken custody of the same
      and hence, I had not drawn any arrest panchnama while formally showing
      them to be arrested in C.R. No. 1 1  7/93.  My  earlier  statement  of
      myself having formally arrested the said  11  accused  persons  before
      applying for grant of sanction is incorrect statement. I made the said
      mistake of fact while giving the said answer.”

It is pointed out by the prosecution that this mistake was  a  bonafide  one
which the officer  corrected  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  He  has  also
admitted the same in his deposition. The error made by  him  was  an  honest
human error which cannot be  said  to  have  caused  any  prejudice  to  the
appellant (A-11). From the admission of the officer, it can be  conclusively
inferred that the investigation was not manipulated and  the  officers  were
careful in the work done by them.
Deposition of Mahesh Yashwarnt Athavale (PW-611)
      At the relevant time,  PW-611  was  attached  with  the  Dadar  Police
Station as a P.S.I. He inspected the scene of offence.   On  24.03.2000,  he
deposed before the Court as under:
(i)   A Panchnama was drawn by him  being  Exhibit  No.  1182  at  the  site
      regarding the prevailing situation and ascertaining the damage in  the
      presence of panch witness Gaurishankar Rajnarayan Oza (PW-307).
(ii)  The said Panchnama was in respect of the inspection  of  the  site  of
      explosion and the seizure of bumper of the vehicle bearing No. MP-09-S-
      0070 (Article No.-406).
(iv)  The panchnama also records that  a  crater  11  feet  long  (south  to
      north), 14 ft, 9 inches long (east to west) and (5ft, 9  inches  deep)
      was found after explosion at Century Bazaar, Worli.
(v)   The windows of the nearby buildings were broken and  extensive  damage
      was caused in and around the blast site.
(vi)  Many vehicles were damaged and two cars were fully burnt.
(vii) The said Panchnama was also proved by PW-307.
It was submitted on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  the  complainant  has
described the scene of explosion but  he  has  not  mentioned  the  name  of
anyone as the accused, so his complaint and testimony are not  reliable  and
admissible.  It is submitted that merely  because  the  complaint  does  not
carry the name of the accused, it would not lose its significance.

Deposition of Hari Shridhar Bhangale (PW-306)
       PW-306 was a Constable attached with the Dadar Police Station. At the
relevant time, he was posted at Police  Chowky  near  Century  Bazaar  along
with Police Naik Keny.  He deposed before the court that:-
(i)   He heard a loud explosion at the side  of  Ramodia  Mansion  on  Annie
      Beasant Road.
(ii)  He also felt a jolt while in chowky.
(iii) He saw dense smoke billowing and he rushed to the place of  explosion.


(iv)  At the place of explosion,  he  found  that  a  big  ditch/crater  was
      formed and that other buildings, BEST buses, motor taxis  and  several
      cars on the said road got damaged and many persons sustained  injuries
      and had succumbed to death and were lying nearby the spot.
(v)   He had taken 25 injured persons to Poddar Hospital.

Investigation, Recoveries and FSL Reports:
371)  Various articles were sent to FSL vide Exhibit  Nos.  1850,  1852  and
2423 for opinion and the reports of FSL were marked as  Exhibit  Nos.  1851,
1853, 2424, 2467 and 2468.  FSL reports show the traces of RDX in  the  said
articles which are as follows:
(i)   Exhibit 1850 is  a  letter  to  the  FSL  dated  17.07.1993  from  CID
      requesting  information  about  percentage/purity  of  RDX  found   on
      forwarded articles and components of explosives used.
(ii)  Exhibit 1851 is the reply of the FSL dated 22.07.1993 to  CID  stating
      that percentage of RDX could be provided.
(iii) Exhibit 1852 is a letter to FSL dated 08.08.1993 from  CID  requesting
      confirmation whether the engine sent for examination belonged  to  the
      exploded Mahindra Jeep No. MP-09-S-0070.
(iv)  Exhibit 1853 is the reply letter of FSL stated that a  high  explosive
      device would have been placed near the engine and the gear box.
(v)   Exhibit 2423 is a letter from Police dated 15.03.1993 to the  Chemical
      Analyser, Bombay sending substances used in Century Bazar  bomb  blast
      and requesting for an opinion on the nature of the bomb used.
(vi)  Exhibit 2424 is a  letter  from  Police  dated  15.03.1993  requesting
      FSL’s opinion on samples collected from the blast site.
(vii) Exhibit 2466 is a panchnama containing the details  of  collection  of
      samples by chemical analyser. Chemical Analyser has noted the  chassis
      and engine number of fully burnt cars.
(viii)      Exhibit 2467 is a FSL  report  dated  26.03.1993  giving  Engine
      number (DQ 16230) and Chassis number (CDR 75 0 DP-2WD–HT–DQ1620).  The
      report clarified that RDX was detected as an  explosive  from  amongst
      the substances recovered by Police at blast site.
(ix)  Exhibit 2468 is  FSL  report  dated  23.03.1993  which  confirmed  the
      presence of RDX as explosive.
Witness describing the Blast and Damage:
Deposition of Anjani Bhanu Gorule (PW-388)
372)  Her deposition was recorded on 05.08.1998. She deposed as under:
(i)   On 12.03.1993, at 2:30 p.m., while doing household work on  the  first
      floor of her house at Nehru Nagar, Rahivashi  Sangh,  Century  Bazaar,
      Bombay-18, she heard the sound of a loud explosion and she was  thrown
      on the ground floor.
(ii)  She became unconscious.  However,  after  gaining  consciousness,  she
      found herself and her relative Sunanda Tambe,  who  had  been  in  her
      house on the said day, in Poddar Hospital.
(iii) She sustained burn injuries to her right leg,  fracture  to  left  leg
      and minor injuries to her person due to piercing of splinters and  she
      remained in the hospital for four  days.
Deposition of Mrs. Sunita Rajendra Walvekar (PW-389)
      In her deposition dated 05.08.1998, she stated that at about  2  p.m.,
she had been to beauty parlour on  second  floor  of  Ramodia  Mansion.  She
further deposed that:
(i)   Around 2:30 to 2:35 p.m., she heard the sound of a huge explosion.
(ii)  As she was sitting near the window, something struck on her  head  and
      left hand which caused bleeding to her.
(iii) She found that shattered glass had pierced her hand. She  removed  the
      same and wrapped the injury with her clothes (pallu of saree) and came
      out of Ramodia Mansion.
(iv)  She found that the entire atmosphere was full of black smoke.
(v)   Her brother took her to KEM Hospital where  she  was  treated  for  11
      days.
Deposition of Jayant Anant Sawant (PW-390)
      He deposed in the Court on 05.08.1998 as follows:
(i)   On 12.03.1993, at about 2.45 p.m., while he  was  at  his  Typing  and
      Xerox Centre situated opposite to Passport Office  on  A.B.  Road,  he
      heard a loud explosion from the side of Century Bazaar.
(ii)  He was thrown away at a distance of 15 feet from the  place  where  he
      was.
(iii) He sustained injuries on his right cheek  due  to  striking  of  glass
      splinters and sustained bleeding injury on  his  right  forearm  along
      with swelling.
(iv)  He also sustained injury on his right thigh.
(v)   He went to KEM Hospital along with 2/3 persons who also had  sustained
      injuries.
(vi)  He was admitted in the said hospital and the glass splinters from  his
      cheek and thigh were removed.
(vii) A piece of iron rod was removed from his forearm and  plastic  surgery
      was conducted on his right cheek.
(viii)      He remained as an indoor patient in KEM Hospital for one  month.


(ix)  One  Chedda  accompanied  him  and  some  more  injured  persons  were
      admitted at KEM Hospital for treatment while  others  were  discharged
      after the treatment.
Other Evidences:
373)  PWs-644, 638 and  632-Doctors  have  issued  the  Injury  Certificates
Exhibit Nos. 2379, 2366 and 2350 for the injuries sustained by  PW-388,  PW-
389  and  PW-390  respectively.            Deposition   of   Dr.   Shivkumar
Dhanjuram Jaiswal (PW-644)
      PW-644 is  a  doctor  attached  to  MA  Poddar  Hospital.  He  deposed
regarding the Certificate issued by him and entry of casualty Register.  His
deposition reveals that PW 388 was brought to  hospital  on  12.03.1993  and
was having 3 injuries and in his opinion the same  were  involving  risk  to
her life and had also given history of injuries being sustained due to  bomb
blast.  The Medical certificate of Anjani Manu  Borale  (PW-388)  certifying
that she was brought to MA  Poddar  Hospital  on  12.03.1993  due  to  burns
during the bomb blast has been proved by the witness.


Deposition of Dr. Vidya Shirvaikar (PW-638)
      The witness proved the Medical certificate of Sunita Walvekar (PW-389)
dated 12.03.1993 which had been marked as Exhibit 2366 certifying  that  she
was treated in  the  out-patient  department  of  KEM  Hospital,  Parel  for
Contused Lacerated Wound (CLW) on face below eye.
Deposition of Dr. Parag Laxman Mhatre (PW 632)
      PW-632 proved Exh. No. 2350, the Medical certificate of Jayant  Sawant
dated 12.03.1993 certifying that the said victim was  treated  in  the  out-
patient department of KEM  Hospital,  Parel  for  Contused  Lacerated  Wound
(CLW) on face.
374)  A total of 88 people died in the blast  that  took  place  at  Century
Bazaar. PWs-391 and 393 proved the death of two of the  victims  in  Century
Bazaar blast as follows:
(i)   Vilas Baliram Gamre (PW-391) deposed as a witness regarding the  death
      of his father. While travelling in BEST bus, his father Baliram  Gamre
      succumbed to injuries on 12.03.1993 at about 2:30 to 2:45 p.m. due  to
      bomb blast occurred at Century Bazaar.
(ii)  Ashalata Prakash Phatak (PW-393) proved  the  death  of  her  husband,
      Prakash Gopal Pathak, in the blast that took place at Century Bazaar.
      The doctors, who examined the dead bodies of various persons  died  on
account of the blasts, have also deposed regarding the injuries received  by
the deceased persons.
(i)   Dr. Walter George Vaz (PW-476) on  03.05.1999  described  the  reasons
for the death of the victims in the blast and proved the death  certificates
namely, Exhibit Nos. 1584, 1585 and 1587 which  were  countersigned  by  him
regarding cause of  death  of  John  Thomas,  Kisan  Barshinge  and  Vishram
Mayekar respectively after they were examined by Dr. Baxi, Dr. Pisal  &  Dr.
Inamdar respectively. He  also  proved  his  certificate  regarding  opinion
given by him for the cause of death of Prakash Pathak  after  examining  his
dead body.

(ii)   Dr.  Anand  Pandurangraj  Desai  (PW-477)  proved  the   certificates
countersigned by him regarding opinion given by him for cause  of  death  of
Baliram Gamre, Niyati Acharya and Mamta Surendra after examining their  dead
bodies.

Deposition of Kishore Laxman Sawant (PW-568)
      PW-568 proved the Accidental Death Reports (ADRs) prepared by  him  in
respect of the dead persons in the blast. The PSI of  Dadar  Police  Station
at KEM hospital had registered ADR Nos. 25/93,  34/93  and  37/93  regarding
accidental death of Balimar Gamre, Kum. Niyati Acharya  and  Prakash  Pathak
respectively. After the bodies were  identified  by  their  relatives,  they
were sent to Coroner’s Court through officers of Coroner’s  Court.   In  the
same manner, with the help of other police officers, he  had  registered  34
accidental deaths reported at KEM Hospital. The said  persons  succumbed  to
death due to the bomb explosion which occurred at Century Bazaar.
Deposition of Shashikant Ramachandra Raut (PW-309)
      PW-309 proved the damage  caused  by  the  explosion.   The  Panchnama
Exhibit 1186 dated 15.04.1998 was drawn by the police officer  Shri  Agarkar
in his presence and in the presence of co-panch on 13.03.1993 at  2.30  p.m.
This panchnama was regarding the places visited by them and  especially  the
damage caused to Century Bazaar Building.

Deposition of Devji Nanji Jogadia (PW-580)
      PW-580 proved the damage to the Passport Office. At the relevant time,
he was the Superintendent of Adminstration at Passport Office, Bombay.
(i)   Due to the explosion that occurred on 12.03.1993 in front  of  Ramodia
      Mansion, opposite to Passport  Office,  glass  panes,  window  frames,
      furniture and doors of the Passport office Building were damaged.
(ii)  For carrying out the repairs, an expenditure  of  Rs.  3,29,908/-  was
      incurred which was paid  by  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  and  the
      quotation of M/s Mahindra & Company was accepted for the same.

Deposition of PWs-583 and 647 proved the damage caused to BEST  Buses-Public
properties.
(i)   Sadanand  Yashwant  Padgaonkar  (PW-583)  was  the  Assistant  General
      Manager, BEST Office, Colaba.  On  12.03.1993,  he  found  one  single
      decker bus in completely burnt condition lying at the spot of  Century
      Bazaar blast. He also reported seeing 4 damaged buses being brought to
      workshop at Dadar and ordered repair of the  said  damaged  buses  and
      replacement of the bus lying at Century Bazaar which was also  brought
      to the workshop. In  the  month  of  August,  1993,  he  received  the
      statement sent by the Officer of the Engineering  Department  of  BEST
      informing that  the  total  expenditure  of  Rs.13,93,000/-  had  been
      incurred for the above stated work.
(ii)  Pradeep R Karandikar (PW-647), who was an Assistant  Engineer  in  the
      Street Lighting Department of BEST deposed that as per the record  the
      total cost was assessed as under:
(a)   One BEST electric light pole of value Rs.12,000/- was vanished;
(b)   3 lanterns of value Rs.4,000/- were damaged; and
(c)   BEST had sustained a loss of  Rs.  16,294/-  due  to  the  blast  that
      occurred at Century Bazaar.



Deposition of Jayvant Rahdeo Salvi (PW-316)
      At the relevant time, PW-316 was the Colony Officer, G-Ward South  for
BMC and proved the damage caused to the properties belonging to BMC  (public
property).
(i)   The pipelines in the Century Bazaar which were supplied  by  BMC  were
      damaged due to the said explosion.
(ii)  The said damage was assessed to the tune of Rs. 45,000/- by  Assistant
      Engineer, Water Works, G-South Ward of BMC.
Deposition of Hemant Dattatray Parab (PW-579)
      At the relevant time, PW-579 was a Fire  Officer  in  the  Worli  Fire
Station and proved the damage caused in general.  In  his  deposition  dated
08.02.2000, he deposed that:
(i)   After attending and  inspecting  passport  office  on  12.03.1993,  he
      prepared the fire report Exhibit 2006 and Exhibit 2007  on  13.03.1993
      regarding the damage caused to the said site and the  fire  spread  in
      the said area;
(ii)  29 vehicles on the road, 6 RCC Buildings and one shed were under  fire
      which was extinguished by them.
Evidence with regard to the vehicle (Jeep) used in the Blast:

375)  Three commander jeeps were purchased by Mohammed Shafi Zariwala  (AA).
 The following are the Registration numbers of the same:-
(i)   MP 09-S 0070
(ii)  MP 09-S 0080
(iii)       MP 09-S 0082
The first jeep was used for the blast at Century Bazaar, Worli.   The  other
two jeeps were  found  abandoned  and  were  seized  by  the  police.  Shafi
Zariwala (AA) purchased all these  vehicles  through  PWs-365  and  366  and
bookings were done by PW-195, an employee of M/s.  Wasan  Motors,  who  were
also dealers of jeeps.  PW-627  of  M/s.  Wasan  Motors  received  the  cash
payment.
Deposition of Nilesh G Parekh (


















PW-195)
      PW-195 is a Salesman of M/s. Wasan Motors. He deposed that:
(i)   In January, 1993,  Shakeel  Suleman  Hasham  (PW-366)  of  Auto  Links
      booked 3 Mahindra Commander Jeeps in the names of Altaf Hussain, Aslam
      Shaikh and Jamal Ahmed of Indore. The  delivery  of  the  said  jeeps,
      i.e., Article Nos. 378/379 was taken through his representative on two
      different dates in the month of January 1993.
(ii)  About ten days after the blast on 12.03.1993, the Jeep  (Article  378)
      bearing registration No. MP-09-S-0082 was shown to  him  at  MRA  Marg
      Police Station.
(iii) After 3 to 4 days, he also saw the blazer-blue coloured Jeep  (Article
      379) bearing registration no. MP-09-D-3043  at  the  office  of  Crime
      Branch.
(iv)  He inspected the said jeeps and found that one additional  cavity  box
      and aluminium sheet flooring was prepared.
(v)   On  22.01.1993,  the  Jeep,  bearing  Engine  No.  DQ  16217,  Chassis
      No.16217 and Temporary Registration No. DMR-8322 was sold by M/s Wasan
      Motors.
(vi)  Exhibit 865 is the order form of 3 jeeps purchased by  Shakeel,  i.e.,
      first blazer blue coloured jeep purchased for Altaf  Hussain  of  M.G.
      Road, Indore, M.P. with temporary registration No.  DMR-8322,  Chassis
      no. DQ-16217, second  blazer blue coloured jeep  purchased  for  Aslam
      Shaikh of M.G. Road, Indore, M.P. with temporary registration No. DMR-
      8323, Chassis no. DQ-16140 and  a  third  blazer  blue  coloured  jeep
      purchased for Jamal Ahmed of M.G. Road, Indore, M.P. with chassis  no.
      DQ-16230.
Deposition of Navnit Dhanpatrai Saini (PW-627)
      At the relevant time, PW-627 was working as a Sales Executive with M/s
Wasan Automobiles  at  Chembur.  In  his  deposition  dated  11.04.2000,  he
deposed as under:
(i)   On 20.01.1993, as asked by PW 195, he met at his residence at  Bibijan
      Terrace, Byculla.
(ii)  He alongwith PW-366 went to Patel Petrol  Pump  and  received  Rs.4.73
      lakhs from PW-365 as an advance for two Mahindra Commander Jeeps which
      he wanted to book.
(iii) Thereafter, he deposited the said amount with PW-195.  On  21.01.1993,
      as instructed by PW 195, he along with sub-broker PW-366 had  gone  to
      PW-365 and placed an order for one more Mahindra  Hard  Top  Commander
      Jeep and paid Rs.2.36 lakhs in cash and he had given the  same  to  PW
      195.
Deposition of Kailash Baheti (PW-342)
      PW-342 was carrying on the business as an Auto  Consultant  under  the
name and style of "Baheti Consultant". In his deposition,  he  deposed  that
on 22.02.1993, he  received  the  papers  for  registration  of  3  Mahindra
Commander Jeeps at Indore. On the next day,  after  receiving  a  call  from
Bombay regarding the registration papers of the jeeps, he  handed  over  the
documents and necessary charges to Mahesh Tiwari,  RTO  Agent.  The  officer
registered the said jeeps at RTO, Indore.  PW-342  gathered  from  the  sale
certificates  that  all  the  said  jeeps  were  purchased  from  M/s  Wasan
Automobiles at Bombay and he deposed that  one  of  the  purchasers  of  the
jeeps was Jamal Ahmed who was  residing  at  M.G.  Road,  Indore  and  other
purchasers were also residents of M.G. Road, Indore.
Deposition of Shakeel Suleman Hasham (PW-366)
      PW-366 was carrying his business under the name and style of M/s  Auto
Links. In his deposition dated 09.07.1998, he disclosed that  before  giving
the delivery of the said three jeeps to PW 365, he got them insured  through
Insurance agent Rakesh Tiwari (PW-338).  He  also  got  them  registered  at
Indore, Madhya Pradesh through one Kailash Bindav. The delivery of the  said
three jeeps was taken by the concerned party directly from the  showroom  of
M/s Wasan Automobiles.
Deposition of Suleman Mohd. Lakdawala (PW-365)
      PW-365 was running his own Petrol Pump at Byculla, under the name  and
style of M/s Patel  Brothers  since  1988.  Besides  the  said  Petrol  pump
business, he was also carrying the business of sale and  purchase  of  motor
vehicles. In his statement dated 09.07.1998, he stated that in the month  of
January/February 1993, he arranged for the purchase of three  new  Commander
Jeeps. The jeeps were  bearing  registration  numbers  of  M.P.   They  were
purchased through PW-366 from Wasan Automobiles for a price of Rs. 7  lakhs.
The amount was paid by Shafi Zariwala (AA) and delivery  of  the  jeeps  was
taken by Shafi who brought them to his petrol pump.


Deposition of Rakesh Tiwari (PW-338)
      PW-338 was an Insurance Agent. Sometime, in between, 22-01-1993 and 25-
01-1993, at the instance of PW-366 of Auto Links,  he  insured  3  Commander
Jeeps and 2 Maruti Vans  with  National  Insurance  Company.   He  gave  the
policy certificates to PW-366, who paid him the necessary  charges.  Exhibit
1236 colly is the cover notes of policies prepared as  per  the  information
given by PW-366.
Mukhtar Imdad Ahmed (PW-281)
      PW-281 deposed that he had been asked by the  Shafi  (AA)  to  prepare
cavities in the Jeep. The cavities were to be prepared under the front  seat
by covering the lower portion of the front left side seat of the jeep.
376)  The evidence of the approver,  the  eye-witness,  experts  and  others
clearly implicate A-11 to the actual scene of the crime  at  Century  Bazaar
along with linking  him  to  taking  part  in  the  entire  conspiracy.  The
confession made by A-11 himself and  the  confessions  of  the  various  co-
accussed which have been discussed above are in consonance  with  the  other
available evidence.    Hence, it is established that  the  appellant  (A-11)
was an active member of the conspiracy which led to the  blasts  at  various
places in Bombay and caused many deaths, injuries and loss to property.
377)  The appellant (A-11) in his  confessional  statement  admitted  having
planted the Jeep at Century Bazaar. It is  clear  from  his  own  confession
along with the  confessions  of  co-accused  and  other  witnesses  that  he
himself drove the jeep and left it there along with the  bomb.  It  is  also
clear that he was aware of the entire conspiracy and was very close to  A-1.
He actively participated in landings, smuggling  of  arms  and  ammunitions,
making of bombs and planting the  bomb  at  Century  Bazaar.   The  evidence
given by the doctors and the  family  members  of  the  deceased  shows  the
extent of suffering that was inflicted by A-11  and  the  other  accused  in
pursuance of the said conspiracy. The quantity  of  RDX  that  was  used  in
blasts clearly shows and establishes the fact that the blasts were  intended
to tear the economic, moral and social fabric of the nation  and  to  induce
communal tensions.  The planning, timing and the  intensity  of  the  blasts
establish that the blasts were synchronised so as to  cause  maximum  damage
to life and property and the involvement of  the  appellant  in  the  entire
conspiracy was of great  importance  as  he  was  himself  involved  in  the
landing of arms and ammunitions and even planted the jeep with a bomb  which
exploded in Century Bazaar.
378)  In view of the above,  we  hold  that  the  prosecution  has  produced
sufficient evidence to bring home the charges framed against him.

                       Criminal Appeal No. 897 of 2008


Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12)              …..Appellant(s)

                       versus

The State of Maharashtra
Thr. CBI-STF, Mumbai                      ……..Respondent(s)


379)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel appeared for  the  appellant  (A-12)
and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior  counsel,  duly  assisted  by  Mr.
Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr. Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for
the respondent.
380)  The instant appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order
of conviction and sentence dated  21.09.2006  and  18.07.2007  respectively,
whereby the appellant has been convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  by  the
Designated Court under  TADA  for  the  Bombay  Bomb  Blasts  Case,  Greater
Bombay, BBC Case No. 1/1993.


Charges:
381)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators including the appellant (A-12).  The relevant  portion  of  the
said charge is reproduced hereunder:-
      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”


      In addition to the  abovesaid  principal  charge  of  conspiracy,  the
appellant was also charged on the following counts:




      At  head  secondly;  He  abetted  and  knowingly   and   intentionally
      facilitated the commission of terrorist acts and acts  preparatory  to
      terrorist acts by doing the following overt acts:


     i) He along with  co-conspirators  participated  in  the  landing  and
        transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives  at  Shekhadi  on
        3rd and 7th February, 1993;
    ii) He participated in training in handling and use of arms, ammunition
        and handgrenades on the outskirts of village Sandheri and Borghat;
   iii) He  along  with  co-conspirators  participated  in  preparation  of
        vehicle bombs in the night of 11th/12th March, 1993 at  Al-Hussaini
        Building;
    iv)  He  participated  in  the  transportation  of  arms,   ammunition,
        handgrenades   and   electric   detonators   from   Jogeshwari   to
        Musafirkhana with co-accused  Ashrafur  Rehman  Azimulla  Sheikh  @
        Lalloo and Smt. Ruksana Mohammed Shafi Zariwala and thereby  having
        committed an offence punishable under Section 3(3) of the TADA.


      At head thirdly; He drove scooter bearing  registration  no.  MP-14-B-
      5349, laden with RDX explosives and fitted with time device  detonator
      and parked the said vehicle  at  Katha  Bazaar,  opposite  Maturchhaya
      Building, PS Pydhonie, Bombay which exploded resulting in death  of  4
      persons, injuring 21 others and causing loss of properties  worth  Rs.
      37 lakhs and  thereby  committed  offences  punishable  under  Section
      3(2)(i) and (ii) of TADA.


      At head fourthly; For the aforesaid act mentioned in  charge  thirdly,
      the appellant has committed an offence punishable  under  Section  302
      IPC.


      At head fifthly; For the aforesaid act mentioned  in  charge  thirdly,
      the appellant committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC by
      injuring 21 persons.


      At head sixthly;  The  appellant  (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted in grievous hurt to 10 persons, committed an
      offence punishable under Section 326 IPC.


      At head seventhly; The appellant  (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion and voluntarily causing hurt to  11  persons,  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 324 IPC.


      At head eighthly; The  appellant  (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, caused damage to properties worth Rs. 37  lakhs,  committed
      an offence punishable under Section 435 IPC.


      At head ninthly;  The  appellant  (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, caused damage to the property used as dwelling house and as
      places for custody of property committed an offence  punishable  under
      Section 436 IPC.


      At head tenthly;  The  appellant  (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, committed an offence punishable  under  Section  3  of  the
      Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


      At head eleventhly; The appellant (A-12),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, committed an offence punishable under Section 4 (a)(b)   of
      the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


      At head twelfthly; The appellant (A-12),  by  possessing  RDX  without
      licence which was filled in the above  mentioned  scooter,  which  was
      used  for  causing  the  aforesaid  explosion,  committed  an  offence
      punishable under Section 9B(1)(b)  of the Explosives Act, 1884.


      At head thirteenthly; The appellant (A-12), planted an explosive laden
      suitcase in Room No. 1840 of Hotel Sea Rock on 12th March, 1993, which
      exploded causing damage to the property to the tune of  Rs.  9  crores
      and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3(2)(ii)  of
      TADA.


      At head fourteenthly; The appellant (A-12), by causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.


      At head fifteenthly; The appellant (A-12), by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion in Hotel Sea Rock by using explosives committed  an  offence
      punishable under Section 436 IPC.


      At head sixteenthly; The appellant (A-12), by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion in Hotel Sea Rock which resulted in damage to the properties
      worth Rs. 9 crores, committed an offence punishable under Section 3 of
      the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


      At head seventeenthly; The appellant (A-12), by causing the  aforesaid
      explosion in Hotel Sea Rock  committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 4 (a)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.


      At head eighteenthly; The appellant (A-12), by  possessing  explosives
      without licence, committed an  offence  punishable  under  Section  9B
      (1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884.

382)  The Designated Judge found the appellant guilty on all  the  aforesaid
charges.  The appellant has been convicted and sentenced for the above  said
charges as follows:
Conviction and Sentence:

(i)   The appellant has been convicted and sentenced to death under  Section
3(3) of TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with the  offences  mentioned  in
the said charge. In addition, the appellant was ordered to  pay  a  fine  of
Rs. 25, 000/-.  (charge firstly)
(ii)  The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 3(3) of TADA for commission of such acts as found proved  from
clauses ‘a’ and ‘c’ from charge at head secondly framed against him  and  on
said count the appellant (A-12) was convicted and  sentenced  to  suffer  RI
for 12 years and is ordered to pay a fine  of  Rs.50,000/-,  in  default  of
payment of fine, was ordered to suffer further RI for a period  of  1  year.
(charge secondly)
(iii) The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA for commission of such acts  as  found  proved
from charge at head thirdly framed against him and  on  said  count  he  was
convicted  and  sentenced  to  suffer  punishment  of  death,   subject   to
confirmation of the same by this Court, and is also ordered to  pay  a  fine
of Rs.25,000/-. (charge thirdly)
(iv)  The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 302 IPC for commission of  such  acts  as  found  proved  from
charge at head fourthly framed against him and on  the  said  count  he  was
convicted  and  sentenced  to  suffer  punishment  of  death,   subject   to
confirmation of the same by this Court, and is also ordered to  pay  a  fine
of Rs.25,000/-. (charge fourthly)
(v)   The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 307 IPC for commission of  such  acts  as  found  proved  from
charge at head fifthly framed against him and  on  the  said  count  he  was
convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for life and is ordered to pay  a  fine
of Rs.25,000/-, in default of payment of fine,  he  was  ordered  to  suffer
further RI for a period of 6 months.  (charge fifthly)
(vi)  The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 324 IPC for commission of  such  acts  as  found  proved  from
charge at head seventhly framed against him and on the  said  count  he  was
convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 3 years. (charge seventhly)
(vii) The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 435 IPC for commission of  such  acts  as  found  proved  from
charge at head eighthly framed against him and on  the  said  count  he  was
convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 7 years and was ordered  to  pay  a
fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default of  payment  of  fine,  he  was  ordered  to
suffer further RI for a period of 6 months. (charge eighthly)
(viii)      The appellant (A-12) was further found guilty  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 436 IPC  for  commission  of  such  acts  as  found
proved from charge at heady ninthly framed  against  him  and  on  the  said
count he was convicted and sentenced to  suffer  RI  for  5  years  and  was
ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default,  to  further  undergo  RI
for a period of 6 months. (charge ninthly)
(ix)  The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances  Act,  1908  for  commission  of
such acts as found proved from charge at head  tenthly  framed  against  him
and on the said count he was convicted and sentenced to  suffer  RI  for  10
years and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in  default  of  payment
of fine, he was ordered to suffer further RI for a  period  of  six  months.
(charge tenthly)
(x)   The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for  commission  of
such acts as found proved from charge at head eleventhly framed against  him
and on the said count he was convicted and sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  7
years and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default of payment  of
fine, he was ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 6 months.  (charge
eleventhly)
(xi)  The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 9B(1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884 for  commission  of  such
acts as found proved from charge at head twelfthly framed  against  him  and
on the said count he was convicted  and  sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  two
years. (charge twelfthly)
(xii) The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 3(2)(ii) of TADA for commission of such acts as  found  proved
from charge at head thirteenthly framed against him and on  the  said  count
he was convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for life and was ordered to  pay
a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, in default of  payment  of  fine,  was  ordered  to
suffer further RI for a period of 3 years. (charge thirteenthly)
(xiii)       The  appellant  was  further  found  guilty  for  the   offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC  for  commission  of  such  acts  as  found
proved from charge at head fourteenthly framed against him and on  the  said
count he was convicted and sentenced to suffer  RI  for  10  years  and  was
ordered to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, in default of payment of  fine,  was
ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 3 years.
(charge fourteenthly)
(xiv) The  appellant  (A-12)  was  further  found  guilty  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 436 IPC  for  commission  of  such  acts  as  found
proved from charge at head fifteenthly framed against him and  on  the  said
count he was convicted and sentenced to suffer  RI  for  10  years  and  was
ordered to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, in default of payment of  fine,  was
ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 3 years. (charge fifteenthly)
(xv)  The  appellant  (A-12)  was  further  found  guilty  for  the  offence
punishable under Section  3  of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  1908  for
commission of such acts as found proved  from  charge  at  head  sixteenthly
framed against him and on the said count he was convicted and  sentenced  to
suffer RI for 7 years and was ordered to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-,  in
default of payment of fine, was ordered to suffer further RI  for  a  period
of 6 months. (charge sixteenthly)
(xvi) The appellant was further found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for  commission  of
such acts as found proved from charge at head seventeenthly  framed  against
him and on the said count, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer  RI  for
7 years and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default of  payment
of fine, was ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 6 months.  (charge
seventeenthly)
(xvii)  The appellant was further found guilty for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 9B(1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884 for  commission  of  such
acts as found proved from charge at head  eighteenthly  framed  against  him
and on the said count he was convicted and sentenced to suffer  RI  for  two
years. (charge eighteenthly)
Evidence:
383)  The evidence against the appellant (A-12) is in the form of:-
(i)   his own confession;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses including eye witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence.
Conspiracy:
384)  As mentioned above, a common charge  of  conspiracy  has  been  framed
against all the accused persons and in order to bring home the  charge,  the
cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken  into  account
in determining the guilt of the accused rather  than  adopting  an  isolated
approach to each of the circumstance.  Since we have  elaborately  discussed
the issue relating to conspiracy in the earlier part of our judgment,  there
is no need to refer the same once again.
Confessional Statement of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh   (A-12)

385)  Confessional statement of A-12 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.04.1993 (14:00 hrs.) and 21.04.1993  (06:50  hrs.),  by  Shri
Prem Krishna Jain (PW-189), the then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  The facts  emerge
from his confessional statement are as under:
     i) The appellant (A-12) was introduced to Tiger by Abdul  Gani  Ismail
        Turk (A-11).
    ii) The appellant (A-12) was told by A-11 that his (A-12)  job  was  to
        bring and deliver the Hawala money.  Tiger Memon told the appellant
        to work with honesty.
   iii) In Tiger’s office, the appellant (A-12)  came  across  Asgar  Yusuf
        Mukadam (A-10), Shafi (AA), Rafiq Madi (A-46),  Anwar  Theba  (AA),
        Imtiyaz Yunusmiyan Ghavate (A-15), Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Mohd.
        Hussian, Mohammed Mushtaq Moosa Tarani (A-44) and Haneef (A-40) and
        also came to know that Tiger was a smuggler of silver.
    iv) In the last week of January, 1993, the appellant (A-12) accompanied
        A-15 to the Tiger’s residence from where they, along with Tiger and
        other associates, left for Shekhadi for landing of smuggled items.
     v) The landing took place after three days.  Meanwhile, the  appellant
        (A-12) and others stayed at Vesava Hotel at Mahad and also at Hotel
        Big Splash, Alibaug.
    vi) On the 4th day, landing took place at Shekhadi.  The appellant  and
        some other  boys  were  asked  to  wait  for  A-11  at  the  Tower.
        Thereafter, Tiger Memon came there along with a motor  lorry  which
        was loaded with goods.  All the boxes in the lorry were unloaded at
        the Tower.  The appellant and others opened  the  boxes  and  found
        that they were containing hand  grenades,  bullets,  revolvers  and
        wire bundles.  Thereafter, some goods were loaded in  the  cavities
        of the Jeeps and the remaining goods were loaded in the lorry.
   vii) The appellant (A-12) along with Nasir Abdul  Kader  Kewal  @  Nasir
        Dhakla (A-64), drove a Jeep and stayed at Khandala as instructed by
        Tiger.  A-64 left for Bombay  as  his  daughter  was  sick.   Tiger
        instructed the appellant (A-12) to stay there  and  told  him  that
        Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18) will  come  in  the  morning.
        Accordingly, A-18 and A-15 came to Khandala and all  of  them  left
        for Bombay.
  viii) At the time of opening of goods at the Tower, Tiger showed a pencil
        like item to all of them and told that it was worth Rs.25,000/- and
        he could blow one Hotel Oberoi with it.
    ix) In the second week of February, 1993, the appellant again went with
        Tiger Memon and other accused persons to  Shekhadi  coast  and  was
        present there at the time when the  goods  were  unloaded  and  re-
        loaded in the tempo.  Thereafter, he went to the Tower  along  with
        other accused persons.
     x) On 15th/16th February, 1993, the appellant along with A-10 went  to
        the  Tiger’s  residence  at  Al-Hussaini   Building   where   Shafi
        distributed Rs.10,000/- to everyone present there.
    xi) On 11th March, on the instructions of Tiger,  the  appellant  along
        with A-10, carried  two  suitcases,  two  hand  bags  and  one  big
        suitcase to Room No. 17 of Musafir-khana where he  found  that  one
        bag was containing AK-56 rifles and another  bag  was  having  hand
        grenades in it.  Thereafter, they went to the house of Shafi.
   xii) The appellant (A-12) and Shafi then went to Shafi’s sister-in-law’s
        house at Jogeshwari in a jeep where wife of  Shafi  (Rukhsana)  (A-
        103) was also present.  Shafi kept 2 AK-56  rifles  and  some  hand
        grenades in one bag and pistols in another bag.
  xiii) The appellant (A-12) and others carried both the bags and left in a
        Jeep and Shafi dropped them at Mahim and asked them to  go  to  his
        house.  Thereafter, they went to the house of Shafi and  left  both
        the bags there.
   xiv) The appellant (A-12) drove Shafi’s scooter and reached  Al-Hussaini
        Building.
    xv) At Al-Hussaini Building, the appellant saw that the accused persons
        were filling the black coloured chemical into  the  cars,  scooters
        and Jeeps which was smuggled on 03.02.1993 at Shekhadi,.
   xvi) The appellant also assisted the co-accused persons in  filling  RDX
        in vehicles.
  xvii) The appellant, A-10 and Shoaib were asked by Anwar  Theba  (AA)  to
        dispose off 5/6 plastic bags containing the empty  cardboard  boxes
        in which black soap was packed.
 xviii) On return to Tiger’s residence, the appellant along with Asgar  and
        Shoaib picked up three suitcases which were kept in the garage  and
        reached Anwar’s residence in a red  coloured  Van  where  they  met
        Anwar Theba (AA) and Mushtaq (A-44).  A-15 also joined them  later.


   xix) Anwar Theba (AA) and Mushtaq (A-44) sat in the Van and left towards
        Link Road.  On the way,  Anwar  Theba  (AA)  opened  the  bags  and
        inserted the pencil like articles into the chemical filled  therein
        and then closed the same.
    xx) After reaching Link Road, Anwar Theba (AA) instructed A-12 to  take
        one bag and keep it in Room No. 1840 of Hotel Sea Rock.
   xxi) Accordingly, the appellant kept the said explosive-laden bag in the
        said room and reached the Al-Hussaini Building and handed over  the
        keys of the said room to Anwar.
  xxii) Thereafter, Anwar handed over an old blue coloured Bajaj Scooter to
        the appellant and asked him to park it  in  Katha  Bazaar.   Before
        leaving, Anwar Theba (AA) further inserted the said pencil into the
        black chemical which was filled  in  the  scooter.   The  appellant
        parked the scooter at Katha Bazaar and took away the  keys  of  the
        scooter with himself.
 xxiii) On 12.03.1993, When Asgar and Shoaib  came  to  the  house  of  the
        appellant (A-12), he then handed over the keys of the scooter which
        he had parked at Katha Bazaar to Asgar.
  xxiv)  He knew that the explosions were for taking revenge for demolition
        of Babri Masjid against Hindus.  He knew that the  explosion  would
        cause huge loss to human lives and properties and he  intentionally
        committed this mistake.
386)  On perusal of the aforesaid  confessional  statement,  the  followings
facts emerge:
     i) The appellant (A-12) was a trusted confidant of Tiger  Memon  since
        he was assisting him in crime relating to  Hawala  transaction  and
        was well acquainted with other co-conspirators;
    ii) He  participated  in  the  landing  of  arms  and  ammunitions  and
        explosives and was fully aware of the nature and capacity  of  such
        material which is clear from the demonstration given by  Tiger  and
        as stated by the appellant (A-12) that a pencil like thing was good
        enough to blow the Oberoi Hotel;
   iii) He participated in the transportation and storage of such material;
    iv) He participated in filling of RDX in the  vehicles  parked  in  the
        garage of Al-Hussaini building;
     v) He planted the suitcase in Hotel Sea Rock knowing that it  contains
        RDX and is fitted with time pencil detonator; and
    vi) He parked the scooter laden with black  chemical  and  fitted  with
        time pencil detonator at Katha Bazaar.
Retraction Statement:
387)  It was contended on behalf of  the  appellant  (A-12)  that  since  he
subsequently retracted from his own confession dated  11.01.1994,  the  same
cannot  be  relied  upon.   Since  we   have   elaborately   discussed   the
admissibility or otherwise of the retraction statements in the earlier  part
of our judgment, there is no need to refer the same once again.    The  said
conclusion will be applicable to this appeal also.
Confessional Statements of co-accused:
388)  Apart from his own confession, the involvement of  the  appellant  has
also been disclosed in the confessional  statements  of  the  following  co-
accused.  The legality and acceptability  of  the  confessions  of  the  co-
accused has been considered by us in the earlier  part  of  our  discussion.
The said confessions insofar as they refer to the appellant  are  summarized
hereinbelow:
Confessional Statement of Mohammed Soaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9)

      Confessional statement of A-9  under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (13:10 hrs.) and 22.04.1993  (00:30  hrs.),  by  Prem
Krishna Jain (PW-189), the then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  A-9 with reference  to
A-12 has stated as under:
    i) The appellant (A-12) was working for Tiger  Memon  and  he  used  to
       visit his shop occasionally.
   ii) The appellant (A-12) along with other accused persons was working in
       the garage at Al-Hussaini.
  iii) A-12 and A-10, on the instructions of Anwar Theba (AA),  threw  away
       six big plastic bags in the wastage van of BMC.
   iv) In the morning of 12.03.1993, A-12 and A-10 brought  out  three  VIP
       bags from the garage at Al-Hussaini Building and put them in the Van
       and left for the residence of Anwar.
    v) Anwar Theba (AA) inserted pencil of steel into the blackish chemical
       inside the bags and then the appellant was dropped near a  taxi  and
       was asked to go to Hotel Sea Rock with a bag.
   vi) The appellant came back to the Al-Hussaini building.
 (vii)     After the blast, A-10 and A-9 went to the house of the appellant
       on 13.03.1993.


   Confessional Statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)
      Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
   recorded on 23.04.1994 (18:00 hrs.), by Shri  Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-
   193), the then DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   A-10  with  reference  to  the
   appellant has stated as under:
     i) The appellant was dealing with Hawala money.
    ii) The appellant was present at Tiger’s residence.
   iii) A-10 and A-12 took Rs. 5 lakhs from Choksi (A-97) and  gave  it  to
        Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17).
    iv) The appellant assisted him in collecting Rs. 1 crore from Choksi (A-
        97) for Yakub Abdul Razak Memon   (A-1).
     v) The appellant accompanied him to the Tiger’s residence and  shifted
        two VIP bags, one hand bag and one briefcase from Tiger’s residence
        to Room No.17 of the Haj Committee House, near Crawford Market.
    vi) The appellant accompanied him (A-10) to the house of Shafi and took
        a new scooter from his residence.
   vii) The appellant  (A-12)  along  with  other  co-accused  persons  was
        present at  the  Al-Hussaini  building  in  the  night  intervening
        between 11/12th  March  and  was  loading  black  chemical  in  the
        vehicles.
  viii) A-10 and A-12 disposed off the plastic  bags  in  which  the  empty
        boxes of chemicals were kept.
    ix) The appellant was present along with  him  when  Anwar  Theba  (AA)
        inserted aluminum like pencils into  the  chemical  filled  in  the
        suitcases.
     x) The appellant was dropped by the accused (A-10) on the instructions
        of Anwar Theba (AA) with one of the said VIP bag.
   (xi)      The  appellant  (A-12)  came  back  to  Al-Hussaini   building,
        thereafter, as per the instructions of Anwar, he drove one  scooter
        loaded with RDX to park it at the designated place.

Confessional Statement of Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11)
   Confessional statement of A-11 under Section 15 of TADA has been recorded
on 15.04.1993 (22:35 hrs.) and 18.04.1993, by Shri Prem  Krishna  Jain  (PW-
189), the then DCP, Zone X, Bombay.  A-11 with reference  to  the  appellant
has stated that:
     i) The appellant (A-12) was present at the residence of Tiger Memon on
        or about 27/28th January along with co-accused Shafi,  Yakub  Abdul
        Razak Memon (A-1), Rahim Yakub Memon, Rafiq Madi (A-46) and Imtiyaz
        Yunusmiyan Ghavate (A-15), whereafter, all of  them  (except  Yakub
        and his wife) left for Mhasla/Shekhadi.
    ii) The appellant (A-12) was present at Al-Hussaini on  11.03.1993  and
        was filling chemical @ black soap in the vehicles along with the co-
        accused.
Confessional  Statement  of  Dawood  @  Dawood  Taklya  Mohammed  Phanse   @
Phanasmiyan (A-14)

      Confessional statement of A-14 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 17.04.1993, by Shri P.K. Jain, the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.
A-14 with reference to the appellant stated that the  appellant  along  with
Tiger Memon and others came to Shekhadi for landing of arms.
Confessional Statement of Imtiaz Yunusmiyan Ghavate
(A-15)

   Confessional statement of A-15 under Section 15 of TADA has been recorded
on 07.05.1993 (12:30 hrs.) and 09.05.1993 (13:30 hrs.), by Shri Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.  A-15  with  reference  to
the appellant stated the following:
     i) The appellant worked in the office of Tiger Memon.
    ii) The appellant participated in the landing at Shekhadi.
   iii) The appellant arrived at Anwar’s house in the morning of 12.03.1993
        along with A-10.
    iv) Thereafter, the appellant reached Al-Hussaini building.
     v) The appellant drove a scooter filled with black coloured soap  like
        chemical at the instance of Anwar Theba (AA).
389)  On perusal of the aforesaid  confessions  of  the  co-accused,  it  is
clearly discernable that the appellant knowingly participated in  doing  the
following overt acts:
     i) The appellant was a trusted confident of Tiger Memon since  he  was
        assisting him in crime relating to Hawala transactions and was well
        acquainted with other co-conspirators.
    ii) The appellant participated in the landing of arms  and  ammunitions
        and explosives and was fully aware of the nature  and  capacity  of
        such material.
   iii) The appellant participated in transportation and  storage  of  such
        material.
    iv) The appellant was involved in filling of RDX in the vehicles parked
        in the garage of the Al-Hussaini building.
     v) The appellant planted suitcase in Hotel Sea Rock  knowing  that  it
        contains RDX and is fitted with time pencil detonator.
    vi) The appellant parked the scooter laden with black chemical  on  the
        instructions of Anwar.
390)  It is also clear that the  confessions  made  by  the  appellants  are
truthful and voluntary and were made without any coercion.   All  safeguards
enumerated under Section 15 of TADA and the  rules  framed  thereunder  have
been duly complied with while recording the confessions of the appellants.
Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Blast at Katha Bazaar
Deposition of Laxman Dhondu Posture  (PW-8)
391)  PW-8 was working as a peon in  the  office  of  Chemical  Corporation,
Katha Bazaar.  He is an eyewitness  to  the  incident  and  has  deposed  as
under:
     i) The appellant parked the scooter  on  the  road  in  front  of  the
        Matruchayya Building at Katha Bazaar.  It was this scooter in which
        the bomb exploded.
    ii) PW-8 identified the appellant before the court in the dock  as  the
        person who parked the said scooter.
   iii)  PW-8  identified  the  appellant  in  the  identification   parade
        conducted  by  Moreshwar   Thakur   (PW-469),   Special   Executive
        Magistrate, on 13.05.1993, in Sitaram Building.
    iv) PW-8 further deposed that his employer’s scooter  was  also  parked
        next to the scooter parked by the appellant which  was  blown  into
        pieces.
Deposition of Abdulla Ibrahim Shaikh (PW-9)
   PW-9 was a driver working with one Mr. Mehra, whose  office  was  on  the
third floor of AGH Chambers which is opposite to Matruchayya building:
     i) PW-9 deposed that on 12.03.1993, a boy was trying to park a scooter
        adjacent to his employer’s car.
    ii) PW-9 told the driver of the scooter not to park it there  since  it
        would be difficult for him to take out his car.
   iii) PW-9 further deposed that on this the driver of  the  scooter  told
        him that he will leave in a while  and  parked  his  scooter  there
        itself.
    iv) While parking the scooter, the appellant even lost his balance  and
        was about to fall on the car then  he  helped  the  driver  of  the
        scooter to park it.
     v) PW-9 stated that after  sometime  he  heard  the  sound  of  a  big
        explosion and saw that his car was completely burnt.
    vi) PW-9 identified the appellant (A-12) before the Court  as  the  boy
        who parked the said scooter which exploded.
   vii) PW-9 also identified the appellant  in  the  identification  parade
        conducted on 21.03.1993 at 4.30 p.m.  by  PW-462  at  Sacred  Heart
        School.
392)  On  perusal  of  the  depositions  of  PWs-8  and  9,  it  is  clearly
established that on 12.03.1993, the appellant parked the  scooter  at  Katha
Bazaar,  opposite  to  Matruchhaya  Building  which  later   exploded.   The
appellant was duly identified by PWs 8 & 9 before the Court and also  during
the identification parade conducted by  the  Special  Executive  Magistrate.
The  above  depositions  also  sufficiently  corroborate  the   confessional
statement made by  the  appellant  that  he  parked  a  scooter  laden  with
explosives at Katha Bazaar.
Deposition of Vasant Ganpat Kamble (PW-462)
   At the relevant time, PW-462 was the Special Executive  Magistrate  (SEM)
who conducted the Test Identification Parade for the identification  of  the
appellant. He deposed as under:
     i) He conducted the Test Identification Parade on 21.03.1993 for PW-9.
    ii) He further deposed that PW-9 duly identified the appellant (A-12).
   iii) The witness proved the panchnama of the parade which  was  prepared
        by him and is marked as Exh. 1478.
Deposition of Moreshwar Thakur  (PW-469)
   At the relevant time, PW-469 was the  Special  Executive  Magistrate  who
conducted the Test Identification  Parade  for  the  identification  of  the
appellant-A-12.  He deposed as under:
     i) PW-469 conducted the Test Identification Parade  on  13.05.1993  at
        Sitaram Building in the presence of two panchas and also prepared a
        panchnama for the said parade.
    ii) PWs-8 and 9 identified the appellant as the person who  parked  the
        scooter at Katha Bazaar.
   iii) PW-469 in his deposition proved the panchnama.
Deposition of Suresh Satappa Walishetty (PW-680)
   PW-680 was the Investigating Officer at the relevant  time  in  the  case
pertaining to blast at Katha Bazaar:
     i) He deposed that the appellant made a statement before him  that  he
        was willing to make a voluntary disclosure which was  reduced  into
        writing by him.
    ii) The appellant (A-12) led the police party to Room  No.  63  on  the
        ground floor of Railway Quarters from where he  took  out  a  white
        shirt from a trunk and handed over the  same  to  the  police.   On
        inspection by the police, it was  found  that  it  contained  black
        stains on both the sleeves.
   iii) He deposed that he drew a recovery panchnama of the entire event.
    iv)  He  deposed  that  on  31.05.1993,  the  appellant  made   another
        disclosure statement and led the police party and got  his  driving
        licence bearing No. MH-01-93-5023 issued  on  17.02.1993  recovered
        from the house of his friend Mohd. Taufiq  Naulakhiya  resident  of
        Hussain Rattan Chawl.  The panchnamas for  the  entire  event  were
        also prepared.
     v) Vide covering letter dated 28.06.1993, PW-680 sent the  said  shirt
        to the Chemical Analyzer.
    vi) The report of the Chemical Analyser dated 16.07.1993  was  received
        by him.
   vii) He also deposed  that  one  Raju  Kodi  (A-26)   made  a  voluntary
        confession and led the police party to his shop and he took  out  a
        packet from a cupboard and handed over the same to the police party
        who  opened  it  and  found  that  it  contained   a   registration
        certificate of Bajaj Scooter bearing No. MP-14-B-5349, Chassis  No.
        MO-5-178695.
  viii) He deposed that he prepared two panchnamas of the entire event.
The report of the Chemical Analyzer confirms  the  presence  of  the  highly
explosive RDX (Cyclonite) on the shirt recovered by the police party at  the
instance of the appellant (A-12).  Thus it can safely be inferred  that  the
appellant was present at the time of filling RDX in the vehicles and  during
the said process he had soiled his shirt.
Deposition of Sanjay Laxman Kadam (PW-530)
   PW-530 was the API and had assisted PW-680 in the  interrogation  of  the
appellant on 31.05.1993.  PW-530 confirms and corroborates the fact  of  the
appellant (A-12) making a voluntary statement and, thereafter,  leading  the
police party to the house of his friend Mohd. Taufiq from where his  driving
licence was recovered.
Deposition of Abdul Rauf (PW-525)
   PW-525 was a police officer at Pydhonie, Police Station at  the  relevant
time.  He deposed that he inspected the place of occurrence in the  presence
of panch witnesses.  He further deposed as under:
     i) He seized chassis of a scooter and a part of the scooter which  had
        burnt on the spot.  The chassis bore the No. MO-5-178695.
    ii) He seized the number plate of the scooter bearing No. MP 1B 5349.
   iii) He also seized glass splinters and ashes from the spot.
    iv) He deposed that he seized pieces of cloth and earth soaked with oil
        lying on the spot.
     v) He also drew a spot panchnama which was proved by him.
Deposition of Ramesh G. Thakur (PW-64)
   PW-64, an electrician working in Andheri, has deposed as a witness.   The
following facts have been established from his statement:
     i) He is a panch witness.
    ii) In his presence, A-26 made a voluntary statement.
   iii) A-26 led the police party and the panch witness to his shop.
    iv) In his presence, the police party pursuant to disclosure  recovered
        the registration papers of Bajaj scooter.
Deposition of Shantilal Gandhi (PW-386)
   PW-386 was involved in the preparation of ornaments of gold and  owned  a
stall in Zaveri Bazaar.  He deposed to the following effect:
     i) He is a resident of Ratlam and  after  staying  there  he  came  to
        Bombay and worked at Zaveri Bazaar.
    ii) He knows A-26 since 1983.
   iii) Between 15-20th April, 1992 he went to Ratlam by train  and  before
        leaving, he met A-26.
    iv) A-26 told him that since Kumbhmela was going on in M.P.,  he  would
        get 50% off on purchase of scooters.
     v) A-26 gave him Rs.20,000/- to purchase a scooter from  Ratlam,  M.P.
        in the name of P.B. Mali.
    vi) He purchased the scooter for Rs.19,000/- from Ratlam in the name of
        P.B. Mali and gave his residential address as 53, Hatiram Darwaja.
   vii) The Registration No. of the scooter was MP-14-B-5349.
  viii) He then booked the scooter by train to A-26 from Ratlam.
Upon perusal of the evidence of PW-386, it is clearly  established  that  he
purchased the scooter at the behest of A-26 from  Ratlam,  MP  in  the  fake
name of P.B. Mali and A-26 paid the money for  the  said  purchase.   PW-386
also sent the registration papers to him which were  subsequently  recovered
from his shop vide disclosure statement made by A-26.
Deposition of Pratapram Buraji Mali (PW-75)
   He had his own business of making gold and silver ornaments and  so  also
in the Share Market.  He deposed as under:
     i) He knew Raju Kodi (A-26) for the last ten years.
    ii) He had seen Raju Kodi driving a  blue  coloured  scooter  of  Bajaj
        Company.
   iii) He had not booked any scooter in his name.
On perusal of the aforesaid deposition, it is clearly discernible  that  the
scooter was booked in the fake name which fact is also established from  the
deposition of PW-75.

Other Witnesses:

Depositions of  Dharmendra  Ratilal  Parekh  (PW-423)  and  Sadashiv  Ganpat
Ranmale (PW-429)

393)  The above witnesses deposed about taking claim of  the  dead  body  of
their brothers who succumbed to the injuries sustained during the  blast  at
Katha Bazaar.

Deposition of Dr. Madhavrao Lalasaheb Lankeshwar      (PW-478)

      PW-478 deposed about the fact that Hiten Ratilal Parikh, brother of PW-
423 died on account of burn injuries sustained by him.  PW-478  also  issued
Medical Certificate explaining the cause of the death.
Deposition of Vijay Harishchandra Kelvekar (PW-479)
      PW-479 deposed about the fact that Baburao Ganpat Ranmale, brother  of
PW-429, died on account of burn injuries sustained by him.  He  also  issued
Medical Certificate explaining the cause of the death.



Deposition of Faizan Khan (PW-372)
      PW-372 deposed that Gulabi House owned by his company was damaged.  He
deposed that the damage estimated to the tune of Rs.25,000/-.
Deposition of Dinanath Ramchand Ramani (PW-373)
      PW-373 deposed that he has an office at Vyapar Bhavan and due  to  the
explosion at Katha Bazaar the glass panes of the  windows  in  the  bathroom
and balcony were damaged.


Depositions of  Suresh  Shamrao  Jathar  (PW-617),  Maheshwar  Diwakar  Datt
Sharma (PW-616) and Anil Baburao Gorakshakar (PW-618)

      All the abovesaid witnesses have  proved  the  damage  caused  to  the
public property on account of explosion at Katha Bazar.
Deposition of Namdeo Yashwant Gole (PW-430)
      PW-430 deposed that he sustained injuries on his leg and forehead  due
to which he became unconscious and was admitted in GT Hospital.


Explosion at Hotel Sea Rock:
Deposition of Premchand Pandhari Nath Garud (PW-23)
394)  PW-23 was working as an attendant in the House Keeping  Department  of
the said Hotel.  He deposed as under:
     i) A guest (A-12), carrying a biscuit coloured suitcase  and  a  black
        shoulder bag checked in Room No. 1840 at about 12:15 hrs.
    ii) The guest (A-12) was finding difficulty in opening the lock of  the
        room so he assisted him in opening the door.
   iii) The appellant asked him not to disturb  as  he  was  exhausted  and
        wanted to sleep.
    iv) Around 3 p.m., he heard a loud explosion due to which the said room
        was completely damaged and the lift also stopped working.
     v) PW-23 identified the appellant before the Court in the dock.
    vi) He also identified the appellant in the Test Identification  Parade
        conducted by Vasant Kamble (PW-462) on 21.03.1993.
Deposition of Vasant Kamble (PW-462)
     i) He is  the  SEM  who  conducted  the  TIP  on  21.03.1993  for  the
        identification of A-12 at Sacred Hearts School.
    ii) A Panchnama of the parade was also prepared by him which is  marked
        as Exh. 1478 and he also proved the same.
Deposition of Suresh K. Singh (PW-28)
      At the relevant time, PW-28 was working as a  bell  boy  in  the  said
   hotel.
     i) On 12.03.1993, he offered help to the appellant (A-12) to carry his
        biscuit coloured suitcase and black coloured bag but he refused  to
        take any help.
    ii) After 10/15 minutes, he saw the appellant leaving the hotel without
        luggage.
   (iii)    He identified the appellant (A-12) in the Identification  Parade
        dated 07.05.1993 conducted by Almedia, Special Executive Magistrate
        at Bandra Police Station in the presence of panch witness.



Deposition of Suresh Kumar Champalal Bhandari (PW-467)

     i) He was the panch witness of the parade conducted by the  SEM.
    ii) He deposed that PWs-28 and 23 duly identified the appellant  (A-12)
        in the Identification Parade conducted by SEM
   iii) He deposed that a panchnama was prepared for the parade.
The above said evidence establishes  the  fact  that  the  appellant  (A-12)
entered into the Room No. 1840 along with the luggage and after leaving  the
same in the said room,  he  went  out  of  the  hotel.   Thereafter,  a  big
explosion took place in the said room.  Both PWs-23 and 28  have  identified
the appellant (A-12).
Deposition of Ms. Darive Nicholas Henriques (PW-279)
      PW-279 was the Front Office Receptionist at  Hotel  Sea  Rock  at  the
relevant time and deposed that a person by name Domnic D’Souza came  to  the
hotel along with one  more  person  to  make  an  advance  payment  for  Mr.
Advani’s reservation on 08.03.1993.

Deposition of Johnwin George Manavalan (PW-280)
      PW-280 was working as a Cashier at  Hotel  Sea  Rock  and  deposed  of
having  accepted  Rs.7,000/-  on  08.03.1993  towards  advance  payment  for
reservation of the said room commencing from 11.03.1993, in the name of  Mr.
Advani.  He further deposed that he issued receipt for the same.
Deposition of Valery D’Souza (PW-620)
      PW-620 was a Reservation Assistant at Hotel Sea Rock at  the  relevant
time and deposed that on 08.03.1993, a person had come to confirm the  check
in of one Mr. Advani on  11.03.1993.   She  deposed  that  the  said  person
deposited  Rs.7,000/-  with  the  cashier  and  completed  the   reservation
formalities.
Deposition of Lorraine Gonsalves (PW-495)
      A receptionist at Hotel Sea Rock testified as follows:
     i) One person came to the desk and told that he has a booking  in  the
        name of Mr. Advani for Gorakhpur Metal Company.
    ii) He gave the booking number.
   iii) He also produced the receipt for advance payment.
    iv) He was given a registration card in which he filled 108, Napean Sea
        Road, as his address.
     v) After completing all the formalities, she allotted  Room  No.  1840
        and handed over the keys of the said room to him.
Deposition of Dr. Manoj Jagatraj Virani (PW-107)
      He was a doctor and residing at 100 AA, Sea View Bungalow.  He deposed
that no person by name Dominic D’Souza or Advani stayed at  108  Napean  Sea
Road.
On perusal of the aforesaid evidence, it is established that Room  No.  1840
was booked in a fictitious name.
Deposition of Dominic Anthony Martis (PW-333)
      At the relevant time, PW-333 was working as a  Security  Assistant  at
Hotel Sea Rock and deposed about the explosion and damage caused due to  it.
He proved his complaint which culminated into  a  first  information  report
about the said incident.
Deposition of Rajan Mayandy Natarajan (PW-437)
       He was also a Security Officer at Hotel Sea Rock and he deposed about
the scene after the blast.  He further deposed about the inspection  of  the
site conducted by PSI Bhagwan and proved the panchnama drawn by him.
Dastagir Mohamad Gavandi (PW-552)
   PW-552 was a police officer and he deposed as under:
     i) He inspected the site.
    ii) PSI Bhagwan collected 7 to 8  samples  from  the  room  by  drawing
        panchnama in the presence of panch witnesses.
   iii) On 14.03.1993, he along with PW-531 again went to  the  Hotel  with
        FSL experts who took some samples and handed over  them  to  PW-531
        vide panchnama Exh. 1826.
    iv) On 19.03.1993, he sent three sealed packets vide covering letter to
        Chemical Analyzer through PW-531.
     v) The chemical analyser report was received on 29.03.1993.
The report of the Chemical  Analyser  in  this  regard  is  clear  that  the
samples  sent  for  examination  contained  traces  of  high  explosive  RDX
(Cyclonite) and nitrite.

Deposition of Bhaurao Takekar (PW-531)
      PW-531 was a police officer and deposed that on 14.04.1993 he went  to
the Hotel along with Mandlik and Karnik, FSL experts and inspected the  said
room.  The FSL experts  collected  samples  and  handed  over  to  him.   He
deposed that he drew a panchnama and handed over the seized articles to  PW-
552.  He further deposed that he handed over three  sealed  packets  to  FSL
for opinion vide covering letter Exh. 1897.
Deposition of Ashok Hotchand Motwani (PW-419)
      PW-419 was a Project Manager at Hotel Sea Rock and deposed  about  the
monetary loss/damage caused to the hotel building owing to the explosion.
Other Recoveries at the behest of the appellant:
Deposition of Padmakar Bhosale (PW-43)
395)  PW-43 is a hawker near Gandhi Market.  He deposed that:
     i) The appellant made a voluntary statement that he was in  possession
        of the licence and the revolver of the Tiger  Memon  which  he  has
        kept in a black coloured pouch in a house.
    ii) The appellant led the police  party  and  the  panchas  to  Railway
        Quarters, Andheri.
   iii) The appellant took them behind his  house  and  took  out  a  black
        coloured pouch from the cavity of a fallen tree which  contained  a
        revolver loaded with six rounds and five  loose  rounds  were  also
        found, out of which, three were  similar  in  number  and  two  had
        different numbers inscribed on it.
    iv) The police party seized the same and a panchnama was drawn  by  PW-
        506.
Deposition of Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW-506)
   PW-506 was posted at Matunga Police Station as API. He deposed as under:
     i) The  appellant  expressed  his  willingness  to  make  a  voluntary
        statement.
    ii) He called for two panchas.
   iii) He recorded the statement of the appellant (A-12)  by  drawing  the
        panchnama.
    iv) The appellant (A-12) led  the  police  party  and  the  panchas  to
        Railway quarters.
     v) The appellant (A-12) then took the police party  behind  his  house
        and from the cavity of a fallen tree pulled out a pouch.
    vi) The said pouch contained one old cobra brand  loaded  revolver  and
        five loose live cartridges.
396)  It is contended by the counsel for the appellant (A-12) that there  is
no eye-witness to the incident of filling  of  RDX  and  as  such  the  said
incident has not been proved by the  prosecution.   It  is  clear  from  the
confession of the appellant (A-12) and the confessions of  other  co-accused
that the work of filling of RDX in vehicles and suitcases  was  carried  out
in the garage of the Al-Hussaini  Building.   We  are  also  satisfied  that
sufficient evidence is available on record to  substantiate  the  fact  that
the appellant (A-12) participated in filling RDX in vehicles  in  the  night
intervening 11th/12th March, 1993.
397)  It is contended on behalf of the appellant  that  PW-8  saw  a  person
parking the said scooter at Katha Bazaar  from  the  window  of  his  office
which is at a distance of about 15-20 meters from the  road  and  therefore,
his statement should not be relied upon.  It is further contended on  behalf
of the appellant (A-12) that the doctor who treated  PW-8  of  the  injuries
sustained by him in the blast has not been examined by  the  prosecution  to
corroborate the evidence of PW-8.  The said contentions are also  liable  to
be rejected since the scooter of PW-8’s employer was  parked  close  to  the
scooter parked by the appellant (A-12).  It is  normal  human  behaviour  to
look out for one’s own vehicle or employer’s vehicle and  accordingly,  PW-8
was attentive and had a clear sight of the  scooter.   Thus,  there  was  no
difficulty  in  seeing  the  appellant  parking  the  scooter  which   later
exploded.  Further, PW-8  has  correctly  identified  the  appellant  (A-12)
before  the  Court  during  the  dock  proceedings  and  also  in  the  Test
Identification Parade.  In addition to the same, it is relevant  to  mention
that PW-8 has been extensively cross-examined by the defence  on  the  point
that he was injured and he took  treatment  at  Dr.  Shah’s  Clinic  and  he
withstood  the  cross-examination  without  being  shaken.   Therefore,  the
credibility of the evidence of PW-8 is not affected whatsoever.
398)  It is contended on behalf of the appellant (A-12) that PW-530 had  not
obtained the signatures of panch witnesses upon the licence and/or  that  he
had not recorded the Registration number  of  the  vehicle  in  the  Station
Diary and that the panch witness was not a local panch witness and was  from
a place more than 100 kms. away.  This  submission  is  also  liable  to  be
rejected since PW-530 clearly explained the circumstances in  which  he  had
taken the said panch for the panchnama, i.e., the persons who  were  fetched
by staff from Crawford Market.  PW-530 in his  deposition  stated  that  the
driving licence being a plastic card, he could not obtain the signatures  on
the same and  the  details  of  the  driving  licence  having  already  been
mentioned in the panchnama, he had not pasted the label of the signature  of
panch witness upon the same and that he had mentioned in the  Station  Diary
the purpose of his visit and the persons accompanying him.
399)  Finally, it is contended on behalf of the appellant  (A-12)  that  the
testimony of PW-28 should be disregarded since he  failed  to  identify  the
appellant (A-12) before the Court.  This contention of  learned  counsel  is
also liable  to  be  rejected  since  PW-28  had  correctly  identified  the
appellant (A-12) during the test identification parade dated 07.05.1993  and
he failed to identify him before the Court possibly  because  his  testimony
was recorded after about 2 years and 9 months, i.e. on 21.12.1995.
400)  In view of the above said confessional statement of the appellant  (A-
12), the confessional statements of other co-accused persons,  as  also  the
eye-witnesses along with other witnesses duly examined  by  the  prosecution
and recoveries made, the charges framed  against  the  appellant  have  been
duly proved.
           Criminal Appeal Nos. 941-942 of 2008


Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf
Pawale (A-16)                                          ……..Appellant(s)

                       versus

The State of Maharashtra
thr. CBI-STF, Bombay                     ……..Respondent(s)


401)  Ms. Farhana Shah, learned counsel appeared for the appellant  and  Mr.
Gopal Subramanium, learned  senior  counsel,  duly  assisted  by  Mr.  Mukul
Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr.  Satyakam,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent.
402)  The present appeals are directed against the final judgment and  order
of conviction and sentence dated  09.10.2006  and  25.07.2007  respectively,
whereby the appellant has been convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  by  the
Designated Judge in the Bombay Bomb Blast Case, Greater Bombay  in  BBC  No.
1/1993.


Charges:
403)  A  common  charge  of  conspiracy  was  framed  against  all  the  co-
conspirators including the appellant (A-16).  The relevant  portion  of  the
same is reproduced hereunder:


      “During the period from December,  1992  to  April,  1993  at  various
      places in Bombay, District Raigad and  District  Thane  in  India  and
      outside India in Dubai  (UA.E.)  Pakistan,  entered  into  a  criminal
      conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal  conspiracy  whose
      object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you  all  agreed
      to commit following illegal acts, namely,  to  commit  terrorist  acts
      with an intent to overawe the Government as  by  law  established,  to
      strike terror in the people, to alienate Sections of the people and to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people,
      i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs,  dynamites,  handgrenades  and
      other explosives substances like RDX or inflammable substances or fire-
      arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in
      such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of  or  injuries
      to any person or  persons,  loss  of,  damage  to  and  disruption  of
      supplies of services essential to the life of the  community,  and  to
      achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all  agreed  to  smuggle
      fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and  high  explosives
      like RDX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves  and
      your men of confidence for the purpose of  committing  terrorist  acts
      and for the  said  purpose  to  conceal  and  store  all  these  arms,
      ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst  yourselves
      and with your men of confidence till its use for committing  terrorist
      acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and  to  dispose
      off the same as need arises.  To organize training camps  in  Pakistan
      and in India to import and undergo weapons  training  in  handling  of
      arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts.  To harbour
      and conceal terrorists/co-conspirators, and  also  to  aid,  abet  and
      knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory  to
      the  commission  of  terrorist  acts  and  to  render  any  assistance
      financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the  conspiracy
      to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal  acts  as
      were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the  criminal
      conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993  were  successful  in  causing  bomb
      explosions at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building,  Hotel  Sea
      Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu,  Hotel  Centaur  at  Santacruz,
      Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century  Bazaar  at  Worli,  Petrol  Pump
      adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing  handgrenades
      at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at  Bay-52,  Sahar  International
      Airport which left  more  than  257  persons  dead,  713  injured  and
      property worth about Rs. 27 crores destroyed, and attempted  to  cause
      bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street,  all  in  the
      city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay and  thereby
      committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987
      and  Section  120(B)  of  Indian  Penal  Code   read   with   Sections
      3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3), 3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and  read  with
      Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436,  201  and  212  of  Indian
      Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with  Sections  25
      (1A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections  9B(1)(a)(b)(c)  of  the
      Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of  the  Prevention  of  Damage  to
      Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance.”


      In addition to the aforesaid principal charge of conspiracy, A-16  was
also charged on other counts which are summarized as follows:

      At head  secondly;       He  committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 3(3) of TADA by committing the following overt acts.


           (a) He participated in the landing and transportation  of  arms,
           ammunitions and explosives which were  smuggled  into  India  at
           Shekhadi in February, 1993.


           (b) He visited Pakistan via  Dubai  for  receiving  training  in
           handling of arms, ammunitions and explosives from the agents  of
           ISI to commit terrorist acts in India.


           (c) He attended the conspiratorial meetings during the month  of
           March 1993 at the residence of Babloo @ Nazir Anwar  Shaikh  and
           Mobina @ Baya Musa Bhinwandiwala  for  making  plans  to  commit
           terrorist act.


           (d) He participated along with co-conspirators  in  loading  the
           explosives like  RDX  fitted  with  time  device  detonators  in
           various vehicles and in the preparation of vehicle bombs in  the
           intervening night of 11/12 March, 1993.


           (e)  He  surveyed  and  conducted  reconaissence  of  the  Stock
           Exchange Building and  Air  India  Building  on  10.03.1993  for
           causing explosions there at the instructions of Tiger Memon.


      At head thirdly; He, along with PW-2 drove explosive laden Maruti  Car
      No. MH-03-A-2143 and parked the same at Lucky Petrol  Pump  near  Shiv
      Sena Bhavan, Dadar, Bombay which exploded and  caused  death  to  four
      persons and injury to 50 persons and causing loss  of  property  worth
      Rs. 21,20,600/- and thereby  committed  an  offence  punishable  under
      Section 3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA.

      At head fourthly; The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the  death  of  4  persons,  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.


      At head fifthly;  The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the injury to  50  persons,  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C

      At head sixthly;  The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted in grievous hurt to 10 persons, committed an
      offence punishable under Section 326 IPC.

      At head seventhly; The appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted into  injury  to  40  persons  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 324 IPC.

      At head eighthly; The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted into damage to properties worth Rs. 22 lakhs,
      committed an offence punishable under Section 435 IPC.

      At head ninthly;  The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, committed an offence punishable under Section 436 IPC.

      At head tenthly;  The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion, which resulted into death, injury and damage to property as
      mentioned has committed an offence punishable under Section 3  of  the
      Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head eleventhly; The appellant (A-16),  by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion and possessing RDX explosives in the said car  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 4(a)(b) of the  Explosive  Substances
      Act, 1908.

      At head twelfthly; The appellant (A-16),  by  possessing  RDX  without
      licence committed an offence punishable under Section 9B(1)(b)  of the
      Explosives Act, 1884.

      At head thirteenthly; The appellant (A-16), along with co-conspirators
      drove explosive laden Ambassador  Car  No.  MH-20-TR-622  fitted  with
      detonators and parked the said vehicle at the Tunnel Road,  Air  India
      building in front of the rear gate of Bank  of  Oman  Limited  at  Air
      India Building which exploded and  caused  death  to  20  persons  and
      injured 84 persons and loss of properties to  the  tune  of  Rs.  2.15
      crores and thereby  committed  an  offence  punishable  under  Section
      3(2)(i)(ii) of TADA.

      At head fourteenthly;  The appellant (A-16), by causing the  aforesaid
      explosion at Air India Building which resulted in death, committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.


      At head fifteenthly; The appellant (A-16), by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the injury  of  84  persons  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.

      At head sixteenthly; The appellant (A-16), by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion  which  resulted  in  the  grievous  injury  to  36  persons
      committed an offence punishable under Section 326 IPC.

      At head seventeenthly; The appellant (A-16), by causing the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the injury  of  49  persons  committed  an
      offence punishable under Section 324 IPC.

      At head eighteenthly;  The appellant (A-16), by causing the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the damage of property  committed  offence
      punishable under Section 435 IPC.

      At head nineteenthly;  The appellant (A-16), by causing the  aforesaid
      explosion committed an offence punishable under Section 436 IPC.

      At head twentiethly; The appellant (A-16), by  causing  the  aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in  the  death,  injury  and  damage  to  the
      property as mentioned above has committed an offence punishable  under
      Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head twenty-firstly;      The  appellant  (A-16),  by  causing  the
      aforesaid explosion committed  an  offence  punishable  under  Section
      4(a)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

      At head twenty-secondly; The appellant (A-16), by possessing  the  RDX
      explosives in the above mentioned vehicle without  licence,  committed
      an offence punishable under Section 9B(1)(b) of  the  Explosives  Act,
      1884.

      At head twenty-thirdly; The appellant (A-16), by causing the aforesaid
      explosion which resulted in the damage of public  property  i.e.,  Air
      India Building committed an offence punishable under Section 4 of  the
      Preventive Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.


404)  The Designated Court found the appellant guilty on all  the  aforesaid
charges  after  considering  the  evidence  brought   on   record   by   the
prosecution.  The appellant has been convicted and sentenced for  the  above
said charges as follows:
Conviction and Sentence:
(i)   The appellant has been convicted and sentenced to death under  Section
3(3) of TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with the  offences  mentioned  in
the said charge.  In addition, the appellant was ordered to pay  a  fine  of
Rs. 25, 000/-.
(charge firstly)
(ii)  The appellant was  found  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 3(3) of TADA and sentenced to suffer RI for 12 years and is  ordered
to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default, he was ordered to  suffer  further
RI for a period of 1 year.  (charge secondly)
(iii) The appellant was sentenced to death, subject to confirmation  of  the
same by this Court, for the offence  punishable  under  Section  3(2)(i)  of
TADA and Section 302 of IPC respectively, and is also ordered to pay a  fine
of Rs.25,000/-. (charges thirdly & fourthly)
(iv)  The appellant has been sentenced  to  RI  for  life  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC. (charge fifthly)
(v)   The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for 10 years along  with
a fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable  under  Section  326  IPC.
(charge sixthly)
(vi)  The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for 3 years  along  with
a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable  under  Section  324  IPC.
(charge seventhly)
(vii)       The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for  7  years  and
10 years  for  the  offence  punishable  under  Sections  435  and  436  IPC
respectively along with a fine of  Rs.  25,000/-,  in  default,  to  further
undergo RI for 6 months. (charges eighthly & ninthly)
(viii)      The appellant has been sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  10  years
along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to further undergo  RI  for  6
months  for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  3  of  the  Explosive
Substances Act, 1908. (charge tenthly)
(ix)  The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for 7 years  along  with
a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for  6  months  for
the offence punishable under Section 4(b) of the Explosive  Substances  Act,
1908. (charge eleventhly)
(x)   The appellant has been sentenced to suffer  RI  for  1  year  for  the
offence punishable under Section 9-B(1)(b)  of  the  Explosives  Act,  1884.
(charge twelfthly)
(xi)  The appellant has been sentenced to death along with  a  fine  of  Rs.
25,000/, in default, to further undergo RI  for  3  years  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA. (charge thirteenthly)
(xii)        The  appellant  has  been  sentenced  to  death,   subject   to
confirmation of the same by this Court, along with a fine  of  Rs.  25,000/-
for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. (charge fourteenthly)
(xiii)      The appellant has been sentenced to RI for life for the  offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC. (charge fifteenthly)
(xiv)       The appellant has been sentenced  to  suffer  RI  for  10  years
along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable  under  Section
326 IPC. (charge sixteenthly)
(xv)  The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for 3 years  along  with
a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable  under  Section  324  IPC.
(charge seventeenthly)
(xvi)       The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for  7  years  and
10 years for the offence punishable  under  Sections  435  and  436  of  IPC
respectively along with a fine of  Rs.  25,000/-,  in  default,  to  further
undergo RI for 6 months.  (charges eighteenthly & nineteenthly)
(xvii) The appellant has been sentenced to suffer  RI  for  10  years  along
with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to further undergo  RI  for  1  year
under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. (charge twentiethly)
(xviii) The appellant has been sentenced to suffer  RI  for  7  years  along
with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to further undergo  RI  for  1  year
for the offence punishable under Section 4(b) of  the  Explosive  Substances
Act, 1908. (charge twenty-firstly)
(xix)       The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI  for  1  year  for
the offence punishable under Section 9-B(1)(b) of the Explosives Act,  1884.
(charge twenty-secondly)
(xx)  The appellant has been sentenced to suffer RI for 5 years  along  with
a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6  months  for
the offence punishable under Section 4 of Prevention  of  Damage  to  Public
Property Act, 1984. (charge twenty-thirdly).
Evidence:
405)  The evidence against the appellant (A-16) is in the form of:-
(i)   his own confession;
(ii)  confessions made by other co-conspirators; (co-accused);
(iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses including eye witnesses; and
(iv)  documentary evidence.
Conspiracy:
406)  As mentioned above, a common charge  of  conspiracy  has  been  framed
against all the accused persons and in order to bring home the  charge,  the
cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken  into  account
in determining the guilt of the accused rather  than  adopting  an  isolated
approach to each of the circumstances.  Since we have elaborately  discussed
the issue relating to conspiracy in the earlier part of our judgment,  there
is no need to refer the same once again.
Confessional Statement of Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16)

407)  Confessional statement of A-16 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 20.05.1993 (16:30 hrs.) and 22.05.1993 (16:45 hrs.),  by  Sanjay
Pandey (PW-492), the then DCP, Zone VIII, Bombay.   The  appellant,  in  his
confessional statement, has given  details  about  his  involvement  in  the
conspiracy.  He has given the description of the meetings that he  attended.
 He also described about the training that took place in Pakistan and  other
relevant details about his own involvement as well  as  that  of  the  other
accused.  We have been taken through his entire confession.   The  following
facts emerge from his confessional statement:
     i) He resided at Balmiya Lane, Pamkar Chawl, Room  No.  8,  Wanjewadi,
        Mahim, Bombay and worked as a driver at Anees Travels, Mahim.
    ii) He stated that he knows Javed Chikna (AA), resident  of  Mahim  for
        the last five years (as on date of confession) and who  is  a  goon
        and has also committed murder.  He further stated that he also knew
        the friends of Javed Chikna i.e., Usman, Nasir  Dhakla  and  Parvez
        Zulfikar Qureshi who were also criminals.
   iii) On 07th February, 1993, Javed Chikna called him and  asked  whether
        he could drive a jeep for him and whether  he  could  take  2  days
        leave.  He (A-16) agreed and said that he would take leave for  two
        days.
    iv) Next day, i.e., on 08/09th February, 1993, he accompanied Usman  to
        Bharat Training School where he saw Javed Chikna, Nasir Dakhla  and
        Parvez.  Two blue coloured jeeps arrived there after about half  an
        hour.  Javed Chikna sat in one jeep and A-16, Shaikh  Ali,  Parvez,
        Nasir Dhakla and Usman sat in another jeep which stopped at  Vashi.
        He got down at that time and saw that Munna,  Bashir,  Anwar  Theba
        (AA) and  two  other  persons  were  sitting  in  other  jeep.   He
        identified Anwar and  Bashir  because  they  used  to  visit  Javed
        Chikna.  Usman told him the name of Munna.
     v) He along with Munna, Anwar and other  co-accused  assisted  Bhai  @
        Tiger Memon in the landing of 84 bags.  He mentioned  that  it  was
        dark and they were prohibited from lighting even a matchstick. This
        shows that the bags contained explosive material and they  did  not
        want to take any risk.
    vi) He was given a plastic bag containing two pistols for his safety by
        Tiger after that they searched for the  tempo  which  was  carrying
        their material.
   vii) On 10.02.1993, he along  with  5  other  persons  left  Bombay  and
        reached Dubai.
  viii) On 13.02.1993, he along with six other co-accused persons was  sent
        to Islamabad, Pakistan by Tiger Memon.
    ix) On 16.02.1993, he was taken to the training spot where he was given
        seven days’ training in dismantling and handling of  arms,  use  of
        bombs, hand grenades and chemical bombs.  He further stated:
           “Next  day  we  were  given  training  in  dismantling  and  re-
           assembling the rifles and pistols and  the  use  of  the  bombs.
           Second day, we were given  physical  training  and  handling  of
           pistol and rifle.  We were also given training in firing.”


     x) On 27.02.1993, he was taken back to Islamabad and on 01.03.1993  to
        Dubai.
    xi) In the evening on 03.03.1993, he along with 5 others,  returned  to
        Bombay from Dubai.
   xii) On 07.03.1993, he attended a meeting along  with  Irfan  and  other
        accused persons at Khar in which Tiger told that he  was  going  to
        cause riots in Bombay and asked him to work with Salim Mujahid  and
        Irfan.
  xiii) On 10.03.1993, he collected one white safari suit  for  himself,  a
        blue coloured suit for Irfan and a biscuit coloured suit for Salim.
   xiv) On the same day, A-16, Irfan and  Salim  wearing  their  respective
        suits surveyed Air India Building, Nariman Point in  a  red  Maruti
        1000 car driven by the appellant (A-16).  The appellant stopped the
        car, came out and saluted the said two companions.   Then  he  took
        them to the Saudi Consultate and Maker Tower.  At about 1:30  p.m.,
        they visited the Stock Exchange Building where he parked the car in
        the parking lot.  Irfan got down earlier, while Salim got  down  at
        the parking place.  On objection being raised by the watchman, A-16
        took the vehicle out of the parking lot.
    xv) On the same day, in the evening, he alongwith others  attended  the
        meeting  at  Bandra  behind  the  Bhabha  Hospital  whereby   Tiger
        distributed Rs. 5,000/- to each one of them and asked them to  work
        without fear.
   xvi) On 12.03.1993, he was paid Rs. 5,000/- by Javed Chikna  who  handed
        over to him a white Ambassador Car to park it at the spot near  Air
        India Building which was earlier surveyed by them.   He  also  took
        one pistol and rounds from Javed which he hid in his shirt.
  xvii) A-16, who was wearing a white Safari Suit, took the Ambassador  Car
        and left it near the Bank of Oman near Air India Building.
 xviii) At that time, he was picked up by Irfan Chougule along  with  Salim
        Rahim Shaikh (A-52), who was in a blue coloured Maruti Car  and  he
        was, thereafter, dropped at Sachivalaya (Secretariat).
   xix) He handed over the pistol and rounds (ammunitions) to A-52.
    xx) He was taken by Usman in a Maruti 800 Car to Sena  Bhavan  Junction
        where Usman parked the car at the nearby Petrol Pump.
   xxi) In the evening, he told  Bashir  (A-13)  that  he  had  parked  one
        vehicle near Air India Building which caused the blast.
  xxii) Next day, he came to know that the Memon’s Building  (Al  Hussaini)
        was raided by the Police.
 xxiii) On 14.03.1993, on the advice of Rafiq, he went to Siraz  Saloonwala
        at Mumbra and stayed there for  7  days  and,  thereafter,  to  his
        relative Tauji Ahmed at Kalva for 2 days  and  then  to  Uran  from
        where he was arrested from  the  residence  of  his  relative  Fusa
        Kumbi.
408)  The appellant herein was involved in the blasts  that  took  place  in
three places, namely, Air India Building, Shiv Sena  Bhawan  and  the  Stock
Exchange.  It is submitted that  in  these  three  blasts  108  people  were
killed, 314 were injured and property worth Rs. 7.7  crores  was  destroyed.
From the overt acts committed by the appellant  herein,  it  is  discernible
that the appellant was fully conscious of the conspiratorial design and  has
actively and willingly participated in the conspiracy.


Confessional Statements of other co-accused:
409)  A perusal of the above  confession  by  the  accused  shows  that  the
appellant  was  playing  a  key  role  in  furtherance  of   the   abovesaid
conspiracy.  The other accused, in their confessions  under  Section  15  of
TADA have also discussed the role played by A-16  in  the  conspiracy.   The
confessions of the co-accused persons are as follows:-
Confessional Statement of Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10)
      Confessional statement of A-10 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 23.04.1993 (18:00 hrs.) by Shri Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP, Zone III, Bombay.   The  said  accused  has  stated  that  the
appellant      (A-16) along with Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) and  Salim
Rahim Shaikh (A-52) left for Dubai on 10/11th February, 1993 when he  (A-16)
was picked up along with the said two associates by A-10 from Midland  Hotel
and were dropped at the  Airport.   This  statement  corroborates  with  the
confession of the appellant, who too had stated that he  went  to  Dubai  on
10.02.1993.
Confessional Statement of Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29)

      Confessional statement of A-29 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 18.05.1993 (18:30 hrs.) and on 21.05.1993 (14:45 hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said
accused referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
     i) A-16 was present in the training camp in Pakistan  when  Shahnawaz,
        Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29) and others reached there.
    ii) They received training  in  handling  of  arms  and  explosives  in
        Pakistan.
Confessional Statement of Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32)

      Confessional statement of A-32 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (1125 hrs.) and 19.05.1993  (1730  hrs.)  by  Krishan
Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP, Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said  accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
(i)   A-16 went to Dubai along with other co-accused.
(ii)  They (including A-16)  received  training  in  handling  of  arms  and
      ammunitions in Pakistan.
(iii) During his stay in Pakistan, A-16 was  renamed  as  ‘Faizal’  and  the
      accused were not allowed to use their actual names.
(iv)  On 03.03.1993, Farooq, Parvez, Salim Mujahid,  Salim  Dandekar,  Irfan
      and A-32 left Dubai at 1 p.m. and came to Bombay.
Confessional Statement of Abdul Akhtar Khan (A-36)
      Confessional statement of A-36 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.05.1993 (17:40 hrs.) and on 21.05.1993 (18:20 hrs.)  by  Shri
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said
accused also stated that A-16 had undergone training in  handling  arms  and
ammunitions and explosives in Pakistan.  This  confession,  along  with  the
above stated confessions, establishes that the appellant  went  to  Pakistan
to receive training in the use  of  arms  and  ammunitions  and  explosives.
This further proves that the conspirators were maintaining secrecy  and  the
actions on 12.03.1993 were a result of a pre-planned agreement  between  the
conspirators.

Confessional Statement of Feroz @ Akram Amani Malik   (A-39)

      Confessional statement of A-39 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (22:30 hrs.) and on 23.04.1993 (20:50  hrs.)  by  Mr.
P.D. Pawar (PW-185), the  then  DCP,  Zone  V,  Bombay.   The  said  accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
     i) A-16 had received training in the use of arms and  ammunitions  and
        handling of bombs in Pakistan.
    ii) The trainees were told that they have to place  the  bombs  in  the
        trains in Bombay and explode them to cause harm to Hindus and  also
        that whatever they were doing, they were doing it for Islam.
The confessional statement of A-39 establishes that  the  conspirators  were
well aware of the motive of the conspiracy and had become a part of  it  and
were also fully aware of the consequences of  their  actions.  The  training
which was imparted to them was for the purpose  of  causing  destruction  in
Bombay.  It is conclusively established from this confession  that  all  the
accused  who  went  for  training  in  Pakistan  were  fully  aware  of  the
conspiracy and its motive.




Confessional Statement of Nasim Ashraf Sherali Barmare (A-49)

      Confessional statement of A-49 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 16.05.1993 (09:30 hrs.) and on 18.05.1993 by  Shri  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said  accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) and said that A-16  joined  him
with his assumed name as ‘Faizal’  in  Pakistan  and  received  training  in
using pistols, AK-56 rifles, machine guns, hand grenades,  RDX,  detonators,
pencil timers etc.

Confessional Statement of Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52)
      Confessional statement of A-52 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 and on 18.04.1993 by Mr.  P.D.  Pawar  (PW-185),  the
then  DCP,  Zone  V,  Bombay.   The  said  accused  also  referred  to   the
involvement of the appellant (A-16) in the  conspiracy  at  various  stages.
From the statement  of  A-52,  the  following  facts  emerge  regarding  the
appellant which are as follows:
     i) On 11.02.1993, he along with the appellant and others  left  Bombay
        and reached Dubai.
    ii) On 12.02.1993, he along with others stayed in a  building  opposite
        to Hotel Al-Khaleez where Tiger Memon met them.
   iii) On 13.02.1993, he along with the appellant attended the meeting  in
        the same building in which Javed  Chikna  and  Tiger  Memon  talked
        about the communal riots of Bombay and Gujarat.
    iv) On 14.02.1993, he along with other accused left Dubai  and  reached
        Islamabad where they were taken to the training camp and were given
        training in firing arms, handling  LMG  rifles,  throwing  of  hand
        grenades, use of RDX, detonators  and  timer  pencils.  He  further
        stated as follows:
        “We were given the training of firing with Pistol.  The pistol  was
        loaded with  one  magazine.   We  were  taught  about  opening  and
        assembling of LMG.  We were taught about firing  with  LMG  rifles.
        Fourth day, we learnt about firing of rifles.  Thereafter, we  were
        given the training of  throwing  hand  grenades.   There  were  two
        persons for our training, one was Pathan and another  was  aged  50
        years.  Both were about 45-50 years old.”


     v) A-52 also stated that they were told about ‘black soap named RDX’.
    vi) A-52 further explained about the  object  and  the  motive  of  the
        training.  He stated as follows:
        “Tiger also came there on the seventh day of our training.  He also
        took training.  He told all of us “Take good training, you have  to
        do good work in Bombay as per this training.” During the  last  two
        days, the training of hand grenades with weight, without weight and
        with detonators was given.  We were also  told  about  black  soaps
        named RDX.  Time pencil was also shown.  The  red  coloured  pencil
        used to burst in 15 minutes and the white coloured pencil  used  to
        burst in one hour and the green coloured pencil used to burst in  2
        and a half hours.  We threw  that  pencils  by  using  detonators.”
          (Emphasis supplied)


   vii) On 28.02.1993, at Dubai, he had taken oath along with all the other
        members by placing  their  hands  over  Quran  for  not  disclosing
        anything about the training to anyone and to take revenge  for  the
        loss caused to their persons.  He further stated:
        “They had also given us the oath of causing loss to  those  persons
        who had caused loss to our persons and burnt them in Bombay.”

  viii) On 03.03.1993, he along with the  appellant  and  other  co-accused
        left Dubai and reached Bombay.
    ix) After returning from Dubai, on the 3rd day, the conspirators met at
        the house of Babloo.  All those who received training  in  Pakistan
        were present in the meeting.  In this meeting, it was decided  that
        the blasts in Bombay would be caused after Ramzan.
     x) All the trainees, along with other co-accused attended a meeting in
        a flat at Bandra where they were divided in groups by Tiger Memon.
    xi) On 11.03.1993, at night,  A-16  along  with  other  co-accused  was
        present in the garage of the  Al-Hussaini  building,  i.e.  at  the
        residence of Tiger Memon where the vehicles were  loaded  with  RDX
        for causing bomb blasts.
This confession further proves the fact of training  in  Pakistan  and  that
the accused went to Pakistan via  Dubai.   It  also  proves  the  extent  of
training that was given.  The taking of oath on holy  Quran  has  also  been
proved.  It also establishes the motive of the  conspirators  which  was  to
cause destruction and havoc in  achieving  their  ultimate  goal.   He  also
stated about the meetings that took place at the house of Babloo  and  at  a
flat in Bandra after the conspirators returned from Dubai.  He  also  proved
that the appellant (A-16) was present in the Al Hussaini Building  when  the
vehicle bombs were being prepared.
 Confessional Statement of Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57)
      Confessional statement of A-57 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 19.04.1993 (12:00 hrs.) by Shri Krishan  Lal  Bishnoi  (PW-193),
the then DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   A-57  went  to  meet  Javed  Chikna  on
08/09.02.1993 at the Soda Factory.   He  said  that  at  that  time,  Usman,
Nasir, Farooq and some other people were also present there.  This  incident
was related to meeting before the landing at Shekhadi.


Confessional Statement of Nasir Abdul Kadar Kewal @ Nasir Dhakla (A-64)

      Confessional statement of A-64 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded  on  22.01.1995  and  on  24.01.1995  by   H.C.   Singh   (PW-474),
Superintendent  of  Police,  CBI/SPE/STF,  New  Delhi.   The  said   accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) in his confession as follows:
     i) He described the  meeting  near  Soda  Factory  wherefrom  all  the
        participants  (including  A-16)  went  for  the  first  landing  at
        Shekhadi.
    ii) On the way to Shekhadi, the accused stopped at a place where  Abdul
        Gani had brought a black coloured bag which contained five AK-47/AK-
        56 rifles, revolver, magazines and cartridges.
   iii) Around 60-70 large packets were smuggled by them.
    iv)  After  the  second  landing,  he  transported  smuggled  arms  and
        explosives from Hotel Persian Darbar to Mumbra with  the  appellant
        (A-16).  On the way, the conversation between the Tiger  Memon  and
        his associates revealed that the arms  were  to  be  used  to  take
        revenge against the demolition of Babri Masjid.  These arms were to
        be used against Hindus.  The wires brought in his jeep  to  Waghani
        Tower were to be used in the bomb blasts at Bombay.
     v) A-16 was present at the Al Hussaini Building during the preparation
        of vehicle bombs in the night of 11/12.03.1993 by using  RDX  which
        had landed at Shekhadi.
    vi) A-16 was seen going to the Al-Hussaini compound in the  morning  of
        12.03.1993 wearing a white uniform as a driver.
   The said confessional statement proves  that  the  appellant  (A-16)  was
   involved in the landings which  took  place  in  Shekhadi.   It  is  also
   established  that  the  motive  of  the  conspiracy  was  known  to   the
   conspirators and the claim/contention of the appellant  that  the  motive
   was not known to them is without any basis.  The statement  also  further
   established that the appellant was present at the Al Hussaini building on
   the night when the RDX  was  being  filled  in  the  vehicles  for  their
   preparation as vehicle bombs.
Confessional Statement of Md. Rafiq Usman Shaikh (A-94)
      Confessional statement of A-94 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 14.05.1993  (18:30  hrs.)  and  on  16.05.1993  by  Krishan  Lal
Bishnoi (PW-193),  the  then  DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said  accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
     i) A-94 told about the  presence  of  the  appellant  when  they  were
        waiting to go to Pakistan for training.
    ii) On 14.03.1993, A-16 met A-94 and told him that the bomb blasts have
        been caused by Tiger Memon.  He told Rafiq to escape to Mumbra with
        him and, accordingly, both of them went to Mumbra.
   iii) A-16 also told A-94 that he had parked  the  white  Ambassador  Car
        which was laden with RDX/explosives at Air India Building.


   (iv)     A-94 and A-16  were  arrested  by  the  police.   A-94,  in  his
        confession stated that the police had come to his house along  with
        the appellant.

Confessional Statement of Niyaz Mohammed @ Aslam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98)

      Confessional statement of A-98 under  Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 17.05.1993 (14:30  hrs.)  and  on  20.05.1993  (11:30  hrs.)  by
Krishan Lal Bishnoi (PW-193), the then DCP,  Zone  III,  Bombay.   The  said
accused referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
(i)   A-98 admitted that he had received training in handling  of  different
types of arms and ammunitions, hand grenades and making of  bombs  by  using
RDX.  He said that A-16  also  took  training  with  him  in  Pakistan.   He
further stated as follows:
           “The training included P.T. and exercise from 7:00-8:00 hrs  and
      from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. dismantling, reassembling  and  manner  of
      firing of pistols AK-56 rifles, LMG etc.  After 3-4 days,  seven  boys
      had also joined whose names were Javed Chikna alias Ali,  Usman  alias
      Nasir, Farooq alias Faizal, Zabir alias Shakir, Salim  alias  Mujahid,
      Parvez alias Qureshi and Salim Driver alias  Irfan.   They  had  their
      training together with us…..
           During the training period they also gave the training  in  hand
      grenades, RDX, detonators, safety fuse, Electric Detonators and  Timer
      Pencil.  They told us on black-board about making of a bomb  by  using
      RDX.  After 1-2 days there came a bearded person with Ahmedbhai.   All
      the other boys were calling that bearded man as  Tiger.   He  got  the
      details of the training for 2 days.”

(ii)  On 01.03.1993, after reaching Dubai, A-16, who had gone  for  training
at the instance of Tiger took an oath by placing  his  hands  on  Quran.   A
speech was given by Tiger regarding the riots in  Bombay  and  about  taking
revenge.
      The confession of A-98 along with that of A-52 proves that the accused
knew about  the  black  soap  which  is  an  explosive  viz.,  RDX.   It  is
established beyond doubt that during the training, the accused  were  taught
how to use the detonators, hand grenades, timer  pencils  as  well  as  RDX.
The confessional statement further establishes that the accused were  taught
how to make bombs using RDX.

Confessional Statement of Mohd. Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100)


      Confessional statement of A-100 under Section  15  of  TADA  has  been
recorded on 15.04.1993 (23:30 hrs.)  and  on  17.04.1993  (17:00  hrs.),  by
Sanjay Pandey (PW-492), the then DCP, Zone VIII, Bombay.  The  said  accused
referred to the role of the appellant (A-16) as follows:
     i) He disclosed the participation of the appellant in the  landing  of
        smuggled items of Tiger Memon on 09.02.1993 at Shekhadi  coast  and
        thereafter in transportation of the  said  consignment  to  Waghani
        Tower and other places.
    ii) He participated in the training of fire  arms  and  ammunitions  at
        Islamabad, Pakistan alongwith his associates during February 1993.
   iii) On 02.03.1993, he came back to Dubai where  Tiger  Memon  gave  200
        Dirhams to each one of them and administered oath on Quran to  take
        revenge against Hindus for demolition of  Babri  Masjid  and  their
        tyranny perpetrated on them.
   (iv)     He was present at the residence of Tiger Memon in the  night  of
        11/12.03.1993 alongwith other co-accused when the  explosives  were
        being filled in the  vehicles  which  were  brought  for  the  said
        purpose.
410)  From the confessional statements made  by  different  co-accused,  the
following facts emerge:
     i) A-16 had gone for training in handling weapons  and  explosives  to
        Pakistan via Dubai along with other accused.
    ii) A-16 was given fake name as ‘Faizal’ which  was  used  in  Pakistan
        while training.
   iii) A-16 was fully aware of the conspiratorial design and the  plan  to
        cause blasts and destruction in the  city  of  Bombay  at  a  large
        scale;
    iv) A-16 knew that this was an act of retaliation by  the  conspirators
        and he was one of them;
     v) A-16 had also participated in the landing of explosives and weapons
        at Shekhadi;
    vi) A-16 had attended various meetings between the conspirators;
   vii) A-16 was present at the time of filling of  RDX/Black  chemical  in
        the vehicles at Al Hussaini Building;
  viii) A-16 had taken oath on holy Quran that he would  cause  destruction
        and loss to the Hindu community as a revenge for what had  happened
        on 06.12.1992 (demolition of Babri Masjid) and in  the  riots  that
        ensued;
    ix) A-16 was responsible for taking the explosives laden vehicle to the
        Air India Building and the Shiv Sena Bhawan (Lucky Petrol Pump) and
        causing death and destruction.
From the above, it can easily be inferred that  A-16  was  fully  aware  and
conscious of the fact that their actions were of such  a  nature  that  they
had to keep the conspiracy a secret and the activities  done  by  them  were
grave.  Taking of oath on Quran shows  their  intent  and  determination  to
cause damage and destruction.  Their sole aim was to  terrorise  the  people
of the country by causing massive and  extensive  damage  to  the  financial
capital of the country and to destabilize the  Government  of  India.   From
the above confession, it is evident that he had no trace of remorse for  the
actions committed by him.  The very fact that when the appellant  fled  from
Bombay,  he  also  suggested  A-94  to  do  the  same  which   shows   their
incriminating post incident conduct.  Hence, it is clear that the  appellant
was well aware of the consequences of his action  and  played  an  important
role in the conspiracy.  We have already held that a voluntary and  truthful
confessional statement  recorded  under  Section  15  of  TADA  requires  no
corroboration.
Retracted Confessions:
411)  It has been contended that all the  confessions  relied  upon  against
the  appellant  including  his  own  confession  have  been  retracted   and
therefore, they are not trustworthy.  Since  the  very  same  objection  has
already been considered and rejected, we are not  repeating  the  same  once
again.  The said conclusion is applicable to these appeals also.
Deposition of Prosecution Witnesses:
Deposition of Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) (Approver)

412)  PW-2, the approver, has also deposed against the appellant.   We  have
gone through the portion relating to A-16.   The  deposition  of  PW-2  with
regard to the involvement of A-16 is summarized hereinbelow:
(i)   He knew Md. Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale as Farooq Pawale (A-16).
(ii)  He identified the appellant in the identification parade.
(iii) On 09.02.1993, he met A-16 at the Soda Factory along  with  other  co-
      accused and went to Waghani Tower where the goods brought in the  cars
      were unpacked by them.
(iv)  The gunny bags contained AK-56  rifles,  its  rounds,  hand  grenades,
      pistols, magazines and RDX, i.e, ‘Kala Sabun’.  All these  items  were
      then kept in the cavities of the jeeps.  A box of detonators was  also
      there.
(v)   On 10.02.1993, the appellant went to Hotel Persian Darbar  along  with
      Tiger Memon.
(vi)  The appellant (A-16) also  accompanied  the  approver  and  other  co-
      accused to Pakistan for training in handling of arms  and  ammunitions
      and explosives.
(vii) In the training, they  were  taught  how  to  operate  and  use  AK-56
      rifles, pistols, hand grenades and use  of  RDX  for  preparing  bomb.
      They were explained that the RDX  could  be  used  for  exploding  and
      blowing off the bridges, trains, dams etc.  They were also shown timer
      pencils, detonators of different colours which could ignite RDX  bombs
      from a period of half an hour to five hours and were told how  to  use
      them.  In the evening time, classes were held and they were  explained
      things on black board and were also instructed about  rocket  launcher
      but were not given firing practice of the same.
(viii)      The appellant (A-16) was present  in  the  meeting  at  Babloo’s
      residence which took place on 08.03.1993 wherein the targets  for  the
      explosions were selected and finalised.
(ix)  Tiger had called A-16 and two other people in a room to talk  to  them
      separately.
(x)   A-16 was present in the meeting at the residence of Tiger Memon at  Al
      Hussaini Building on 11/12.03.1993.
(xi)  PW-2, along with the appellant, took the  white  coloured  Maruti  800
      car (laden with RDX) and parked it near  the  Shiv  Sena  Bhawan/Lucky
      Petrol Pump.
(xii) A-16 had altercations with a Hawaldar (Constable) as well as  with  an
      employee of the Lucky Petrol Pump regarding the parking  of  the  said
      car.  This  fact  has  been  corroborated  by  the  testimony  of  the
      prosecution witness.
413)  Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on para  74  of  the
deposition of the approver in support of her  contention  that  the  accused
was only a pawn and was following the directions of his  masters.   Para  74
reads as under:-
      “After talking to Tiger Memon on telephone, Javed Chikna and all of us
      came  downstairs.   We  met  Farooq  Pawale  (A-16).    Javed   Chikna
      instructed Farooq Pawale to take one  Maruti  Car  800  to  Shiv  Sena
      Bhawan, Dadar and park it near Shiv Sena Bhawan, Dadar.  Farooq Pawale
      requested me to accompany him.  I accompanied  Farooq  Pawale  in  the
      white coloured Maruti 800 car, I drove the Maruti  Car  to  Shiv  Sena
      Bhawan.  The white coloured Maruti 800 car was filled  with  RDX.   We
      were told to park the white coloured Maruti Car near Shiv Sena  Bhawan
      to blow it up.”

A-16 participated in the landing and transportation of arms and  ammunitions
and explosives which were smuggled  into  India  at  Shekhadi  in  February,
1993.  He visited Pakistan via Dubai for receiving training in  handling  of
arms and ammunitions and  explosives  from  the  agents  of  ISI  to  commit
terrorist acts in India.  He attended  conspiratorial  meetings  during  the
month of March 1993 at the residence of Babloo  @  Nazir  Anwar  Shaikh  and
Mobina @ Baya Musa Bhiwandiwala (A-96) for making plans to commit  terrorist
act.
414)  He also participated along with other co-conspirators in  loading  the
explosives like RDX fitted with time device detonators in  various  vehicles
during preparation  of  vehicle  bombs  in  the  intervening  night  between
11/12th March, 1993.  He surveyed and conducted reconaissence of  the  Stock
Exchange  Building  and  Air  India  Building  on  10.03.1993  for   causing
explosions there.  Therefore, it is established that the appellant was  well
aware  of  the  conspiracy  right  from  the  inception  and  also  of   the
consequences of his acts.
415)  It is evidently clear from  the  participation  of  A-16  in  all  the
important events and his presence in the  conspiratorial  meetings  that  he
was an integral part of the conspiracy and knew  everything  about  it.   It
was not the case  that  he  was  merely  following  the  instructions.   The
testimony of the approver corroborates the  confession  of  the  accused  as
well as confessions of other co-accused in all  material  particulars.   The
approver was one of  the  conspirators  and  he  was  a  party  to  all  the
landings, meetings, training and also went to  plant  the  explosives  laden
vehicle at  the  Shiv  Sena  Bhawan.   The  account  of  the  conspiratorial
meetings, training and other events is reliable and fits in to the chain  of
events which has already been established  by  the  confessions  of  various
accused.
Other Witnesses
Deposition of Ishwar Haralkar (PW-11)
416)  PW-11 was a service man at Lucky Petrol Pump. He  deposed  that  while
he was on duty on 12.03.1993, at 2  p.m.,  the  driver  (PW-2)  of  a  white
coloured Maruti 800 car stopped in front of the service station. He  further
deposed as follows:
(i)   PW-11 refused to allow the driver to park the car there as it had  not
      come for servicing in the station.  There was an  altercation  between
      PW-11 with the person (A-16) sitting next to the driver.   Ultimately,
      PW-2 parked the said car towards the direction of Shiv Shahi Chawl  at
      the side of petrol pump and left it there.  After half an hour,  PW-11
      heard the sound of a big explosion and saw that the  said  Maruti  Car
      had exploded.  He noticed that there was fire and  massive  damage  to
      the vehicles standing nearby.  The cement roof of the service  station
      blown up and fell on him.  He was injured and went to the doctor.   He
      noticed complete damage to the service station and the petrol pump.
(ii)  PW-11 identified PW-2 in the identification  parade  dated  11.05.1993
      conducted by the Special Executive Magistrate, Ram S Bhosale  (PW-460)
      and he again identified PW-2 as well as  A-16  in  the  identification
      parade dated 23.05.1993 conducted by SEM Moreshwar Thakur (PW-469).
(iii) The witness also identified the appellant (A-16) in the Court.
417)  It has been contended by  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  that  the
person (A-16) sitting next to the driver got off before the  white  coloured
Maruti 800 car was parked at the side of the  Lucky  Petrol  Pump.   On  the
basis of this, the counsel submitted that A-16 was not responsible  for  the
blast that took place at the Petrol Pump.  It is submitted that even  though
the accused (A-16) was not the  last  person  to  leave  the  car  but  most
certainly he went with the other person who was driving the  car  (PW-2)  to
plant the bomb at the said Petrol Pump.  It is further submitted  that  A-16
had to get down from the car only because PW-11 did not permit  the  parking
of the vehicle in front of the said Pump.  A-16 had gone along with PW-2  to
the place where the incident took place for  the  purpose  of  planting  the
vehicle.
418)  It has also been contended on behalf of the appellant that the  height
of A-16 has not been recorded and so PW-11 is not a  reliable  witness.   It
was submitted by the counsel that the witness has stated:
      “My statement recorded on 12.03.1993 was read over and explained to me
      after it came to be recorded and found that it was correctly recorded.
       (The attention of  the  witness  is  drawn  to  his  statement  dated
      12.03.1993). In my statement recorded  by  the  Police  on  12.03.1993
      there is no mention of the height of the person who was sitting by the
      side of the driver.   I  cannot  assign  any  reason  why  it  is  not
      recorded.  According to me the colour complexion of a person would  be
      important in describing him.  In case of the  person  whom  I  noticed
      sitting by the side of the driver in the Maruti Car on 12.03.1993, his
      colour complexion was important feature and not his shortness.”

Therefore, in view of the above statement, the witness was conscious of  the
fact that the height was not recorded in  the  earlier  statement.   It  was
submitted from  the  side  of  the  prosecution  that  for  identifying  the
accused, it was not his height which was important but  it  was  his  colour
and complexion which was important.
419)  The witness has further deposed that the statement was  read  over  to
him and he found it to be correct.  It cannot be contended by the  appellant
that merely because the height of the  accused  was  not  mentioned  in  the
earlier  statement,  the  witness  is  unreliable.  PW-11  has,   in   fact,
identified the accused A-16 and therefore his testimony  is  reliable.    It
was further contended on behalf of the appellant that  since  PW-11  was  an
injured witness, the doctor who treated him should have  been  examined  and
his non-examination would result in discrediting the witness.
420)  The witness has given accurate description  of  the  accused  and  the
approver has identified them.  The testimony of the witness is  corroborated
by the evidence given by the accused, the approver and other witnesses.   It
is also mentioned in his statement that  he  did  not  suffer  any  bleeding
injuries.  Since the witness was not seriously injured, there  was  no  need
for him to be admitted in a hospital and for the  Investigating  Officer  to
examine any doctor in this regard.  Hence, the contention of  the  appellant
is without any basis.
Deposition of S.S. Hande (PW-12)
      PW-12 was a police constable attached to  Dadar  Police  Station.   On
12.03.1993, he along with PC 13196 was on duty at the Shiv Sena Bhawan.   He
is an eye-witness to the incident.  PW-12 deposed as under:
(i)   Around 2 p.m., PW-12 had an altercation  with  A-16  who  was  sitting
      next to the driver (PW-2) of white coloured Maruti Car with regard  to
      the parking of car near Shiv Sena Bhawan.  The driver (PW-2) took  the
      car away from there and ultimately parked it near the compound wall of
      service station after some discussion with an employee  of  the  Lucky
      Petrol Pump.  After parking the vehicle, both A-16 and PW-2  left  the
      place.
(ii)  He further deposed that  after  sometime  an  explosion  occurred  and
      there was lot of smoke in the area and  many  vehicles  and  buildings
      were damaged.
(iii) PW-12 identified PW-2 and A-16  in  the  identification  parade  dated
      23.05.1993 conducted by SEM Moreshwar Thakur (PW-469) who prepared the
      memorandum Panchnama Exh. 1519 for the same.
(iv)  The witness also identified the appellant (A-16) in the Court.
It was submitted by the counsel for the  appellant  that  this  witness  has
deposed that A-16 had an altercation with  him  regarding  parking  of  car.
Thereafter, he saw them talking to an employee of  the  Lucky  Petrol  Pump.
After some time, the person sitting next to the driver  got  down  from  the
car.  Here again, it was contended that A-16 was not  there  until  the  car
was parked and so he was not responsible for the blast that  took  place  at
the Lucky Petrol Pump.  In view of the above,  it  is  contended  that  even
though he did not finally park the car,  his  intention  was  to  cause  the
blast and he got down from it only because of the altercation. A-16  was  an
equal participant in the planting of the car at the place of the blast.
421)  Learned counsel for the appellant has placed para No. 5 in  which  the
accused has been identified by the witness and paragraph  No.  8  where  the
distinguishing marks on the face of the accused have been described  by  the
witness.  This supports the case of the  prosecution  that  the  eye-witness
has correctly identified the accused and,  therefore,  the  accused  can  be
placed at the scene  of  crime  on  the  date  and  time  of  the  incident.
However, the counsel has not pointed out para No. 312 from the statement  of
PW-2 which reads as “I told Farooq Pawale to  get  down  and  go  ahead  and
engage a Taxi for us, as stated in my evidence  before  the  Court.”  It  is
thus established that the testimony of the witness is reliable and also  the
fact that the accused had gone to the site of the explosion along with  PW-2
in the car in which the explosion took place.  The evidence given by PWs  11
and 12 corroborate the  evidence  given  by  the  accused  himself  and  the
approver.
422)  Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that PWs 11,  12  and
2 have given different versions of the story  which  are  contradictory  and
thus their statements cannot be  relied  on.   The  statements  of  all  the
witnesses and the confession of the accused, if read  as  a  whole,  do  not
give any contradictory or conflicting account,  in  fact,  they  corroborate
each other.
Deposition of Jagannath B. Patil (PW-668)
      PW-668 was a Police Officer who visited the said Petrol Pump after the
blast in the presence of two panch witnesses Sudhakar Kadam and Kallapa.  He
drew a panchnama and seized ten Articles, viz., Articles  549-A  (colly)  to
558-A (colly) in and around the site of explosion.  These articles  included
burnt pieces of tar, burnt pieces of wood and mud  from  the  ditch  created
due  to  the  explosion.   PW-668  also  collected   samples/Articles   vide
Panchnama Exh. 2460 in  the  presence  of  Panch  Witness  Kiran  Padhrinath
Deshmukh (PW-666).  A Panchnama was prepared in respect  of  articles  taken
by the Assistant Chemical Analysers from the site of  the  blast  near  Shiv
Sena Bhavan in Dadar.
Deposition of Anil Kumar V. Kamat (PW-669)
      PW-669 was the person who sent articles like burnt  pieces  of  bones,
skull, branches of trees, etc. to the FSL  for  its  opinion  and  has  also
deposed about the injuries to the persons and the deaths of the  persons  on
account of explosion at Lucky Petrol Pump.  The  reports  sent  by  the  FSL
confirm the traces of RDX which were present in the objects  collected  from
the scene of the blast.
Deposition of Fazal Fruitwala (PW-363)
      PW-363 was a Car Broker.  In July, 1990, Salim Abdul  Gani  Gazi  (AA)
had approached him for purchasing a new white coloured Maruti 800 car.   PW-
363 inquired with Shakil Hasam of Auto Links.  He informed Salim  Gani  that
the car was available.  As  asked  by  Shakil  Suleman  on  12.07.1990,  the
delivery order was taken from M/s Sai Service Station.  The car was  in  the
name of the original purchaser Sultan Ali.  On the  same  day,  at  7  p.m.,
Salim Gani had paid Rs.  1,40,000/-  inclusive  of  brokerage.   PW-363  had
asked Salim Gani to take delivery from  Daman  Stockyard.   After  deducting
the brokerage, PW-363 sent the price of  the  car  to  Shakeel  Hasam.   The
vehicle, i.e., the white Maruti Car used for the explosion was purchased  by
Salim Abdul Gani Gazi (AA) in July,  1990  through  PW-363  and  Shakeel  S.
Hasam (PW-366).  The car  was  given  Registration  No.  MH-03-A-2143.   The
registration of the car was done under a fictitious name which is proved  by
the evidence of PW-329 who was a postman in the concerned locality.
Deposition of Sadanand S. Paradkar (PW-329)
      PW-329 was a Postman and was in the service of Ghatkopar Rajawadi Post
Office in the year 1993.  It was deposed by him that Garodia Nagar  did  not
have any building by name of Manohar Apartment  and,  hence,  there  was  no
question of any person by name Sultan Ali residing in Flat  No.  8,  on  the
second  floor  of  the  said  building.   His  deposition  proves  that  the
registration of the car was done under a false identity.


Deposition of Sudhakar D. Kadam (PW-445)
      PW-445 was a petrol-filler at the Lucky Petrol Pump.   On  12.03.1993,
at 5 p.m., he went to the petrol pump as he was posted in the second  shift,
i.e., from 5 p.m. to 12 a.m.  He found that the atmosphere  was  smoky;  the
roof of the service station was missing; the petrol pump  was  partly  burnt
and the articles and parked vehicles were partly or fully burnt.  There  was
a big hole on the 2nd floor wall of the building.  He further  deposed  that
damage was also caused to the buildings behind the petrol  pump  and  things
in its vicinity.  He also gave the information regarding  the  situation  of
petrol pump and its  vicinity  in  the  presence  of  panchas.   He  further
deposed that the police had correctly drawn the Panchnama  Exh.  1431  dated
12.03.1993.
Injured Witnesses:
423)  It was pointed out that around 50 people suffered injuries due to  the
explosion which took place at the Shiv Sena Bhawan/Lucky Petrol Pump.
The following witnesses have deposed about the injuries suffered by them  on
account of the explosion at the Lucky Petrol Pump on 12.03.1993:
     i) Sudhir Shankar Chandrorkar (PW-408) – sustained  bleeding  injuries
        due to the pieces of iron  which  had  pierced  into  his  body  at
        various places.
    ii) Lallan S. Pandey (PW-409) – suffered various bleeding injuries  and
        his left leg had to be amputated from the thigh region, and
   (iii)    Ankush K. Sawant – (PW-308) – suffered bleeding injuries due  to
        striking of plastic splinter on his left thigh.

The following doctors have deposed with respect to the injuries suffered  by
the aforestated injured witnesses:
     i) Dr. Vijay Madhav Deshmukh  –  (PW-631)  –  He  is  the  person  who
        prepared the Medical Certificate for PW-408.
    ii) Dr. sunil Raghunath Rai – (PW-633) – He is the person who  prepared
        the Medical Certificates for PWs 409 and 308.
The said witnesses (doctors) proved to have issued the medical  certificates
Exh. 2348 in respect of the above mentioned injuries.

The following claimants have claimed the dead  bodies  of  their  son  (Shri
John Thomas) and cousin sister (Smt. Mamta Surendra  Pilankar)  respectively
who died on account of the explosion at Lucky Petrol Pump:
     i) Thomas Itiyavira Modabamkunnel – (PW-427) and;
   (ii)         Nitin Vasant Parkar – PW-410

Four persons died in  the  blast  that  took  place  at  Shiv  Sena  Bhawan.
Kishore L. Sawant PW-568 – has prepared the Accidental Death Reports  (ADRs)
in respect of the two deceased persons.
     i) Exh. 1967 – ADR No.  19/93  in  respect  of  death  of  Smt.  Mamta
        Surendra Pilankar, cousin sister of Shri Nitin Vasant  Parkar  (PW-
        410).
    ii) Exh. 1971 – ADR No. 42/93 in respect of death of Shri John  Thomas,
        son of Shri Thomas Itiyavira Modabamkunnel (PW-427).
The doctors who prepared the Death Report Certificates  in  respect  of  the
deceased are:
     i) Dr. Walter G. Vaz (PW-476) – prepared the death certificate of John
        Thomas son of Thomas Itiyavira Modabamkunnel (PW-427);
    ii) Dr. Anand P. Desai (PW-477) – prepared  the  death  certificate  of
        Mamta Surendra Pilankar who was  the  cousin  sister  of  Nitin  V.
        Parkar (PW-410).
The articles seized from the scene of the blast  that  took  place  at  Shiv
Sena Bhawan were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory  for  opinion  vide
Exh. 2447 and Exh. 2469.  The FSL Reports received in respect  of  the  said
letters are Exh. 2447-A and Exh. 2448.  The reports prove that the  articles
found at the scene contained traces of  Highly  Explosive  substance  ‘RDX’.
It was further found that the clothes were stained with human blood and  had
traces of RDX as well.  The aforesaid evidence  establishes  the  fact  that
the appellant planted the vehicle bomb at the  site  of  the  explosion  and
massive damage was caused to life and property due to his actions.
Witnesses regarding the incident at the Air India Building:

Deposition of Vilas Vyankatesh Kulkarni (PW-10)
424)  He is an eye-witness to the incident.  He deposed with respect to  the
explosion at Air India  Building  and  the  Ambassador  car  which  exploded
causing damage.
     i) He was the owner of MAFCO Farm Fair Shop.  On 12.03.1993, at  about
        12 noon, while going to his  shop,  he  noticed  a  white  coloured
        ambassador car bearing No. MH -9622 parked  abutting  the  footpath
        and opposite to the footpath at the rear gate of Bank of Oman.   In
        the tunnel, the driver alighted from the car  and  locked  it.   He
        stood near the car and at the same time  noticed  another  Contessa
        Car entering the tunnel from the eastern side in reversed position.
    ii) He also saw a blue coloured Maruti-800 car stopped 5 to 6 feet away
        from him and the person sitting by the side of  the  driver  called
        the driver of  the  white  coloured  Ambassador.   They  then  left
        together in a blue coloured Maruti 800 car.
   iii) Around 2:40 to 2:45 p.m., PW-10 reported hearing a deafening  sound
        from the Air India Building.  He saw the white Ambassador car 5  to
        6 feet up in the air.  He also noticed black smoke rising from  the
        tunnel and heard falling of glass pieces.  After 15 minutes, he saw
        a  big  crater  formed  at  the  place  where  the  white  coloured
        Ambassador Car was parked.
    iv) He also reported that many people were injured and died in the said
        incident.  His shop was also badly damaged and his employees, viz.,
        Ganesh and Joginder sustained minor injuries.
     v) He identified A-16 in the identification  parade  dated  09.04.1993
        conducted by the SEM (PW-462) and again he identified A-16  in  the
        identification parade dated 14.05.1993 conducted by the SEM PW-469.
    vi) He also identified the photographs  of  the  appellant  which  were
        marked as Article Nos. 7 and  8  in  the  parade  dated  15.06.1993
        conducted by SEM PW-469.
425)  It was submitted  by  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  (A-16)  after
reading paragraph Nos. 7, 8 and 14 of his deposition that  witness  was  not
able to identify the accused even after giving more chances to identify  the
accused.  It was furher contended that there  being  only  one  eye-witness,
who also could not identify the accused,  hence,  there  is  no  other  eye-
witness in the case.  It  is  pointed  out  that  the  witness  had  wrongly
identified A-16.  It is submitted that the witness  understood  his  mistake
and informed that he had wrongly identified the accused. It is  relevant  to
mention that the incident took place on 12.03.1993  and  the  identification
was held in the court on 11.10.1995, i.e., after a period of two years,  and
therefore, the witness could not identify A-16.  This  cannot  be  taken  to
discredit the other facts which have been accurately described by him.   The
witness had identified the appellant when the parade was  conducted  by  the
SEM, however, it is only due to lapse of time that  he  could  not  identify
the accused again.
Deposition of Fuldas Yadav Bhoye (PW-321)
      PW-321 was a PSI with Cuffe Parade Police Station at the time  of  the
incident.  He deposed regarding the damage caused to life  and  property  at
the scene of the blast.  He deposed as follows:
(i)   On 12.03.1993, at 3 p.m., he along with PI Chaudhary and  other  staff
      had been to the Air India Building.  He  found  two  cars  burning  in
      front of the Bank of Oman.
(ii)  He further stated in his deposition that  the  entire  atmosphere  was
      surrounded with dense smoke and a crater of size  8x7  feet  had  been
      created in the porch.
(iii) The flooring of the first underground floor also had a similar  crater
      and the second underground floor was visible through the craters  that
      had been formed.
(iv)  The building of the Bank of Oman had been fully  destroyed  and  there
      was substantial damage to the offices  of  Air  India,  Mauritius  and
      Singapore Airlines.
(v)   He further deposed that three cars bearing registration  numbers  BLL-
      904, MH-01-M-5039 and BLN-2933 and motor taxi bearing registration no.
      MMT-3075 were completely burnt, leaving behind only the chassis.
(vi)  The cars parked on the porch of Air India building were also damaged.
(vii)       Six dead bodies were removed and sent to the  JJ  Hospital  with
      the help of firemen.
(viii)      The injured were taken to GT Hospital and the Bombay Hospital.
Deposition of N. Venkatramni (PW-376)
      He was the  Engineer-in-charge  of  Air  India  Building  situated  at
Nariman Point, Bombay.  He found that there was extensive damage  caused  to
Air India Building after the blast  that  occurred  in  front  of  the  said
building.   He  along  with  other  engineers  inspected  the  site.    They
appointed  specialized  valuers  ‘M/s   Sunil   Vora   &   Associates’   for
ascertaining the damage caused to the building.   The  valuers  visited  the
building in April 1993 and gave a report estimating the damage to be to  the
tune of Rs. 1 crore 51 lakhs.
Deposition of Abbas Husseini Rangwala (PW-377)
      He was working with the Bank of Oman at the time of the incident.   He
deposed as follows:
(i)   On 12.03.1993, at 2.40 p.m., he heard a big sound like bomb  explosion
      and the ceiling  and  glass  panels  fell  down.   The  furniture  was
      damaged, computers worth Rs. 10 lakhs were damaged,  air  conditioning
      system was totally damaged and two  vehicles  belonging  to  the  bank
      which were parked in the tunnel were fully damaged causing loss of Rs.
      6 lakhs.
(ii)   The  bank  lost  about  Rs.  2  lakhs  96  thousand  due  to   sudden
      interruption in banking operations.
(iii) Twelve employees of the bank were  injured,  out  of  which  2  ladies
      succumbed to death.  In addition, 3-4 customers of the Bank were  also
      injured.   Three  persons  from  RBI  sustained  injuries  and   later
      succumbed to death.
(iv)  The Bank appointed M/s Bhatavedekar &  Co.,  specialised  valuers,  to
      ascertain the damage caused.  The report of the valuers  assessed  the
      damage to be to the tune of Rs. 50 lakhs.
Other witnesses:
426)  The number of injured people in the blast which took place at the  Air
India Building was 84 and 20 people had died  in  the  said  incident.   The
following injured persons have deposed as witnesses who were present  inside
the Air India building when the blast took place:
(i)   Purshottam Narhar Karmarkar (PW-404)
(ii)  Madhav Pundalik Patkar (PW-405)
(iii) Sadashiv Gopal Pendse (PW-407)
Their deposition may be summarized as under:
(i)   At 2.45 p.m., while waiting  for  lift  in  the  lobby  of  Air  India
      building, they heard the sound of a big explosion which  was  followed
      by a black out.
(ii)  The false ceiling of the lobby collapsed and fell on them.
(iii) PW-404 sustained injury in his leg.
(iv)  PWs 405 and 407 sustained  multiple  injuries  from  splinter  glasses
      also.  They were frightened and immediately left the building.
(v)   Glass splinters pierced on the right side of the body  of  PW-405  who
      was later admitted in Bombay Hospital and  discharged  on  18.03.1993.
      PW-404 and PW-407 were admitted in the casualty ward  of  JJ  Hospital
      and were later shifted to the Hinduja Hospital.  PW-404 was discharged
      on 22/23rd March, 1993 and 3-4 days after that PW-405 was discharged.
The testimonies of these witnesses proves the fact that the  impact  of  the
blast was massive, causing exponential loss to  life  and  property.   These
people were present at the scene of the incident and received  injuries  due
to the blast which occurred at the Air India Building.   The  people  inside
the building were also hurt by the blast and huge loss  was  caused  to  the
property.
Deposition of Dr. Sanjay Rajendra Agarwala (PW-653)
      He was the doctor  at  Hinduja  Hospital  and  deposed  regarding  the
injuries sustained by PW-404 who  was  admitted  in  the  said  hospital  on
13.03.1993.  He deposed that the victim had seven  to  eight  injuries;  his
major injuries included a fracture of left elbow  sustained  in  bomb  blast
occurred on 12.03.1993.  He had to  be  operated  on  and  was  treated  and
discharged on 24.03.1993.  He was  again  admitted  on  02.05.1993  and  was
discharged on  05.05.1993  after  treatment  and  removal  of  foreign  body
‘granuloma’ from the ring finger  of  his  right  hand  and  the  metacarpel
region of neck.


Deposition of Dr. Rajaram Amrut Bhalerao (PW-646)
      He was the doctor at Hinduja Hospital and has deposed regarding PW-407
who was brought to the casualty centre of the said hospital  on  13.03.1993.
He deposed that the injured was having one major injury towards  right  side
of the neck and multiple abrasions on the neck and  face  and  had  suffered
loss of blood.
Deposition of Dr. Rajkumar Patil (PW-635)
      He was the doctor at Bombay Hospital and has deposed regarding PW-405.
 He deposed that the injured witness was brought to the Bombay  Hospital  on
12.03.1993 and examined by one Dr. Gupta.  He was admitted in a place  where
arrangements were made for victims of bomb blasts that had occurred  at  the
Bombay Stock Exchange, Air India Building  and  Zaveri  Bazaar.   Dr.  Patil
reported that PW-405 had been treated at the hospital and was discharged  on
19.03.1993.
Depositions of Sandeep Prakash Bafna (PW-194) and  Prakash  Sanchalal  Bafna
(PW-247)

      At the relevant time, both were working with Hindustan Motors and Hero
Honda Motors respectively.  In the month of January, 1993, Gulam Rasool  (A-
58) of Ujjain (M.P.) had taken the delivery of an  Ambassador  car  for  Rs.
1,84,466/- from Hindustan Motors whose temporary Registration No. was MH-20-
TR-622.  This booking was made through ‘Sulebhai’  (Suleman  Lakdawala  (PW-
365)) of Petrol Pump at Byculla and Shakeel Suleman of Auto  Links.   PW-194
identified  the  photograph  (Article  377-A)  of  Gulam   Rasool   in   the
identification parade held at Police Head Quarters  conducted  by  SEM  Shri
Vichare (PW-247) and also identified the photograph (Article  382-B)  in  an
identification parade held at the office of DCB, CID conducted  by  SEM  PW-
469.  Thus, the place from where the car was purchased was located  and  the
witness identified the person who had bought the car.
Deposition of Suleman Lakdawala (PW-365)
      PW-365 deposed that Shafi Zariwala (AA)  told  him  that  he  required
three new Commander Jeeps  bearing  Registration  Number  of  Gujarat  State
during February/March 1993.  PW-365 contacted Shakeel  Suleman  Hasham,  who
informed that  the  cars  with  Registration  No.  of  Madhya  Pradesh  were
available.  Shafi (AA) agreed to buy those  cars.   Suleman  Lakdawala  also
arranged for one white ambassador car for  Shafi.   This  would  further  be
established by the evidence of PW-366.
Deposition of Shakeel Suleman Hashan (PW-366)
      In his deposition, he stated that he (PW-366) introduced  PW-365  with
the car agency by name ‘Kailash Agencies’. PW-365 taken the  said  car  from
the said agency and delivered it to Shafi Zariwala (AA).
Deposition of Mukhtar Imdad Ahmed PW-281
      PW-281 deposed that he  had  been  asked  by  Shafi  (AA)  to  prepare
cavities in between the rear seat and fuel tank of the white Ambassador  car
bearing Registration No. MH-2Q-TR-622.  It is pointed out that it  was  this
car which was used to cause the explosion outside the  Air  India  building.
It is further pointed out that all these witnesses prove that the car  which
was used by the appellant for the blast was bought by the other  co-accused.
 It has been established that Shafi Zariwala was a close associate of  Tiger
Memon.  The depositions of these witnesses establish the  link  between  all
the evidence leading to the appellant (A-16) and the incident  of  explosion
that took place on 12.03.1993.
Deposition of Ashok Budhavale (PW-614)
      PW-614 was working in the Worli Police Station as an API in  the  year
1993.  It was contended that the police officer did not remember whether  he
had made entries in the station diaries while taking  the  accused  out  for
TIP and while bringing them back.  It was also  contended  that  his  senior
officer PI Pharande had not given him any  written  orders  for  taking  the
accused out of the custody and so the TIP is vitiated as the  procedure  was
not followed.  It is relevant to note regarding the entries to  be  made  in
the diary that the officer had deposed that he did not recollect whether  he
had made the entry or not and with respect to the communication between  the
API and  the  PI,  it  is  pointed  out  that  the  API  had  received  oral
instructions from his superior and there was no requirement of  any  written
orders.
Deposition of Madhukar Baburao Gathade (PW-535)
      In the year 1993, he was attached as a PI with DCB, CID, Unit IX.   In
his deposition, he mentioned that  he  did  not  remember  as  to  how  many
letters of sanctions were sent to  him  by  the  District  Magistrate.   The
counsel for the appellant submitted that he did not grant any  sanction  and
even if he did, the sanction was not granted on due application of  mind  by
the District Magistrate.  It is pointed  out  that  the  deposition  of  the
witness was made on 06.12.1999,  i.e.,  six  and  a  half  years  after  the
incident.  It is not possible for all the  witnesses  to  remember  all  the
details of all the events that took place during the trial.  It  is  further
submitted that the  investigating  officer  had  written  a  letter  to  the
District Magistrate explaining the circumstances in which his  sanction  was
sought to prosecute under the provisions of the Explosive Substances Act.
Deposition of Ramalingam Nadar (PW-349)
      PW-349 acted as a panch witness in the search that  was  conducted  at
the house of A-16.  It was submitted by the counsel for the  appellant  that
the witness did not know  English  and  the  statement  and  panchnama  were
recorded in English  and  the  driving  licence  was  also  in  the  English
language.  It is pointed out that the witness deposed that the document  was
explained to him in Hindi and  he  found  the  contents  to  be  true.   The
contention of the counsel for the appellant stands negatived.
Deposition of Nagesh Lohar (PW-356)
      PW-356 was working with Unit-I of DCB, CID and went to the house of A-
16 when the search was made.  It  was  submitted  by  the  counsel  for  the
appellant that no personal search of the members of the  raiding  party  was
conducted by the panch witness when they went to search the house  of  A-16.
The witness deposed that a personal search was conducted;  however,  he  did
not record it in the panchnama due to oversight.  He  deposed  that  he  did
not realize that it had to be recorded till the time he was  questioned  for
it.
Deposition of Rajan Dhoble (PW-585)
      In the year 1993, he was attached with DCB, CID, Unit-I as a PI.   The
counsel for the appellant submitted that the same person  was  acting  as  a
witness in investigation taking place at two places of incident,  i.e.,  Air
India Building and the  Stock  Exchange  and,  hence,  was  not  a  reliable
witness.  It is pointed out by the other side that there is  no  prohibition
that a Police Inspector cannot investigate two matters at the same time.
Evidence of Witness regarding the incident at the Stock Exchange:

Deposition of Ashok Kamble (PW-24)
427)  PW-24 was a Security Guard at the Bombay Stock Exchange  Building.  He
is an  eye-witness  to  the  incident.   His  deposition  revealed  that  on
10.03.1993, the appellant along with other accused persons had  entered  the
Stock Exchange Building for parking the said red coloured Maruti  1000  car.
PW-24 identified A-16 in the Court at the time of his deposition as well  as
in the TIP dated 11.05.1993 and 08.06.1993 conducted by SEMs PW-458 and  PW-
469 respectively.   In  view  of  the  above,  it  was  submitted  that  the
deposition of PW-24 establishes that the appellant had  been  to  the  Stock
Exchange Building prior to the blasts  for  the  purpose  of  surveying  the
targets.
Deposition of Brijmohan Mehra (PW-458)
      PW-458 was the SEM who conducted the TIP with regard to the accused A-
16 for PW-24.  It was submitted by the counsel for the  appellant  that  the
SEM was neither aware of the guidelines nor he had seen the Rules framed  by
the High Court of Judicature of  Bombay  regarding  the  precautions  to  be
taken by a person conducting the TIP.  It  is  relevant  to  note  that  the
Government of Maharashtra had not issued as  such  any  guidelines  but  had
given the draft memorandum for  Identification  Parade.   Therefore,  it  is
established that the procedure which was required to be followed  was  known
to the SEM and he had conducted it in accordance with the same.
428)  A perusal of the entire evidence above establishes the  guilt  of  the
appellant (A-16). The confession of the appellant gives the  detail  of  all
the important events that took place during the  time  when  the  conspiracy
was in its nascent stage.  The appellant (A-16) was involved in the  landing
of arms and ammunitions and explosives; he went to Pakistan for training  in
using arms and making explosives; attended crucial conspiratorial  meetings;
went to survey the targets;  was  also  present  in  the  meeting  when  the
targets were being finalized; and in  addition  to  all  these  actions,  he
planted explosives laden vehicles at two locations and went  to  survey  the
third location.
429)  All these events have been narrated by the  co-accused  also  and  the
presence of the appellant has been narrated in the confessions of  many  co-
accused including the ones who were an  integral  part  of  the  plan.   The
evidence given by the approver and eye-witnesses also corroborate  the  fact
that the appellant had planted explosives at two locations and had  surveyed
the third place.
430)  The evidence of the approver, the  eye-witnesses,  experts  and  other
witnesses above clearly establish the involvement of A-16 in the  explosions
that took place at the Stock Exchange building, Air India building  and  the
Shiv Sena Bhawan.  It is established that A-16 was an active member  of  the
conspiracy which led to the blasts at various places in  Bombay  and  caused
many deaths, injuries and loss to property.
431)  The evidence given by the  doctors  and  the  family  members  of  the
deceased show the extent of suffering that was inflicted  by  A-16  and  the
other accused in pursuance of the conspiracy.  The quantity of RDX that  was
used in the blasts clearly shows and establishes the fact  that  the  blasts
were intended to tear the economic, moral and social fabric  of  the  nation
and to induce communal tensions.  The involvement of the  appellant  in  the
entire conspiracy establishes the critical role played by him in the  blast.

432)  In view of the above said confessional statement of the appellant  (A-
16), the confessional statements of other co-accused persons,  as  also  the
eye-witnesses along with other witnesses duly examined, the prosecution  has
produced sufficient  evidence  against  the  appellant  to  bring  home  the
charges framed against him.
TERRORISM:

433)  The term “terrorism” is a concept that is commonly and widely used  in
everyday parlance and is derived from the Latin word  “Terror”  which  means
the state of intense fear and submission to  it.   There  is  no  particular
form of terror, hence, anything intended to create terror in  the  minds  of
general public in order to endanger the lives of the members and  damage  to
public property may be termed as a terrorist  act  and  a  manifestation  of
terrorism. Black’s law dictionary defines terrorism as “the  use  of  threat
or violence to intimidate or cause panic,  esp.  as  a  means  of  affecting
political conduct” (8th edition, page 1512).
434)  Terrorism is a global phenomenon in today’s world and India is one  of
the worst victims of terrorist acts.  Terrorism has a long history of  being
used to achieve political, religious and  ideological  objectives.  Acts  of
terrorism can range from  threats  to  actual  assassinations,  kidnappings,
airline hijackings, bomb scares, car bombs, building explosions, mailing  of
dangerous  materials,  computer-based  attacks  and  the  use  of  chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons—weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
435)  The fight against terrorism  requires  a  concerted  and  multifaceted
strategy at both the domestic and international levels and should involve  a
legal order which itself needs to be updated and elaborated upon and  should
hence be turned into a practical tool.  There  exist  several  domestic  and
international  legislations  to  counter  terrorism.   The   Terrorist   and
Disruptive Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1985  (Act  31  of  1985)   which
received the assent of the President on May 23, 1985 and  was  published  in
the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section 1, dated May 23,  1985,  came
into force on May 24, 1985 in the whole of India for a period of two  years.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act reads as follows:
      “Prefatory Note — Statement of Objects and  Reasons.—  Terrorists  had
      been indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting  of  properties  and
      other heinous crimes mostly in Punjab and Chandigarh. Since  the  10th
      May, 1985, the terrorists have  expanded  their  activities  to  other
      parts of the country, i.e. Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan
      as a result of which several innocent lives have been  lost  and  many
      suffered serious injuries. In planting of explosive devices in trains,
      buses and public places, the object to terrorise, to create  fear  and
      panic in the minds of citizens  and  to  disrupt  communal  peace  and
      harmony is clearly discernible. This is  a  new  and  overt  phase  of
      terrorism which requires to be taken serious note of  and  dealt  with
      effectively and expeditiously. The  alarming  increase  in  disruptive
      activities is also a matter of serious concern.”

436)  The Bill as introduced sought to make  provisions  for  combating  the
menace of terrorists and disruptionists, inter alia, to—
       (a)    provide  for  deterrent  punishment  for  terrorist  acts  and
   disruptive activities;

      (b)   confer on the Central Government adequate powers  to  make  such
   rules as may be necessary or expedient for the  prevention  of,  and  for
   coping with, terrorist acts and disruptive activities; and

      (c)   provide for  the  constitution  of  Designated  Courts  for  the
   speedy and expeditious trial of offences under the proposed legislation.

437)  The said Act No. 31 of 1985 was due to expire on May 23, 1987  and  in
order  to  combat  and  cope  with  terrorist  and   disruptive   activities
effectively and to strengthen  it  further,  the  Terrorist  and  Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Act 28 of 1987) was enacted.  Since  both
the Houses of Parliament were not in session and it was  necessary  to  take
immediate action, the President promulgated  the  Terrorist  and  Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987 (2 of 1987) on May  23,  1987  which
came into force w.e.f.  May  24,  1987.  However,  this  Act  repealing  the
Ordinance, received the assent of the President of  India  on  September  3,
1987 and was published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section  1,
dated September 3, 1987. The scheme of the Act 31 of  1985  and  Act  28  of
1987 as reflected from their preambles  is  the  same.  The  scheme  of  the
special provisions of these two Acts were/are “for the  prevention  of,  and
for coping  with,  terrorist  and  disruptive  activities  and  for  matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto”.

 International Conventions

438)  There also exist  several  International  Conventions,  which  aim  to
suppress terrorism and define terrorist acts.  The League  of  Nations  took
the initiative to  formulate  the  first  Global  Convention  on  Preventing
Terrorism and, accordingly, adopted the 1937 Convention for  the  Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism, which defined “acts of terrorism” as:
      “Criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated  to
      create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons,  a  group
      of persons or the general public.”

439)  More recently,  several  International  Conventions  and  Multilateral
Agreements have been entered into by States to curb global  terrorism.   The
International Convention for the Suppression  of  Terrorist  Bombings,  1997
defines the offence of “terrorist bombing” as follows:
      “Article 2.1 – Any person commits an offence  within  the  meaning  of
      this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally  delivers,
      places, discharges or detonates an explosive or  other  lethal  device
      in, into or against a place or  public  use,  a  State  or  government
      facility,  a  public  transportation  system  or   an   infrastructure
      facility:


      a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
      b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction  of  such  a  place,
      facility or system, where such a destruction results in or  is  likely
      to result in major economic loss.”

440)  The United Nations Security Council in its 2004  Resolution  denounced
“terrorist acts” as follows:
      “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent
      to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of  hostages,  with
      the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a
      group of persons or particular persons,  intimidate  a  population  or
      compel a government or an  international  organization  to  do  or  to
      abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope
      of and as defined  in  the  international  conventions  and  protocols
      relating to terrorism,  are  under  no  circumstances  justifiable  by
      considerations of a  political,  philosophical,  ideological,  racial,
      ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”

India’s Contribution in Combating Terrorism
441)   India  has  played  a  major  part  in  strengthening   international
consensus against terrorism in UN,  Non-Aligned  Movement  (NAM)  and  South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).  India  is  a  party  to
major international conventions against terrorism and has also  incorporated
them in  domestic  legislation.   These  conventions  and  treaties  condemn
terrorist acts and expressly state the grave concern posed by terrorism.
Terror Attacks
442)  Another trend common to both national and international  terrorism  is
the  emergence  of  terrorist  groups  motivated  by  religious  fanaticism.
Whenever the perpetrators are  motivated  by  religious  fanaticism  or  had
secular  goals  and  beliefs,  they  become  susceptible  to  the  idea   of
sacrificing their own life for carrying out the will of God, or Allah or  in
waging a ‘holy war’.  It  is  important  to  note  here  that  terrorism  is
abhorred and condemned by  all  the  religions  of  the  world.   Terrorists
conduct planned and coordinated attacks targeting innocent civilians with  a
view to infuse terror in the minds  of  people.   India,  particularly,  has
been a victim on several occasions.  An indicative list of recent  terrorist
attacks on India as furnished by learned  senior  counsel  for  the  CBI  is
provided below:
|S.No. |Date of     |Place of Attack      |No. of Bomb |No. of Persons  |
|      |Attack      |                     |Blasts      |killed          |
|1.    |12.03.1993  |Bombay               |13          |257             |
|2.    |14.02.1998  |Coimbatore           |13          |46              |
|3.    |13.12.2001  |New Delhi            |-           |9               |
|4.    |25.09.2002  |Akshardham           |-           |29              |
|5.    |06.12.2002  |Mumbai (Ghatkopar)   |-           |2               |
|6.    |25.08.2003  |Mumbai (Zaveri       |-           |50              |
|      |            |Bazaar)              |            |                |
|7.    |29.10.2005  |Delhi                |3           |60              |
|8.    |11.07.2006  |Mumbai (Local trains)|-           |209             |
|9.    |25.08.2007  |Hyderabad            |2           |42              |
|10.   |23.11.2007  |Lucknow, Varanasi,   |-           |18              |
|      |            |Faizabad             |            |                |
|11.   |13.05.2008  |Jaipur               |9           |63              |
|12.   |25.07.2008  |Bangalore            |9           |2               |
|13.   |26.07.2008  |Ahmedabad            |21          |56              |
|14.   |13.09.2008  |Delhi                |5           |30              |
|15.   |26.11.2008  |Mumbai               |-           |172             |
|16.   |13.02.2010  |Pune                 |-           |17              |
|17.   |13.07.2011  |Mumbai               |3           |26              |
|18.   |07.09.2011  |Delhi ( outside Delhi|1           |12              |
|      |            |High Court)          |            |                |
|19.   |13.02.2012  |Delhi (Israeli       |Injured Persons              |
|      |            |Embassy Official’s   |4                            |
|      |            |car)                 |                             |



443)  Terrorist attacks are not only limited to India but several  terrorist
attacks  have  also  been  taken  place  in  countries  around  the   world.
Following is a list of select terrorist attacks outside India:
|S.No. |Date of     |Place of Attack      |No. of Bomb  |No. of Persons |
|      |Attack      |                     |Blasts       |killed         |
|1.    |11.09.2001  |NY and Washington DC,|4            |Nearly 3000    |
|      |            |USA                  |             |               |
|2.    |12.10.2002  |Bali, Indonesia      |3            |202            |
|3.    |11.03.2004  |Madrid, Spain        |10           |191            |
|4.    |07.07.2005  |London, England      |4            |52             |


Supreme Court of India on Terrorism:
444)  The Supreme Court of India has also explained the term ‘terrorism’  in
a series of cases.  Provided below are summaries of key cases on  terrorism.
In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,  (1994)  4
SCC 602, one of the key questions for consideration of  this  Court  was  in
relation to the applicability of Section 3(1)  of  TADA.   This  Court  held
that while offences  mentioned  in  Section  3  of  TADA  may  overlap  with
offences mentioned in other statutes, a charge under  Section  3  should  be
made where the offence was committed with  the  intention  as  envisaged  in
Section 3.  This Court further observed:
      “7. ‘Terrorism’ is one of the manifestations of increased  lawlessness
      and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute  a  threat  to  an
      established order and  are  a  revolt  against  a  civilised  society.
      ‘Terrorism’ has not been defined under TADA nor is it possible to give
      a precise definition of  ‘terrorism’  or  lay  down  what  constitutes
      ‘terrorism’. It may be possible to describe it as use of violence when
      its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage
      of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect  it  produces  or
      has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may be
      death, injury, or destruction  of  property  or  even  deprivation  of
      individual liberty in the process but the  extent  and  reach  of  the
      intended terrorist activity travels beyond the effect of  an  ordinary
      crime capable of being punished under the ordinary penal  law  of  the
      land and its main objective is to overawe the  Government  or  disturb
      harmony of the society or “terrorise” people and the society  and  not
      only those directly assaulted, with a  view  to  disturb  even  tempo,
      peace and tranquillity of the society and create a sense of  fear  and
      insecurity. A ‘terrorist’ activity does not merely  arise  by  causing
      disturbance of law and order or of public order. The fall out  of  the
      intended activity must be such that it travels beyond the capacity  of
      the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle it under the  ordinary
      penal law. Experience has shown us that ‘terrorism’  is  generally  an
      attempt to acquire or maintain power or control  by  intimidation  and
      causing fear and helplessness in the minds of the people at  large  or
      any  section  thereof  and  is  a  totally   abnormal   phenomenon…..”
                            (emphasis supplied)


445)  Girdhari Parmanand Vadhava vs. State of  Maharashtra,  (1996)  11  SCC
179 relates to kidnapping of a boy for ransom  and  on  non-payment  of  the
same, the accused persons tortured  and  killed  the  boy.   The  Designated
Court convicted the accused and awarded life sentence.   While  adjudicating
the appeal, it was contended by counsel for the accused persons before  this
Court that kidnapping is not a terrorist activity within the meaning of  the
provisions of TADA.  This Court, while affirming  the  conviction  and  that
the offence committed was a terrorist act, held as under:
      “39. A crime even  if  perpetrated  with  extreme  brutality  may  not
      constitute “terrorist activity” within the meaning of Section 3(1)  of
      TADA. For constituting “terrorist  activity”  under  Section  3(1)  of
      TADA, the activity must be intended to strike terror in  people  or  a
      section of the people or bring about other consequences referred to in
      the said Section 3(1). Terrorist activity is not confined to  unlawful
      activity or crime committed against an individual or  individuals  but
      it aims at bringing about terror in the minds of people or section  of
      people disturbing public order, public peace and tranquillity,  social
      and   communal   harmony,   disturbing   or    destabilising    public
      administration  and  threatening  security  and   integrity   of   the
      country…..
      ….. It is the impact of the crime and its fallout on the  society  and
      the potentiality of such crime in producing fear in the minds  of  the
      people or a section of the people which makes  a  crime,  a  terrorist
      activity under Section 3(1) of TADA. In our view, in the facts of  the
      case, the learned Designated Judge has rightly convicted  the  accused
      for offences under Section 3(1) of TADA  besides  convicting  each  of
      them under Section 120-B and Section 302 read with  Section  120-B  of
      the IPC.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

446)  In State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini &  Ors.,
(1999) 5 SCC 253, this Court, while adjudicating the convictions of  several
accused persons in the case for assassination of Mr.  Rajiv  Gandhi,  former
Prime Minister of India, spelt out  the  ingredients  of  an  offence  under
Section 3(1) of TADA as follows:
      “650. …… A perusal of the provision (Section 3(1)),  extracted  above,
      shows that it embodies the principle expressed in the maxim “actus non
      facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”; both “mens rea” and a criminal act are
      the ingredients of the definition of “terrorist  act”.  The  mens  rea
      required is the intention (i) to overawe  the  Government  as  by  law
      established; or (ii) to strike terror in the people or any section  of
      the people; or (iii) to alienate any section of the people; or (iv) to
      adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people.
      The actus reus should comprise of doing any  act  or  thing  by  using
      bombs,  dynamite  or  other  explosive   substances   or   inflammable
      substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons  or  noxious
      gases  or  other  chemicals  or  by  any  other  substances   (whether
      biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as  to
      cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any  person
      or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction  of,  property  or
      disruption of any supplies or services essential to the  life  of  the
      community, or detaining any person and threatening to kill  or  injure
      such persons in order to compel the Government or any other person  to
      do or abstain from doing any act.”
                                               (emphasis supplied)

447)  In Mohd. Khalid vs. State of West Bengal,  (2002)  7  SCC  334,  while
affirming the decision in appeal, this Court held that it  is  difficult  to
define terrorism in precise terms  and  acknowledged  that  terrorism  is  a
threat to global peace and security.  This Court further observed as under:

      “42. ……..It is not possible to define the  expression  ‘terrorism’  in
      precise terms.   It  is  derived  from  the  word  ‘terror’.   As  the
      Statement of Objects and Reasons leading to enactment of the  TADA  is
      concerned,  reference  to  the  Terrorist  and  Disruptive  Activities
      (Prevention) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Old  Act’)  is
      necessary.  It appears that the intended object of the said Act was to
      deal with persons responsible for escalation of  terrorist  activities
      in many parts of the country.   It  was  expected  that  it  would  be
      possible to control the menace within a period of two years, and  life
      of the Act was restricted to the period of two years fro the  date  of
      its commencement.  But noticing the continuance of menace, that too on
      a larger scale TADA has been enacted.   Menace  of  terrorism  is  not
      restricted to our country, and it has become a matter of international
      concern and the attacks on the World Trade Center and other places  on
      11th September, 2001 amply show it.  Attack on the Parliament on  13th
      December, 2001 shows how grim the situation is, TADA is applied as  an
      extreme measure when police fails to tackle with the  situation  under
      the ordinary penal law.  Whether the criminal act was  committed  with
      an intention to strike terror in the people or section of people would
      depend upon the facts of each case.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)
448)  Nazir Khan & Ors. vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8  SCC  461  pertains  to
prosecution of accused persons involved in kidnapping of  foreign  nationals
and killing of police officers during combat.  While the mastermind of  this
terrorist operation was subsequently released by the government in  exchange
for passengers held as hostages in the hijacked Indian  Airlines  Flight  IC
814, the other accused persons were tried for offences punishable under  the
IPC and TADA.  This Court, while  hearing  their  appeals,  challenging  the
judgment of  Designated  TADA  Court,  which  had  awarded  death  and  life
sentences to certain accused persons, made detailed observations  about  the
nature of terrorist activities and attempted to define  terrorism  and  held
as under:
      “13…. As noted at the outset, it is not possible to  precisely  define
      “terrorism”. Finding a definition of “terrorism” has haunted countries
      for  decades.  A  first  attempt  to  arrive  at  an   internationally
      acceptable definition was made under the League of  Nations,  but  the
      convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence.  The  UN  Member
      States still have no  agreed-upon  definition.  Terminology  consensus
      would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive convention  on
      terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the present  twelve
      piecemeal conventions and  protocols.  The  lack  of  agreement  on  a
      definitio